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ABSTRACT 
Taking the use of the logos in Ratzinger’s Regensburg Lecture as its starting point, the thesis 
expands three horizons in Ratzinger studies. Firstly, it extends the understanding of Ratzinger 
as the author of a logos theology. Secondly, it shows how the Regensburg theme of the full 
breadth of reason, represented by the logos, is applied by Ratzinger in a critique of secular 
modernity. Thirdly, it claims that the logos theology of Joseph Ratzinger can provide a repair 
of the culture of human rights. The thesis argues that if human rights are set exclusively 
within the framework of secular modernity, they fall sick and fail to meet the criterion of 
inclusivity and universality. Set within the framework of a Ratzingerian logos theology, their 
power is strengthened and their promise of inclusivity and universality restored. The thesis 
calls for a mutually reparative dialogue about human rights, based on the full breadth of 
reason, between the three constituencies of Christianity, the religions and secular modernity. 
The thesis concludes that the Regensburg Lecture, far from damaging the dialogue with 
Islam, and with secular modernity, opens up a new intercultural bridge based on a mutually 
enriching engagement with a logos-based culture of human rights. 
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CHAPTER ONE   INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  STARTING POINT: THE REGENSBURG LECTURE 
The Regensburg Lecture provides the starting point and the structure for this thesis. The 
lecture was delivered by Joseph Ratzinger as Pope Benedict XVI on 12 September 2006, in 
the second year of his pontificate. The lecture starts with a controversial discussion of the 
purportedly non-rational, and therefore potentially violent, character of Islamic faith. The 
argument then proceeds through three phases. Firstly, Ratzinger argues that Christianity was 
born out of an inner rapprochement between biblical faith and the logos of Greek rationality.  
This encounter is presented as providential and beneficial, both for Christianity and for the 
wider culture. Ratzinger goes on to make the second, related claim that the encounter with 
Greek rationality is not just a moment in history, but has a permanent significance. As part of 
this second claim Ratzinger laments the successive attempts to remove the logos of Greek 
thought from the tradition of Christian thought, the process called ‘dehellenization.’ The third 
phase proposes that the reinstatement of the concept of the logos has the potential to heal the 
wounds of contemporary culture. The structure of this thesis follows Regensburg by moving 
in the same three phases.  
Part One responds to the first phase of the Regensburg Lecture, where Ratzinger 
argues that Christianity bears within itself a synthesis between biblical faith and Greek 
rationality.  Part One explores the meaning and significance of logos theology in the early 
foundations of Christianity. This involves an examination of the logos in three expressions, in 
Greek thought, in the New Testament and in the Patristic period.   
Part Two responds to the second phase of the Regensburg Lecture, where Ratzinger 
deplores attempts to sunder this synthesis of biblical faith and Greek rationality. Part Two 
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explores the loss of logos theology in the Western intellectual tradition. This involves the dual 
task of exploring the development of the concept of human rights and the development of the 
concept of natural law.  
Part Three responds to the third phase of the Regensburg Lecture, where Ratzinger 
calls for a dialogue of cultures based on a broadening of reason. Part Three explores the 
potential of logos theology to speak to two major debates in contemporary society, the 
strengths and weaknesses of secular modernity and the relationship of Islam to secular 
modernity. 
The subtitle of the Regensburg Lecture is ‘Faith, Reason and the University.’ On the 
one hand, the lecture argues that people of faith must not become divorced from reason, lest 
they lose their right to participate in public discourse and run the risk of condoning violence. 
On the other hand, it argues that secular society must not allow its reasoning to become 
divorced from faith. If it does, it might deprive itself of the wisdom of centuries of tradition, 
find it impossible to build true community and might compromise its capacity for dialogue 
with people of faith. 
This thesis takes the Regensburg argument one step further by bringing the concept of 
human rights to bear on the relationship between the secular and the religious. The thesis 
argues that people of faith must not become divorced from human rights, but that human 
rights must not be deprived of the insights of people of faith. Reason, religion and rights 
therefore form a co-dependant triad, with each of the elements dependant for its health on the 
restraining and enriching presence of the other two.  
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1.2:   THE HEALING OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The concept of human rights, which enjoys such a global charisma, hardly seems to stand in 
need of healing. However, even a brief encounter with the human rights literature soon 
uncovers the three key areas of debate around the concept and culture of human rights. The 
three areas where questions are raised are: the theoretical grounding of human rights, the 
historical roots of human rights, and the cultural universality of human rights. In each of these 
three areas, there is a clear choice and a considerable debate between secular and religious 
perspectives, and between what can be termed ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ theories of rights.  
In a global context characterised by problems of inequality, armed conflict, economic 
crisis, religious divisions and environmental degradation, the human family is searching for 
ways of meeting, and these are often based on the concept of human rights. The aim of this 
research project is to strengthen the concept of human rights as a basis for dialogue between 
secular, Christian and other religious actors. The thesis responds to perceived problems in the 
relationship between each of these three constituencies. 
Secular modernity prefers a ‘thin’ discourse of human rights as positive law, where rights 
are understood as a socio-historical construct, fabricated in response to the contingent 
contexts of the contemporary world. This secular framework of rights has an impressive 
record, especially in terms of the core civil and political rights which have been rendered 
justiciable by legal enshrinement. At the same time, it faces the problem of producing a 
theoretical underpinning of human rights, the practical problem of securing allegiance to the 
doctrine of rights from a pluralist citizenry as well as the problem of its own ongoing 
violations of human rights. 
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The Roman Catholic Church has traditionally sought to uphold a ‘thick’ framework for 
the articulation of the concept of human rights. This religious engagement with rights could 
be said to have an impressive legacy, especially in terms of economic, social and cultural 
rights and their grassroots promotion. At the same time, the Catholic Church faces the same 
challenges as the secular world, of producing a coherent Christian theory of human rights, 
securing genuine commitment to human rights in its adherents and subjecting its own 
doctrines and practices to a critique in the light of the culture of human rights. 
Adherents of the world religions in general, and of Islam in particular, are faced with the 
problem which has already had to be faced by the Roman Catholic Church, of choosing either 
accommodation or resistance to secular modernity’s commitment to the concept of human 
rights. This thesis argues that secular modernity, Christianity and Islam can find common 
ground in the culture of human rights, but that this can only happen if human rights 
themselves are conceived as an expression of unchanging moral truths, derived as a response 
to fundamental truths about the nature of reality and of the human person. The thesis finds in 
the logos theology of Joseph Ratzinger a proposal for the strengthening of human rights 
through a recovery of its philosophical and theological roots in natural law and the dignity of 
the human person. 
1.3: CONTRIBUTION TO RATZINGER STUDIES 
This study makes three contributions to Ratzinger studies: i) it engages critically with 
Ratzinger as theologian of the logos ii) it organizes Ratzinger’s thought into seven key 
themes, all understood within the over-arching theme of the self-limitation of reason, and iii) 
it links Ratzinger to human rights.  
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1.3.1   Ratzinger as theologian of the logos 
The Ratzinger corpus consists of over several hundred published titles, articles and 
allocutions, and the number of themes which can be drawn out from the Ratzinger literature is 
almost unlimited. Relatively few scholars have made the choice to identify Ratzinger as a 
theologian of the logos.1 My study will seek to demonstrate that throughout this body of 
teaching, one theme stands out above all and that is the theme of the logos, so that Ratzinger 
is pre-eminently a theologian of the logos. The central meaning of logos is reason, and 
Ratzinger’s concerns about modernity can be summed up in terms of the loss of the logos and 
the self-limitation of reason. In the Regensburg Lecture (para.17), logos is described as ‘a 
reason that is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as reason.’ The lecture 
uses the term logos thirteen times and ‘reason’ thirty times, all in a call for the broadening of 
reason.2  
1.3.2   Ratzinger as philosopher of rationality  
If there is one overarching story which embraces the entire Ratzinger project, it is this 
persistent critique of the limited rationality of the Enlightenment or of secular modernity. My 
                                                             
1 Two titles, both based on doctoral dissertations, do portray Ratzinger as a theologian of the Logos or Word. 
These are Christopher S. Collins, The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict 
XVI, (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2013), and John J. Lynch, The Logos as Reason, Word and Love in the 
Theology of Joseph Ratzinger, self-published work available from https://www.amazon.co.uk. The centrality of 
the Logos has also been highlighted by Marc. D. Guerra, Liberating Logos: Pope Benedict XVI’s September 
Speeches, (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2014) and by David G. Bonagura, ‘Logos to Son in the 
Christology of Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI’, New Blackfriars, Vol.93, Issue 1046, July 2012, pp.475 – 488. 
2 Throughout the thesis, logos (lower case) will be used when referring to logos as rationality, and Logos (upper 
case) will be used when referring to Logos as Divine Word. Both forms will be italicized. In quotations from 
sources, whatever form was used in the original text will be preserved. In the phrase ‘logos theology’, logos will 
be used with lower case, even though Ratzinger’s logos theology incorporates logos in both its Greek 
philosophical mode as rationality and its Judaeo-Christian theological mode as Divine Word. The Johannine 
logos will also be referred to with lower case. 
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thesis holds that Ratzinger’s overarching theme is the loss of the logos and the self-limitation 
of reason. This self-limitation of reason will be explicated in this thesis in terms of seven key 
themes, understood as seven self-limitations or losses, which emerge from the Regensburg 
Lecture and which provide the structure for the thesis. 
1.3.3 Ratzinger as theorist of human rights  
The Ratzinger literature is not associated with human rights and contains no sustained 
reflection on human rights. It could be argued that the overall tenor of Ratzinger’s doctrinal 
programme is inimical to the concept of human rights, given that Ratzinger is critical of 
aspects of modernity, and human rights are a key product of modernity. This study, however, 
argues that Ratzinger offers significant purifications to the theology and philosophy of human 
rights, providing the groundwork for future development and application of the human rights 
framework and releasing the potential of human rights discourse as a meeting point between 
secular society, the Christian faith, the religions in general, and Islam in particular.  
Speaking from the religious perspective, Ratzinger raises important questions for each of 
the three problematic areas of the culture of human rights. Thus, in terms of the theoretical 
grounding of human rights, he questions whether we can base our lives on values that have no 
firm foundation. In terms of the historical roots of human rights, he questions whether we can 
live in denial of our Christian past. In terms of the cultural universality of human rights, he 
questions whether we can create a true dialogue of cultures without any reference to faith. 
Ratzinger’s answers to these three questions can be captured by the theological term, the 
logos. In brief, in terms of theoretical grounding, he is convinced that our values are most 
secure when they are grounded in the logos. In terms of historical roots, Ratzinger wants to 
say that the deepest values of our cultures have come from the logos. In terms of the cultural 
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universality of human rights, he is adamant that only the values that are grounded in the logos 
can achieve the universality required to speak effectively in the dialogue of cultures.  
1.4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
1.4.1 Ontology, epistemology and ethics 
From the discipline of philosophy this study will refer repeatedly to the primordial tripartite 
framework of ontology, epistemology and ethics. Ontology poses the question of what is at 
the root of reality, existence or being. Epistemology poses the question of what we can know 
and how we can know it. Ethics raises the question of what we should do and how we should 
live. The use of this framework has three purposes.  
Firstly, it is a straightforward strategy for the organisation of material. The purpose 
here is to bring clarity to both theological and philosophical understandings of the concept of 
the logos, as well as to the positions of the various theologians and philosophers encountered 
in the course of discussion, assisting the reader to understand when these theologians and 
philosophers are making ontological points, when they are making epistemological points and 
when they are making ethical points. It is intended that the thought-processes and arguments 
of the Regensburg Lecture become clearer when read through this tripartite lens. 
Secondly, it is a framework which is particularly appropriate for the study of Joseph 
Ratzinger in general and of the Regensburg Lecture in particular. At Regensburg, and 
repeatedly elsewhere, Ratzinger critiques the self-limited nature of the rationality of 
enlightened modernity and proposes a broadening of reason or rationality as a healing of the 
dialogue of cultures and by implication of human rights. The thesis seeks to clarify what 
Ratzinger means by rationality by analysing it in terms of ontology, epistemology and ethics. 
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It seeks to demonstrate that the broadening of reason proposed by Ratzinger at Regensburg is 
primarily a broadening of epistemology, so that Ratzinger invites modernity to increase its 
knowledge by going beyond the limitations of empirical epistemology and entertaining the 
insights of faith. While I acknowledge that the threefold framework is not deployed explicitly 
or self-consciously by Ratzinger, I maintain that one of the central themes of his output, the 
broadening of reason, is best understood when broken down into these three crucial areas. 
Thirdly, it is a framework which is appropriate for an engagement with human rights. 
Human rights are generally proposed as free from any contentious epistemological and 
ontological presuppositions. In other words, we do not need to concern ourselves with how 
we know them or what they are. This is often regarded as a strength, on the grounds that their 
ontological and epistemological indeterminacy renders them cross-culturally inclusive. It will 
be argued that the ontological and epistemological deficits in human rights theory can lead to 
loss of conviction in the dialogue of cultures and render human rights less, rather than more 
inclusive. 
The framework will be deployed with an awareness of the potential pitfall that, given the 
fact that they exist in a dynamic of interdependence, the separation of ontology, epistemology 
and ethics could be construed as a rigid and artificial imposition which distorts rather than 
clarifies. As has been suggested, emphases and approaches in one area will have significant 
implications for the other two.  By refusing to engage in questions of ontology, modernity’s 
epistemology, in Ratzinger’s view, produces distorted or limited theories of ethics. In 
response to this problem, it is important to clarify the nature of the relationship between the 
three areas by coming to a view on which of the three has priority. 
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My answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand I acknowledge that epistemology 
will always be the fulcrum around which the other two aspects will hinge, in the sense that 
epistemology will always be the starting point and the end-point for any inquiry into human 
rights and the relationship between faith and reason, the subject of the Regensburg Lecture. 
As soon as we ask about the ethical content, or the ontological nature of human rights, we 
come up against the epistemological question of the source of our knowledge of these rights. 
At the same time, a restoration of ontological considerations, a revival of transcendence and a 
recovery of Being are such prominent features of so much of Ratzinger’s output, and of the 
Regensburg Lecture, that I believe that Ratzinger’s thought will not be distorted if his material 
is organized with ontology as a starting point. The most important point here is not to start 
with ethics, since in Ratzingerian theology logos always precedes ethos, but to start with the 
ontological and the epistemological. We will arrive at an appropriate reconciliation or 
synthesis of this problematic, as soon as we understand that, if the ground of all being is self-
communicative, is logos, then ontology and epistemology are contained in each other.  
1.4.2  Exclusivism and inclusivism 
The threefold conceptual paradigm of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism is well 
established as a framework developed by Christian theologians in order to clarify what is the 
appropriate relationship between Christianity and other religions. Because this paradigm, as 
originally formulated, is predicated on soteriological, ecclesiological and Christological 
concerns, it may not seem relevant to a study of human rights. I will use these terms more 
loosely to help us to understand the function of the culture of human rights in its relationship 
to other cultures. I take exclusivism as the view that I am right and others are wrong, 
inclusivism as the view that I am right and others are partially right and can be included in my 
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stance, pluralism as the view that we are all equally right or indeed equally wrong. Central to 
the paradigm is a concern with truth and with the relationship between global religious 
cultures, and this is highly relevant to the issue of human rights. The culture of human rights 
has always been presented as inclusive and universal. 
Ratzinger’s logos theology of human rights emerges from a Christian, specifically a 
Catholic, perspective, but sees itself as a tool both for a critique of, and an engagement with, 
the belief systems of secular modernity and of the religious cultures. Central to Ratzinger’s 
theology is a defence of the possibility of truth and its presence in the Christian tradition. It is 
therefore important to examine whether Ratzinger approaches human rights in exclusivist, 
inclusivist or pluralist modes. The Regensburg Lecture in particular, alongside Ratzinger’s 
theology in general, is often perceived negatively as unacceptably exclusivist. The culture of 
human rights, by contrast, is generally perceived positively as inclusivist.  
Applied to the issue of human rights, the threefold paradigm calls into question how 
the Christian, or specifically the Catholic, view of rights relates to secular and other religious 
views of rights. If Ratzinger is adopting an exclusivist stance, then he is proposing that in the 
concept of the logos can be found the whole truth about rights, dignity and justice. If he is 
inclusivist, then secular modernity and the other religions are in possession of the partial truth 
about rights, dignity and justice, which can then be brought to its fullness by the Christian or 
Catholic understanding. If his approach is pluralist, then no single understanding of human 
rights is the complete one; all approaches are in possession of precious insights about rights, 
dignity and justice and all could be enriched by an encounter with the other. 
This thesis will portray Ratzinger’s stance on human rights as one of ‘open 
inclusivity’. By this I mean that Ratzinger stands firmly in the truth of his own tradition, 
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expects that tradition to provide a critique of other traditions, both secular and religious, but is 
open to his own tradition being purified and modified through encounter with other traditions, 
both secular and religious. It is on this basis that I will claim that Ratzinger’s logos theology 
offers an inclusive approach to the presentation of human rights, and will contrast this with 
the exclusive tendency of secular liberal modernity. 
1.4.2 Personal background 
My own theological background is that of the Roman Catholic tradition. It is because of my 
Catholic background that the theology of Joseph Ratzinger commands my attention and 
engagement, especially in the light of his elevation to the papacy and his eight-year period of 
leadership of the Roman Catholic faithful. I will seek throughout the thesis to place some 
distance between myself and Ratzinger, by bringing as many voices as possible into the 
conversation so that Ratzinger’s thought can be subjected to a genuinely critical engagement. 
The study provides me with an opportunity to revisit my first degree in Classics by 
studying the relevant Greek and Latin texts in the original. It also affords me the opportunity 
to harmonise and reconcile my classical studies with my theological studies and to bring both 
strands to fulfilment. 
1.5   STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS AND SEVEN KEY THEMES 
The main body of the thesis consists of seven chapters, Chapters 3 – 9. The subject of each of 
these seven chapters is a variation on the overarching Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of 
reason. These seven chapters are organized within three parts of the thesis. 
Part One of the thesis is called ‘Foundations of logos theology’ and contains three 
chapters, Chapters Three, Four and Five. It explores three foundations of logos theology in 
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the form of Greek thought, as exemplified by Plato, the scriptures, as exemplified by the 
Prologue to the Fourth Gospel and the Fathers, as exemplified by Justin Martyr. 
The first key theme is the self-limitation of reason through the loss of transcendence. This 
is explored in Chapter Three, ‘The Greek logos and the Hellenization of Christianity.’ The 
second key theme is the self-limitation of reason through the loss of the concept of creation. 
This is explored in Chapter Four, ‘The Johannine logos and the Hellenization of Judaism.’ 
The third key theme is the self-limitation of reason through the loss of the synthesis of faith 
and reason. This is explored in Chapter Five, ‘The logos theology of Justin Martyr.’ 
Part Two of the thesis is called ‘Restoring the logos to the culture of human rights’ and 
contains two chapters, Chapters Six and Seven. This part of the thesis explores two losses 
which occurred in the intellectual history of Western thought. The concept of human rights 
emerged from a theological voluntarism which resulted in a self-limitation of reason and a 
severance of the link with the divine. In a parallel development, a further self-limitation of 
reason occurred when natural law became untethered from its classical roots in Greek 
philosophy and Catholic theology. The fourth key theme of the thesis is the theme of the self-
limitation of reason through the loss of the Christian past. This is explored in Chapter Six, 
‘The Genealogy of Human Rights.’ The fifth key theme is the self-limitation of reason 
through the loss of the classical tradition of natural law. This is explored in Chapter Seven, 
‘Ratzinger, Natural Law and Rights.’  
Part Three of the thesis is called ‘The logos at work in the dialogue of cultures’ and 
contains two chapters, Chapters Eight and Nine. The sixth key theme is the self-limitation of 
reason through the loss of the voice of religion in the public square. This is explored in 
Chapter Eight, ‘Ratzinger, Democracy and Public Reason.’ This chapter explores the crisis of 
cultures caused by totalizing theories of secularization which seek to secure social and 
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political harmony through a deliberate self-limitation of reason which confines religion to the 
private sphere. The seventh key theme is the self-limitation of reason through the loss of the 
philosophical tradition in Islam. This is explored in Chapter Nine, ‘Ratzinger, Islam and 
Rights.’ This chapter explores the possibility that a self-limitation of reason has taken place in 
Islam, resulting in totalizing theories of religious truth which seek social, political, religious 
and cultural harmony by rejection of the culture of human rights.   
Thus through an exploration of seven losses, understood as seven modes of self-limitation, 
it will be argued, the ‘Ratzinger Project’ comes into focus and displays its significance for the 
culture of human rights. 
Chapter Two will provide a way in to the main body of the thesis by setting out the 
nature and significance of the relationship between Ratzinger, reason and rights. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTRODUCING RATZINGER, REASON AND RIGHTS 
‘the subjective “conscience” becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, 
ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal 
matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity.’ 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will argue that human rights, when solely framed within modernity’s restricted 
rationality, are not genuinely inclusive, nor truly universal. They fail to defend the dignity of 
the human person or to critique the law. Human rights proposed by a logos theology rest on 
reason and revelation. This broader epistemology gives access to a deeper ontology of the 
human person and a more enduring foundation for human dignity. 
The relationship between Ratzinger and rights has received relatively little attention in 
the Ratzinger literature.2 The aim of this chapter is to make good this deficiency by clarifying 
the Ratzinger position on human rights. The starting point for this chapter is the invitation in 
the Regensburg Lecture to a dialogue of cultures based on the use of the full breadth of 
reason. The chapter will be confined almost exclusively to one document, Christianity and the 
                                                             
1 The Regensburg Lecture, paras.48-49. Paragraph references for the Regensburg Lecture throughout the thesis 
will be taken from the version provided in Appendix I in James V. Schall, The Regensburg Lecture, (South 
Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007), pp.130-148. 
2 Taking four distinguished studies of Ratzinger’s theology, Nichols (2007) contains no reference to human 
rights, Rowland (2008) two references, Twomey (2007) three references and Rourke (2011) eight references. 
Rowland (p.119.) connects human rights to natural law, while Twomey (p.106.) understandably links human 
rights to conscience, the overarching theme of his treatment. Rourke’s comprehensive treatment of the social and 
political thought of Ratzinger links human rights to the Ratzingerian themes of natural law (pp.53-54.), 
democracy (p.57.), the right to life (p.92.), reason (p.97.), truth (p.134.) the environment (p.136.). 
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Crisis of Cultures.3  This document contains Ratzinger’s explicit teaching on human rights 
and sets it in a framework of the themes that make his teaching on human rights intelligible 
and which also inform what we might call the ‘Ratzinger project.’4 This chapter is based on 
the premise that Ratzinger’s concerns about human rights can only be understood in the 
context of the network of concerns which recur repeatedly throughout his theological output. 
Examining Ratzinger’s treatment of human rights therefore fulfils a second aim, to bring the 
themes of the Ratzinger corpus into a coherent and intelligible whole.  
Ratzinger has famously stated ‘I have never tried to create a system of my own, an 
individual theology.’5 In the same breath he does suggest that ‘God is the real central theme of 
my work’ and quickly supplements this with ‘the concept of truth.’6 The volume of his work, 
its diffuse, repetitive interconnectedness, its multi-faceted diversity and its provisional, 
fragmentary character all create challenges for Ratzinger scholars. Despite Ratzinger’s 
protestations, I insist that it is appropriate a) to try to discern (not to impose) an overall 
guiding principle or hermeneutic key with which to unlock the riches of his work, and b) to 
try to appreciate and define the individual character of this highly distinctive theologian.  
                                                             
3 Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, trans. Brian McNeil, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2006). This text contains the Subiaco Address, delivered at the Convent of St. Scholastica, 
Subiaco, 1st April 2005, on the day before Pope John Paul II died. There is an introduction by Marcello Pera, 
Ratzinger’s atheist interlocutor in Without Roots. See J. Ratzinger and M. Pera, trans. M.F.Moore, Without 
Roots: the West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam, New York: Basic Books, 2006. A further address is appended, 
called The Right to Life, delivered at the School of Catholic Culture in Santa Croce, in Bassano, shortly before 
Ratzinger’s election to the Papacy. Adrian Walker’s alternative translation of the Subiaco Address can be found 
in Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 156-165 and in David L. 
Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy, Joseph Ratzinger in Communio, Vol.2, Anthropology and Culture, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), pp. 188-199, where it is titled ‘Europe in the Crisis of Cultures.’ Weigel explains 
that Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures was introduced at a conference at the United Nations, co-sponsored 
by Ignatius Press, Edizioni Cantagalli, the Path to Peace Foundation, and the Sublacense Life and Family 
Foundation. See George Weigel, Review of Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, Ethics and Public Policy 
Center. Available at: http://eppc.org/publications/on-christianity-and-the-crisis-of-cultures/ (Accessed: 10 
November 2015). 
4 With eight references, Rourke is the author who has made most extensive use of Christianity and the Crisis of 
Cultures. See Thomas R. Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI, (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2011). 
5 J. Ratzinger, trans. Adrian Walker, Salt of the Earth - The Church at the End of the Millennium: An Interview 
with Peter Seewald, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p.66. 
6 Ibid., p.67. 
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As stated in the introduction, I present the theme of the self-limitation of reason as the 
major overarching theme that incorporates all the other themes, and this constitutes the 
‘Ratzinger project’, the broadening of reason.  This theme of reason is also the theme of God 
as well as the theme of truth. No matter what subject he discusses, the theme of the self-
limitation of reason will always be there, so his approach to human rights cannot be fully 
explained without an appreciation of this theme. 
The chapter will show how Ratzinger deploys his logos theology both to endorse and 
critique human rights. It will situate this endorsement and critique in the wider context of the 
Ratzingerian endorsement and critique of modernity. 
2.1: THE LOGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In a key passage in Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger says Christianity must 
always remember that it is ‘the religion of the Logos’ and that belief in this logos, the 
ontology of everything, gives Christianity ‘its philosophical power’.7 Either the world comes 
from an irrational source, (often considered the only rational and modern view), or it comes 
from reason, ‘so that its criterion and its goal is reason.’ Christianity chooses this second 
thesis ‘and has good arguments to back it up, even from a purely philosophical point of view.’ 
A reason that comes from the irrational ‘does not offer a solution to our problems.’ 
Ratzinger’s ‘reason’ or ‘logos’ is not just the rationality at the root of the human person, in 
which dignity resides, but the divine Logos, the Creator Spiritus. ‘Only that creative reason 
which has manifested itself as love in the crucified God can truly show us what life is.’8 I note 
                                                             
7 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.49. 
8 Ibid., p.49. Rourke (p.34) says that ‘this understanding of reason will be telling in the entire development of 
Benedict’s thought on the subject of politics.’ 
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here how one sentence has brought together four cornerstones of Ratzinger’s Christological 
emphasis:  reason, love, the cross, and God.9 
This passage can be re-worked to provide an accurate representation of the Ratzinger 
position on the theoretical grounding of human rights. Belief in the logos, the ontology of 
everything, gives the concept of human rights its philosophical power. Either human rights 
come from an irrational source, as a mere by-product of the struggle for survival and power, 
often considered the only rational and modern view, or they come from reason, so that their 
criterion and goal is reason. A concept or culture of human rights that has its origin in the 
irrational does not offer a solution to the crisis of cultures. Only that creative reason, which 
has created the human person in the image of its own rationality, and which has manifested 
itself in the person of Jesus Christ, whose sacrifice on the cross is a sign of God’s love for 
humanity, can truly show us what human rights are. Herein lies both an endorsement and a 
critique of human rights, a critique of ‘the only “rational” and modern view’.10  
If the term logos is as important as Ratzinger claims it is, then a primary and 
foundational task for this thesis will be to return to the sources of the concept of the logos. We 
need to examine critically the appropriateness of Ratzinger’s characterization and deployment 
of the concept, but also to evaluate the potential significance of Ratzingerian ‘logos theology’ 
for the repair of the concept of human rights. The first three chapters of the thesis will 
therefore be dedicated to a patient listening to the foundational sources of the logos. In 
Chapter One it was suggested that there were three areas of uncertainty in the concept of 
human rights: theoretical grounding, historical roots, and cultural universality. I will now visit 
                                                             
9 De Gaál is the author who has done most to elucidate the Christological emphasis at the heart of Ratzingerian 
thought. See Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010). 
10 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.49. 
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each of these areas of discussion, in order to elucidate Ratzinger’s essentially positive 
orientation towards human rights. 
2.2:  THE RATZINGER ENDORSEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
2.2.1 Theoretical grounding of human rights  
In a key statement Ratzinger calls for support for the Universal Declaration:  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed by almost all the countries of the 
world in 1948 in the aftermath of the terrible ordeal of the Second World War, 
expresses fully (even in its title) the awareness that human rights – the most 
fundamental of which is, of course, the right to life itself – belong to man by nature; 
that the state recognizes them but does not in fact confer them; and that they are 
applicable to all men as such, not because of other secondary characteristics of 
particular individuals, which others would be entitled to define at their pleasure.11 
We note that Ratzinger deliberately distances himself from any Hobbesean account, where 
rights are granted by the sovereign power as it seeks to referee society’s warring factions.  He 
sides to some extent with the approach taken by the Enlightenment’s rights philosophers such 
as Rousseau, who uphold the pre-political nature of human rights. This move is essential if 
rights are to be considered inalienable. He also relates human rights to human nature, not to 
human qualities, an essential move if rights are to be regarded as universal. He also sees the 
historical achievement of the Universal Declaration as emerging as an aftershock from the 
human rights violations of the 1930s and 1940s.  
Ratzinger proposes a clear theological rationale for human rights: ‘the splendour of the 
fact that he is the image of God – the source of his dignity and his inviolability.’12  
Christianity ‘has always defined men – all men without distinction – as creatures of God, 
                                                             
11 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, pp.63-64. 
12 Ibid., p.26. 
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made in his image, proclaiming the principle that they are equal in dignity.’ Human rights 
represent a moral truth, ‘the truth of the unique and unrepeatable value of this person made in 
the image of God’, a truth which inevitably involves some restriction on the rights and 
freedoms of others.13 At the same time Ratzinger is realistic about the practical application of 
the principle of dignity, which must be ‘within the given limits of societal order’.14 Because 
he believes in this theoretical underpinning of human rights, Ratzinger is happy to see the 
Christian task of ‘announcing the dignity of man and the duties of respecting life that flow 
from this dignity’ as synonymous with ‘the task of proclaiming the good news of the faith’.15 
We can say that Ratzinger has an ontology of human rights, a theory about the essence of 
human rights, based on an ontology of the human person.   
An acceptance of Ratzinger’s proposal that the dignity of the human person provides 
the theoretical grounding of human rights begs the question of the theoretical underpinning of 
this dignity. To some extent he answers this with the concept of the human person made in the 
image of God. He also answers it with the idea that human rights ‘belong to man by nature’. 
This belief in human nature raises the question of natural law as a theoretical underpinning for 
human rights. The story of the part played by natural law in the theology of Ratzinger and in 
the theory of human rights will be examined in Chapter Seven. 
2.2.2   Historical origins of human rights 
When Ratzinger refers to human rights, it is often in a list of those aspects of ‘the 
Enlightenment culture’ which he considers we should welcome as Christians.16 Rather than 
                                                             
13 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.66. 
14 Ibid., p.48. 
15 Ibid., p 72. 
16 Rourke (p.36) suggests that Ratzinger’s positive comments about the Enlightenment in Christianity and the 
Crisis of Cultures should be understood in the wider context of the Roman Catholic debate about Gaudium et 
Spes and its attempt to reposition Enlightened modernity and Roman Catholicism in a fruitful relationship. 
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talk about rights themselves, Ratzinger prefers to think about the ‘values’ underlying rights. 
In Crisis of Cultures, he accepts ‘that a new moralism exists today. Its key words are justice, 
peace, and the conservation of creation.’17 Ratzinger is being genuinely positive: ‘these are 
words that recall essential values, of which we genuinely stand in need.’ However, I sense a 
cautious note in the term ‘moralism,’ almost implying a pseudo-morality. The word ‘recall’ is 
also interesting, suggesting perhaps that words like ‘justice’ and ‘peace’ bear a different 
meaning today from the one they held in the past. The important point here is that Ratzinger is 
positive about the achievements of Western liberalism, and that this includes the entire 
structure of liberty, equality, non-discrimination, which provide the natural habitat in which 
the culture of human rights can thrive. This raises the question of the sources of these values. 
‘Thin’ theories see rights as the result of pragmatic power plays and political compromise. 
‘Thick’ theories see them emerging from deeper and more historical values, particularly from 
Christianity. The Enlightenment for Ratzinger has a Christian origin and ‘it is not by chance 
that it was born specifically and exclusively within the sphere of the Christian faith.’18 For 
human rights to regain their charisma and their moral persuasiveness, we need to re-narrate 
their true origin in the genealogy of cultures, so that we can get back behind modernity and 
recover their true greatness. 
Ratzinger consistently shows that he is a keen supporter of the key cornerstones of 
liberal modernity’s democratic settlement, explicitly approving of religious freedom, the 
religious neutrality of the state, freedom of speech, parliamentary democracy, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Ratzinger has devoted considerable energy to critiquing the theology of Gaudium et Spes. See ‘The Struggle 
Over Schema XIII’ in Theological Highlights of Vatican II, trans. H. Traub, G.C. Thormann and W. Barzel.  
(New York: Paulist Press, 1966), pp.212 – 244 and Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a 
Fundamental Theology, trans. Sr. M.F. McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), pp. 378-393. 
Ratzinger’s position with regard to Gaudium et Spes is subjected to a thorough discussion in Rowland, ‘Gaudium 
et Spes and the Importance of Christ’, Chapter Two of Ratzinger’s Faith, pp.30 – 47. See also my own brief 
discussion of what I call ‘the Ratzinger ambivalence’ below, p.30ff. 
17 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.27. 
18 Ibid., p.48. 
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independence of the judiciary. He places all these in the context of human rights, ‘the 
protection of the rights of man and the prohibition of discrimination,’ all of which are 
gathered under the banner of ‘the rights to liberty.’19 He is reluctant to descend into the detail 
of particular rights or the values that underpin them: 
I do not intend to provide an exhaustive list of the contents of this canon of the 
Enlightenment culture. It is obvious that it contains important values that are essential 
for us, precisely as Christians, and we do not wish to do without them.20 
The Enlightenment has a Christian origin, but because Christianity became ‘mere tradition’ 
and entwined with political power ‘the voice of reason had become excessively tame.’ In a 
statement of considerable significance Ratzinger shows his genuine respect and even gratitude 
towards the Enlightenment: 
It was and remains the merit of the Enlightenment to have drawn attention afresh to 
these original Christian values and to have given reason back its own voice.21 
 
2.2.3   Universality of human rights 
As part of his appreciation of the Enlightenment, we hear Ratzinger championing one right in 
particular, which he believes Christianity contributed to the Enlightenment; Christianity 
‘denied the government the right to consider religion as part of the order of the state, thus 
stating the principle of liberty of faith.’22  This right to religious freedom is of enormous 
importance to Ratzinger, and a crucial issue in the dialogue with Islam. 
Together with the right to religious freedom, Ratzinger gives pre-eminence to the right 
to life and the theme of the sanctity of life brings us naturally to Ratzinger’s reservations 
about modernity which are also reservations about rights. The Ratzinger project is conducted 
                                                             
19 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.34. 
20 Ibid., p.35. 
21 Ibid., p.48. 
22 Ibid., p.48. 
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not primarily to restore an enervated Christianity, but as a pastoral duty to the wider world: 
‘we are taking seriously our tremendous responsibility for humanity today.’23 
According to Ratzinger, the values that underlie human rights are justice and peace, 
but he has three reservations about these grand values. Firstly, they are vague, secondly they 
are used as slogans in party politics, thirdly, they are always conceived as claims upon others, 
‘rather than a personal duty in our own life.’24 Here we see a positive component of 
Ratzinger’s teaching on human rights, that they must always be presented and understood 
within a corresponding framework of duties.25 The ‘dignity of man’ involves the ‘duties of 
respecting life.’26 He expresses this reciprocity of rights eloquently when he says, 
The way I look at the other is decisive for my own humanity. I can treat him quite 
simply like a thing, forgetting my dignity and his, forgetting that both he and I are 
made in the image and likeness of God. The other is the custodian of my dignity. This 
is why morality, which begins with this look directed to the other, is the custodian of 
the truth and the dignity of man.27 
In this sense, the universality of rights lies not just in their rationality but in their relationality. 
For Rourke, this is the very essence of Ratzinger’s theological anthropology.28 
 
                                                             
23 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.32. 
24 Ibid., p.28. In her Chapter 6, ‘Modernity and the Politics of the West’, Rowland quotes extensively from this 
passage of Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures. The term ‘values’ is endlessly elastic and open to abuse, and 
is a poor substitute for binding ethical norms. See Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, p.115, quoting from Christianity 
and the Crisis of Cultures, pp.28-29. 
25 The theme of the co-dependence of rights and duties is fully explored by Ratzinger as Benedict XVI: 
‘Individual rights, when detached from a framework of duties which grants them their full meaning, can run 
wild, leading to an escalation of demands which is effectively unlimited and indiscriminate. An overemphasis on 
rights leads to a disregard for duties. Duties set limits on rights because they point to the anthropological and 
ethical framework of which rights are a part, in this way ensuring that they do not become licence. Duties 
therefore reinforce rights and call for their defence and promotion as a task to be undertaken in the service of the 
common good.’ See Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate: Encyclical Letter on Integral Human Development in 
Charity and Truth, (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2009), p.53 (para.43). 
26 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.72. 
27 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
28 Rourke (p.18.) is struck by Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures pp.112-116, where Ratzinger identifies a 
series of walls; one separating me from my true self, one separating me from others, one separating me from the 
world as it is intended by God, one separating me from the memory of God inside me. 
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2.3:   THE RATZINGER CRITIQUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
This section will highlight eight ‘-isms’ of modernity against which Ratzinger repeatedly 
inveighs. These will be placed within the threefold framework of ontology, epistemology and 
ethics, which provides a conceptual framework for the thesis.  If modernity’s engagement 
with ethics has gone wrong, then there must be something wrong with modernity’s 
epistemology. If modernity’s epistemology is mistaken, it must be based on a false ontology. 
The essential Ratzingerian task then is to re-propose the ancient ontological tradition of 
reason’s capacity to understand and grasp divine being. 
2.3.1   Modernity’s mistaken ontology  
Part One of the thesis, Chapters 3, 4 and 5, will be devoted to a recovery of an ontology of the 
human person that was there in the Greek inheritance, in the biblical witness and in the 
foundational period of Patristic thought and doctrine. Here we will encounter the theme of the 
self-limitation of reason through three Ratzingerian themes of loss: loss of transcendence, 
(Plato) loss of creation, (John) and loss of the synthesis of faith and reason (Justin). We can 
only understand Ratzinger’s critique of the theoretical underpinning of human rights if we 
place it in the context of this wider lament of modernity’s self-limitation through the loss of 
ontology. Ratzinger’s analysis of modernity’s loss of ontology can be explicated in four 
interconnected ideologies: materialism, exclusive humanism, atheism and agnosticism.  
Materialism wants to analyse ‘isolated fragments of reality that we might in some way 
take in our hands, verify experientially, and then master.’29 But this ignores that which 
‘exercises its lordship over us and over the whole of reality’.30 Ratzinger asks us not to ignore 
                                                             
29 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.89. 
30 Ibid., p.89. 
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the question of ‘the very foundation of all rationality’, ‘the foundations of everything,’ ‘the 
depths of being.’31  
Materialistic humanism represents the reduction of the ontology of man to a thing, not 
the image of God, which Ratzinger has said is the source of human dignity, but ‘nothing more 
now than the image of man.’32 Deprived of transcendence, man can ‘lose his dignity in the 
world of things.’33 Modernity’s ‘emancipation of man’ is Ratzinger’s ‘mutilation of man’, the 
‘total exclusion of God, leading to the ‘annihilation of man.’34 When we encounter another 
human person, we cannot penetrate his true ontology, ‘the vast expanses of his spirit,’ the 
‘totality of his being.’35 Ratzinger’s real objection to the philosophies of materialistic 
positivism is that they are ‘anti-metaphysical ... so that ultimately there is no place for God in 
them.’36  
Atheistic modernity is proud of ‘the radical emancipation of man from God’, and 
human rights are part of this culture of emancipation.37 But the exclusion of God is a potential 
source of violence and conflict. The clash of cultures will be between ‘this radical 
emancipation of man’ and ‘the great historical cultures.’38 Modernity ‘would like to see God 
eradicated’ because talk of God is intolerant and offensive to non-theistic religions and to 
atheists and agnostics.39 Yet scientistic atheism makes an absurd claim. Its materialist 
                                                             
31 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, pp.89, 90 and p.114. 
32 Ibid., p.26. 
33 Ibid., p.70. 
34 Ibid., p.51. Ratzinger (p.69.) cites his hero Guardini on this point: ‘We treat a thing like a thing when we 
possess it, use it, and finally destroy it – or if we are speaking of human beings, kill it.’ 
35 Ibid., p.90. 
36 Ibid., p.40. 
37 Ibid., p.44. 
38 Ibid., p.44. 
39 Ibid., p.44. 
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interpretation of the universe seems self-evident, but ‘it will never lead to the scientific 
certainty that God does not exist.’40 
That leaves agnosticism, the standard view of ‘the average person with a university 
education today.’41 Despite ‘the prestige enjoyed by the agnostic solution’ it does not stand up 
to close examination because it proposes a programme that cannot be realized. It masquerades 
as an illuminating epistemological insight, but the question it is dealing with, is different from 
all other questions. It is nothing less than the question of ‘the very foundation of all 
rationality.’42 Faced with this ‘ineluctable’ question, the agnostic tries to abstain from casting 
a vote, but the question of God, admits of only two responses, affirmative or negative.43 To 
engage with this question is not to engage with ‘the sphere of the irrational.’44 It can be 
answered, but only if we listen to the messages given to us by a) ‘our own existence’, b) ‘the 
world’ and c) ‘the religious experience of humanity.’45  
2.3.2   Modernity’s mistaken epistemology 
Chapters Six and Seven, which constitute Section Two of the thesis, will narrate how a 
broader understanding of the capacity of human reason was lost in the historical development 
of modernity and how this impacted on the philosophy and theology of human rights. Here we 
will encounter the theme of the self-limitation of reason through the genealogical loss of the 
Christian past and the loss of the classical tradition of natural law.  
The reason Christian ethics morphed into utilitarianism and relativism is because of 
the supremacy of modernity’s restricted epistemology, which confines what can be known for 
                                                             
40 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.85. 
41 Ibid., p.84. 
42 Ibid., p.90. 
43 Ibid., p.89. 
44 Ibid., p.90. 
45 Ibid., p.91. 
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certain to the realm of the scientific and empirically verifiable.  ‘This is a purely functional 
rationality that has shaken the moral consciousness.’46 Rourke calls it ‘the negation of truth in 
favour of what is convenient’.47 The merits and rewards of positivism are readily conceded, so 
far as they apply ‘in the technological sphere’ where they contain ‘important elements of 
truth’48 and make ‘positive and important contributions’49 of which ‘all of us, to a greater or 
lesser degree, make use.’50 Extrapolated to the level of the universal and only acceptable form 
of reason, an ‘absolutization’51 which entails ‘the mutilation of man’52 and the ‘self-limitation 
of reason’.53 This form of rationality is not as universally valid or complete as it thinks it is. 
The great religious cultures show that human reason is capable of reaching beyond the 
scientifically verifiable. This is possible because ‘we are not simply blind vis-à-vis God.’54 
There is ‘a wall of prejudices’ that keeps ‘truth a prisoner’ and ‘prevents people from seeing 
God.’55 The truth is that ‘in silence and recollection’ there exists ‘a direct access to the 
Creator.’56  
2.3.3   Modernity’s mistaken ethics 
The ethical crisis of modernity is a crisis of reason. Reason was the Enlightenment’s slogan 
and the key watchword of modernity. As always, Ratzinger starts by acknowledging the 
plausibility of the opposing argument, that ‘we have at last achieved a philosophy that is 
universally valid and completely scientific, a philosophy in which reason common to all men 
finds expression.’ Again, he welcomes the Enlightenment’s key cornerstones, the ‘important 
                                                             
46 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.30. 
47 Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI, p.41.  
48 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.40. 
49 Ibid., p.43. 
50 Ibid., p.80. 
51 Ibid., p.44. 
52 Ibid., p.40. 
53 Ibid., p.41. 
54 Ibid., p.115, or alternatively, ‘Man is not condemned to remain in uncertainty about God’, ibid., p.96. 
55 Ibid., p.112. 
56 Ibid., p.103. 
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gains that can claim a general validity.’57 These are i) the assurance that religion cannot be 
imposed by the state ii) respect for the fundamental rights of man iii) the separation of 
powers. Where he becomes nervous is when ‘the modern philosophies inspired by the 
Enlightenment’, among which we can count human rights, are elevated to the status of ‘the 
last word of that reason that is common to all men.’ This cannot be the last word and it cannot 
be common to all men, because a) it’s a ‘self-limitation of reason’ and b) it’s a product of one 
determined cultural situation.58 Other cultures of the present and the past do not have the 
sociological presuppositions required to underpin democracy and do not agree with ‘the total 
neutrality of the state.’59 Modernity’s reason, or enlightenment philosophy,  
‘consciously cuts off its own historical roots, depriving itself of the powerful sources 
from which it sprang. It detaches itself from what we might call the basic memory of 
mankind, without which reason loses its orientation, for now the guiding principle is 
that man’s capability determines what he does.’60  
The phrase basic memory may carry a double meaning. Firstly, it refers to the historical 
wisdom tradition of modernity’s Graeco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian roots. Secondly, it may 
allude to conscience as anamnesis, our basic memory of the true and the good. Deprived of its 
religious context, morality loses its ‘proper environment’61 and cannot breathe. All that is left 
is ‘the cynicism of a secularized culture that denies its own foundations.’62 
                                                             
57 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.39. 
58 Ibid., p.41. 
59 Ibid., p.40. Ratzinger is presumably referring to Islam. This issue will be discussed in Chapter Nine. 
60 Ibid., p.41. Glenn uses this page of Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures and comments that ‘Enlightenment 
may have arisen within the bosom of Christianity but it has now left that shelter behind.’ See Gary D. Glenn, ‘Is 
Secularism the End of Liberalism? Reflections on Europe’s Demographic Decline Drawing on Pope Benedict, 
Habermas, Nietzsche and Strauss’, The Catholic Social Science Review, 13 (2008), pp.91-106, at p.93. 
61 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.70. Habermas strongly agrees with the point that the West is 
deluding itself if it thinks it can indefinitely sustain New Testament morality while rejecting the New Testament 
God. If one is seeking a sure foundation for human rights and democracy it is in ‘the Judaic ethic of justice and 
the Christian ethic of love’ and there is no alternative available. See Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions, 
(Malden, MA.: Polity Press, 2006), pp.150-151. 
62 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.33. Rowland (p.120.) makes use of this quotation to make the point 
that Ratzinger respects the fact that Islam would not want to ‘undergo its own eighteenth century style 
Enlightenment’ and end up with cynicism and secularism of the West. Glenn believes that the natural 
consequence for Europe’s abandoning Christianity for the cynicism of liberal secularism is that Islam will fill the 
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Technology, that which is possible, becomes the guiding force of modernity’s 
advance, a project cut free from the restrictions of morality. ‘If you know how to do 
something, then you are also permitted to do it.’ The problem is that ‘man knows how to do 
many things.’63 The catalogue of technological developments deplored by Ratzinger includes 
cloning, the storing of organs and nuclear warfare, which are all accepted as reasonable by 
man’s ‘self-authorization.’64 Global crises of inequality, poverty, environmental degradation, 
disease, famine and conflict are all evidence that ‘the growth of our possibilities is not 
matched by an equal development of our moral energy’ and ‘moral strength has not grown in 
tandem with the development of science.’65 
Ratzinger pays relatively little attention to a critique of Kantian deontology. This is 
because he claims that the preferred ethical philosophy of Enlightened modernity is 
consequentialism, or we might say, utilitarianism, and it is this that he habitually rejects and 
seeks to combat. ‘In a world based on calculations, it is the calculation of consequences that 
determines what should be considered moral or immoral.’66 The instrumentalization of the 
human person opens up the possibility of abortion.67  The Greek question of ‘the good’ has 
disappeared.68 The result is that ‘man no longer accepts any moral authority apart from his 
own calculations.’69 Alongside utilitarianism, relativism is a key feature of Enlightenment 
ethics.  Ratzinger defines relativism as ‘nothing is good or evil in itself.’70 It is a dogmatism 
that thinks it possesses ‘the definitive knowledge of human reason’ and consigns traditional 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
vacuum and flourish. Glenn (p.99) reflects ‘with sadness' upon this prospect, but wonders whether Islam may 
protect human dignity more effectively than secularism. (p.102). See also footnote 76 below. 
63 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.41. 
64 Ibid., p.42. 
65 Ibid., p.27. 
66 Ibid., p.31. 
67 Ibid., p.69. Ratzinger includes a 244-word passage ‘by a great Italian-German thinker, Romano Guardini’. The 
Guardini passage is taken from ‘I diritti del nascituro’ in Studi cattolica, May/June 1974. 
68 At this point Ratzinger expresses agreement with Kant, the great opponent of utilitarianism. 
69 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.40. 
70 Ibid., p.31. 
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wisdom to the obsolete past.71 Non-negotiable values such as the sanctity of life ‘may be 
considered relative, in view of the pluralism of opinions we find in modern society.’72 I will 
return to the issue of relativism in my discussion of natural law in Chapter Seven. 
Chapters 8 and 9, which constitute the third and final section of this thesis, constitute a 
search for a deeper universalism and inclusivism, beyond modernity’s pluralism and 
relativism. Their purpose will be to test whether human rights, conceived in the framework of 
Ratzinger’s broadened reason, can be brought to bear upon a renewed dialogue of cultures 
which brings together Christian faith, secular reason, and the faith of the religious cultures. 
Here we will encounter the Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason through the theme 
of the loss of the voice of religion in the secular public square, and the possible loss of the 
philosophical tradition in Islam. 
2.4:  CRITIQUING RATZINGER 
My aim in this chapter has not been to engage critically with Crisis of Cultures, nor to resolve 
the complex issues it raises. I have used it as a gateway to an understanding of the relationship 
between Ratzinger, the rationality of modernity and the culture of human rights. However, I 
will now use two reviews of Crisis of Cultures to provide an insight into common reactions to 
the Ratzinger project. This will help to signpost the difficult issues the document raises and 
which will be further explored in the thesis. 
2.4.1 Catholic and Muslim perspectives 
Sullins, a Catholic academic, regards Ratzinger as ‘one of the most original and 
influential minds of our time’.73 He admires the perception, insight, and creativity’ of Crisis 
of Cultures but is embarrassed by its ‘provocative’ and ‘blunt’ tone. He understands its aim, 
                                                             
71 Ibid., p.45. 
72 Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, p.60. 
73 Paul Sullins, ‘Book Review: Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures and Values in a Time of Upheaval by 
Joseph Ratzinger’, Journal of Church and State, April 2007, 368-370. Available at: 
http://faculty.cua.edu/sullins/published%20articles/ccc-vtu  (Accessed 10 November 2015). 
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to provide ‘a rationale for the Christian faith that seeks to convince non-believers,’ but 
concludes that ‘those looking for a systematic argument will be disappointed.’ I accept this as 
a valid point, explicable by Ratzinger’s uniquely diffuse style of exposition, combined with 
the fact that two quite separate addresses have been artificially stitched together. Sullins 
draws out three positive take-home Ratzinger messages for human rights; rights are absolute, 
they are antecedent to and above the law of the State, and it is the Church’s task to safeguard 
these two principles.74 
 Sohail, a Muslim academic, picks up on the same key teachings, but, accurately in my 
view, senses Ratzinger’s ambivalence to a culture of human rights which has ‘superseded all 
other values.’75 The same ambivalence is detected in Ratzinger’s attitude to the 
Enlightenment. Ratzinger seems unsure whether to distance himself from it, as essentially 
non-Christian, or to ‘take ownership of it’ because the ‘basic liberties’ represented by human 
rights are ‘superior to other cultures.’ Where Sullins demurs from identifying a clear line of 
argument, Sohail provides a thought-provoking parody. Once upon a time Europe was 
Christian. Because it was Christian, Europe found that it could not make scientific progress. 
So it broke away from Christianity and developed a secular ideology called Enlightenment. 
Enlightenment culture is good because it establishes human rights. The Church doesn’t like 
some of those rights, such as the right to an abortion. Enlightenment culture, including 
democracy and human rights, is not universal. It arose in Christian lands and can only flourish 
in Christian lands. But it can only flourish by making a break with Christianity. The result is 
that the Church finds it impossible to keep people Christian within the framework of 
                                                             
74 For an alternative view, see Weigel’s On Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, op.cit. Weigel says that 
Ratzinger ‘synthesizes his arguments into a series of finely tuned propositions on which all men and women of 
good will would do well to reflect.’ In brief, these four propositions are i) imbalance between technological and 
moral development, ii) denial of Christian roots of Europe, iii) dehellenization leading to exclusive humanism 
and iv) recovery of the logos as a path to truth. 
75 Shazia Sohail, ‘Book Review: Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures by Joseph Ratzinger’. Available at: 
www.alislam.org/egazette/articles/Christianity-and-Crisis-of-Cultures.pdf. 
(Online blog, no page numbers.) (Accessed: 10 November 2015). 
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Enlightenment culture. Europeans have stopped believing, because Christianity is 
contradicted both by the positivistic reasoning of science and by the ethical reasoning of 
human rights. Nevertheless, they should behave as if they did believe in God, so that they 
could rediscover some of the non-negotiable Christian values. 
Sohail is useful because she gives us a feel for the probable reception of the Crisis of 
Cultures argument, and indeed for the reception of the overall argument of this thesis among 
Ratzinger’s two most important interlocutors, secular atheistic Western modernity and 
believing political Islam. She finds that Ratzinger’s treatment of abortion takes no account of 
‘a wider social malaise’ which is seen in the Western disregard for modesty, chastity and 
celibacy. Her sub-text is that the Qu‘ran represents the best synthesis of faith and reason and 
that Islam represents the best hope for Western civilization.76 
One of the most challenging and puzzling moments in Ratzingerian thought is the 
invitation to non-believers to adhere to their atheism and agnosticism but to act as if God 
really did exist. This would open up their minds to a consideration of some of the non-
negotiables proposed by Christian faith. Sohail is horrified by this proposal, an ‘upside-down 
way of doing things’ that simply goes against human nature and so has no chance of success. 
Sullins is also unhappy at this point. He charges Ratzinger with utilitarianism, since such a 
proposal would represent a mere instrumentalization of Christianity, surrendering to the 
values of modernity instead of arguing with confidence for the faith of the Church and Bible. 
The result would be the kind of ‘civil religion’ approach that has already ensured the death of 
Christian Europe. 
                                                             
76 Glenn (p.102) draws from his reading of Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures the conclusion that if human 
dignity is ultimately sustainable only through belief in God, and if secular Europe has effectively abandoned 
belief in God ‘it becomes thinkable that it may be Islam through which this providence will restore the “sight of 
God” to a Europe “hollowed out” by secularism.’ He quotes Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures pp.44-45: 
‘we must not lose sight of God if we do not want human dignity to disappear.’ 
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Criticisms notwithstanding, Sohail concludes by calling for a trilateral discussion 
between the Christians, atheists or agnostics and Muslims, with the aim of finding the right 
balance between faith and reason. Sohail’s own engagement with the thought of Ratzinger 
provides an example of the value of just such a discussion and thereby, in my view, validates 
the, albeit ‘provocative’ and ‘blunt’, forays of Ratzinger into the contemporary dialogue of 
cultures. Her ‘trilateral discussion’ is exactly the destination towards which this thesis 
attempts to trace a path, guided by the Ratzingerian conviction that ‘reason’ ‘religion’ and 
‘rights’ need each other, if they are to maintain their health and strength. 
 
2.4.2 The Ratzinger ambivalence 
Concepts of rights, dignity and natural law take us into the territory of Vatican II’s Gaudium 
et Spes, and the debates initiated by Ratzinger over whether that document in particular, and 
the Council in general, had arrived at the correct discernment of the relationship between 
Christian faith and the ‘signs of the times’ it encountered in modernity.77 One of the features 
of the modern world to which Gaudium et Spes had to react was the culture of human rights, 
where important groundwork had already been achieved in Dignitatis Humanae, with its 
endorsement of religious freedom. The Church’s answer to the underpinning principle of 
human rights was explicated in Gaudium et Spes in a 3,700 word opening chapter, ‘The 
Dignity of the Human Person’, with a ringing endorsement of rights:  
But forms of social or cultural discrimination in basic personal rights on the grounds 
of sex, race, colour, social conditions, language or religion, must be curbed and 
                                                             
77 Tanner highlights the central importance of this document in the dialogue of cultures: ‘There was pleasure and 
satisfaction that such a monumental task had been undertaken – almost a new type of document for an 
ecumenical council, especially the attempt to dialogue with the world, - and the results were worthwhile, indeed 
commendable, and had caught the imagination of the public, both Catholic and non-Catholic, as witnessed 
especially by coverage in the press.’ Norman Tanner, Rediscovering Vatican II: The Church in the World, (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2005), p.36.  
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eradicated as incompatible with God’s design. It is regrettable that these basic personal 
rights are not yet being respected everywhere.78 
This was based on the concept of dignity: 
It is up to public and private organizations to be at the service of the dignity and 
destiny of man; let them spare no effort to banish every vestige of social and political 
slavery and to safeguard basic human rights under every political system.79 
Dignity in turn was set in a framework of natural law: 
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself 
but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love, and to do what is good and 
avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For man has in 
his heart a law inscribed by God. His dignity lies in observing this law.80 
There was also a genuinely Christological vision: ‘In reality it is only in the mystery of the 
Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear’ as well as a Christ-centred 
theological anthropology: ‘Man can fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of 
himself.’81 
Despite the sound Ratzingerian reasoning at the core of the document, Ratzinger was 
quick to initiate a debate that would continue up to the year of his resignation.82 While 
                                                             
78 Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern Word, 7 December 1965, in Austin 
Flannery OP (ed.), Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, (Leominster, Fowler 
Wright, 1981), pp.903-1014 at p.929, para.29 
79 Gaudium et Spes, para.29 in Flannery, p.930. 
80 Gaudium et Spes, para.16 in Flannery, p.916. 
81 Gaudium et Spes, para.24 in Flannery, p.925. Weigel explains the crucial role played by Karol Wojtyla, later 
Pope John Paul II, in the composition of para.24. Weigel calls para.24 ‘the Council’s philosophical and moral 
linchpin’ at the heart of which lies Wojtyla’s great teaching that ‘The Law of the Gift was the fundamental 
dramatic structure of the human condition.’ See George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John 
Paul II, (New York, Harper Collins, 1999), pp.166-169, this quotation from p.169. 
82 Ratzinger voiced his concern about Gaudium et Spes as early as 1966, in his report on the Fourth Session of 
the Council. See J. Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II, (New York: Paulist Press, 1966), pp.212-
243. Only ten years after the Council, Ratzinger highlighted the importance of Gaudium et Spes, but he now  
spoke of the Church in crisis, reeling from the shock of ‘a generational change of decisive importance in the 
overall intellectual situation of mankind and especially of the Western world.’ The new movement meant ‘a 
farewell to history and a farewell to metaphysics’, resulting in ‘asphyxiation in a world that offers everything 
34 
 
endorsing the document’s ‘openness to authentic human realism and thus to modern thinking, 
speaking and questioning’, he criticized a flawed methodology which, lest modernity be 
frightened by ‘theological ghosts’, took an accommodation to modernity as its starting point, 
with the result that almost as an afterthought ‘it had to embarrassedly admit that there were 
other things that had to be mentioned.’83 Yet these other things, essentially that man is saved 
by Christ alone, should not be confined to a theological ghetto, where faith becomes ideology, 
but must be presented wholeheartedly, since ‘faith is essentially certainty.’ Modernity 
deserves nothing less than this, for ‘its dark nights ask for God.’84 
From her thorough discussion of Ratzinger’s relationship with this document, 
Rowland draws the message that dialogue with unbelievers can certainly be pursued around 
the notion of humanitas, but that philosophy and theology, or reason and faith, must not be 
severed by being merely juxtaposed. Christology is essential for sound anthropology, and the 
dialogue of cultures must assume that secular humanism will always be inadequate: ‘The 
insight that faith provides the key to the meaning of our human experiences is a 
presupposition of dialogue between faith and unbelief.’85 It is in line with this Ratzinger 
ambivalence that this study starts with a search within the foundations of the logos for critical 
tools with which to discern between human rights as signposts of authentic humanity and 
human rights as standing in need of healing and repair.86 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
except a reason why,’ a world which ‘abolishes the Logos.’ The authentic Gaudium et Spes was to be found in ‘a 
theology and a piety that developed essentially on the basis of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, and 
the great liturgical heritage of the universal church.’ See J. Ratzinger, ‘Ten Years After the Beginning of the 
Council: Where do we stand?’ in Dogma and Preaching, pp.377-384. 
83 J. Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II, (New York, Paulist Press, 1966), pp.220-223. 
84 J. Ratzinger, ‘Ten Years After the Beginning of the Council’, in Dogma and Preaching, p.383. 
85 Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, p.33 
86 O’Connor sees ‘ambiguity of thought’ as a distinguishing feature of Ratzinger’s work. Garry O’Connor, 
Subdued Fires: An Intimate Portrait of Pope Benedict XVI, (Stroud: The History Press, 2013), p.221. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Allen, who is often critical of Ratzinger, acknowledges that  
Over the course of his intellectual career, he has identified many positive elements in 
the contemporary social order that should be defended and built upon, chief among 
them democracy, and the respect for human rights upon which it is based.87 
This chapter has argued that Ratzinger has an essentially positive orientation towards human 
rights, exemplified in his respect for the Universal Declaration, human dignity, democracy, 
the values of modernity, religious freedom, the right to life, and the idea of duties. This 
chapter has also suggested that Ratzinger’s whole approach to human rights is hedged about 
by qualifications and reservations which are rooted in deeper and wider concerns about the 
trajectory of modernity. The chapter has outlined the seven major themes to be discussed in 
the following seven chapters of the thesis. It has presented these themes as modernity’s great 
losses, for each of which a healing or repair is proposed by the logos theology of Joseph 
Ratzinger. Analysis of Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures, and of reactions to it, has 
shown that engagement with enlightened modernity, and engagement with non-Christian 
religions must lie at the heart of any Christian engagement with human rights. If Ratzinger’s 
logos theology, as a ‘thick’ theory of human rights, is to play a universalist and inclusivist 
role in the dialogue of cultures, then it must join an intercultural dialogue about human rights, 
triangulated from the three stances of Christianity, secular modernity and the religions in 
general, but Islamic faith in particular. The following quotation confirms the centrality of the 
logos to Ratzinger’s thinking about human rights and the dignity of the human person: 
                                                             
87 John L. Allen, The Rise of Benedict XVI: The Inside Story of How the Pope was Elected and What It Means 
for the World, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p.172. 
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God himself is Logos, the rational primal ground of all that is real, the creative reason 
that gave birth to the world and that is reflected in the world. God is Logos – meaning, 
reason, and word, and that is why man corresponds to God when his reason is open 
and he pleads the cause of a reason that is not allowed to be blind to the moral 
dimensions of existence. For Logos designates a reason that is not merely 
mathematical: it is the basis of the good and guarantees the dignity of the good. Faith 
in the God who is Logos is at the same time faith in the creative power of reason. It is 
faith in the Creator God and faith that man is created in the likeness of God and 
therefore shares in the inviolable dignity of God himself. It is here that the idea of 
human rights finds its deepest foundations, although its historical development and 
elaboration have taken other paths. God is Logos.88 
Before putting this logos theology to work in the dialogue of cultures, it is essential to 
understand its character by an examination of its foundational sources. 
                                                             
88 J. Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), p.112. In 2004, a year 
before his election to the papacy, 11 of Ratzinger’s essays and public addresses were gathered together and 
published under the title Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs: Die Herausforderungen der Zukunft bestehen. The 
subtitle can be translated as ‘Future Challenges’(my translation). After his election, the title was reissued as 
Values in a Time of Upheaval by the Ignatius Press. The quotation is taken from Chapter 6, Searching for Peace 
– Tensions and Dangers. This address was originally entitled Auf der Suche nach dem Frieden and was given on 
the sixtieth anniversary of the landing of the allies in France, June 6, 2004. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE GREEK LOGOS AND THE HELLENIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY 
‘A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place here, an encounter between genuine 
enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith and, at the same time, the 
heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: Not to act “with 
logos” is contrary to God’s nature.’1 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point for Chapter Three is the championing of Greek thought in the Regensburg 
Lecture.2 The chapter examines Plato and the Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason 
through the loss of transcendence. Ratzinger argues that Platonic philosophy had a significant 
and beneficial impact on early Christianity. Many theologians have held that Platonic influence 
must be removed to reveal authentic Christian faith. This chapter builds on Ratzinger’s logos 
theology by arguing that Platonic thought is still a valuable resource in critiquing modernity 
and in developing a framework for an inclusive culture of human rights. 
The Regensburg Lecture was delivered on 12 September 2006, in the second year of the 
pontificate of Benedict XVI. This address will forever be associated with remarks that alluded 
to the potentially non-rational character of Islamic faith.  The ensuing furore overshadowed 
Regensburg’s central claim: Christianity was born out of an inner rapprochement between 
biblical faith and the logos of Greek rationality.  This encounter was providential and beneficial, 
both for Christianity and for wider culture. Ratzinger makes a second, related claim: the 
encounter with Greek rationality was not just a moment in history, but has a permanent 
                                                             
1 Ratzinger, The Regensburg Lecture, para.24. 
2 The translation and paragraph references used in this study are taken from the version provided in the appendix 
to Bainard Cowan (ed.) Gained Horizons: Regensburg and the Enlargement of Reason (South Bend, IN: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 2011) pp.109-125. 
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significance. As part of this second claim Ratzinger laments the successive attempts to remove 
the logos of Greek thought (or ‘Plato’) from the tradition of Christian thought, a process called 
‘dehellenization.’ A third claim is that the reinstatement of the concept of the logos has the 
potential to heal the wounds of contemporary culture. 
This chapter evaluates the validity of Ratzinger’s narrative of Hellenization and 
dehellenization, examines the nature and purpose of Ratzinger’s championing of Platonic 
thought and extends Ratzinger’s recovery of the Greek tradition by exploring its implications 
for a healing of the contemporary culture of human rights. The contribution this chapter seeks 
to make to Ratzinger studies lies in its bringing together of Plato, Ratzinger and human rights. 
Plato is analysed in terms of inclusivity and exclusivity as well as within the philosophical 
framework of ontology, epistemology and ethics. Ratzinger’s statements on Plato are evaluated 
in the light of scholarly opinion. The contribution to the study of human rights is to use 
Ratzinger’s logos theology, with its recovery of Greek thought, as a paradigm for an inclusive 
formulation of the concept of human rights. 
3.1: HELLENIZATION AND DEHELLENIZATION 
3.1.1   Two enlightenments, four moments of Hellenization 
Approximately half of the 4,500 word Regensburg Lecture is devoted to the story of 
Hellenization and dehellenization. Hellenization is a word that encapsulates for Ratzinger ‘the 
reasonableness of faith.’3 It is defined as ‘the profound harmony between what is Greek in the 
best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God.’4 Repeatedly at 
Regensburg, Ratzinger praises ‘the encounter between the Biblical message and Greek thought’ 
                                                             
3 Ratzinger, The Regensburg Lecture, para.5. 
4 Ibid., para.17. 
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and ‘the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between biblical faith and Greek inquiry.’5 This 
‘profound encounter of faith and reason’ was an encounter between ‘genuine enlightenment 
and religion’ which constituted ‘a mutual enrichment.’6 The message is clear: the ‘critically 
purified’ Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith, such that the intimate 
relationship between faith and the use of human reason ‘are part of the faith itself.’7  
Dehellenization, by contrast, is the term applied to the historical process whereby the 
intimate relationship between faith and reason, or Christianity and Greek thought, was 
sundered. Ratzinger highlights three key figures responsible for this rupture: Luther, Kant, and 
von Harnack. Luther wanted to liberate faith from the rationality of metaphysics; Kant strove 
to limit the rationality of faith to the sphere of practical rationality; von Harnack wanted to 
remove the false overlay of rationality that had claimed divinity for Christ, in order to align 
Christianity and Christology with modern rationality. The end result of these processes was ‘the 
self-limitation of reason’ which made modernity’s scientific empiricism the only acceptable 
rationality.8 
Ratzinger’s Introduction to Christianity and Truth and Tolerance can be used to supplement 
Regensburg’s Hellenization and dehellenization narrative, which is summed up in Rowland’s 
words: ‘At its very origins Christianity sides with reason and considers this ally to be its 
principle forerunner.’9 Ratzinger’s aim is to champion ‘the inalienable right of Greek thought 
to a place in Christianity.’10 He argues that the encounter between the biblical message and 
                                                             
5 The Regensburg Lecture, para.19. 
6 Ibid., paras.24 and 22. 
7 Ibid., paras.31 and 53. 
8 Ibid., para.40. 
9 See J. Ratzinger, trans. J.R. Foster, Introduction to Christianity, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1969, 2004), 
J. Ratzinger, trans. Henry Taylor, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, (San Francisco, 
Ignatius Press, 2004) and Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p.62. 
10 Introduction to Christianity, p.78. 
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Greek thought did not happen by chance: ‘I am convinced that at bottom it was no mere accident 
that the Christian message, in the period it was taking shape, first entered the Greek world and 
there merged with the inquiry into understanding, into truth.’ Ratzinger believes that the 
encounter between the faith of the Bible and Greek philosophy ‘was truly providential.’11 In 
these two works he provides a narrative of six moments of demythologization, movements 
towards enlightenment and the realisation of the logos.  
Two enlightenments, one Greek, one Judaic, occur independently of each other. In the 
Platonic enlightenment, a transcendent being is proposed as an alternative to the Homeric 
tradition of a pantheon and its attendant mythology. In the Mosaic enlightenment, a pure 
monotheism is embraced and the gods of surrounding peoples rejected. 
Two processes of Hellenization then occur within Judaism: the Hebrew Old Testament is 
translated into Greek, creating the Septuagint, and rendering the Judaic faith accessible to the 
Greek mind. The Wisdom literature employs Greek categories of thought to deepen the radical 
monotheism of the Old Testament. These are followed by two specifically Christian moments 
of Hellenization. The New Testament is written in Greek, using the Greek version of the Old 
Testament. The Greek Fathers use Greek philosophical categories to establish the credal 
formulae of the early church. 
Of these six processes, I will focus in this chapter on the first, the Platonic enlightenment, 
in order to understand the essence of Hellenization. The first task is to understand why 
Ratzinger ascribes such significance to Plato; the second task is to question whether he is right 
to do so. 
                                                             
11 Truth and Tolerance, p.95. 
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3.1.2   The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers 
In raising the issue of dehellenization at Regensburg, Ratzinger is revisiting a theme which he 
learned from Söhngen, namely the relationship between the God of faith and the God of the 
philosophers. At Regensburg, (para.37), he refers explicitly to the origin of this phrase in Pascal, 
and references his own Inaugural Lecture of that same title, delivered at the University of Bonn 
on 15 April 1959.12 In that lecture, Ratzinger expresses the dehellenization thesis as forcefully 
as possible through the arguments of Emil Brunner.13 Brunner held that the Fathers and the 
Scholastics made a fundamental error, reading back a synthesis of the God of faith and the God 
of the philosophers into the Christian faith, whereas in fact the truth was the exact opposite, and 
that the Fathers thereby fundamentally distorted and falsified the very essence of Christian 
revelation. Ratzinger regards the arguments surrounding the God of faith and the God of 
philosophy as a difficult and serious problem which for him crystallizes many of the central 
problems of fundamental theology, especially the problem of the restriction of reason or 
rationality. Once Kant had set up ‘an unbridgeable gap between metaphysics and religion’, then 
religion could no longer find a place to sit in ‘Reason’s room’ and once religion could no longer 
be rationalized, it could no longer propose any intelligible dogma.14 
   To oppose Brunner’s thesis, Ratzinger recommends the synthesis of Aquinas, in which the 
God of faith and the God of philosophy are ‘in one another’ but ‘distinguished’. Without faith, 
philosophy expresses the highest possibility of the human spirit. Faith does not destroy or 
replace the philosophical God. It ‘exceeds’ it, takes it up into itself and fulfils it. Aristotle and 
                                                             
12 Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der theologia naturalis, (Trier: 
Paulinus Verlag, 2006). This document has not been translated into English. All English quotations from the 
document are my own translation. 
13 Swiss Protestant theologian, b.1889. Ratzinger references Die christliche Lehre von Gott: Dogmatik I, (Zurich: 
Zwingli Verlag, 1953), pp.121-140. 
14 Gott des Glaubens, p.13. 
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Plato did know the true God; it is just that faith knows God in a way that is deeper and purer.15 
Ratzinger cites Varro’s Stoic schema of three pre-Christian theologies, the mythical, the 
political and the natural. The first two were not concerned with truth, nor with the Absolute as 
accessible to reason. Christianity rather allies itself with natural theology and with monotheism, 
which Ratzinger describes as the ‘hyphen’ which conjoins the two Gods. In retaining natural 
theology, he is able to retain the analogia entis, just as he does at Regensburg (para.27), as ‘a 
necessary dimension of Christian reality, the removal of which would be an actual repeal of the 
claim which Christianity requires.’ The Regensburg claim of the constitutive status of Greek 
philosophy within Christian faith, had already been clearly stated at Bonn: 
The accomplished synthesis of biblical faith with the Greek spirit as the representative 
of the philosophical spirit was not merely legitimate, but was necessary in order to bring 
the essential claim and seriousness of biblical faith to its fullest expression.16 
Ratzinger accepts, however, that we must ‘give room’ to the legitimate request of Emil Brunner 
and recognize that in order to become the God of faith, the God of philosophy had to be 
converted into faith through ‘a necessary profound purification and transformation’ that took 
place when the ‘the Absolute which philosophy already knew’ was recognized as ‘the Absolute 
which speaks in Jesus Christ, is Word, and can be spoken to’, the God who for Brunner, in 
naming Himself opens Himself to humanity. Ratzinger even goes further and concedes that, 
legitimate and essential as it was, the process of Hellenization was not always sufficiently 
critical. ‘Philosophical statements were often adopted unthinkingly and not subjected to the 
necessary critical purification and interpretation.’17 This process of the critical purification and 
                                                             
15 Gott des Glaubens, pp.15-16. 
16 Ibid., p.29. 
17 Ibid., p.34. 
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interpretation of Greek philosophy will be made clearer in this thesis through an examination 
of Ratzinger’s own appropriation of Greek thought, and through an examination of the 
appropriation of the term logos in both John and Justin, in which Ratzinger’s theme of 
purification and interpretation will recur through my own deployment of theme of welcome and 
correction. 
Ratzinger’s 1959 use of Varro’s tripartite understanding of pre-Christian theology sets 
up another theme which recurs throughout his thinking right up to Regensburg. Alongside the 
welcome of natural theology, we should note the rejection of political theology, or what we 
might call civil religion. In Ratzingerian social and political thought, the separation of church 
and state will always be of crucial importance. The political take-over of theology or religion 
and the theological or religious take-over of politics always constitute for Ratzinger a mutual 
betrayal. When the Church becomes entwined with political power its true nature is 
compromised. If it succumbs to the temptation to turn positive Church law into state law, it 
abandons its true vocation, which is to critique the positive law of the state from the standpoint 
of truth. These issues will come to the fore in Chapters 8 and 9 of this thesis, in the dialogue 
with the secular and the dialogue with Islam. A third theme of the Varro paradigm is that of 
mythical religion. Here we encounter the process of demythologization, which this chapter will 
show to be of central importance to Ratzinger’s understanding of the intimate relationship 
between biblical and philosophical thought. 
3.1.3   Ratzinger’s Platonic enlightenment as demythologization 
Socrates and Plato, just like the logos itself, are a powerful presence in Ratzinger’s writings, to 
which this brief survey cannot do full justice. For Ratzinger, Socrates’ achievement was to 
question the truthfulness of Greek mythology. As a result of this, the entire system of Greek 
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religion suffered a loss of credibility. Socrates was motivated by ‘the longing for an appropriate 
form of religion, which would yet go beyond the capacity of reason itself.’18 Ratzinger is willing 
to go so far as to describe Socrates as ‘a prophet of Jesus Christ.’19 The distinguishing feature 
of Greek philosophy was that ‘it did not rest content with traditional religions or with images 
of the myths; rather, in all seriousness, it put the question about truth.’20 The Greek search for 
God and for the truth resulted in ‘a self-criticism of that world’s own culture and its own 
thought.’21 There is no contradiction between philosophy and a logos theology: 
The way of doing philosophy ... received what we might call a “salvation-historical 
privilege,” which means it made it a suitable vessel for the Christian Logos, which is 
concerned with liberation by means of truth and liberation for truth.22 
Plato’s criticism of myth represented an attempt ‘to replace the classical Homeric mythology 
with a new mythology appropriate to the logos.’ Because they were using their reason to 
question the religious myths of their day, ‘the ancient world knew the dilemma between the 
God of faith and the God of the philosophers in a very pronounced form.’ When the ancient 
religion did collapse, it was because a gulf had grown up between the God of faith and the God 
of the philosophers, the result of ‘the total dichotomy between reason and piety.’23  
                                                             
18 Truth and Tolerance, p.153. 
19 J. Ratzinger, trans. Brian McNeil, Values in a Time of Upheaval, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), p.89. 
20 Truth and Tolerance, p.95. 
21 Ibid., p.200. 
22 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.89. 
23 Introduction to Christianity, pp.138-9. Such a narrative was central to the work of Karl Jaspers, by whom 
Ratzinger was influenced. See Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, (1949), (London, Routledge 
Revivals, 2011) and The Great Philosophers, trans. Ralph Manheim, (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962). 
Following Jaspers, Habermas sees the Enlightenment as a re-run, or logical extension of the work of 
disenchantment which metaphysics and religion, i.e. Socrates and biblical faith, once directed against myth. See 
Jürgen Habermas, The Liberating Power of Symbols: Philosophical Essays, trans. Peter Dews, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), pp.37-38. Ratzinger says in Salt of the Earth, ‘...Jaspers interested me a great deal.’  See J. 
Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium – An Interview with Peter Seewald, (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p.60. 
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Rowland identifies Romano Guardini as ‘one of the seminal influences on Ratzinger’s 
intellectual formation’ and ‘one of the great scholars of twentieth century Catholic Germany.’ 
She says that Guardinian themes ‘appear like a watermark on the pages of Ratzinger’s essays.’24  
Guardini, who is referenced in the thirteenth footnote of the Regensburg Lecture, reads the 
Euthyphro as a story of demythologisation. ‘Men have inwardly abandoned the system of myth 
... Mythical thought has lost its real justification.’ This means that ‘a step forward must now be 
taken’ and that step forward is the posing of the ontological question ‘what is the nature of 
things.’25 This will be answered by ‘that which is essential truth, existing above phenomena; it 
is likewise the true and imperishable reality.’26 Elsewhere, Ratzinger tells us that ‘Romano 
Guardini emphatically urges that the question of truth is the core of all Socrates’ philosophical 
endeavours.’27 
3.1.4  Ratzinger’s dehellenization as a self-limitation of reason  
Regensburg describes three waves of dehellenization, conceived as six ruptures of faith and 
reason. Luther, seeking ‘faith in its pure primordial form’ abandons the metaphysics of 
philosophy and confines himself to sola scriptura.28  Kant limits the capacity of reine vernunft, 
                                                             
24 Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, p.146 and Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 
p.18. Romano Guardini (1885-1968) was an Italian-born Catholic priest who held posts at Berlin (1923-1939), 
Tübingen (1945-1948) and Munich (1948-1962). The most obvious connection between Ratzinger and Guardini 
is their respective publications The Spirit of the Liturgy. Ratzinger’s 2000 publication is written as an homage to 
Guardini’s work of 1937. Guardini wrote two theses on Bonaventure, influenced Josef Pieper and Hans Urs von 
Balthasar. Rowland (A Guide for the Perplexed p.17.) says that Pieper’s first book was inspired by a lecture 
entitled ‘About the Classical Spirit’, delivered by Guardini at Castle Rothenfels on the Main in 1924. Von 
Balthasar paid homage to Guardini in his work Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2010). Guardini was also the subject of an unfinished doctoral dissertation by Jose Bergoglio, 
later Pope Francis. Francis references Guardini eight times in his second encyclical, Laudato Sí. Georg Ratzinger 
also cites Guardini as an important read for both brothers. See Georg Ratzinger (with Michael Hesemann) trans. 
Michael J. Miller, My Brother the Pope, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011), p.151. In Salt of the Earth, p.178, 
Ratzinger mentions Guardini as part of a post-WW1 disillusion with liberal modernity. In Milestones, Ratzinger 
lists him alongside Josef Pieper as one of the ‘voices that moved us most directly.’ See Ratzinger, J. (1988) 
Milestones: Memoirs 1927 – 1977, trans. E. Leiva-Merikakis. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), p.43. 
25 Romano Guardini, trans. Basil Wrighton, The Death of Socrates: An Interpretation of the Platonic Dialogues: 
Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948), p.12. 
26 Ibid., p.103. 
27 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.89, n.11. 
28 The Regensburg Lecture, para.34. 
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or pure reason, and confines himself to praktische vernunft, or practical reason, thereby denying 
reason ‘access to reality as a whole.’29 Pascal, attempting to recover authentic biblical faith, 
abandons le dieu des philosophes and confines himself to Dieu d’Abraham.30 von Harnack, the 
central figure in this narrative, abandons the divine Christ of Faith and confines himself to the 
Jesus of History, who becomes merely ‘the father of a humanitarian moral message.’31 These 
four ruptures were initiated by Christians seeking to liberate authentic religious faith from alien 
philosophical distortion. On the secular front, natural science then abandons rational 
speculation and confines itself to empirical ‘verification or falsification through 
experimentation.’32 The human sciences are also thus forced to abandon the question of God 
and confine themselves to the ‘canon of scientificity.’33  
Reading Regensburg, we can identify five self-limitations of Christian rationality. Firstly, 
the question of the existence of God can only be believed in faith and is not susceptible to 
rational inquiry. Secondly, all Christological and Trinitarian formulations are likewise 
‘unreasonable’. Thirdly, religious faith must be confined to the realm of the subjective. 
Fourthly, the discipline of theology is no longer a rational inquiry into the metaphysical but is 
reduced to phenomenological investigation into the historical, cultural and linguistic aspects of 
religion. Fifthly, the original synthesis between Greek and biblical thought is relegated to the 
status of a historically conditioned phenomenon which can be legitimately discarded or 
superseded. 
                                                             
29 The Regensburg Lecture, para.35. 
30 Blaise Pascal; (1623 – 1662), French mathematician, physicist, inventor, writer and Christian philosopher.  
31 The Regensburg Lecture, para.38. Adolf von Harnack (1851 – 1930), German Lutheran theologian and 
prominent church historian. 
32 Ibid., para.42. 
33 Ibid., para.45. 
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Ratzinger’s championing of Hellenization depends on the twin convictions a) that there was 
in fact a historical marriage of Greek and Christian thought and b) that Christianity benefited 
from this Platonic-style synthesis of faith and reason. It is important to review the literature to 
understand the arguments for and against these hypotheses. 
3.1.5   Support for Ratzinger’s historical narrative.   
Werner Jaeger tells the story of how ‘the classical heritage is incorporated in the structure of 
Christian thought,’ examining the material from a cultural and educational perspective.34 He 
agrees with Ratzinger that a key moment of Hellenization was the use of Greek for the New 
Testament. Then in the patristic period ‘Greek culture and tradition streamed into the church 
and became amalgamated with its life and doctrine.’35 Like Ratzinger, he sees a deep-seated 
commonality between Judaeo-Christian monotheism and Greek philosophy, the only two 
contenders for the prize of universality or catholicity.  
Arnold Toynbee shares Jaeger’s interest in the broad sweep of cultural history. In his 
discussion of ‘Hellenism’ he points up the self-assured universality of Greek culture: ‘Like 
present day Westerners, the Greeks assumed that mankind’s coming common civilization 
would, as a matter of course, be theirs.’36 His view of demythologization supports Ratzinger’s: 
‘Disbelief in the gods of the old poets and the popular religion was as old as philosophy itself.’37  
 
                                                             
34 (1888 – 1961) Werner Jaeger was a classicist, philologist and patristics scholar, who moved from Berlin to 
Harvard in 1936. He delivered his Gifford Lectures on ‘The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers’ in 1936-
1937.  See Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknapp Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1962). p.21. 
35 Ibid., p.35. 
36 Arnold Toynbee, (ed.) The Crucible of Christianity: Judaism, Hellenism and the Historical Background to the 
Christian Faith. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969) p.44. 
37 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p.28. 
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3.1.6   Markschies’ doubts about the Hellenization of Christianity  
A contemporary scholar who takes issue with Ratzinger’s dehellenization narrative is 
Markschies.38 He asks whether it still makes sense today to talk of the Hellenization of 
Christianity. This term attained totemic significance in the polemics of the world of 
Religionsgeschichte,39 but has never been defined in terms of either its content or its 
chronology. So if there is such a thing as Hellenization, nobody can agree on what it is, when 
it started or when it ended.  
For Droysen, the Hellenistic Age could be summed up as ‘an era of reconciliation 
between West and East, Hellenism and Judaism.40 Droysen characterized this era as ‘the eternal 
longing for reconciliation,’ (the Judaic element), and ‘the natural human longing for the lost 
paradise,’ (the Hellenic element).41 Droysen, like Ratzinger, sees the Christian synthesis 
between the two as a providential aspect of salvation history. Markschies says that for von 
Harnack, Hellenization meant ‘the Christian reception of the standards of rational 
argumentation in Greek philosophy, exemplified by ‘the church-sanctioned dogmatics of 
rationally explainable doctrines.’42 For von Harnack this was a wrong step taken by the church 
as it became tainted by philosophy. So Droysen and von Harnack take opposing views of the 
                                                             
38 Markschies graduated from Tübingen in 1988 as a student of Martin Hengel, who published on the subject of 
Hellenization in 1989. See C. Markschies, ‘Does it make sense to speak about a Hellenization of Christianity in 
Antiquity?’’ CHRC 92, 2012, pp.5-34. Available at: 
www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/chrc/2012/00000092/.../art00001 (Accessed: 10 October 2012). 
Markschies’ paper on the subject of Hellenization was delivered in 2011 and published in 2012. 
39 The Religionsgeschichtliche Schule developed in German biblical studies during the 19th century and 
emphasized the degree to which biblical ideas were the product of cultural milieu. Ratzinger consciously 
references this in para.29 of the Regensburg Lecture: the encounter with Greek thought is not just 
‘religionsgeschichtlich’ but ‘weltgeschichtlich’, a question of world history. 
40 Johann Gustav Droysen, pupil of Hegel and author of Geschichte des Hellenismus (First published 1836, 
reprint Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Jaeger credits Droysen with initiating academic 
engagement with the concept of Hellenization. 
41 Markschies, Does it make sense to speak about a Hellenization of Christianity in Antiquity? p.7. 
42 Ibid., p.11. 
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process of Hellenization, the former positive and the latter negative. But a key point emerges. 
Hellenization did take place. 
Markschies, indeed, concedes the point made by Schlatter, that ‘Hellenism is the 
precondition for everything in the New Testament’, Ratzinger’s point at Regensburg.43 He also 
accepts the scholarly consensus that there is such a thing as Hellenization, but only in Hengel’s 
sense of the term as referring to ‘this new civilisation which was established through the march 
of Alexander.’44 He regrets the use of a term that has spawned simplistic dualisms which 
artificially pitch Hellenism against Judaism and / or Christianity. To support his reservations, 
Markschies points out that ancient Christian writers (e.g. Tatianus) use the term Hellenization 
(Hellenismos) to refer to the pagan polytheism of educated Greeks and therefore resisted 
Hellenismos, as re-hellenization.45 This enables him to conclude, contra Droysen, that ‘well-
educated ancient Christians...were not able to regard Hellenismos as part of their salvation 
history and a positive development.’46  
The whole Hellenization debate is further complicated by the fact that the same 
phenomenon that some call Hellenization, others think of as dehellenization. Grillmeier used 
the term Enthellenisierung, (dehellenization) to characterize the synthesis of Greek and biblical 
thinking that Ratzinger calls Hellenization.47 Likewise Ricken, whom De Vogel quotes, uses 
dehellenization as a description of the process which took place at Nicea, in which the church 
                                                             
43 Adolf Schlatter (1852-1938) biblical scholar, author of Die Theologie des Neuen Testaments, published as 
History of the Christ: New Testament Theology in two volumes, trans. Andreas J. Köstenberger, (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 1997). 
44 Markschies, Does it make sense to speak about a Hellenization of Christianity in Antiquity? p.31. 
45 Jaeger (Paedeia p.34) describes Tatianus as a ‘champion of anti-Hellenism’ who rejected the entire cultural 
milieu’. 
46 Markschies, Does it make sense to speak about a Hellenization of Christianity in Antiquity? p.30. 
47 Aloys Grillmeier (1910 – 1998) was a Jesuit theologian and cardinal of the Catholic Church. He is the author 
of Christ in Christian Tradition Volume 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451) (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1975). In his endnotes Ratzinger accepts that the literature on Hellenization is 
vast, but recommends Grillmeier ‘above all.’ Enthellenisierung is the word Ratzinger uses in para.32 of the 
Regensburg Lecture. 
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faced the ‘crisis of early Christian Platonism.’48 Subordinationism appealed to Middle and neo-
Platonic philosophers, because it maintained the Platonic order of divine principles. Athanasius’ 
homoousios therefore represents a dehellenization or ‘de-Platonization’; in denying 
subordinationism it abandons Platonism. 
Yet for von Harnack homoousios itself represents a deplorable deployment of Greek 
metaphysics. Markschies points out that von Harnack’s view was later taken up with enthusiasm 
by some Catholic theologians.49 In criticizing von Harnack’s dehellenization agenda, according 
to Markschies, Ratzinger has fallen into von Harnack’s trap of deploying a ‘historically highly 
problematical dualism’ and this has resulted in ‘a metaphysical glorification of the concept of 
Hellenization.’50  
3.1.7   Von Hildebrand’s response to Markschies  
Guerra makes a useful distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ dehellenization.51 Ratzinger’s 
principal target is von Harnack and his analysis is surely sound; the von Harnack project was 
to bring Christianity into harmony with modern reason. Dehellenization is ‘bad’ if it is based 
on the premise that the scriptures represent pure and simple Christian faith which we can only 
recover by jettisoning the alien accretion of philosophical thought. The premise is false; 
Hellenization was already present in the Wisdom literature, Septuagint and New Testament. 
‘Good dehellenization’ is the process whereby Greek thought is purified of the untruth of 
mythology and arrives at the truth of pure being. This then supports the revealed faith in the 
personal God, who is identified with this pure being.  
                                                             
48 Markschies, Does it make sense to speak about a Hellenization of Christianity in Antiquity? p.22. 
49 Markschies (p.22.) cites Hübner. Ratzinger concedes this point, when he says ‘When I was a student, and in 
the early years of my teaching, this programme was highly influential in Catholic theology too.’ (Regensburg 
Lecture, para.37). 
50 Markschies, Does it make sense to speak about a Hellenization of Christianity in Antiquity? p.32. 
51 Marc D. Guerra, ‘Good and Bad De-Hellenization’ in Cowan, Gained Horizons, pp. 41-48. 
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If there is a surprising weakness in Ratzinger’s presentation it is that he fails to allude 
to the process of ‘de-Platonization’, which was required when the patristic period made use of 
Greek metaphysics to express Christian doctrine. In his defence, Ratzinger reinforces the idea 
that Greek thought cannot be accepted into Christianity without this process of 
demythologization with phrases such as ‘what is Greek in the best sense of the word’, ‘the best 
of Greek thought at a deep level’ and ‘the critically purified Greek heritage’ (emphases 
added).52  
Alice Von Hildebrand has spoken of Plato as ‘a precursor of Christ.’53 Von Hildebrand 
identifies key teachings shared by both Platonism and Christianity, especially the passion for 
the truth and the identification of the existence of God as the key issue for human inquiry. 
Striking a Ratzingerian note, Von Hildebrand sees Plato as standing in judgement on some 
aspects of the modern world. She is critical of modernity’s predilection for opinion, as opposed 
to respect for the truth, which results in the notion of tolerance; this only leads to the notion of 
the impossibility of certainty and so to indifference.  She believes Plato anticipated that when 
religion was dismissed as ‘the cooking up of words and make-believe’ (Laws 886), humanity 
would fall back on the dictum of Protagoras, making humanity the measure of all things and 
creating, as Aristotle did, a secular ethic devoid of any transcendent grounding.54 Hildebrand’s 
aim is to demonstrate that ‘Plato’s ethic is noble and is clearly open to Christian ethics.’55 I note 
an important point here. Christian Platonists, as with ‘radical orthodox’ theologians, often enlist 
Plato’s support in their critique of the ills of modernity. 
                                                             
52 The Regensburg Lecture, paras.17, 22 and 31. 
53 Alice Von Hildebrand, ‘Platonism: An Atrium to Christianity’, Logos, Vol.10, No.2, (2007), pp.29-37. 
Von Hildebrand is a feminist theologian and philosopher, born in Brussels in 1923, former professor of 
Philosophy at Hunter College, New York City.  
54 Jaeger (p.66), quoting Laws IV 716c, praises Plato’s retort to Protagoras that “God is the Measure of all 
things.” 
55 Von Hildebrand, ‘Platonism: An Atrium to Christianity’, p.37. 
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3.1.8   Dörrie: Platonism and Christianity as incommensurable  
Heinrich Dörrie’s view was that Platonism and Christianity could never be compatible because 
they had radically opposed theologies.56 ‘Christian Platonism’ is a contradiction in terms. 
Platonism was not just a philosophy; it was a faith, with a soteriological dimension. This placed 
it in direct competition with Christianity, which is why the early Christians opposed Platonism 
and why Christians must always be anti-Platonists. To support his argument, Dörrie identifies 
five incommensurable dogmas: 
 PLATONISM CHRISTIANITY 
1 Degrees of divinity Equality of the Trinity 
2 Eternal uncreated world Created world 
3 Logos, revealed in ancient times Revelation through Jesus Christ 
4 Transmigration of souls No transmigration of souls 
5 Salvation through knowledge Salvation through faith 
 
As an alternative to the von Harnack demand for dehellenization, but in similar ‘anti-Greek’ 
vein, Dörrie wants to assert that Hellenization never took place. All that occurred was a 
superficial adoption of Platonic vocabulary. It came in useful in the early dogmatic 
controversies, but was of no lasting significance for Christianity. Christian faith was not 
influenced by Platonic thought. 
 
                                                             
56 Heinrich Dörrie, (1911-1983) Classical philologist who taught at Münster from 1961 – 1980. Author of Der 
Platonismus in der Antike, (Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzbog, 1987) published posthumously. 
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3.1.9   De Vogel: Plato and Christianity on common ground  
Cornelia Johanna De Vogel is ranked as ‘one of the foremost historians of ancient philosophy 
in the twentieth century.’57 Discussing the relationship between Platonism and Christianity, De 
Vogel accepts the accuracy of Dörrie’s incompatibilities and concedes that Platonic doctrines 
had to be de-Platonised before they could become a part of the Christian faith.58  After a detailed 
survey of the patristic period, De Vogel concludes that Christians of the early centuries felt a 
real affinity with Platonic metaphysics and ‘did not take an attitude of hostility towards Greek 
philosophy.’ On the contrary, it was something in which they were ‘positively interested’, 
which penetrated ‘the depths of their inner life’, but to which they adopted an attitude of ‘critical 
reserve’.59  
On that reality this world depended, in its beauty and its order, in its origin and its 
existence. “God is good,” He is the cause of all things and He holds the world together 
by His Providence.60 
Nevertheless, it is an inescapable fact that ‘God eternal Light, God eternal and perfect Being, 
Cause of all things existing, God eternal Wisdom and Goodness, could be thought of in terms 
of Platonic metaphysics.’61 De Vogel believes that the Christian use of Greek thought and 
language goes deeper and further than being ‘a mere outward thing’, a sort of strategy used to 
win people over:  
                                                             
57 Cornelia Johanna De Vogel (1905 – 1986) Dutch philosopher and theologian, author of a three-volume series 
Greek Philosophy, (3rd edn. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963 and Columbia: University of Carolina Press, 2002), regarded 
as the standard critical study of Plato, Aristotle, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and Patristic philosophy. 
The quotation is taken from M.E. Waite, (ed.) A History of Women Philosophers: Volume IV: 1900 to today, 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands:  Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1994) p.xxxiv.  
58 C.J. De Vogel, ‘Platonism and Christianity: a mere antagonism or a profound common ground?’, Vigiliae 
Christianae 39 (1985), Leiden: E.J. Brill pp.1-62. 
59 Ibid., p.27. 
60 Ibid., p.28. 
61 Ibid., p.29. 
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Plato’s metaphysics of transcendent and perfect being on which all things visible depend 
has actually become an essential and even a fundamental part of Christian thinking from 
the second century onward.62  
Ratzinger would agree. He calls it ‘a profound encounter’ or Begegnung and an ‘inner 
rapprochement’ or Zugehen (‘reach’).63 Jaeger uses Clement’s word synkrasis, which he 
translates as ‘mutual penetration’ or ‘blend’.64 After a thorough examination of the 
archaeological evidence, Meyers concludes that Hellenization should not be seen as a challenge 
or a clash, but as ‘the meeting of two traditions that would one day enhance each other.’65 De 
Vogel’s riposte to Dörrie is to list five beliefs shared by Platonism and Christianity as ‘a 
profound common ground’, five principles which in my view permeate Ratzingerian thought: 
i) The visible is not the primary reality 
ii) The visible points to perfect, absolute, primary reality 
iii) This invisible reality is of higher significance than visible reality 
iv) This fundamental fact must rule our life and conduct 
v) The human soul and therefore the human person is of infinite value 
De Vogel believes that ‘there has been no greater philosopher than Plato. He alone attained 
to the greatest height that can be reached by human reason, and he alone of philosophers can 
truly be called a precursor of Christianity,’ a philosopher who truly earned the title theologian, 
‘by lifting the mind to the Invisible and systematically reflecting on its structure.’66 Thus there 
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is a legitimate and living tradition called Christian Platonism, a tradition which could be 
described as ‘Christianity fed by Platonism in its innermost life.’67  
3.1.10   Taylor on Christianity and Platonism 
More recently, the relationship between Christianity and Platonism has been discussed by 
Charles Taylor.68 Ratzinger always maintains that Greek thought must be ‘critically purified’ 
before it can be accepted into Christianity.69 Taylor helpfully narrates six such purifications.70  
These can be tabulated thus: 
 PLATONISM CHRISTIANITY 
1. Body-soul dualism The whole person as body-soul unity 
2. Time beyond history Dynamic history with an eschatology 
3. Eventual loss of individuality Personal salvation and resurrection 
4. Contingency as a negative Contingency loved and used by God 
5. Emotions as inferior Emotions as agapē, passion for the divine 
6. Divinity as impersonal Divinity as personal Trinitarian koinōnia. 
 
These are transformations rather than incompatibilities. Taylor admires the Cambridge 
Platonists because ‘their account of reason had a place for an intuition of the divine’.71 He also 
sums up how Plato’s logos philosophy represents an ontological, epistemological and ethical 
unity: 
                                                             
67 De Vogel, Platonism and Christianity, p.47. 
68 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). 
69 Regensburg Lecture, para.31. 
70 Taylor, A Secular Age, pp.275-280. 
71 Ibid., p.226. 
57 
 
An order conceived in this way can be called a “meaningful” order; one involving an 
“ontic logos”. It sets the paradigm purposes for the beings within it. As humans we are 
to conform to our Idea, and this in turn must play its part in the whole, which among 
other things involves our being “rational”, i.e., capable of seeing the self-manifesting 
order.72 
3.2:  READING PLATO WITH RATZINGER 
3.2.1   Defining Plato  
Regensburg calls for a re-engagement with ‘Greek thought’, ‘Greek philosophical inquiry’, the 
‘Greek heritage’ and ‘what is Greek in the best sense of the word.’73 This ‘heart of Greek 
thought’ is clearly associated with Socrates and Plato.74 Yet it is almost impossible to 
understand what Ratzinger, (or anyone else?) means by ‘Plato’. Sallis, for example warns that 
there is no such thing as ‘the philosophy of Plato’ and that ‘Plato never says anything.’75 
Differences and developments in thought take place within Plato, from the early ‘Socratic’ 
dialogues, such as the Apology, the ‘middle’ dialogues, such as the Phaedo, and the ‘late’ 
dialogues, such as the Timaeus. Philosophical convention also distinguishes between ‘Middle 
Platonism’, closer to Plato and associated principally with Plutarch (c45CE – 120CE) and 
‘Neoplatonism’, acquiring a more mystical character and associated principally with Plotinus 
(c204CE – 270CE).76 Ratzinger says that the works of Plato ‘are as topical today as when they 
were written.’77 Yet the Ratzinger corpus provides no extended or detailed engagement with 
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the Platonic writings and seems to make little use of that pillar of Platonic thought, the Theory 
of Forms. The Theory of Forms, could be summed up in this way:  
We cannot understand anything in the visible world until we see it in relation to the 
stable patterns which exist in the intelligible realm. The world of everyday life is an 
image in time of the intelligible order which exists in eternity; a flowing, changing 
image.78 
Ratzinger does sound thoroughly Platonic when he speaks of ‘what cannot be seen’ as ‘more 
real than what can be seen,’ ‘the invisible as the true ground of all things’ and ‘the pre-existing, 
world-supporting reality of creative meaning.’79  
Richard Mohr says that the Timaeus is the Platonic dialogue in which all the elements 
of Plato are seen ‘related to each other all within a single frame, and where all the major 
branches of speculative thought in Plato – epistemology, metaphysics, theology, physics and to 
an extent logic and ethics – are seen.’80 I will use Timaeus 36D-37C as an illustration of 
Ratzinger’s epistemological and ethical contrast between opinions and truth.81 Plato is 
discussing the world-soul: 
Her verdict is true both concerning material and immaterial existence; for when...she deals 
with sensible, she forms opinions (doxai) and beliefs (pisteis); but when...she apprehends 
intelligible being (to logistikon), the knowledge (epistēmē) and reason (nous) which soul 
alone possesses, are made perfect in her (apoteleitai – ‘achieve their telos’).82 
I summarize Greek thought by using Ratzinger’s threefold definition of the content of good 
Hellenization: 
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i) ‘talk about being...the truth of existence’ 83  
ii) ‘the mathematical structure of matter’ 84  
iii) ‘to act reasonably’ 85 
I then propose that logos represents what I will dub ‘the three rationalities’, creator, creation 
and creature. The human mind is created by the same creator who creates the natural world and 
it is therefore capable of apprehending in thought and understanding the creator who is the true 
being underlying the natural world. I link these three rationalities to the three philosophical 
areas of ontology, epistemology and ethics. ‘Greek philosophical inquiry’ then has a content, 
the three rationalities, but is of course also a process or methodology.86 
I could agree with Guerra, that for Ratzinger ‘the question of faith and Greek philosophy is 
a secondary question’ but I would prefer to say ‘a foundational question’.87 Greek thought is 
more than merely a device Ratzinger uses to attack modernity’s restriction of reason. At 
Regensburg Ratzinger moves discernibly through the three Platonic modes, from the 
ontological, ‘the question of God’, to the epistemological, ‘empiricism’, to the ethical, ‘not to 
act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary to the nature of God’, and all is couched within 
the Platonic process of dialogue, ‘the dialogue of cultures’.88 
I will therefore now proceed to examine the logos in these four modes, both in Ratzinger’s 
thought and in other Christian writers where Platonic thought has been Christianized. I will 
suggest some influences on Ratzinger and will clarify the purposes that the logos fulfils for him, 
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observing how Plato provides support for the Ratzinger critique of modernity, but also drawing 
key conclusions for the health and integrity of the Christian tradition. 
3.2.2   Ontology: logos and the rationality of being   
In this mode Ratzinger uses Plato to restore the primacy of the metaphysical and to critique 
modernity’s rejection of the transcendent.  Greek thought offers a ‘glimpse of the eternal, which 
is the real,’ because it seeks the concept of the Highest Being, ‘what the Highest Being is like 
in itself.’89 This ‘absolute Being’ is ‘the first stage of ontological thinking.’90  Ratzinger 
proposes ‘the Greeks’ ontology - its question concerning is’ and ‘the Greek expectation and its 
question concerning truth’.91 Being is ‘the highest culminating concept’, ‘pure thought’, ‘pure 
eternity and unchangeability,’ ‘the esse subsistens’, ‘the absolute Being, that is discovered in 
the lonely silence of philosophical speculation.’92 The Greek enlightenment can be summed up 
in this way: ‘Greek philosophy regarded it as its decisive discovery, that it had discovered, 
behind all the many individual things with which man has to deal daily, the comprehensive idea 
of Being, which it had also considered the most appropriate expression of the divine.’93 
Ratzinger specifically references Guardini and I propose that Guardini’s Death of 
Socrates provides an interpretative key to Regensburg. Rowland places both Guardini and 
Ratzinger in the tradition of Augustine, Newman and Przywara.94 Guardini associates Greek 
thought with the posing of the ontological question ‘what is the nature of things.’95 This is 
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answered by ‘that which is essential truth, existing above phenomena; it is likewise the true and 
imperishable reality.’96 De Vogel provides a summary of Greek ontology: 
For Platonists, indeed, things invisible were far more important than things visible. They 
alone were the “true reality”, and therefore of a far greater interest than things here. This 
world was regarded as essentially depending on that other Reality which was the only 
one to be named “Being” in the full and perfect sense.97 
This Platonic ontology, once Christianized, has been fruitful for theology. De Vogel sums up 
Christianity as ‘the strict transcendency of God to all things created, and at the same time His 
unsurpassable nearness to man.’ She contends that we have drawn on Platonic metaphysics to 
express this truth. ‘Do we have any better or equivalent thinking forms? No, we don’t.’98 She 
notes how Clement of Alexandria’s thoughts ‘on the rationality of simple faith’ were taken up 
by John Henry Newman in his Grammar of Assent. Mark McIntosh has illustrated the Platonic 
strain in Newman’s thought, making use of passages from the Apologia in which Newman 
exhibits Platonic ontology.99 From his boyhood Newman believed in ‘the unreality of material 
phenomena.’ He could almost be alluding to Plato’s Theory of Forms when he speaks in 
Apologia 29 of ‘the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and the instruments of 
real things unseen.’ It is the concept of sacramentality that raises this doctrine from mere 
Platonism to Christian Platonism. 
From the ontological theme I conclude that to maintain its health the Christian tradition 
must always uphold a broadened rationality, what McIntosh calls the ‘metaphysical vision of 
                                                             
96 Guardini, Death of Socrates, p.103. 
97 De Vogel, Platonism and Christianity, p.28. 
98 Ibid., p.34. 
99  Mark McIntosh, ‘Newman and Christian Platonism in Britain’, The Journal of Religion, Vol.91, No.3, (2011) 
pp.344-364. 
62 
 
the cosmos, unfolded over centuries,’ which ‘understood finite creaturely “being” as existing 
in analogy to Being itself as the source of existence.’100  
3.2.3   Epistemology: logos and the rationality of the universe   
In this mode Ratzinger is using Plato to remind modernity that its positivist epistemology relies 
on the presupposition of the ‘mathematical structure of matter’, which is ‘the Platonic element 
in the modern understanding of nature’, but also to critique modernity’s ‘reduction of the radius 
of science and reason’.101 For Ratzinger, Being is ‘the eternal mathematics of the universe’, and 
‘the real truth and ground of all Being’.102 The central problem is the link between the 
transcendent and material worlds. Ratzinger tells Seewald ‘To a certain extent I am a Platonist. 
I think that a kind of memory, of recollection of God is, as it were, etched in man, though it 
needs to be awakened.’103 The doctrine of analogy explains how this awakening is possible: 
‘between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy...’.104 
I suggest Ratzinger’s thinking here has affinities with that of Przywara.105 He may also 
be paying homage to his teacher Söhngen, a thoughtful proponent of the analogy of being.106 
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This theory holds that there is an analogical relationship between “being what it is” (So-sein or 
essence) and “being there at-all” (Da-sein or existence).107 McIntosh points out that this 
epistemology has an eschatological or mystagogical dimension: this is what the world is for, 
‘God is intimately...present and at work’ in his universe and is using it to lead us back to its 
source and our source in Him.’108 
McIntosh describes Newman’s vision of ‘an intelligible cosmos whose visible being is 
sacramental, whose every creature is an event of intelligent communication.’ Newman locates 
us in ‘a speaking universe’ and ‘existence is resonant with divine meaning because it is ‘a 
continual divine self-communication.’109 He notes the Platonic influence on Newman of 
Augustine and Bonaventure, the subjects of Ratzinger’s two doctoral dissertations. Chenu, 
another influence, emphasised the Augustinian Platonic heritage of ‘the distinction between the 
intelligible and the sense-perceptible worlds into which the universe was divided.’110 McIntosh 
also cites Bonaventure’s expression of the Christian Platonist tradition: ‘It is certain that as long 
as man stood up...he had the knowledge of created things and through their significance, was 
carried up to God, to praise, worship and love Him. This is what creatures are for, and this is 
how they are led back to God.’111 The empiricist epistemology is a flawed, restricted rationality. 
‘Every event of human knowing is once more recognizable as an encounter with God.’112 
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A key feature of those scholars who style themselves as ‘radical orthodox’ theologians 
is a commitment to Platonic ‘participation.’ Milbank states that ‘The central framework of 
radical orthodoxy is “participation” as developed by Plato and reworked by Christianity.’113 
They recommend their theology as a combination of ‘participatory philosophy and 
incarnational theology,’114 which we could see almost as a definition of Christian Platonism. 
We could say that the radical orthodox concept of “participation” is a reworking of the doctrine 
of analogy, another attempt to make the link between the transcendent and the time-bound 
material. 
The work of ‘radical orthodox’ theologian Catherine Pickstock on Plato’s Cratylus115 is 
relevant to my enquiry because she uses the concept of the logos to argue for what we could 
call a correspondence theory of language.116  Pickstock shares Ratzinger’s desire for a 
broadened rationality. A Christian Platonist Theory of Forms will understand language, or 
logos, as in its essence religious, a divinely inspired ‘self-disclosure’ of the transcendent, i.e. 
participation. Ratzinger’s mentor Guardini would probably agree with Pickstock; 
Socratic/Platonic thought is not ‘mere abstraction’, or ‘mystical unsubstantiality.’ It is imbued 
with ‘the Greek feeling for the body’, ‘the vivacity of man’s being.’117  
From the epistemological theme I conclude that Christianity must always be engaged in 
a battle against the Hobbesian vision in which ‘the universe is a body’ and ‘the universe is 
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all.’118 The Christian tradition must insist that positivism represents a restriction of rationality, 
limiting the capacity of the human person to apprehension of the sensible world. 
3.2.4   Ethics: logos and the rationality of the divine 
In this mode Ratzinger is using Plato to restore the idea that each person is capable of access to 
moral truth and so to critique the tendency of those of religious faith to sever the link between 
what is right and what is reasonable. ‘Not to act “with logos” is contrary to God’s nature’.119 
This phrase, repeated from para.13, expresses the ethical heart of the Regensburg Lecture. 
Ratzinger rehearses the debate from the Euthyphro on the relationship between morality and 
religion. Is an action right because God wills it, or does God will it because it is right? 
Theological voluntarism may preserve God’s transcendence, but it forfeits the congruence 
between human and divine rationality. If moral action amounts to no more than doing God’s 
will, then the human person is open to performing irrational acts, purely because of the 
conviction that these acts are God’s will. 
Guardini is impressed by Socrates’ ‘daimonion’, ‘a certain sign from God’ which 
provides him with an unerring guide to ethical behaviours in the form of a deeply intuitive 
conscience, ‘a kind of voice, which, whenever I hear it, always turns me back from something 
which I was going to do.’120 Socrates is accused of atheism, but is able to insist that ‘I do believe 
in the Gods’ and ‘God has commanded me...to spend my life searching for wisdom.’121 This 
Greek religious spirit is profoundly moral. Guardini interprets Socrates’ message as ‘Man must 
understand his life’s truest task is a manifestation of the divine will.’122 Guardini notes that the 
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performance of God’s will is not defined merely by passivity, or even receptivity, but by 
‘watchfulness for the numinous command.’123 
From the ethical theme I conclude that a healthy Christianity must always seek to 
maintain a dynamic link between religion, reason and morality. 
3.2.5   Dialogue: logos and the rationality of dialectic   
Ratzinger uses Plato’s concept of dialogue to critique modernity’s view of dialogue as mere 
political negotiation. Pickstock believes that Plato offers us logos as dialogos, dialectic. This 
means that the Socratic method adopts a ‘many-layered and digressive approach.’ It is a vehicle 
for ambivalence and ambiguity, ‘self-consciously incomplete’ and ‘enigmatic’, imbued with a 
strategy or dialectical quality she calls ‘demur and indirectness.’ Logos, or the ‘art of logos,’ is 
no mere intellectual or rational exercise; it is a ‘performance,’ a ‘giving birth’ to the 
transcendent logos ‘under the prompting of desire.’124 ‘Socrates identifies the piercing ερως 
with the “force” or “power” of λογος as dialectic.’ The transcendent logos is made available to 
us by way of the logos of dialogue, or dialectic. There are transcendent logoi behind the words 
we use, a transcendent logos behind the discourse or dialectic we use to understand the world. 
Language is ‘the constant work of synthesis between reason and emotion.’125 Christianity 
should seek to recover the ‘Platonic link between reason, emotion, language and the divine.’126 
De Vogel points out how misleading it would be to think of Platonism as a defined, 
closed system. Platonic philosophy is always logos in the sense that it is ‘always a matter of 
discussion.’127 Pickstock believes that the exercise of true reason, the logos, is a far ‘warmer’ 
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exercise, which engages both emotions and senses, because ultimately it has as its telos the 
beautiful and the good, for which reason, the logos, has an insatiable, innate desire. So 
philosophy, far from being the desiccated, analytic exercise of Western convention, is ‘a kind 
of terrible and physical anguish, which yearns to see again and again intimations of the highest 
reality, within material and beloved reality.’128 So language, logos, operates at a point of 
interchange between the transcendent and the material worlds. Logos, or reason, is not mere 
rationality or intellect, but is imbued with desire: ‘And insofar as he sees logos or thought-
language as corresponding to things, this is a matter of corresponding through desire to the 
disclosed excellence of things in the light of the form of the Good.’129 In my reading of 
Ratzinger, Pickstock’s insights are highly relevant, since I consider it a key feature of 
Ratzinger’s theological process that it is shot through with feeling and restrained passion. 
In Guardini, as in Plato, logos refers to the process of rational discourse. In the Phaedo 
Socrates faces the powerful objections of Simmias and Cebes. Guardini comments that ‘we 
have experienced the collapse of the logos, which we took to be reliable.’130 In a footnote 
Guardini points out that ‘The word logoi means spoken words, but also the problem stated in 
them, and the logical process by which it is discussed.’ Logoi are the words and arguments of 
philosophy, but logos denotes a true dialectic, which goes far beyond the attitude of those who 
are only anxious ‘to persuade their audience that they are right.’131 True logos is man’s 
experience of ‘the meaning of his own existence and of existence in general.’ In the Phaedo, 
Socrates says that ‘to hate reasoning is the greatest evil that can happen to us.’ Thus Socrates 
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equates misology, the hatred or distrust of sincere, rational, philosophical dialectic, with 
misanthropy, the hatred or mistrust of mankind himself. 
From the theme of dialogue, I conclude that to be true to its nature the Christian tradition 
must engage in philosophical intercourse as a deeply religious exercise. 
3.2.6   Logos as aletheia: dialogue in search of truth    
The search for truth, as Tilley has suggested, is an appropriate title for the entire Ratzinger 
project.132 It was Guardini who set the compass for this trajectory, summed up by Socrates’ 
statement in the Euthyphro: ‘I like nothing but what is true.’133 At his trial in the Apology, 
Socrates’ accusers will be ‘sentenced by truth.’134 Guardini defines ‘the Socratic-Platonic mind’ 
as ‘the search after the essential.’135 ‘The Platonic man wants to know.’136 
The climax of Regensburg is the moment when the personality of Socrates intrudes, to defend 
the process of philosophy when it is conducted in the spirit of a search for the transcendent 
truth, an ontological orientation: 
It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false 
notions that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being – but in 
this way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss.137 
The passage, from the Phaedo (88c), is the one alluded to earlier in which Socrates reacts to the 
apparent collapse of his arguments. This plunges the company into scepticism (apistia), which 
causes Socrates to warn against misology (misologia) and equate it with misanthropy 
(misanthropia). To lose our commitment to the logos would be to lose our humanity. Guardini 
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lauds ‘the brilliant advance which Socrates makes in the cause of thought in the next 
paragraphs.’138 To engage with antilogikoi logoi, antithetical or contradictory arguments is fine; 
Socrates does this all the time. But antilogikoi logoi in the sense of indulgence in extreme 
combative contradiction for its own sake leads to ‘the unique discernment that nothing sound139 
and nothing solid140 is to be found in any object or any argument (logos).’ With an allusion to 
Heraclitus’ “all is flux” (panta rhei), Socrates expresses dismay at the relativistic scepticism 
which will result if the philosophic enterprise, the technē of logos, is abandoned: 
Everything in existence, according to them, is fluctuating this way and that, just like the 
tide in the Euripus: nothing abides for a moment in one stay.141 
Burger says this shows us ‘the difficulty of maintaining love of men and love of logos.’142 The 
point Burger is making is that we tend to use logos for argumentation and dispute for its own 
sake, when we should prefer logos as constructive debate and discussion in a search for the 
truth about the human person. We can do this if we avoid ‘abandoning trust in the soundness of 
logos itself’ and the ‘misological projection of our own deficiency onto the logos itself.’143 
Gallop reminds us that the Theory of Forms is ‘the assumption that truth is discoverable through 
philosophical arguments.’144 There is a deep connection between the logos of philosophical 
argument and the logos of the realities which philosophical argument tries to discern. 
Here the inadequacy of the translations ‘true’ (alēthēs) and ‘argument’ (logos) becomes 
apparent. ‘Truth’ (alētheia) not only belongs to arguments (logoi), but also characterizes 
or designates ‘the things that are’. It is a property not only of arguments, but of what 
                                                             
138 Guardini, The Death of Socrates, p.189. 
139 ‘hygies’ – sound, healthy (Liddell and Scott, abridged version, 1953). 
140 ‘bebaios’ – firm, steady, steadfast, trusty, sure, safe; a favourite word in Plato, which we might relate to 
Guardini’s stress on ‘validity’. 
141 R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedo: Translation with an Introduction and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1955), p.108. (Phaedo 90c). 
142 Ronna Burger, The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth, (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999) p.115. 
143 Ibid., p.117. 
144 David Gallop, Plato Phaedo translated with notes (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975) p.154. 
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they express. And ‘arguments’ (logoi) are not mere pieces of reasoning, to be assessed 
for their internal logic, but are characterizations of a “reality” external to themselves. 
These nuances defy translation.145 
Accordingly, in terms of the theme of truth, I can sum up the Ratzinger project, Regensburg, 
Plato, the logos, the contribution of Greek thought to Christianity, by that one phrase from the 
Phaedo - ‘the truth of existence.’146 Jaeger brings the themes of ontology, epistemology and 
ethics together in this quotation: 
But had not Plato, in his last great work, the Laws, taught that the Logos is the golden 
link through which the Lawgiver and Teacher and his work are connected with the 
divine Nous? Had he not placed man in a universe that in its perfect order and harmony 
was an eternal model for the life of man?147 
3.3   CRITIQUING RATZINGER  
3.3.1    Defining Greek thought 
A number of weaknesses in Ratzinger’s predilection for Plato suggest themselves. Although it 
must be accepted that he has ‘painted with broad strokes’ (para.54), there is still a lack of clarity 
in his definition of Greek thought, so that we are not sure exactly what is being recommended. 
I have attempted to construct an understanding of Greek thought from the Ratzinger literature. 
Even there, I find no clear exposition of Platonic doctrine. I do agree, for example, with Guerra, 
that it is confusing to equate Platonism with Cartesianism and to associate both with positivism. 
                                                             
145 Gallop, Plato Phaedo, p.154. 
146 The Greek reads ‘tōn de ontōn tēs alētheias te kai epistēmēs sterēthē, literally ‘would be deprived both of the 
truth of being, and of the knowledge of being,’ which Ratzinger turns into ‘Der Wahrheit des Seienden verlustig 
gehen’, thus omitting the word ‘knowledge.’ Hackforth (p.108) translates ‘be debarred from knowing the truth 
about reality.’ There is in fact an ambiguity in the three genitives and the position of kai, to which Burger draws 
our attention. Is it ‘the truth of the knowledge of being’ or ‘the truth and knowledge of being’ or ‘the truth of 
being and of knowledge.’ Burger draws a subtle conclusion that for Socrates, ‘avoidance of misology depends 
precisely on abandoning the desire for knowledge of the beings themselves, in order to preserve trust in the 
possibility of discovering “the truth of the beings” through logoi.’ (Burger, p.118) 
147 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p.35. The reference is to Laws I.645 a-c. 
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However, I understand why; all three presuppose the mathematical structure of matter. Yet 
rationalism is the opposite of empiricism. 148  
Twomey, however, does ask us to remember ‘the fragmentary nature of all he has 
written.’149 Avoiding the Rahnerian temptation to build a complete theological system, 
Ratzinger prefers to make ‘contributions to an ongoing debate,’150 a genuinely Socratic 
methodology. Yet I still see surprising lacunae in Ratzinger’s Plato, not only the neglect of the 
Theory of Forms, but the lack of emphasis on the role of personal moral integrity, so central to 
Guardini’s understanding of Socrates. Ratzinger might reply that it is exactly for this purpose 
that Socrates enters Regensburg in para.61, where the three rationalities and the technē of 
philosophy come together in a historical person. 
Ambiguities and lacunae in the presentation of Plato may undermine Ratzinger’s 
dehellenization narrative. I am not sure how seriously Ratzinger expects the Church to take 
Greek thought today, whether to use its content instrumentally, for the clarification of Christian 
doctrine, or to study it for its own sake. Perhaps Greek thought is extolled merely for posing 
the right questions, rather than providing the right answers. I am not sure whether it is 
‘philosophy’ as a discipline which is to be restored to Christian theology, or Socratic dialectic 
as a pedagogy and way of meeting. Nichols attributes to Ratzinger the view that the Church has 
much to do in order to ‘correct and purify’ Plato’s intention. I would add, still in faithfulness to 
Ratzinger, that in our ongoing dialogue with the logos tradition, Plato has much to offer to 
correct and purify both the Church and secular modernity. If Twomey is right, then the prime 
methodology of Ratzingerian theology is ‘attention to the whole history of human questioning’ 
                                                             
148 Marc D. Guerra, ‘Good and Bad De-Hellenization’, in Cowan, Gained Horizons, p.43. Guerra demands a 
distinction between pre-modern and modern science; Descartes gives a non-teleological account of matter, Plato 
a teleological. 
149 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age – a theological portrait, p.41. 
150 Ibid., p.41. 
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and to ‘the great thinkers of mankind.’151 This means that for Ratzinger, theology ‘takes up the 
fundamental questions of Greek philosophy.’152 
3.3.2  The question of historicity 
Corkery narrates the bitter dispute between Ratzinger and Kasper which had the issue 
of Platonism at its heart.153 The difference was essentially between a modern/postmodern 
approach that finds truth in the historical, the contingent and the particular, and a traditional 
approach that finds truth in a radical inward turn to the universal and the invisible. It may be 
that Ratzinger struggles to define his Platonism, while Kasper struggles to define what he will 
learn from the empirical. Historical thinking is central to Ratzinger from his 
Augustine/Bonaventure studies onwards.154 However, in my view Ratzinger is rightly unwilling 
to yield on the principle of logos before ethos that he learned from Guardini. His ‘theological 
seismograph’ alerts him to the contemporary fashion for praxis, the prospect of an uncritical 
accommodation to modernity and a false utopianism.155 
Occupying the same space as Kasper, Rausch describes the ‘ahistorical’ aspect of 
Ratzinger’s thought, which he ascribes to ‘a Platonic cast to his thought’, as ‘a remaining 
concern’ which hampers theological development. 
                                                             
151 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age, p.39. 
152 Ibid., p.109. 
153 James Corkery S.J., Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate Hopes, (Dublin: 
Dominican Publications, 2009), pp.69-74. The dispute took place in the late 1960s and was consequent upon 
Kasper’s review of Introduction to Christianity. Corkery’s personal conclusion is that ‘a qualified Platonism is 
evident in his work.’ See Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas, p.157, n.26. 
154 For an attempt to tease out a fully developed theory of history in the work of Benedict, see Brennan C. 
Pursell, ‘The Historical Theory of Benedict XVI’, Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, Vol.11, 
No.3, (Summer 2008), pp.49-67. Pursell argues that Ratzinger’s bid to rescue biblical exegesis from the 
restricted rationality of modernity is paralleled by a suggestion that Catholic historians, at least, have the courage 
to include religious and spiritual explanations into their historical studies. For Ratzinger’s critique and 
repositioning of exegesis with historicity see J. Ratzinger with Vittorio Messori, trans. Salvator Attanasio and 
Graham Harrison, The Ratzinger Report: An Exclusive Interview on the State of the Church, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1985), p.75. 
155 I have borrowed this phrase from D. Vincent Twomey, ‘Pope Benedict XVI: Joseph Ratzinger on Politics’, in 
Logos, Vol.18, No.4, (Fall 2015), pp.82-99. 
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He speaks of the church not as a historical reality, growing through its history, 
borrowing from the cultures in which it is embedded but more as a Platonic idea existing 
eternally in the mind of God.156 
I would counter this opinion with the emphasis on dialogue and on interculturality which 
underpins Ratzinger’s recovery of the Greek logos.157 Nichols helps by reminding us that the 
tension between the invisible and the visible is as old as Augustine, in whom we see a 
development from ‘a purely metaphysical theology to a more historical understanding of 
Christianity.’158 Inevitably, this tension is found in the Augustinian scholar Ratzinger, who 
recognizes the claims of Platonism as a ‘philosophical partner’ to Christian revelation and for 
whom ‘turning to the Platonic corpus for assistance will recur in his own evolution.’159 
3.3.3   Conscience – the key to a Platonic Christian humanist utopia 
An overall answer to this collection of questions may be provided by Ratzinger’s 
definition of the Greek project as ‘Platonic – Christian – humanist “utopia”.’160 The word 
‘utopia’ bears the speech marks to remind us of Ratzinger’s oft-repeated aversion to all forms 
of utopian thought. He acknowledges two Platos, the ‘otherworldly’ Plato of the Theory of 
Forms and Plato the ‘politician’ who seeks to reconstruct the sick polis. Both Platos draw their 
inspiration from Socrates, ‘the death of the just man in conflict with the laws of the State’ and 
herein lies ‘a real synthesis’ of the transcendent and the immanent.161  All the themes we have 
                                                             
156 Thomas P. Rausch, Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to his Theological Vision, (New York: Paulist Press, 
2009), p150. He contrasts Ratzinger with the theological historicity associated with Bernard Lonergan. See 
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, ‘The Transition from a Classical World View to Historical Mindedness’, in William F.J. 
Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell, (eds.) A Second Collection, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), pp.1-9. 
157 See for example Truth and Tolerance, p.68, for an eloquent expression of his views. 
158 Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger, 
(London: Burns & Oates, 2007), p.22. 
159 Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, p.23. In the same vein, Nichols (p.120) says ‘Ratzinger insists 
that Platonism had, and has, much to offer Christianity, by way of assisting the latter’s ‘philosophical unfolding’.  
160 J. Ratzinger, trans. James M. Quigley S.J., ‘Eschatology and Utopia’, in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio Vol 
1: The Unity of the Church, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), pp.10-25, at p.24. 
161 Ibid., p.18. 
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encountered in Greek thought, the ontological theme of the rationality of being, the 
epistemological theme of the rationality of the natural world and the ethical theme of the 
rationality of the divine will, as well as the theme of dialogue in search of truth, come together 
in Ratzinger’s Greek-inspired teaching on conscience. This can be located in the Socratic 
concept of daimon and the Platonic concept of anamnēsis. We have adverted to the connection 
between Ratzinger, Newman and Plato, and Ratzinger identifies Socrates and Newman as his 
two ‘signposts to conscience.’162 
Conscience is central to Newman’s thinking ‘because truth is the heart of everything’.163 
Newman’s conscience is ‘the commanding presence of the voice of truth’, the touching of 
man’s ‘intimate sphere’ by a truth that comes from God. In promoting conscience Newman was 
opposing relativism, the subjectivist idea that ‘the subject has the final word vis-à-vis the claims 
made by authority and the liberal idea that we live in a world devoid of truth and that the best 
we can hope for is a compromise between the individual and society.164 We will know we are 
acting in accordance with our conscience if we find ourselves opposing both our own wishes 
and advantages and the consensus of society and political power. 
The person of Socrates, as martyr to the truth, is highly relevant to today and a 
permanent reminder that the Greek philosophical endeavour contains a ‘salvation-historical 
privilege’, which bears prophetic witness to the conviction ‘that man is capable of perceiving 
                                                             
162 Ratzinger, ‘If You Want Peace … Conscience and Truth’, in Values in a Time of Upheaval, pp.75-99, 
originally published as ‘Wenn du Frieden willst, achte das Gewissen jedes Menschen: Gewissen und Wahrheit’, 
in Fied quarens intellectum: Beiträge zur Fundamentaltheologie, ed. Michael Kessler, Wolfhart Pannenbereg, 
and Herman Josef Pottmeyer (Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 1992). In true Ratzingerian style, the article draws 
upon the Old Testament, St.Paul, the Gospels, especially the Gospel of John, the Fathers, in the form of St.Basil 
and upon Augustine, whose idea of a good ‘imprinted’ on us will inform Aquinas’ presentation of natural law.  
163 Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.85. 
164 Ibid., p.86. Ratzinger here includes in parenthesis a reference to another great signpost to conscience, 
St.Thomas More. This is a theme to which he will return in the Westminster Address in 2010. His admiration for 
Thomas More is fed by Berglar’s 1979 study. See P. Berglar, Die Stunde des Thomas Morus, 3rd edn. (Olten: 
Walter, 1981). 
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truth and that this ability both sets a limit to all power’ and guarantees man’s resemblance to 
God.165  
Specifically, from Plato Ratzinger draws the term anamnēsis as his preferred definition 
of conscience, a term he finds ‘clearer, deeper and purer’ than the Stoic term synderēsis, as well 
as more in keeping with biblical thinking.166 Anamnēsis is an ontological term which represents 
‘a kind of primal remembrance of the good and the true’, an ‘existential tendency’ which can 
be connected to the idea of being made in the image of God and which Twomey calls ‘the 
primal level of conscience.’167 We naturally tend towards the things of God and recognize our 
being to be in harmony with certain things. We can call it ‘an inner sense, a capacity for 
recognition’, or a ‘capacity bestowed on man to go beyond the question of what he can do and 
to perceive what he ought to do.’168 Following Ratzinger, Casarella proposes Socrates as ‘a 
transcultural exemplum of conscience’ and defines the Ratzingerian concept of conscience as 
‘the Socratic feature of maintaining a connatural affinity with a truth not of one’s own 
making.’169 
Socrates and Plato therefore teach us that the individual and the community can continue 
to exist only if there is ‘a just order of being’ which acts as a kind of ‘utopian’ template from 
which they derive their standards and to which they feel a responsibility. This is the first great 
pearl of Platonic thought we must treasure; we will take it with us into the dialogue with 
Habermas in Chapter Eight. 
                                                             
165 Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.90. 
166 Ibid., p.91. 
167 Twomey, Conscience of our Age, p.122. 
168 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.90 and p.92. 
169 Peter Casarella, ‘Culture and Conscience in the Thought of Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI’, in John C. 
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The second pearl of Platonic – Christian humanism, or Christian Platonism if you will, 
is Regensburg’s broadening of reason for the dialogue of cultures, which includes a broadening 
of conscience: 
...to insist that the concept of reason be broadened and that not only the demand for what 
can be empirically verified, but also the demand for the values by which the empirical 
is set in order, be seen as one of the tasks of reason – which therefore must always be 
schooling itself in the great religious traditions of mankind.170 
This is an insight we must take with us into the dialogue with Islam in Chapter Nine. Conscience 
is the key to both these great dialogues, because, as Casarella points out, conscience is an 
attribute of human nature,  
‘that in its universal, quasi-Socratic scope serves as a beacon to all cultures. At the same 
time, a Christian conscience needs to confront itself and other moral systems in 
culturally specific situations to guarantee that its truthfulness stands at the service of 
human nature in all its conflicting variations.’171  
3.4: PLATO, LOGOS THEOLOGY AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
I can now summarize how Ratzinger sees the logos as a key to a solution for a range of 
problems.172 In so doing, I am starting to construct what I am calling ‘a logos theology’, and to 
apply that logos theology to the concept of human rights. 
Firstly, the logos can be translated as ‘reason which is creative’ and is thus identified 
with the creator God. There is ‘a real analogy’ between us and this creator God, ‘between his 
eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason’. God therefore has to be accessible to rational 
                                                             
170 Ratzinger, Eschatology and Utopia, p.24. 
171 Casarella, Culture and Conscience, p.81. 
172 Ratzinger even finds time at Regensburg to make a reference, albeit in one brief sentence (para.28), to his 
favourite topic of the liturgy. Possibly his most central personal project, in continuity with his beloved mentor 
Guardini, is to restore logikē latreia, a liturgy in harmony with the logos, the eternal Word. 
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discourse and inquiry; Christians must not abandon philosophical inquiry into the nature of 
God. If there is an analogy between the human and the divine, then this acts as a foundation for 
human rights.  
Secondly, the word logos refers to Jesus Christ, who is thus identified with ‘creative 
reason’, the God through whom the world was created. The word logos can also be translated 
as ‘Creator Spirit’.  So ‘a reason which is creative and capable of self-communication’ is present 
in all three persons of the Trinity; Christians must not abandon the early Christological and 
Trinitarian doctrines. They encapsulate what I will term the ‘relationality with rationality’ 
which lies at the heart of the concept of human rights. 
Thirdly, if God’s nature is logos, then religious morality should adopt a rational 
approach; Christians must not abandon philosophical ethics. The concept of human rights can 
always be expressed in purely philosophical, rather than theological terms. 
Fourthly, in the same way, theology is an inquiry into God whose nature is reason; 
Christians must not reduce theology to a pseudo-scientific humanity. Christian formulations of 
human rights cannot be reduced to a technical or empirical formula. 
Fifthly, the word logos tells us that rationality is an irreducible attribute of God; even in 
a multicultural world of religious pluralism, Christians must not set aside Greek rationality. It 
shares the foundational significance of the scriptures themselves. Christian formulations of 
human rights can still be grounded in the foundational philosophy of Plato. 
Five parallel dysfunctions in contemporary society, I suggest, can be healed by a 
recovery of the concept of the logos.  
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Firstly, the modern application of reason grew from the belief ‘in the mathematical 
structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality’, but this resulted from the idea that it owed its origin 
to creative reason, the logos. Secular society should not regard it as irrational to inquire into the 
source and origin of the mathematical structure of the universe, the question of God. This 
includes inquiry into the ultimate nature of the human person. 
Secondly, the Western academy should see rationality as capable of embracing the 
metaphysical, since human reason itself is created by, and reflects, the ‘creative reason’ 
responsible for everything that exists. Secular society should not regard theology as an irrational 
discipline of no consequence. Theology can help secular society deepen its understanding of 
the concept of human rights. 
Thirdly, the logos concept contains the implication of the in-built capacity of every 
human mind to reflect upon and understand the source of its own rationality. Secular society 
should accept that religion is a universal human phenomenon and should not exclude it from 
the public conversation. To speak of human rights in religious terms renders them more, not 
less, inclusive. 
Fourthly, the logos concept upholds the concept of a rationality shared by all persons 
which gives them an inbuilt sense of ‘the true and the good’. Secular society should not dismiss 
ethical considerations as purely subjective, but should encourage a shared public discourse on 
ethical values. Human rights must be grounded in the conviction that the search for the true and 
the good is valid. 
Fifthly, the logos concept insists that God is rational and does not act irrationally, so our 
task is not simply to carry out the inscrutable will of God. Followers of all religions in general, 
and of Islam in particular, should re-examine the relationship between faith, reason and 
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morality. Human rights must not be rejected by religious cultures on the grounds that they are 
derived merely from reason and not revelation.   
Revelation, nevertheless, cannot be set aside. I have argued that Plato, at his very ‘best’, 
represents the expectation of truth. But I also propose that we must move beyond Plato, because 
Plato has his limits: ‘The philosophical God is essentially self-centred, thought contemplating 
itself, “a God of detachment”.173 The philosophical God is pure thought, ‘he who exists in 
himself and needs only himself.’174 
To satisfy ourselves with Plato would be to adhere to a monotheism derived purely from 
philosophical speculation. Such a belief, while representing a perception of the truth, could have 
no real religious force.  ‘One cannot worship one’s own intellectual concepts.’175  
CONCLUSION 
‘Creative reason’ is probably Ratzinger’s favourite translation of the logos. ‘Logos means 
“reason”, “sense”, “word”. It is based on the notion that ‘thought and thought alone is divine.’176 
But this thought ‘is capable of producing material and is to be regarded as the true point of 
origin of reality.’177 So logos is creative reason, which speaks and communicates itself. The 
term ‘creative reason’ is carefully chosen by Ratzinger to bring together the creation theology 
of biblical faith and the ultimate Being of Greek rationality. As De Vogel points out, no self-
respecting Platonist could either arrive at by discussion, or accept philosophically, that ‘The 
Word became flesh and dwelt among us.’178 This astounding biblical insight is derived not from 
                                                             
173 Introduction to Christianity, p.147. 
174 Ibid., p.147. 
175 Truth and Tolerance, p.154. 
176 Introduction to Christianity, p.148. 
177 Truth and Tolerance, p.150. 
178 De Vogel, Platonism and Christianity, p.29. 
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speculative thought but from revelation: ‘One can name God only because he has named 
himself,’ and, as impressive as the achievements of Plato are, there is a gulf between the biblical 
God and the Platonic absolute Being, who is ‘the final stage of ontological thinking, which is 
not named and names itself even less.’ Put simply, Plato has his limits, because deprived of 
revelation, he cannot arrive at the truth that the logos has a name. This ‘logos-with-a-name’, 
then, will be the subject of our next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE JOHANNINE LOGOS AND THE HELLENIZATION OF JUDAISM 
‘John began the Prologue of his Gospel with the words: “In the beginning was the logos”. 
This is the very word used by the emperor: God acts, sō logō, with logos. Logos means both 
reason and word – a reason which is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely 
as reason.’ 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point for Chapter Four is the description in the Regensburg Lecture of two 
enlightenments, the Greek and the Judaic. The chapter will examine John’s Gospel and the 
Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason through the loss of the concept of creation. 
This chapter will argue that logos theology must draw its inspiration from the logos of the 
Johannine Prologue. It will interpret the Johannine logos as a synthesis of Greek rationality 
and biblical Wisdom traditions. Logos theology holds that this intercultural encounter 
provides a powerful signpost for the inclusive culture of human rights as a contemporary 
meeting place in the dialogue of cultures.  
The Regensburg Lecture describes two processes of demythologization, which stand 
‘in close analogy’.  The Greek enlightenment is Socrates’ attempt ‘to vanquish and transcend 
myth.’ The Judaic enlightenment is the revelation to Moses of ‘the mysterious name of God’, 
which ‘presents a challenge to the notion of myth’.2 The lecture also describes two processes 
of Hellenization within Judaism. The first is the translation of the Old Testament into Greek. 
The second is the Jewish encounter with ‘the best of Greek thought at a deep level’, a ‘mutual 
                                                             
1 The Regensburg Lecture, para.17. 
2 Ibid., para.20 
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enrichment’ which is especially evident in the Wisdom literature.3 The profound harmony 
between what is Greek ‘in the best sense of the word’ and Jewish faith in God finds its 
‘culmination and synthesis’ in the logos of the Johannine Prologue. Logos is translated as ‘a 
reason which is creative and capable of self-communication.’ The identification of God as 
reason has ethical implications. ‘Not to act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary to the 
nature of God.’4  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical examination of the sources and nature of 
the Johannine logos. The contribution to Johannine studies is to analyse the Prologue in terms 
of inclusivity and exclusivity as well as within the philosophical framework of ontology, 
epistemology and ethics. The contribution to Ratzinger studies is to bring Ratzinger’s 
statements on the Prologue together with the statements of respected Johannine scholars. The 
contribution to the study of human rights is to use Johannine logos theology as a paradigm for 
an inclusive formulation of the concept of human rights. 
4.1: THE HELLENIZATION OF JUDAISM 
4.1.1: Ratzinger and the Hellenization of Judaism   
In a central passage of the Regensburg Lecture, Ratzinger expounds the Hellenization of 
Judaism in five stages.5 His analysis starts with a Judaic enlightenment analogous to the 
Greek/Socratic enlightenment. A process of demythologization occurred in the revelation of 
the nature of God at the burning bush.6 ‘The mysterious name of God, revealed from the 
burning bush, a name which separates this God from all other divinities with their many 
                                                             
3 The Regensburg Lecture, paras.22 - 23. 
4 Ibid., paras.13 and 63. 
5 Ibid., paras.20 - 23. 
6 Exodus 3:1-15. 
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names and simply asserts being, “I am”, already presents a challenge to the notion of myth...’7 
He goes on to say that this new-found faith in Yahweh ‘came to a new maturity at the time of 
the Exile’.8 Ezekiel  and the Deutero-Isaiah were ‘the theologians of the name Yahweh.’9 This 
period precipitated a ‘decisive breakthrough to a clear monotheism.’10 
The Hellenization of Judaism is first evidenced in textual form by the Septuagint, the 
translation of the Old Testament into Greek, of which the Pentateuch had already been 
completed in the third century B.C.E. The Septuagint is ‘a step in the process of intercultural 
encounter with the widest possible implications’ and not just a translation but ‘an independent 
textual tradition’, a witness to the development of biblical faith.11 This is the version of the 
Old Testament used by the Gospel writers. 
Although the Jews consistently opposed idolatrous cults, they also ‘encountered the 
best of Greek thought’ in the Hellenistic period and this resulted in a ‘mutual enrichment’.12 
The principle location of this Old Testament Hellenization, according to Ratzinger, is the 
Wisdom Literature.13 Written during the five hundred years from the Exile to Christ, Wisdom 
literature ‘shows more and more evidence of contact with Greek thought.’14 This is summed 
up by Ratzinger as ‘The rationality that is seen in the structure of the world is understood as a 
                                                             
7 The Regensburg Lecture, para.20. 
8 Ibid., para.21. 
9 Introduction to Christianity, p.130. Ezekiel’s ministry runs from 593BCE to approximately 570BCE, during 
the turbulent years of the last days of Judah as an independent kingdom and during the Babylonian exile. The 
Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 40 – 55) likewise is regarded as addressing the Israelites during and after the Babylonian 
captivity.  
10 Truth and Tolerance, p.92. 
11 Truth and Tolerance, p.223 and The Regensburg Lecture, para.23. 
12 The Regensburg Lecture, para.22. 
13 The Wisdom literature comprises the Book of Job, the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, the Song of 
Songs and Sirach. 
14 Truth and Tolerance, p.150. 
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reflection of the creative wisdom that has produced it.’15 The logos, for Ratzinger, 
encapsulates the Hellenization of Judaism: 
The movement of the logos against the myth, as it evolved in the Greek mind in the 
philosophical enlightenment, so that in the end it necessarily led to the fall of the gods, 
has an inner parallelism with the enlightenment that the prophetic and Wisdom 
literature cultivated in its demythologisation of the divine powers in favour of the one 
and only God. For all the differences between them, both movements coincide in their 
striving toward the logos.16 
For Ratzinger, Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity then come together in the New 
Testament, most particularly in the Fourth Gospel, and most especially in the use of the term 
logos. In the Fourth Gospel, ‘the last retrospective biblical interpretation of belief in Jesus,’ 
we see the Greek, Judaic, Platonic and Mosaic enlightenments converge.17 
Ratzinger connects John with the Mosaic enlightenment.18 He is impressed by the ego 
eimi sayings, in which Jesus seems consciously to reference the Old Testament Yahweh, of 
which ego eimi is the Septuagint translation.19 Thus the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel brings us 
full circle from the revelation of God’s name to Moses at the burning bush, to John 17, which 
‘centers around the idea of Jesus as the revealer of God and thus assumes the position of New 
                                                             
15 Truth and Tolerance, p.150. 
16 Introduction to Christianity, p.149. ‘Inner’ is a favourite Ratzinger word, denoting a relationship with truth, 
rather than a mere coincidence or contingent fact. 
17 Ibid., p.132. We should note that, despite Ratzinger’s confident assertion, it is a hypothesis, rather than an 
established fact, that the Fourth Gospel was the last of the four gospels to be written. 
18 Conscious of debates about the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, for the sake of clarity and convenience, I will 
refer to the author as ‘John’. Ratzinger considers the authorship question in Jesus of Nazareth, Volume 1, and 
sides with the opinion of Peter Stuhlmacher, that the contents of the Fourth Gospel go back to the beloved 
disciple, for whom the author became a literary editor. See J. Ratzinger/Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth: From 
the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration, trans. Vatican Secretariat of State, (London: Bloomsbury, 
2007), pp.222-226.  The Stuhlmacher reference provided by Ratzinger is Peter Stuhlmacher, Biblische Theologie 
des Neuen Testaments, vol.2: Von der Paulusschule bis zur Johannesoffenbarung, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1992-1999), p.206. 
19 Jesus says ‘I am’ 45 times in John’s Gospel, but the key ego eimi passages most commonly discussed and 
cited are 8:24 and 8:28 ‘unless you believe that I AM He (hoti ego eimi), 8:58 ‘before Abraham was, I AM (ego 
eimi), 13:19 ‘so that when it does occur, you may believe that I AM He’ (hoti ego eimi), 18:5 ‘Jesus replied “I 
AM He”’ (Ego eimi), 18:6 ‘Jesus said to them, I AM He’ (ego eimi) 18:8 ‘I told you that I AM He’ (hoti ego 
eimi). 
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Testament counterpart to the story of the burning bush.’ He also connects John explicitly with 
the Wisdom literature, where Mosaic monotheism was subjected to a further purification: 
‘John’s thinking is directly based on the Wisdom literature.’20  However, the logos also 
represents the Hellenization of Judaism: ‘When John characterises the Lord as logos, he is 
emphasising a term widely current in both Greek and Jewish thought and taking over with it a 
series of ideas implicit in it that are in this way transferred to Christ.’21 Ratzinger in fact 
suggests a complex interaction of sources for the Johannine logos, from the Pentateuch, the 
Sapiental literature, Greek and Hellenistic philosophy and from within Christianity itself. His 
position is represented in this important statement: 
…it is incorrect to reduce the concepts logos and aletheia, upon which John’s Gospel 
centers the Christian message, to a strictly Hebraic interpretation, as if logos meant 
“word” merely in the sense of God’s speech in history, and aletheia signified nothing 
more than “trustworthiness” or “fidelity”. For the very same reason, there is no basis 
for the opposite accusation that John distorted biblical thought in the direction of 
Hellenism. On the contrary, he stands in the classical sapiental tradition.22 
4.1.2 The Challenge from Emil Brunner 
As a locus of Hellenization, the revelation of Yahweh at the burning bush, especially in its 
Septuagint translation, is central to both Ratzinger and to Emil Brunner. We will therefore 
benefit at this point from revisiting the 1959 Inaugural Lecture, in order to appreciate the 
difference between the Ratzinger and Brunner positions on the Hellenization of both Judaism 
and Christianity. 
                                                             
20 Introduction to Christianity, p.132. 
21 Ibid., p.189. 
22 J. Ratzinger, trans. Adrian Walker, The Nature and Mission of Theology: Approaches to Understanding Its 
Role in the light of Present Controversy, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), pp.24-25.  
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 Brunner opposes and contrasts the God of faith and the God of the philosophers. The 
God of Moses at the burning bush is simultaneously a God of names and a God who, as 
mystery, cannot be named, but who in naming Himself opens Himself up in circumlocutory 
manner, to humankind. Brunner holds that philosophy rejects this revelatory naming as 
anthropomorphism and, obsessed with the knowledge of the essence of Being, contents itself 
with its own self-sufficient rationality, which does not want to know anything other than what 
it can come to from within its own possibilities. The translation of Yahweh to ego eimi 
therefore does not work for Brunner: 
It was a complete, and in its working out disastrous misunderstanding which the Greek 
Fathers fell under, reading an ontological definition of God out of the name Yahweh. 
‘I am that I am’ should never have been translated as an attempt at philosophical 
speculation or definition, as if it read ‘I am Being’ or ‘I am the Existent One.’ This is 
not just a mistaking of the meaning of this one quotation. It is a traducing of the 
teaching of the biblical revelation into its opposite. This is the turning of the name of 
God, of that which cannot be translated, into an abstract definition.23 
Ratzinger, by contrast, admires how the Septuagint translates the double active voice (ich bin 
der ich bin) into an active voice followed by a participle (ego eimi ho ōn), so that ‘I am’ 
becomes ‘Being’: 
Thereby a decision of incalculable scope was made, because with this translation the 
synthesis of the Greek and biblical images of God took on a decisive approach…What 
the highest term of ontology and the ultimate term of the philosophical concept of God 
is, appears here as the central self-expression of the biblical God. 
                                                             
23 Gott des Glauben, p.21, quoting Brunner, Lehre, p.125. 
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It is in this moment, in which the name of Yahweh becomes an expression of Being, that 
Ratzinger locates a benign and providential instantiation of the Hellenization of Judaism, and 
thereby of Christianity. 
4.1.3   Scholarly opinion on the Hellenization of Judaism 
Contemporary scholarly opinion tends to regard the construct ‘Hellenization of Judaism’ as 
just as complex and as problematic as ‘the Hellenization of Christianity’.  Because of a 
widespread consensus that the interaction of the Greek and Semitic worlds was a centuries-
long process, operating on every level of society, the tendency of modern scholarship has 
been to move away from clear-cut instances of ‘Hellenization’. A more nuanced picture has 
emerged in which Hellenism always exists alongside vibrant Semitic cultures, and even 
becomes an all-pervasive part of the cultural furniture. Thus Grabbe, following Hengel, asks 
us to eschew all artificial binary analyses which would oppose Judaism to Hellenism or 
‘Palestinian’ to ‘Hellenistic’ Judaism.24 Hellenism was a culture, Judaism a religion; to be 
‘Hellenized’ did not mean ceasing to be a believing, practising Jew. What marked the Jews 
out in the Graeco-Roman world was their refusal to honour gods and cults other than their 
own: ‘However Hellenized they might be, observant Jews can never be fully at home in the 
Greek world.’  
In some ways it is more appropriate to talk of the ‘Judaization of Hellenism’, rather 
than the ‘Hellenization of Judaism’. The Alexandrian Jews were responsible for the 
Septuagint, Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon. They overwhelmingly remained loyal to 
Judaism, ‘held in check by the proud consciousness of their superiority to the gentiles in 
                                                             
24 L. Grabbe, ‘The Jews and Hellenization: Hengel and his Critics’, online article. Available at: at fonts.lstc.edu/-
rklein/Doc8/hengel.doc (Accessed: 12 November 2012). 
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morals and religion’ and were confident enough to engage in a Judaic proselytization of the 
Greeks alongside processes that might warrant the term Hellenization of Judaism.25  
Ratzinger’s analysis could be said to emerge from older scholarly consensus that 
Christianity was the result of ‘a mating of Hellenism and Judaism.’26 Gilbert, for example, 
narrates the Hellenization of the Jews in six phases: Alexander (4th century BCE), the 
Septuagint (3rd century BCE), the Book of Daniel (2nd century BCE), Roman rule (1st century 
BCE), Herod the Great (1st century BCE) and widespread familiarity with the Greek language 
(1st century CE).27 Gilbert concludes that ‘Alexander the Great...set in motion a current of 
Hellenism which, through the medium of the Jews and then of the New Testament, still flows 
on in Christian thought.’28 Jones says that ‘The Hellenization of the indigenous upper classes 
was remarkably thorough-going in the three centuries that followed Alexander’s conquest.’29  
A modest conclusion is that the phenomenon of Greek influence on Judaism is 
undeniable but that only with caution can uses of the term logos be ascribed to ‘Hellenism’ or 
‘Judaism’. We must also keep in the back of our minds that the term ‘Hellenization’ is often 
deployed to serve a particular line of argument or agenda and that Ratzinger uses the term 
polemically as he battles to restore the perceived rupture between faith and reason. 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 G. Gilbert, ‘The Hellenization of the Jews between 334B.C. and 70 A.D.’, The American Journal of Theology, 
Vol. 13, No 4 (Oct 1909), pp. 520-540 at p.531. 
26 Toynbee The Crucible of Christianity p.44. 
27 Gilbert, The Hellenization of the Jews between 334B.C. and 70 A.D., p.531. 
28 Gilbert, The Hellenization of the Jews between 334B.C. and 70 A.D., p.540. 
29 A.H.M. Jones, ‘A Taste for Things Greek: Hellenism in Syria and Palestine’, in Arnold Toynbee (ed.) The 
Crucible of Christianity: Judaism, Hellenism and the Historical background to the Christian Faith, (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1969), pp.100-122, at p.118. 
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4.2: SOURCES OF THE LOGOS 
Johannine scholarship has had to engage with a complex matrix of inter-related issues, 
including the identity of the author(s), the history and the nature of the text,30 especially the 
nature of the Prologue,31 the date of composition, its provenance, purpose32 and possible 
audience and the history of its revision or redaction. Within the scope of this study I will not 
engage with these vast areas of debate, but will confine my discussion to the question that is 
central to my proposal of a logos theology, the source and significance of the logos.  
The answer to the question of the source of the logos will affect our view of the role of 
rationality in Christian faith. A genuinely Greek background to the biblical logos would 
represent a significant inculturation of Greek thought into early Christianity. This would 
allow us to characterize Christianity as intrinsically open, inclusive and committed to a 
rational trajectory. We have seen that Ratzinger is an enthusiast for this analysis. However, 
                                                             
30 Brown’s diachronic reading, in five stages, has been widely accepted: 
i) Collections of the words and works of Jesus are handed down 
ii) Oral preaching and teaching is conducted over several decades, including dramas and discourses 
iii) Material from stage two is used by the evangelist to create the first edition of the Gospel 
iv) The same author issues a second edition to meet objections and difficulties 
v) A final redaction is carried out by a disciple from within the Johannine community. 
31 This debate concerns the Prologue’s nature as poetry or prose, its history as a possible re-working of an earlier 
Christian, or even pre-Christian composition. For Brown, the Prologue is an early Christian hymn, ‘which has 
been adapted to serve as an overture to the Gospel narrative of the career of the incarnate Word.’ See R. Brown, 
The Gospel According to John, (London: Geoffrey Chapman 1966), p.1. The presupposition of a ‘logos-hymn’, 
with an underlying poetic form, led commentators, especially Brown and Schnackenburg, to accept and reject 
various verses in relation to the hypothetical ‘hymn’. Brown understands the Prologue itself as a later insertion at 
stage iv or v. of his scheme. The consensus of contemporary scholarship is to read the Prologue as a whole and 
to take it on its face value as a coherent composition. Barrett called for a more holistic approach to the Prologue, 
which, he pointed out, ‘is not a jig-saw puzzle but one piece of solid theological thinking.’ C.K. Barrett, The 
Prologue of John’s Gospel: The Ethel M. Wood Lecture delivered before the University of London on 19 
February 1970, (London: The Athlone Press, 1971), p.27. 
32 Anderson explains the Gospel’s origin in a series of conflicts, all possibly discernible even in the Prologue: 
Stage One 
30 – 70 C.E. 
Conflict between Galilee and Jerusalem 
Conflict with Baptist adherents 
Stage Two 
80 – 85 C.E. 
Conflict with synagogue Jews 
Conflict with Roman authorities 
The ‘First Edition’ of the Gospel is written 
Stage Three 
85-95 C.E. 
Conflict with Gentile docetizing Christians, becoming worldly and assimilated 
Conflict with a centralized Christianity which offends Johannine egalitarianism 
See Paul N. Anderson, ‘On Guessing Points and Naming Stars: Epistemological Origins of John’s Christological 
Tensions’, in Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser (eds.) The Gospel of John and Christian Theology, (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), pp.311-345, at pp.325-326. 
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the trend of scholarship has tended to move away from the Greek and towards the Jewish 
background. Thus, in the early 20th century, ‘John’s Gospel tended to be seen as 
fundamentally Hellenistic, indebted to Platonic, Stoic and Gnostic thought.’33 Ruth Edwards 
says that ‘today this theory is largely discounted,’34 and that ‘John’s logos image seems to 
owe more to Jewish religious thought than Greek philosophy.’35  Barrett comes close to the 
Ratzinger position when he concludes that John was ‘a synthesis of Jewish and Greek 
thought.’36 Dodd seeks a similar equilibrium to Ratzinger, signalling a shift towards Old 
Testament presuppositions, but conceding that ‘there were elements in the Gospel which were 
foreign to the Old Testament and indigenous to Hellenistic culture.’37 Dodd’s conclusion is 
balanced and tries to be comprehensive:  
The author started with the Jewish idea of the Torah as being at once the Word of God 
and the divine Wisdom manifested in creation, and found, under the guidance of 
Hellenistic Jewish thought similar to that of Philo, an appropriate Greek expression 
which fittingly combined both their ideas.38  
Dodd concludes that John was written ‘to commend Christianity to educated pagans and 
Hellenized Jews familiar with such concepts.’39 This general approach is strengthened by 
support from Lindars: ‘It is clear that the author derives his thought from the 
Jewish...tradition, but it is altogether probable that he writes for the Greeks, and duly takes 
their thinking into account.’40  
Ratzinger does fully accept and endorse the Jewish background: ‘the Gospel thinks 
and argues entirely in terms of the Old Testament.’41 He sees John standing ‘in the classical 
                                                             
33 Ruth Edwards, Discovering John, (London: SPCK, 2003), p.13. 
34 Edwards, Discovering John, p.38. 
35 Ibid., p.38. 
36 C.K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek 
Text, (London: SPCK, 2nd Edition 1978), p.39. 
37 Mark Edwards, John: Blackwell Bible Commentaries, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p.10. 
38 C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p.278. 
39 Edwards Discovering John, p.14. 
40 Barnabas Lindars, The Gospel of John, (London: Oliphants, 1972), p.35. 
41 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, p.221. Ratzinger says that the scholarship he is referring to is Martin Hengel’s 
The Johannine Question, which was published by SCM Press in 1990. On pp.124-135, Hengel associates the 
Fourth Gospel with a Hellenized Jewish upper priestly class.  
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sapiental tradition.’ Indeed, for him, John is ‘the conclusive and normative scriptural creation 
account’ in which the Wisdom literature finds fulfilment.42 Nevertheless, he will not 
relinquish the Greek element: ‘It is precisely in John’s writings that one can study, both in its 
origins and in its outcome, the inner movement of biblical faith in God and biblical 
Christology toward philosophical inquiry.’43 In fact his overall position is influenced by the 
pre-eminent scholar of Hellenization, Martin Hengel.44 Hengel’s verdict can be summarized 
as ‘early Christianity must be understood in the context of contemporary Judaism, and both 
religions in the broader context of the Hellenistic and Roman world.’45  Throughout 
Ratzinger’s corpus, the Johannine Prologue is the locus classicus of the ‘blending’ of biblical 
faith and Greek rationality: 
When the Gospel of John names Christ the Logos, this blending appears very clearly. 
The passage expresses the conviction that what is reasonable, indeed, fundamental 
reason itself, comes to light in the Christian faith.46 
I propose therefore to read the Prologue from five perspectives; firstly, through the ‘pure’ 
Hellenism of the logos of the Greeks, secondly, through the ‘pure’ Judaism of dabār from the 
Pentateuch, thirdly, the Hellenized Judaism of the logos of Philo, fourthly, through the 
Hellenized Judaism of the sophia of the Book of Wisdom and fifthly, through the Christian 
Word of the New Testament. 
                                                             
42 J. Ratzinger, trans. Boniface Ramsey OP, In the Beginning: A Catholic Understanding of Creation and the 
Fall, (London: T & T Clark, 1995), p.15. 
43 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, p.25. Ratzinger cites H. Gese, ‘Der Johannesprolog’, in Zur 
biblische Theologie (Munich, 1977), pp.155-201. This title was published in English as Essays on Biblical 
Theology by Augsburg Fortress Press in 1981. Hartmut Gese (b.1929) is a Tübingen-based Old Testament 
scholar. 
44 Hengel’s pre-eminence is eloquently attested in a survey of his career by Larry W. Hurtado, ‘Martin Hengel’s 
Impact on English-speaking scholarship’, The Expository Times, Vol.120, No.2, (2008), pp.70-76. In Chapter 
Eight of Jesus of Nazareth Ratzinger also draws on Hengel’s The Son of God: The Origin of Christology and the 
History of Jewish-Hellenistic Religion, trans. John Bowden, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976). 
45 John J. Collins, ‘Judaism as Praeparatio Evangelica in the work of Martin Hengel’, Religious Studies Review, 
Vol.15, No.3, (1989), pp.226-228, at p.227, quoted in Hurtado, p.74. 
46 J. Ratzinger, trans. Michael J. Miller et al., Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Endeavours in 
Ecclesiology, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), p.148. 
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My intention is not to side with any particular theory about the sources of the logos or 
the intentions of the evangelist. Rather, I hope to demonstrate that the Johannine logos is 
invested with a range of commonalities which I could describe with MacIntyre’s famous, and 
probably over-worked phrase, overlapping consensus. I am seeking to discern a ‘tone of 
voice’ in the Prologue which opens up ‘creative ways of meeting others’ because it is one of 
welcome, of endorsement, of timeless universality or inclusivity.47 However, I will not shy 
away from the Prologue’s decisive Christological originality, particularity and exclusivity. 
Here there is a different ‘tone of voice’, which I will call one of ‘correction’ or ‘critique’. 
4.3:  UNDERSTANDING THE LOGOS FROM FIVE PERSPECTIVES 
4.3.1 The Greek/Hellenistic perspective: Plato and the Stoics 
To some extent, the Platonic strand of Greek thought was an unavoidable fact of the 
Hellenistic world. Throughout that period Plato constituted an ‘atmosphere’ which had been 
‘absorbed though not understood by many who had never read his works.’48 Augustine 
famously stated that as a Platonist, (a neo-Platonist, of course), he could happily subscribe to 
the first ten verses of the Prologue.49  
Platonic philosophy, however, always had a problem in that it struggled to link the 
transcendent and material worlds, ‘that which always is and has no coming-into-being and 
that which is always coming-into-being but never is.’50 The Timaeus had an answer; the 
                                                             
47 See David Cheetham, Ways of Meeting and the Theology of Religions, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p.1. 
On p.39 Cheetham identifies two tones of voice, the ‘notional’, or ‘second order’ tone, which could be related to 
my way of welcome and endorsement, and a ‘first order’, ‘confessional’ tone, which may correspond to my way 
of correction and critique. 
48 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.35. 
49 Augustine, Confessions, 7.9ff.  
50 Plato Timaeus 27D. 
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Demiurge, a sort of second God who used the Forms to create the cosmos out of chaos, and 
the world-soul, the origin of human souls and animator of the cosmos.  
The Stoics needed no such link. In their materialist, pantheist cosmology, the universe was 
‘a single living organism, permeated and governed in every detail by a material God who had 
produced it out of his own substance.’51 What they did need, however, was a link between the 
universe and the individual. The logos took on the mediating role between the cosmological 
and the personal worlds. As logos prophorikos it was simply speech, or outward expression of 
inward thought; as logos spermatikos it was the rational principle present in all things.  
If we want to read the Prologue in a way that welcomes and endorses Plato we need look 
no further than Jn. 1:9, ‘to phōs to alēthinon’, the true light. Westcott interprets this in the 
Platonic manner as that of which ‘all other lights are only partial rays or reflections’, ‘the 
archetypal light.’52 Barrett interestingly translates alēthinon as ‘real, genuine, authentic.’53 
Schnackenburg similarly construes alēthinon as a reflection of the Greek/Hellenistic outlook 
that the divine being is ‘qualitatively unique in its incomparable excellence.’54 Lincoln 
comments that the logos ‘has a transcendent power of illumination that is indispensable for all 
people.’55 He says John’s point is the supreme irony that ‘the world’ failed to recognise the 
light on which it depends for its very existence.56  
If we are looking for the Stoic strand of Greek thought in the Prologue then we hear it at 
once in the opening lines: ‘in the beginning was the logos’ and ‘the logos was God,’ ‘All 
                                                             
51 A. Hilary Armstrong, ‘Greek Philosophy from the Age of Cicero’, in Toynbee, The Crucible of Christianity, 
pp.209-214, at p.209. 
52 B.F. Westcott, The Gospel According to St John (London: Murray, 1902), p.7. 
53 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.160. 
54 R. Schnackenburg, trans. Kevin Smyth, The Gospel According to St John: Volume One, Introduction and 
Commentary on Chapters 1-4, trans. Kevin Smith, (Tunbridge Wells: Burns and Oates, 1968), p.254. 
55 A. Lincoln, John: Black’s New Testament Commentaries, (London: Continuum, 2005), p.101. 
56 Lincoln points out that the word kosmos is used 80 times in the Fourth Gospel. It can mean i) the created 
world, ii) the world as the environment in which humanity lives and iii) the world of humanity when it becomes 
alienated from the logos that sustains it. 
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things came into being through (the logos) and without (the logos) not one thing came into 
being,’ ‘in (the logos) was life, and the life was the light of all people’ and ‘The true light, 
which enlightens everyone.’ All this chimes precisely with what the Stoics taught. As Barrett 
says, ‘The Stoics believed that every man shared, however slightly, in the universal reason.’57 
Doran comments that the Stoic view that the world is governed by a divine logos/reason, of 
which every human mind is a part...recurs in various ways in Christian thought.’58  
4.3.2 The Biblical / Judaic perspective: The dābār of Genesis 
The Hebrew dābār or ‘word’ occurs 1430 times in the Hebrew Bible. Brown champions this 
as a key source for the Johannine logos, explaining that dābār, unlike rhēma, goes beyond the 
‘spoken word’ to include the effect of the spoken word in event or action, thus incorporating 
both word and deed.59 
In Genesis, dābār has a creative function, associated with light. In the Psalms, ‘by the 
dābār of the Lord the heavens were established’ (Ps. 33:6).60 In the Prophets, dābār impels to 
action and judges (Hos. 1:1). Dābār gives life (Deut. 32:46-7) and is a light for men (Ps. 
19:8). Dābār can be personified, as in Habbakuk 3:5, where dābār goes forth upon the earth 
from the face of God.61 Reading the Prologue from a Jewish perspective, then, is not difficult. 
No one in the Hebrew tradition would be surprised to hear that all things were created through 
the Word, or that the Word was associated with life and light. Furthermore, as their theology 
developed, those in the Hebrew tradition had already begun to hypostasize the Torah itself as 
an active principle with creative and revelatory power.   
                                                             
57 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.36. 
58 R. Doran, Birth of a Worldview: Early Christianity in its Jewish and Pagan Context, (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1995), p.37. 
59 e.g. Isaiah 55:10-11. 
60 LXX ‘logos kyriou’. 
61 See Brown, The Gospel According to John, p.521, Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to John, p.483, 
Barrett, The Gospel According to John, p.153. 
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4.3.3 The perspective from Hellenized Judaism: i) Philo of Alexandria 
Philo lived in the Alexandrian diaspora in the first century C.E., a devout and practising Jew, 
deeply knowledgeable of Platonic and Stoic traditions. His significance for the Prologue lies 
in the fact that he uses the term logos over 1200 times. Barrett warns us that, ‘no simple or 
even consistent doctrine of the Logos can be drawn from his writings.’62 Barnard says the 
same thing: ‘It is a profitless task to seek for a consistent doctrine of the Logos in Philo’s 
voluminous writings.’63 Like Plato’s world-soul, Philo’s logos is an intermediary between the 
divine and the human, ‘a hypostatized principle that bridges the chasm between God and the 
world.’64 Like the Stoic logos, Philo’s logos is an enlivening principle which gives life and 
direction to both the natural and the human worlds. Philo’s logos is variously described as 
first-born Son, (protogonos), image of God, (eikon theou), and archetypal man, (anthrōpos 
theou). Jones believes that Philo’s theism ‘is that of the Bible rather than that of contemporary 
Platonists.’65 Loyal to the Hebrew tradition, Philo is so keen to reject the Stoics’ pantheistic 
material divine being that he reinstates Plato’s transcendent God. Brown explains that ‘For 
Philo, the logos, created by God, was the intermediary between God and his creatures; God’s 
logos was what gave meaning and plan to the universe. It was almost a second God, the 
instrument of God in creation, and the pattern of the human soul.’66  
Nevertheless, as the animating and sustaining cause of the material world, Philo’s 
logos is Stoic. As the ideal prototype of the visible world, it is close to Plato’s kosmos noētos. 
The Stoic logos was itself a development of the Platonic nous. Schnackenburg is impressed 
by these roles of the Philonic logos: ‘The logos of Philo also takes over the same task 
                                                             
62 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.153. 
63 L.W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p.87. 
64 Hermann Ridderbos, The Gospel of John: A Theological Commentary, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 
p.28. 
65 Armstrong, Greek Philosophy from the Age of Cicero, p.211. 
66 Brown, The Gospel According to John, Introduction, p.520. 
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fundamentally as the personal logos who is God in our hymn.’67 He speculates that for a 
devout Jew in Alexandria ‘a way of opening out to the Hellenistic world had to be found.’68 If 
this was true of Philo it could well have been true of John.  
Dodd finds a remarkable parallelism between Philo and the Fourth Gospel: ‘It seems 
clear...that whatever other elements of thought may enter into the background of the Fourth 
Gospel, it certainly presupposes a range of ideas having a remarkable resemblance to those of 
Hellenistic Judaism as represented by Philo.’69 He cites the common symbolic themes of light 
and water, as well as what he considers to be a close resemblance between John’s use of the 
Septuagint’s ego eimi, and Philo’s ho ōn, ‘that which is existing’ or simply ‘Being’. 
Schnackenburg believes there is ‘no direct influence of Philo on John,’ but suggests a ‘similar 
cultural background.’70 
Lindars echoes the judgement of most commentators when he says ‘John’s thought is 
thus in some degree parallel to Philo’s, but not derived from it.’71 Barrett points out that this is 
not surprising because ‘Jewish propagandists had long used the language and thought-forms 
of Hellenism in order to express their own religious experience and to commend their faith to 
men of other races.’72 For him the Johannine logos ‘has a cosmological function similar to 
that described by Philo.’73 
Reading the Prologue, an adherent of Philo might find welcome and endorsement of 
Philonic beliefs in verse 3, panta di’autou egeneto, all things were made through Him, since 
                                                             
67 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, p.243. 
68 Ibid., p.486. 
69 Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.71. 
70 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, p.487. 
71 Lindars, The Gospel of John, p.83. 
72 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.39. 
73 Ibid., p.155. 
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‘Philo constantly uses the preposition dia of the activity of the Logos as demiurge.’74 
Ridderbos identifies the significance of dia as an expression of metaphysical mediation,75 
while Westcott says di’autou equates to ‘Word as mediate Agent of Creation.’76 
Jn.1:1, theos ēn ho logos, the Word was God, stands out because of its lack of a 
definite article. With the article, the logos is designated as God; without it, there is a 
suggestion that the logos is ‘of God.’ This is a statement Philo could make without 
compromising Jewish monotheism; it would be the equivalent of ‘divine’, as if for theos we 
had read theios. The NRSV’s ‘and the word was God’ is rendered by the NEB (and Lindars) 
in Philonic mode as ‘what God was, the Word was.’77 Schnackenburg also virtually takes 
theos as theios, because it ‘signifies the nature proper to God and the Logos in common.’78 
Westcott is thinking along similar lines when he translates theos as ‘the godhead.’79 
Despite these convergences, Philo and John are not ultimately compatible. A 
correction or critique of Philo is taking place. Dodd reminds us that Philo’s logos is not 
personal ‘except in a fluctuating series of metaphors,’ and is not the object of faith or love, 
where the incarnate Logos of the Fourth Gospel ‘is both lover and loved.’80 Philo is perhaps 
best thought of as a philosopher, steeped in the Greek tradition and reformulating the Yahwist 
faith using the categories of Hellenistic philosophy. Westcott identifies the clear blue water 
between Philo and ‘John’: ‘Philo, following closely in the track of Greek philosophy, saw in 
                                                             
74 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, pp. 236-7. 
75 Ridderbos, The Gospel of John, p.36. 
76 Westcott, The Gospel According to St John, p.4. 
77 Barrett (p.156) says that ‘θεόϛ being without the article, is predicative and describes the nature of the Word’. 
Brown (p.5) says that ‘the translation “The Word was God” is quite correct”. Schnackenburg (p.234) says that 
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78 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, pp. 234. 
79 Westcott, The Gospel According to St John, p.3. 
80  Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.73. 
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the logos the divine Intelligence in relation to the universe: the Evangelist, trusting firmly in 
the ethical basis of Judaism, sets forth the logos mainly as the revealer of God to man, 
through creation, through theophanies, through prophecy, through the Incarnation.’81 
4.3.4 The perspective from Hellenized Judaism: ii) Wisdom literature 
If we are looking in ‘John’ for welcome and endorsement of a pre-existing non-Christian 
tradition, then one of the strongest candidates must be the concept of Wisdom. The Book of 
Wisdom was written in Greek in the first half of the 1st century B.C.E., the last book of the 
Old Testament. As with Philo, it was composed in Alexandria by a learned Greek-speaking 
Jew, familiar with Hellenistic philosophy.  Dodd believes that ‘with Wisdom we are already 
half-way to Philo’s logos.’82 It is possible that the Book of Wisdom was an influence on 
Philo; they certainly share a common milieu. Brown argues that ‘in the OT presentation of 
Wisdom, there are good parallels for almost every detail of the Prologue’s description of the 
Word.’83 He cites 60 Wisdom references with parallels with the Johannine logos.84 Brown 
concludes that ‘the Prologue’s description of the Word is far closer to biblical and Jewish 
strains of thought than it is to anything purely Hellenistic.’85 Schnackenburg agrees; Wisdom 
speculation provides ‘aptest parallels in thought.’86   
Dodd thinks John is closer to Wisdom literature than to Philo, while Lindars even 
posits ‘a Wisdom poem’ as John’s model. Dodd defines Sophia as ‘the hypostatized thought 
                                                             
81 Westcott, The Gospel According to St John, pp. xvii-xviii. 
82 Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.73. 
83 Brown, The Gospel According to John, p.523. 
84 Ibid., pp. cxxii-cxxv. Jn 1:1, for example, is reminiscent of ‘The Lord created me at the beginning of his work’ 
(Prov 8:22-3), ‘I was beside him’ (Prov 8:30), ‘with him it remains forever’ (Sir 1:1), ‘ages ago I was set up, at 
the first, before the beginning of the earth’ (Wis 6:22) ‘Wisdom, the fashioner of all things’ (Wis 7:22) or ‘I will 
trace her course from the beginning of creation’ (Sir 24:9). 
85 Brown, The Gospel According to John, p.524. 
86 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, p.484.  
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of God, immanent in the world’ and as such ‘it replaces the Word of the Lord87 as medium of 
creation and revelation’ so that ‘in composing the Prologue the author’s mind was moving 
along lines similar to those followed by Jewish writers of the Wisdom school.’88 Wisdom, 
Hebrew hōkmah, (feminine), is an intermediate divine being, and can be interpreted 
religiously or philosophically. ‘Wisdom has an independent existence in the presence of God 
and also bears some relation to the created world.’89  
The conclusion does seem unavoidable: the logos assumes the functions that a Jewish 
writer would ascribe to Wisdom. Furthermore, Jesus’ pre-existence as Logos, and the Logos’ 
role in creation, are illumined by Jewish Wisdom ideas.90  Nevertheless, we must retain the 
note of correction and critique. If Wisdom truly embodied all that John wanted to convey, he 
could have used sophia rather than logos.91 And the clear blue water is this: Wisdom is never 
called ‘the word of God’, is not personal and is not pre-existent. 
4.3.5 The Christian perspective: The New Testament ‘Word’ 
It is important not to forget the most obvious source for the Word available to John, early 
Christian thought, either oral or written. This raises source-critical questions as to whether 
John knew the Synoptics or, as Lindars believes, knew traditions close to the Synoptics. The 
en archē, for example, of Jn.1:1 could echo not just the Septuagint Genesis but the first word 
archē of Mark’s Gospel. Likewise, John’s logos could actually be a conscious recapitulation 
                                                             
87 i.e. dābār YHWH 
88 Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.274. 
89 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.153. 
90 Edwards, (Ruth) Discovering John, p.39. 
91 Brown suggests that it was the gender of logos that made it preferable. Schnackenburg (p.492.) agrees that the 
masculine noun logos appeared ‘more fitting than the feminine noun Sophia.’ Schnackenburg acknowledges that 
his source for this idea is W. Bauer, Das Johannesevangelium, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 6 (3rd ed., 1933) 
p.7. Grillmeier also thought that the feminine form ‘would be no recommendation in the Greek cultural sphere.’ 
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of the logos of Mark’s Sower and Seed parable.92 There are also striking parallels between the 
Prologue and Hebrews 1:3; ‘He is a reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s 
very being, and he sustains all things by his powerful word.’93 However, the mention of 
Hebrews only brings us back to the complexities of the Prologue. For the author of Hebrews, 
Nash explains, is ‘an active participant’ in Alexandrian Hellenistic Judaism and so contains 
close parallels with both biblical Sophia and the Philonic logos.94 
The putative hymnic form of the Prologue also has New Testament parallels, notably 
Philippians 2:6-11 and Colossians 1:15-20.  Miller has more recently proposed that the true 
source for the logos has been staring us in the face in the form of the Fourth Gospel itself, 
which uses logos or rhema 51 times, and ‘which may be read at one level as meaning “word”, 
but may transparently point at the same time to a Word, the saving truth.’95 Barrett had 
already been thinking along similar lines, when he expressed the view that John ‘does no 
more than take the last step of a process hinted at...by the rest of the New Testament.’96 
 
 
                                                             
92 Mark 4:1-20 
93 ‘Reflection of glory’ in the Greek text is ‘apaugasma tēs doxēs’. ‘Word’ here is actually rhēma, not logos. 
94 Ronald H. Nash, Christianity and the Hellenistic World, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 
1984), p.89. 
95 Ed L. Miller, ‘The Johannine Origins of the Johannine Logos’, Journal of Biblical Literature Vol.112, No 3 
(Autumn, 1993), pp.445-457. p.452.  
96 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.154. Barrett here acknowledges a debt to Hoskyns. See E.C. 
Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel, ed. By F.N. Davey, 2 vols. (1940 2nd rev. ed., 1947) pp.162-4. I will not spend 
time on possible associations of memrā and logos. The memrā was a substitute for the name of YHWH, a feature 
of the Targums which had the effect of protecting divine transcendence by avoiding utterance of the divine 
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original Hebrew and which John appears sometimes to have preferred to use rather than the Hebrew or the 
Septuagint. See Brown, The Gospel According to John, pp.523-4. I have also omitted Bultmann’s proposal of 
Gnostic Mandaean texts due to their very late date (700C.E.). However, the existence of some form of first 
century Christian Gnosticism is a not unreasonable presupposition and some respected commentators detect 
allusions to Gnostic tendencies in the Fourth Gospel. See Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, 
pp.491-493. 
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4.4: THE INCLUSIVITY AND EXCLUSIVITY OF THE LOGOS 
4.4.1 Searching for meaning 
This analysis of a range of possible sources for the logos, which I have carefully termed 
‘perspectives’, has already shown that in communicating the most elevated and distinctive 
doctrine of the Christian faith, John was willing to deploy a term that already had a long 
history and a host of religious and philosophical associations. I have characterized the ‘tone of 
voice’ in John as one of welcome and endorsement, exemplified by his willing deployment of 
a term with a variety of pre-existing associations or ‘baggage’. This is intended to pave the 
way for my conclusion that John’s use of the logos is inclusive. In this view I take 
encouragement from Dodd: 
If...we try to enter into the author’s intention, it must surely appear that he is thinking, in 
the first place, not so much of Christians who need a deeper theology, as of non-Christians 
who are concerned about eternal life and the way to it, and may be ready to follow the 
Christian way if this is presented to them in terms that are intelligibly related to their 
previous religious interests and experience.97  
MacRae expresses this purposeful inclusivity very well:  
Since the age of the Fourth Gospel was the age of Roman Hellenism, characterized in 
many respects by a kind of religious universalism or syncretism, is it not possible that the 
Fourth Gospel may have tried deliberately to incorporate a diversity of backgrounds into 
the one gospel message precisely to emphasis the universality of Jesus.98  
                                                             
97 Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, p.9. 
98 John Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p.96., quoting G. MacRae, 
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I should add that Ashton calls for extreme caution and precision in distinguishing terms such 
as ‘background’, ‘source’ and ‘influence.’99 I also certainly take note of Miller’s warning that 
it would be ahistorical to imagine that the Evangelist self-consciously accessed a range of 
sources and acted as a ‘sifter of documents, or a sifter of traditions.’100 As Ashton himself 
warns us, this approach tells us more about our own contemporary preoccupations than those 
of the author.101 At the same time, Ruth Edwards exhorts us to use John’s Gospel to search for 
‘a life-enhancing message, still relevant to the Church and the contemporary world.’102 Here 
emerges the distinction between exegesis and eisegesis, and herein lies an admonition to my 
project in general and to this chapter in particular, as it interrogates a scriptural source in a 
search for an authentic Christian positioning with regard to the contemporary culture of 
human rights.103 I am essaying a ‘theological interpretation’ of the Prologue based on ‘the fact 
that it is used in communities of faith who are interested in what the text means to them 
today’ and ‘the fact that the New Testament has made valuable contributions to the faith of 
Christian communities for many centuries though in different ways at different times.’104  
This must not mean doing violence to the text, so at the same time I seek to respect ‘reliable, 
careful scholarship that aims to uncover as far as possible the original meaning of the text.’105 
If Nichols is right, my approach is consonant with that of Ratzinger: ‘Christian faith generates 
questions to be put to the theology of the past. The answers which ancient texts offer back 
then broaden the systematic theologian’s field of vision.’106 Twomey’s comment is also 
helpful here. Ratzinger’s personal theology offers ‘faltering but nonetheless stimulating 
insights into God’s word as a response to the crucial questions affecting humanity 
individually and collectively.’107 
With these points in mind, I proceed to a detailed examination of two verses of the 
Prologue. 
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4.4.2 The inclusive logos: Jn. 1:9. 
Even if we side solely with Judaism as the source for the logos, we cannot avoid a sort of 
inclusivity, if we remember, with contemporary scholarship, that it would be hard to find a 
form of Judaism that had not been Hellenized to some degree. An examination of John 1:9 
can act as a further illustration of this point. 
Ēn to phōs to alēthinon, That was the true light, The true light, 
ho phōtizei panta anthrōpon, which gives light to every man which enlightens everyone, 
erchomenon eis ton kosmon. 
(United Bible Societies text) 
coming into the world. 
(NKJV) 
was coming into the world. 
(NRSV) 
 
With its striking Greek sense of natural revelation available to humans, this verse has often 
served as an emblem of universality and inclusivity and at least an opening of the 
epistemological door to the idea of some sort of universal access to ethical truth.  The two 
translations have been selected to show that a serious ambiguity arises in the word 
erchomenon, which could be construed as neuter nominative, in apposition to phōs, (as in 
NRSV), or as masculine accusative, agreeing with anthrōpon, (as in NKJV).108  This means 
that we are not sure whether it is the ‘light’ coming into the world (NRSV), or ‘every man’ 
that is coming into the world (NKJV).109 
Even taking phōs with erchomenon, the interpretation depends on whether we parse ēn 
as a stand-alone finite verb, and erchomenon as a present participle, or whether we attach ēn 
to erchomenon as a periphrastic imperfect, ‘was coming.’110 Westcott tries to do justice to 
                                                             
108 In the textual tradition the reading of ‘coming’ with ‘light’ is favoured by the Latin Fathers such as Tertullian 
and Cyprian. 
109 Some commentators have pointed out that ‘one who comes into the world’ is a common Rabbinic periphrasis 
for ‘man’. Schnackenburg (p.254.) says the presence of anthrōpon makes this implausible. 
110 Brown, (p.8.) finds 9 such circumlocutions in John. 
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both constructions: ‘There was the light, the true light, which lighteth every man; that Light 
was, and yet more, that Light was coming into the world.’111 
Interpretation is also affected by views on the nature, purpose and evolution of the 
Prologue and its possible origin as a ‘Logos-Hymn.’  Brown, for example, does not include 
verse 9 as part of the original ‘poetry’ of the Prologue, moved by the absence of the poetic 
link word kai.  Schnackenburg accepts verse 9 as part of the ‘hymn’, but rejects 9c, 
erchomenon eis ton kosmon, as an anti-Baptist addition of the evangelist.  
Verse 9 raises Augustine’s question concerning the point at which we consider Christ 
to make his entry into the Prologue. We have seen that Augustine located it at verse 11, ‘He 
came unto His own,’ taking vv. 1-5 and 9-10 as Platonic metaphysics. For Schnackenburg, 
only verses 1-5 remain in the cosmic realm. Verse 6 introduces history and the reality of the 
incarnation. He says in a footnote, ‘it was only in more modern times that everything after 
verse 6 came to be applied in the work of the incarnate logos (correctly, as we think, to the 
evangelist’s mind).’112  Westcott allows for a sense of pre-Christian revelation, both on an 
ontological level, ‘From the first He was (so to speak) on His way to the world, advancing 
towards the Incarnation by preparatory revelations’ and an epistemological / ethical level: ‘No 
man is wholly destitute of the illumination of “the Light” – in nature, and in life, and 
conscience it makes itself felt in various degrees to all.’113 
Barrett is sensitive to Greek/Hellenistic undertones: ‘When the Prologue is interpreted 
in terms of Hellenistic religion, and the logos thought of in a Stoic manner, it is natural to see 
in the present verse a reference to a general illumination of all men by the divine Reason.’114 
He translates 9b as ‘which shines on every man.’ Barrett sees the logos coming to the world 
                                                             
111 Westcott, The Gospel According to St John, p.7. 
112 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, p.257n.  
113 Westcott, The Gospel According to St John, p.7. 
114 Barrett, The Gospel According to St John, p.161. 
105 
 
as coming to its natural counterpart in the world of rational men, logikoi. Borgen takes 
erchomenon with phōs, translating ‘Logos was the true light, which enlightens every man by 
coming into the world.’ The background for him is Jewish; ‘the concept of the logos-light’s 
coming in John ... has as a model the conception of Torah – light’s coming with Moses,’ for at 
Sinai the light of the law shone on all men.115 Likewise Schnackenburg says that if the 
original hymn allowed for the historical spiritual illumination of humanity, then that was from 
within the Jewish, not the Greek tradition: ‘An activity of the logos in pre-Christian times is 
not foreign to primitive Christian thought, which was open to the Wisdom speculation and 
notions of pre-existence current among Jews.’116 So the original hymn taught that ‘The power 
of the Logos to give light and life is universal and indispensable to every man,’ but the 
Prologue ‘transfers to the logos the functions ascribed in Jewish literature to Wisdom or the 
Torah.’117 Schnackenburg concludes ‘the hymn does not describe the partial success of the 
work of the logos among mankind.’118 Ridderbos agrees: ‘There is no mention here of 
unsatisfied dormant sense or preunderstanding that needed only to be activated in order to 
acknowledge him.’119 
Thyssen, however, is convinced that verse 9 exhibits an epistemological point: ‘the 
Logos-concept of Greek philosophy: the idea of innate knowledge.’120 Lincoln thinks in terms 
of universalism: ‘The Word, then, has a transcendent power of illumination that is 
indispensable for all people.’121 Lindars also believes that verse 9 ‘refers to the continuous 
                                                             
115 Peder Borgen, ‘Logos was the True Light: Contributions to the Interpretation of the Prologue of John’, 
Novum Testamentum, Vol. 14, Fasc. 2 (Apr., 1972), pp. 115-130, p.125. 
116 Schnackenburg, The Gospel According to St John, pp. 256. 
117 Ibid., pp. 253. 
118 Ibid., pp. 257. 
119 Ridderbos, The Gospel of John, p.44. 
120 Henryk Pontoppidan Thyssen, ‘Philosophical Christology in the New Testament’, Numen, Vol.53, 2006, 
pp.133-176, p. 159. 
121 Lincoln, John p.101. 
106 
 
coming of the light as a source of revelation to mankind.’122 This was in fact the position of 
Aquinas, from which he drew ethical implications. Taking erchomenon with anthrōpōn, he 
explained: 
For all men coming into this visible world are enlightened by the light of natural 
knowledge through participating in this true light, which is the source of all the light of 
natural knowledge participated in by men.123  
This interpretation suits Aquinas’ philosophical-theological concept of participatio, which 
acts as the basis of his theory of natural law, and goes on to influence the concept of human 
rights, a theme to which I will return in Chapter Seven. 
4.4.3 The exclusive logos: Jn. 1:14 
I suggest there are at least five ‘exclusive’ aspects of the Fourth Gospel. Firstly, while it 
resides in what we might call a pluralist context, the Johannine community, like those of Nag 
Hammadi and Qumran, cultivates an understanding of itself as exclusive, a group that dwells 
in the light and has set itself apart from a world given over to darkness and ignorance. 
Secondly, John is famously dualistic in his world-view, understanding the world as a battle 
between dark and light (v.5) and speaking of the world both as God-created and fallen into 
ignorance in the same breath (v.10). Thirdly, John has a passion for truth and proclaims it 
without reservation as the essential characteristic of Christ and the Christian kerygma.124 
Fourthly, there is an obvious exclusivity in John’s uncompromising proclamation of Christ as 
universal saviour, the unique son of God who dwells in the bosom of the Father and has made 
Him known (v18). Fifthly, this last point leads us to John’s key moment of exclusivity, the 
remarkable verse 14. 
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Having thus far emphasised commonalities between the Prologue and various belief 
systems, I must now acknowledge its corrective nature as a polemic against certain religio-
philosophical stances. Barrett regards logos sarx egeneto as ‘a full, and perhaps the most 
succinct, expression of the paradox of the person of Christ.’125 As Edwards says, ‘there is 
nothing precisely like this in Stoicism, the Hermetica, the Targums, or even Philo.’126 Like 
most commentators, Lindars sees verse 14, with its provocative juxtaposition of logos and 
sarx, as the climax of the Prologue, the impact of which will be lost if we overplay the 
application of any of the previous verses to Jesus Christ.  He expresses the shock of verse 14 
for the Hellenists: ‘A reader with a dualist world-view of Hellenistic thought might accept the 
argument up to that point’, understanding the previous verses as ‘timeless inward 
apprehension’, ‘but he would be horrified by the thought of the Word becoming flesh.’127 As 
Lincoln says, for the Hellenistic reader logos sarx egeneto would represent ‘a merging of 
incompatible opposites, since the Logos was the rational and spiritual principle primarily to 
be experienced through the overcoming of physical and material existence.’128 All Hellenistic 
thought subscribed to the dualist world-view in which the flesh is fundamentally incompatible 
with the divine. ‘Salvation’ in Platonic philosophy is always release from the body, to 
facilitate union with the realm of pure spirit, which alone is divine. Schnackenburg requires 
37 words to translate the Greek’s three:  
The Logos who dwelt with God, clothed in the full majesty of the divinity and possessing 
the fullness of the divine life, entered the sphere of the earthly and human, the material 
and perishable, by becoming flesh.129   
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For Westcott the message is that ‘the Incarnation presupposes and interprets the Creation and 
the later history of man, and of man’s relation to God.’ He is also struck by the juxtaposition 
of logos and sarx. ‘The former marks the unchanged continuity of the Lord’s personality, and 
the latter the complete reality of His Manhood.’130  
Some commentators also detect a polemic against the docetists, who, influenced by 
Hellenistic dualism, are keen to deny the union of the divine and human in Christ.131 Lindars 
suggests that docetism ‘was already becoming current within the Church when John was 
writing his Gospel.’132 Others further suspect a defensiveness against Gnosticism, which 
Schnackenburg says ‘can be shown to be current in the second century.’133 The Gnostic logos 
is a heavenly redeemer figure whose mythical status is contrasted with John’s unmistakeably 
historical Logos. Schnackenburg believes that ‘the anti-Gnostic tone is unmistakeable’ and 
that ‘the Logos hymn undoubtedly envisaged Gnostic falsifications of the Christian faith, 
which were already giving the communities some trouble.’134 Thanks to verse 14, ‘the 
Christian teaching on the Son of God made man cannot be reduced to one variety among 
others: it can only be understood as a protest against all other religions of redemption in 
Hellenism and Gnosticism.’  
Traditional Judaic monotheism is also challenged by verse 14, which Dodd points out 
takes us ‘beyond the range of Jewish ideas’ with ‘an entirely fresh expression’ which is 
‘unprecedented and unique.’135 The shock of logos sarx egeneto for Lincoln is that ‘it would 
appear to have breached the clear distinction between the Creator and the Creature.’ He 
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suggests a paraphrase: ‘God’s self-communication became embodied.’136 Dodd’s equivalent 
is ‘this same divine hypostasis now embodied itself in a human individual.’137 The word sarx 
has received various renderings, such as Brown’s ‘the whole man’,138 or Ridderbos’ ‘all of the 
human person in creaturely existence as distinct from God.’139 A Jewish reader will certainly 
be shocked at the anthropomorphism of a man known to history being the revelation of the 
invisible God, rather than just an inspired messenger like the prophets. 
Alongside these incommensurabilities, verse 14 retains Judaic resonances which 
constitute a welcome and endorsement of Hebrew thought. Thus eskēnōsen takes us far from 
Hellenism to the Wisdom language of Sirach 24:4.140  The phrase ‘he tabernacled’ or ‘pitched 
his tent’ among us is pregnant with Exodus’ associations of God’s presence among his 
people.141 The term eskēnōsen connects ‘the Personal Presence of the Lord with his earlier 
Presence in the Tabernacle which foreshadowed it.’142 Lindars and Lincoln hear an allusion to 
the shekīnāh, a Mishnah circumlocution for the presence of God, arising after the destruction 
of the Temple and derived from Deuteronomy 12:11, ‘your God will choose as a dwelling for 
His name’.143 Yet the correction and critique must not be ignored: the presence of the logos in 
Christ ‘surpasses everything that could have been said of Wisdom’ and contains the sense of 
‘taking up residence and staying.’144  
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4.5 READING THE PROLOGUE WITH RATZINGER 
Ratzinger tells us that for all his theological work ‘the point of departure is first of all the 
Word.’145 He presents the Johannine logos as the fulfilment of Hellenistic thought. ‘In using 
the term logos John is taking over a term ‘widely current in both Greek and Jewish thought 
and taking over with it a series of ideas implicit in it.’ One of those ideas, which John retains, 
is ‘the idea of the eternal rationality of being.’146 But in Jesus of Nazareth the logos ‘acquires 
a new dimension.’ It still includes ‘the permeation of all being by meaning’, but shockingly, it 
characterizes this man: ‘he who is here is Word’. Ratio becomes verbum, rationality becomes 
relationality, in a logos Christology whose hallmark is ‘the opening up of being to the idea of 
relationship.’ Jesus Christ is ‘a God who perceives me, hears me, speaks to me (a Logos).’147 
Like John, Ratzinger seeks to correct and critique Greek thought, while valuing and 
respecting its undoubted achievements. Hellenistic thought adheres to a monotheism derived 
purely from philosophical speculation. Such a belief, while representing a perception of the 
truth, can have no real religious force.  ‘One cannot worship one’s own intellectual 
concepts.’148 Jesus Christ, as the Johannine logos, answers both ‘the deepest religious 
longings’ and ‘the requirements of reason’.149 
Jesus becomes the fulfilment of both the Greek and the Judaic enlightenments, the 
ultimate guarantor of the highest reality. Jesus is not the Greek ‘absolute enclosed autarchy’ 
but ‘involvement, creative power, which creates and bears and loves other things...’150  Greek 
philosophy seeks ‘the concept of the Highest Being’ and ‘to know what the Highest Being is 
                                                             
145 Salt of the Earth, p.66. 
146 Introduction to Christianity, p.189. 
147 Truth and Tolerance, p.103. 
148 Ibid., p.154. 
149 Ibid., p.153. 
150 Introduction to Christianity, p.148. 
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like in itself.’ Biblical faith fulfils this yearning by revealing that the highest Being has a 
name, the Highest Being is a person who can be called upon. ‘John presents the Lord Jesus 
Christ as the real, living name of God.’151 
Ratzinger extols the exclusivity of verse 14, struck by ‘the absolutely staggering alliance 
of logos and sarx’ where logos is ‘what sustains history’ and sarx a ‘single historical 
figure’.152 Verse 14 tells us that ‘the name is no longer just a word at which we clutch; it is 
now flesh of our flesh, bone of our bone. God is one of us.’153 Verse 14 must be read with 
verse 1: ‘The creative rationality from which the world has sprung, is personally present in 
this man Jesus.’154 
The Logos represents Jesus as the Word; not only a person who has words or speaks 
words,  but who is his word and his work, who is the Logos (the Word, meaning, mind) itself; 
‘that person has always existed and will always exist; he is the ground on which the world 
stands.’155  Alongside the shock of verse 14’s exclusivity and particularism, Ratzinger refuses 
to relinquish the universality and inclusivity of the Greek vision, for ‘faith in the logos, the 
meaningfulness of being, corresponds perfectly with a tendency in the human reason.’156 But 
he sees that Greek thought is being corrected: 
Perhaps one could maintain, however, that the new element that he imparted to the Logos 
concept lies significantly in the fact that what was decisive to him was not the idea of 
eternal rationality -  as the Greeks supposed -  or whatever other speculations there might 
                                                             
151 Introduction to Christianity, p.134. In a footnote on p.76, Ratzinger says ‘The Greek word logos displays in 
its range of meanings a certain correspondence with the Hebrew root ‘mn’ (“Amen”): word, meaning, 
rationality, truth are all included in its semantic range.’ 
152 Ibid., p.193. 
153 Ibid., p.135. 
154 J. Ratzinger, God and the World, trans. Henry Taylor, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002). 
155 Introduction to Christianity, p.206. 
156 Ibid., p.193.  
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have been previously, but rather the relativity of the existence that is inherent in the 
concept of the Logos.157 
It would, then, be unwise to position John’s deployment of the logos purely in instrumental 
terms, as if the evangelist almost cynically dusted off a well-worn, culturally respectable term 
merely to render his Gospel palatable to Hellenic auditors. My narrative has revealed the inner 
appropriateness of the term logos as a carrier of something precious and true. Nevertheless, 
the usefulness of the term logos cannot be completely ignored. Ratzinger, in my view, struck 
the right balance in the Bonn Inaugural Lecture: 
The appropriation of philosophy … was nothing other than a necessary interior 
process, which was complementary to the exterior task of missionary proclamation of 
the Gospel to the Gentile world. If the Christian message is essential, and is to be not 
merely an esoteric secret teaching for a narrow and limited circle of insiders, but 
God’s message for all, then it is essential that it is interpreted for the outside world 
into the general language of reason.158 
Here is an insight which will orient Ratzinger throughout his life-long theological endeavours. 
 
4.6: JOHANNINE LOGOS THEOLOGY AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
From this chapter’s excursion into the Hellenized Judaism of the Johannine logos, five claims 
emerge.  
The first claim is that the Johannine deployment of the logos can serve as a model for 
an inclusive contemporary Christian engagement with human rights.  I have established that 
the logos concept had various meanings for a range of constituencies and that these pluralities 
flow from complex interactions between the Greek/philosophical or the Judaic/biblical 
                                                             
157 J. Ratzinger: ‘On the Understanding of Person in Theology’, Dogma and Preaching, p188. The word 
relativity may contain the idea of ‘relationality’, although the original German Relativität does mean ‘relativity’. 
Note the use of a favourite Ratzinger word ‘decisive’. 
158 Gott des Glaubens, p.32. 
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traditions, with the ‘theosophy’ of Philo and the Sophia of Wisdom literature constituting 
potent syntheses of both. In a complex, syncretising world, the logos stood out as an almost 
universally well-regarded concept. As logos, it had deep, almost subconscious, roots in the 
Hellenistic thought-world. As ‘Word’, it had an equally respectable pedigree in the heart of 
Judaism and of Christianity.  Whether he was preaching to his own ‘Johannine community’, 
or reaching out to convince highly-educated Hellenized Jews, or Judaized Gentiles, John was 
bold enough to use a widely known non-Christian concept with which to communicate his 
own Christian faith.  
To laud the Fourth Gospel for its ‘inclusivism’ would be as anachronistic as to decry 
its ‘exclusivism’. I have described what I have termed John’s ‘tone of welcome’, but have 
noted also his uncompromising correctives. Neither neo-Platonist, nor Stoic, nor follower of 
Philo can fail to find both a corroboration of something they have got right and a stern rebuke 
of something they have got wrong. This applies equally to the Christian with Gnostic or 
docetic tendencies, to the persistent adherent of John the Baptist, to the over-comfortable or 
elitist Christian and of course to the faithful Jew of the Mosaic tradition. 
The relevance of these reflections to the culture of human rights is this. The concept of 
human rights occupies a status in the contemporary mind analogous to that of the logos in the 
Hellenistic world. In a multicultural, pluralist world, the concept of human rights stands out as 
a widely accepted concept.  Just like the logos, the human rights concept constitutes a 
universal language. Like the logos, it has deep, genealogical roots in the Graeco-Roman 
tradition, alongside equally longstanding sources in the biblical tradition of both Judaism and 
of Christianity.  This thesis therefore makes the claim that it is possible for Christians today to 
use the concept of human rights in order to communicate anew, in an even more complex 
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pluralist setting, that same Christological vision espoused by John, a Christology I have 
characterized as ‘rationality with relationality’. 
My second claim focuses not on the methodology, but the actual meaning of the 
Johannine logos. Beating within the heart of the Prologue is the unmistakeable pulse of that 
Greek, and especially Stoic, thought, which influenced both Philo and the Wisdom literature, 
namely, the congruence between the rationality of the creator, creation and creature. This is 
the insight that Ratzinger admires so much in Greek thought, that to live well is to live kata 
logon, a theme which is central to the Regensburg Lecture, with its passionate appeal for 
religious dialogue syn logō (paras.13, 17, 24 and 63).  Alongside this Greek concept of natural 
law sits a natural theology, which seeks to discover the universal in human experience. We 
have seen this profound universalism in the Prologue, in to phōs tōn anthrōpōn, the 
conviction that certain ontological, epistemological and ethical insights have always been, or 
could always have been, available to humanity, even before the coming of Christ. This 
profoundly inclusive and welcoming insight leads to a second claim; if they are to remain true 
to their own tradition, Christians must engage with the intrinsic universality of human rights. 
They are not optional, nor are they alien, to Christianity. 
This leads to a third claim which builds on the Judaeo-Christian exclusivity of the 
Prologue. Verse 14’s logos sarx egeneto is incarnational, particular, personal, historical and 
human. It therefore contrasts with the metaphysical purity of verse 1’s en archē ēn ho logos; 
yet it is also the logical outcome of a metaphysic that is inherently relational. For the very 
concept of logos or ‘word’ implies communication and thereby proposes an ontology built not 
on transcendence but on communion. The Prologue therefore balances Greek transcendence 
and rationality with Jewish relationality and history. This leads to a third claim. Christians 
must commit to the almost timeless rationality of rights, especially in terms of their protection 
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of the rational autonomy of the individual person, as constituted in the traditional civil and 
political rights of the Enlightenment. However, Christians also have a special responsibility to 
uphold the relationality of rights, as this unfolds and develops in historical time, especially as 
constituted in the tradition of economic, social and cultural rights, which have always been 
the special concern of religious actors, and which are subject to ongoing development in the 
subsequent emergence of group or communal rights, as well as of environmental rights. 
Furthermore, a Christian will want to ground human rights even more deeply, in the 
ontology of love. Ratzinger started his theological work with this insight, that the logos is at 
the same time love, that love is the original creative thought of the world, that truth and love 
are identical and constitute ‘the one and only absolute.’159 Towards the end of his ministry, he 
would reprise the same theme. ‘The ancient world had dimly perceived that man’s real food – 
what truly nourishes him as man – is ultimately the Logos, eternal wisdom: this same Logos 
now truly becomes food for us – as love.’160 If truth and love ‘cannot be produced’ then 
neither ultimately can human rights. ‘Their ultimate source is not, and cannot be, mankind, 
but only God, who is himself Truth and Love.’ Society cannot be merely a human product, a 
human choice, but a response to an intrinsic plan ‘that is prior to us and constitutes a plan to 
be freely accepted.’161 
A fifth and final point must be made concerning dialogue, identified in the previous 
chapter as a crucial dimension of the Platonic concept of logos. Structured as it is around a 
series of discourses, the Fourth Gospel constitutes a dialectic, with truth incarnated in a series 
of speeches, exchanges and conversations, the famous ‘discourses’. Likewise, the Prologue, in 
                                                             
159 Introduction to Christianity, p.148. 
160 J. Ratzinger as Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est: Encyclical Letter on Christian Love, (London: Catholic 
Truth Society, 2006), para.13, p.16. 
161 J. Ratzinger as Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate: Encyclical Letter on Integral Human Development in 
Charity and Truth, (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2009), para.52, p.64. 
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a mere 250 words, can be read as a dialogue with neo-Platonists, Stoics, followers of Philo, 
proto-gnostics, Christians with Hermetic-style beliefs, Jews steeped in the Torah and in the 
Wisdom literature, followers of John the Baptist, Christians with docetizing, 
accommodationist or elitist tendencies, all in a tone of both welcome and correction. In this 
sense it constitutes a model for interreligious dialogue in which Christians can and indeed 
must be exclusive, in the sense of maintaining their doctrinal integrity, while being inclusive 
in the sense of allowing the insights of others to shape and develop that doctrine in new 
directions. If they do this they will simply be taking their lead from the Johannine 
methodology of ‘taking the common linguistic and conceptual coinage of his day and 
reminting it in the light of Christ,’162 an approach by which ‘prevailing philosophies have 
been essentially “baptized” and have helped to sharpen the articulation of Christian thought 
and shape its systematic development.’163 
CONCLUSION 
My enquiry into the nature and sources of the Johannine logos has confirmed that the logos 
was shaped by non-Christian insights and concepts. On this basis, I draw confidence in taking 
forward into my enquiry into human rights, the idea that Christians can and must allow their 
own tradition, including their approach to human rights, to be shaped by non-Christian 
insights and concepts. John teaches the absolute universality of the logos-principle, alongside 
the shocking historical particularity and uniqueness of the Christ-event. Guided by 
Ratzinger’s Hellenization thesis, and his championing of the logos, I conclude that any re-
shaping of Christianity must respect the integrity of the Johannine creation account, in which 
                                                             
162 Stephen C. Barton, ‘Johannine Dualism and Contemporary Pluralism’, in The Gospel of John and Christian 
Theology, Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008) pp.3-18, p.16. 
163 D. Cheetham, ‘Inclusivisms: Having Faithfulness and Openness’, in Paul Hedges and Alan Race (eds.) 
Christian Approaches to Other Faiths, (London: SCM Press, 2008), pp.63-84, pp.66-7. 
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creator, creation and creature are held together in a creative tension I call rationality-with-
relationality. In my account, the permanent significance of Hellenization demands the 
inseparability of ontology, epistemology and ethics. Two Ratzingerian contributions have 
come into focus and will guide the further progress of the thesis. Firstly, secular formulations 
of human rights must remain open to the insights of those with transcendent commitments. 
This principle will be of central importance in the discussion of the Christian engagement 
with the secular in Chapter Eight. Secondly, the interculturality of the Johannine logos shows 
a blend of exclusivity and inclusivity, but not pluralism or relativism. This principle will be of 
central importance in the discussion of Christian engagement with Islam in Chapter Nine.  
Chapter Five will explore the implications of the logos doctrine of Justin Martyr as a 
further encounter between Greek thought and biblical faith, as an inclusive foundation for 
human rights, and as a model for intercultural dialogue. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LOGOS THEOLOGY OF JUSTIN MARTYR 
‘the critically purified Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith.’1 
INTRODUCTION 
This starting point for Chapter Five is the conviction expressed in the Regensburg Lecture 
that the ‘inner rapprochement’ between Biblical faith and Greek philosophy is of decisive 
importance for the history of religions and for world history.2 The chapter examines the 
significance of Justin Martyr for the Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason through 
the loss of the synthesis of faith and reason. This chapter explains how Justin Martyr searched 
for the perfect philosophy which would embody the truth about God. He tried Platonism, 
Stoicism, Judaism and Christianity. To explain why he chose Christianity as the perfect and 
true philosophy, Justin used one word, logos. The logos represented not a denial, but a 
fulfilment of all other systems. It signified a synthesis between the inclusivity and universality 
of general natural revelation and the exclusivity and particularity of special scriptural 
revelation. This chapter argues that logos theology can draw from Justin’s paradigm to bring a 
patristically grounded synthesis of faith and reason into its formulation of the culture of 
human rights. 
The Regensburg Lecture does not refer explicitly to the Patristic period. It does 
however take as its main theme the ‘profound encounter of faith and reason’.3 Regensburg 
accepts that there are aspects of the evolution of the early church which can be set aside 
today. However, the fundamental decisions taken in the New Testament and in the Patristic 
                                                             
1 The Regensburg Lecture, para.31. 
2 Ibid., para.29. 
3 Ibid., para.24. 
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period concerning the relationship between philosophy and Christianity, between faith and the 
use of human reason, cannot be undone; ‘they are developments consonant with the nature of 
the faith itself.’4 Justin Martyr represents one of the earliest and most influential attempts to 
achieve this synthesis. What Justin Martyr learned and taught, on the basis of this synthesis, 
was a logos theology. This theology can be summed up in the statement from Regensburg: 
‘the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos, has acted and continues to 
act lovingly on our behalf.’5  
Justin Martyr is very strongly associated with the term logos. The aim of this chapter is to 
understand how Justin used the logos, in order to uncover the potential significance of the 
term for today. The chapter brings Ratzinger, Justin and human rights together for the first 
time. Justin is analysed in terms of inclusivity and exclusivity as well as within the 
philosophical framework of ontology, epistemology and ethics. Middle Platonism is posited 
as an influence for Justin’s ontology, Judaism for his epistemology and Stoicism for his 
ethics. The contribution to the study of human rights is to use Justin’s logos theology as a 
paradigm for an inclusive formulation of the concept of human rights. 
5.1: JUSTIN’S LOGOS THEOLOGY AND THE ONTOLOGY OF PLATONISM 
Starting with the theme of ontology, this section will outline the importance of Middle 
Platonism for Justin’s theology. Justin will be portrayed as providing both an inclusivity or 
welcome for Middle Platonism and an exclusivity or correction of Middle Platonism.  
 
 
                                                             
4 The Regensburg Lecture, para.53. 
5 Ibid., para.27. 
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5.1.1   Platonism 
It is important to look at a phenomenon referred to by scholars as ‘Middle Platonism’ 
because if it is correct to think of Justin as influenced by Platonic philosophy, then it may be 
Platonic philosophy in this later form. The study of Middle Platonism as an influence on 
Justin was pioneered by Andresen in the 1950s.6 It was Albinus in particular whose 
importance was highlighted by Andresen. 
Many Patristics scholars have discussed ‘Middle Platonism’, but often with severe 
reservations. Philosophical convention distinguishes between Plato, ‘Middle Platonism’ and 
‘Neoplatonism’. Justin scholar Barnard commends Copleston’s scheme of post-Platonic 
philosophy: i) 4th century BCE to 1st century BCE, the rise of the Stoic and Epicurean 
philosophies, alongside the Peripatetic school and the Academy ii) 1st century BCE to 3rd 
century CE, the rise of Middle Platonism and iii) 3rd century CE to 6th century CE, the period 
of Neoplatonism.7 
Daniélou lists Middle Platonism’s chief protagonists as Antiochus (1st century BCE), 
Plutarch (ca. 45–120 CE), Numenius, (mid-2nd century CE), Maximus of Tyre (late 2nd 
century CE), Albinus (mid-2nd century CE) and Atticus (mid-2nd century CE).8  
Barnard describes Middle Platonism as ‘an amalgam and a philosophic transition 
stage’, while Daniélou says that ‘Middle Platonism constitutes a particular interpretation of 
Plato, which retains certain features only of his thought, and organises them in a system.’9 
                                                             
6 Carl Andresen, ‘Justin und der mittlere Platonismus’, Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, xliv 
(1953), 157-195. 
7 L.W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp.28-9. 
Barnard is referencing F.C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy. Vol 1: Greece and Rome, Revised edition, 
London, 1947. pp.382-3. 
8 Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture: A History of Early Christian Doctrine Before the 
Council of Nicaea, Volume Two, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973), p.107. 
9 Ibid., p.107. 
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Emilsson advises caution: ‘Middle Platonism is no unified school of thought, but a label put 
on various Platonically inspired thinkers.’10 Edwards agrees: ‘there was never a school of 
Middle Platonism’ and the term is ‘a convenient designation for those philosophers who 
wrote before Plotinus and exhibit an important debt to Plato.’11 Barnard similarly describes 
Middle Platonism as ‘an eclectic amalgam of different, and at times contradictory, streams of 
philosophy.’12 Lyman regards it as a hybrid of Platonism and Stoicism, and fears that we have 
created an artificial construct called ‘Middle Platonism’ just to serve our retrospective 
narrative of the development of orthodoxy.13  
Despite these reservations, the presence of some sort of Platonism in Justin seems to 
me quite unavoidable. For Barnard, Justin is a philosopher ‘who remained a Platonist even 
after his conversion to Christianity.’ Van Winden agrees that Justin ‘reflects the Middle 
Platonic exegesis of Plato’s philosophy’.14 Daniélou was similarly confident that ‘the Plato to 
whom the Apologists refer is the Plato of Middle Platonism.’15 Even Lyman accepts the 
central importance of Plato for Justin, who wants ‘to be found a Christian, not because the 
teachings of Plato are entirely different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all 
respects like them.’16 
 
 
                                                             
10 Eyjolfur Emilsson, ‘Neo-Platonism’, in Routledge History of Philosophy, ed. David Furley, (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1997), Vol 2. p.357. 
11 M.J. Edwards, ‘Justin’s Logos and the Word of God’, Journal of Early Christian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, (Fall 
1995), pp.261-280, p.264. 
12 Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought, p.77. 
13 J. Rebecca Lyman ‘Hellenism and Heresy’, Journal of Early Christian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, (Summer 
2003), pp.209-222, p.216. 
14 J.C.M. Van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho Chapters One to 
Nine, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), p.75. 
15 Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, p.75. 
16 Lyman, Hellenism and Heresy, p.218, quoting from 2 Apol.13. 
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5.1.2   Justin’s inclusivism: an endorsement of Platonism 
What Justin derives from Middle Platonism is a God who is first and foremost transcendent.17 
Influenced by Albinus’ apophatic theology, Justin describes God by means of a via 
negativa.18 This is located in a succession of adjectives exhibiting the alpha privative, of 
which Justin’s two favourites are the highly Platonic arrhētos,19 ineffable20 and the highly 
Aristotelian agennētos,21 uncaused or unbegotten, in the Peripatetic / Thomist / Leibnizean 
sense of self-caused, necessary being.22 Justin describes his encounter with an ‘Old Man’ on 
the philosophical journey he made as a seeker after truth, which reached its culmination in his 
encounter with Platonism:23  
                                                             
17 Scholarly consensus regards the First and Second Apologies and the Dialogue with Trypho (Hereinafter Dial. 
in the footnotes) as the only genuine works of Justin. There is some doubt about the independent status of the 
very brief ‘Second’ Apology. The text of the Dialogue is suspect in parts, especially because it exhibits some 
curious lacunae. The text of the three genuine books is based almost entirely on a single manuscript, Paris 450, 
dated 11th September 1363. As with the scriptures, the MS can occasionally be attested by brief citations in 
patristic sources. 
18 Palmer does note that it is not a true via negativa ‘in the sense of gradual elimination of positive attributes.’ 
See D.W. Palmer, ‘Atheism, Apologetic and Negative Theology in the Greek Apologists of the Second Century’, 
Vigiliae Christianae, Vol.37, No.3 (Sept., 1983), pp.234-259, p.234. Palmer (p.242) believes that this negative 
theology serves a vital apologetic function, ‘to reject the old gods and to express his commitment to the 
transcendent God of Christian belief.’ Daniélou (pp.323-328) posits Hellenistic Judaism as a possible source of 
this negative theology. 
19 All Greek quotations from the Dialogue with Trypho have been taken from Trollope’s 1846 edition, digitized 
in 2009 by the University of Toronto Internet Archive and accessible at 
http://www.archive.org/details/siustiniphilosop01just. All Greek quotations from the Apologies have been taken 
from Hanstein’s 1911 edition, digitized in 2011 by the University of Toronto Internet Archive and accessible at 
http://www.archive.org/details/siustiniapologia00just. 
All English translations of all three works are taken from Anti-Nicene Fathers: The Writings of the Fathers down 
to A.D.325. Volume 1: The Apostolic Fathers, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, ed. Alexander Roberts and James 
Donaldson. Revised and Chronologically arranged with brief prefaces and occasional notes by A. Cleveland 
Coxe (New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885). Reprinted by Veritatis Splendor Publications, 
2012. 
20 e.g. Dial.126.2 
21 This is how Aristotle used agennētos in Metaphysics B 4 999b 7ff. It is to be distinguished from agenētos, 
which means having no beginning or end, eternal in the sense of no decay. Goodenough, who generally takes a 
poor view of Justin’s philosophical acumen, is not confident that Justin would have been aware of this 
distinction. See Erwin R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), p.129. 
22 Similar apophatic divine attributes include atrepton, immutable, (1 Apol 13.4), aphthartos, incorrupt, 
(Dial.5.4), achōrētos, not to be contained by any place, (Dial.127.2), apathēs, impassible (1 Apol.25.2), 
anōnomastos, nameless, (1 Apol.63.1). 
23 For Hyldahl and Goodenough, this spiritual odyssey is a fictional literary construct, comparable, for example, 
with Plato’s Parmenides or Lucian’s Menippus. Barnard, Chadwick and Van Winden prefer to concede some 
measure of autobiographical authenticity. 
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I was quite enraptured with the perception (noēsis) of immaterial things, and the 
contemplation (theōria) of ideas added wings to my intelligence (phronēsis), and 
within a short time I supposed I had become wise, and in my obtuseness was hoping to 
have a clear vision of God.24  
There follows clear evidence of the influence of Plato on Justin: 
…that the eye of the mind is itself of such a kind, and has been given us for this         
purpose, that we are able by that pure eye unaided to see clearly that very thing, Being, 
(to on) which is the cause of all things that are within the province of understanding 
(ta noēta), and has no colour, no shape, no size, no anything that the eye can see. But 
this very Being, Plato says, a being beyond all essence (ousia), not to be expressed in 
words, not to be described, but alone noble and good (kalon kai agathon), is suddenly 
implanted within well-born souls because of their kinship with it and their longing to 
behold it.25 
We see clearly here the Platonic Theory of Forms, the Forms of the Beautiful and the Good, 
the kinship (suggenes) between the soul and the transcendent realm. Goodenough says that 
Justin has given ‘a fair statement of Platonism as he would have heard it expounded’, its 
typically Middle Platonic character revealed in its ‘all engrossing desire for mystical 
experience’ and ‘a profound desire to find peace in a mystical communion with God.’26 In a 
key passage in the Dialogue, the Old Man asks Justin to define God.27 Justin’s answer is ‘that 
which is ever the same in being and in manner of being, and is the cause of existence (to 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
The transliterated Greek is provided for some words in brackets within my quotations from Justin. The purpose 
of this is to highlight for the reader certain key Platonic phrases such as noēsis, phronēsis, to on, ousia and so on. 
24 Dial.2.6.  
25 Dial.4.1. In Middle Platonism, the human logos gives epistēmē of ta noeta, which are the ‘secondary 
Intelligibles’ or forms within the material world, unlike the Academy’s transcendent forms.  
26 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p.71, p.28 and p32. Barnard agrees: ‘Justin faithfully reflects the 
Platonism of his age.’ See Barnard p.6. 
27 Van Winden (p.59.) explains that Thirlby was so disturbed by the abrupt transition from Justin’s Being, to the 
Old Man’s request for a definition of God, that against all the Mss and editors he proposed a textual amendment 
of theon to on. The Thirlby reference is Justini Philosophi et Martyris Apologiae duae at Dialogus cum 
Tryphone Judaea, cum notis et emendationibus, Styani Thirlbii, (London 1722), p.35. Goodenough (p.64) 
agrees, because ‘the reading is much smoother.’  
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einai) to all else.’28 The Old Man welcomes Middle Platonism’s to on into Christianity’s 
theos.29 In his endorsement of Greek philosophy, Chadwick concludes, Justin ‘could hardly 
have been more positive and generous.’30 
5.1.3   Justin’s exclusivism: a correction of Platonism 
In contrast to Chadwick, De Vogel sees Justin adopting ‘an extremely critical attitude, yet 
receptive of certain elements.’31 Nilson portrays Justin’s enthusiasm for Greek thought as a 
mere apologetic or proselytizing device aimed at his gentile non-Christian audience in 
Rome.32 The Greek philosophical transcendent God, ho hyper kosmon theon, is welcomed, 
but corrected. The Old Man fulfils and supplements philosophy’s insights with the biblical, 
personal God of the prophets and the Word made flesh in Jesus Christ: ‘since they both 
glorified the Creator, the God and Father of all things, and proclaimed His Son, the Christ 
sent by Him.’33 Here we see Justin repeating the phrase from 2 Apol.6.1, where he deploys 
Timaeus 28C, a privileged text of Middle Platonism: ‘Now to find the maker and father of this 
universe is hard enough, ... to declare him to everyone is impossible.’34 When Justin replies 
‘Well done, Plato!’ he is congratulating Plato on replacing the idolatrous images of pagan 
mythology with the ineffable God. The demythologising rejection of pagan idolatry creates a 
                                                             
28 Dial.3.5. This definition of God is Platonic. Cf. Plato, Rep.484 B 4, 509 B 6-8. 
29 The Old Man goes on to reject three Platonic doctrines: the immortality of the soul, the immortality of the 
world, and reincarnation. 
30 Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement and Origen, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.11. 
31 Carolina J. De Vogel, ‘Problems concerning Justin Martyr: Did Justin Find a Certain Continuity between 
Greek Philosophy and Christian Faith?’, Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol.31, Fasc. 4 (1978), pp.360-388, at p.19. 
According to her, the most Justin will concede is ‘that some Greek philosophers had seen at least something of 
the truth’ and that God ‘sometimes enlightened in a special manner the minds of men.’ (Ibid., p.20). 
32 Jon Nilson, To Whom is Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho Addressed?, available online at 
http://cdn.theologicalstudies.net/38/38.3/38.3.6.pdf. (Accessed: 21 November 2013). 
33 Dial.7.3. ‘ton poiētēn tōn holōn theon kai patera.’ – ‘God the creator of everything and father (of all)’ (my 
translation). A more Platonic variation of the same quotation is given in 2 Apol.10.6: ton de patera kai 
demiourgon pantōn. – ‘the father and demiurge of everything’ (my translation). 
34 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, (Indianopolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000) p.14. The Greek for 
Plato’s original phrase ‘father and maker of everything’ is ‘ton ... poiētēn kai patera tou pantos.’ This quotation 
from Timaeus 28C was used by Albinus (27.1), Atticus (Proclus, In Tim., 93 b), Apuleius (Plat. 1.5), Origen, 
(Contra Celsum, 7.42) and Clement of Alexandria (Protrepticus 6.68.1). 
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unifying bond between Judaism, Christianity and Greek philosophy and serves Justin’s 
apologetic imperative to defend Christianity against atheism. Daniélou calls this ‘the shaping 
of Christian theological language under Platonic influence.’35 
Justin does have one further important reservation about Plato in the form of his firmly 
held and oft-repeated belief that Plato derived his teachings from Moses, (‘Moses is more 
ancient than all the Greek writers’), and derived his Timaeus doctrine of creation from the 
Book of Genesis.36 Droge points out that Justin was not the first to make such a claim and that 
‘no one in antiquity seems to have regarded it as preposterous.’37 This presumed dependence 
of Greek thought on Moses undercuts Plato as the fount of philosophic wisdom and replaces 
him with a putative primal philosophy, of which Plato is a distortion, followed by further 
distortions of the various philosophic schools. Droge therefore makes the point that for Justin, 
Christianity is not just the best philosophy among many, but is the only philosophy, because it 
is the reconstitution of the original, primordial philosophy.38 The way is therefore opened for 
Justin, the Middle Platonist turned Christian, to sport his philosopher’s cloak declaring 
himself ‘a true philosopher.’ Ratzinger provides a summary which pulls together the 
ontological and the ethical: 
As early as the second century, Justin Martyr had characterized Christianity as the true 
philosophy, for which he adduced two main reasons. First, the philosopher’s essential 
task is to search for God. Second, the attitude of the true philosopher is to live 
according to the Logos and in its company. Christian existence means life in 
                                                             
35 Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, p.110. 
36 1 Apol.44.8 and 1 Apol.59. 
37 Arthur J. Droge, ‘Justin Martyr and the Restoration of Philosophy’, Church History, Vol.56, No.3 (Sept. 
1987), pp.303-319, p.311. Pelikan is able to provide citations from four important authors who all advanced the 
idea that Plato got his ideas from the Hebrew scriptures. Philo (Qu.om.pr.lib 8:57), Josephus (Ap. 2.36 256-7), 
Origen (Contra Celsum 6.19) and Clement (Protrepticus. 6.70.1). See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: 
A History of the Development of Doctrine Vol 1. The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition 100-600, (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p.33. 
38 Ibid., p.319. 
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conformity to the Logos, that is why Christians are true philosophers and why 
Christianity is the true philosophy.39 
Summary  
Justin welcomed Plato’s transcendentalism, but corrected it with Judaeo-Christian 
monotheism. Justin may have achieved this by welcoming the Middle Platonism of Albinus, 
which had moved Platonic philosophy in the direction of theism. Justin then corrected 
Albinus by portraying Christ as the link between God and the world. 
5.2: JUSTIN’S LOGOS THEOLOGY AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUDAISM 
The predominant theme in this section is epistemology. This section will examine the logos as 
welcome and correction of Judaic sophia (Wisdom), Judaic nomos, (Law) and Judaic dabar 
(Word). 
5.2.1   Sophia provides a bridge between philosophy and Christ 
I have already shown in Chapter Four that the concept of Wisdom represents an important 
background to the concept of the Word in John’s Gospel. In biblical Judaism, the Word is i) 
associated with creation ii) a link between creator, creation and creature, iii) the Law of 
Moses, the Torah.40 The post-exilic period sees an increasing appreciation of divine 
transcendence. The sapiental era evinces an increasing deployment of Greek philosophical 
categories in the formulation of a mediating principle between God and creation. At times the 
Torah, and at times Sophia, assume this mediating role in creation. More dominantly, this was 
the role ascribed to Sophia.  
                                                             
39 Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, pp.14-15. 
40 e.g. Ps.33:6 ‘by the word of the Lord the heavens were made’ and Ps.19:4 ‘their voice goes out through all the 
earth’. (NRSV). 
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Sophia is identified with Greek philosophic notions such as nous, logos and psychē tou 
kosmou (‘soul of the cosmos’). God creates the world in the presence of, and with the help of, 
Sophia.41 Sophia permeates the universe, preserves the order of creation, is seen as a 
pneuma,42 is a clear effulgence of the almighty,43 is associated with the Law, while the 
pneuma sophias is responsible for empowering humanity with the faculty of reason. Although 
personified, Sophia never represents for the Jews an intermediate deity or true personality. 
Nevertheless, for a Hellenistic Jew like Philo, Sophia is a vital cosmic mediating force. 
Scholarly consensus sees Paul in the tradition of Hellenistic Judaism. For Goodenough ‘it was 
Paul who made the tremendous discovery of the identity of Christ the man of history with the 
logos of Hellenistic Judaism,’ while Edwards points out that ‘Paul styles Christ the Wisdom 
of God.’44 The personification of both sophia and logos in the wisdom literature and in Philo 
opens the door to the creative and revelatory role ascribed to Christ as Word in both John and 
Justin. 
I see Sophia opening up Christology through two opposing tendencies. Sophia allows 
Jewish, and therefore Christian, thought to move in the direction of the Greek transcendent 
impersonal God, since the whole purpose of Sophia as a mediating principle is to preserve 
transcendence. Yet as Sophia adopts an increasingly personal profile, it moves in the direction 
of the personal God, intimately involved in creation. Like Paul, Justin is ‘among the first to 
equate this figure with the pre-existent and exalted Christ,’ both employing the word Power or 
                                                             
41 Wisdom 7:24, ‘she pervades and penetrates all things’ and 8:1, ‘she orders all things well.’ 
42 Wisdom 1:6, ‘wisdom is a kindly spirit’ and 7:22 ‘wisdom, the fashioner of all things, taught me.’ 
43 Wisdom 7:25-6, ‘she is a breath of the power of God.’ 
44 Edwards, Justin’s Logos and the Word of God, p.265, referring to 1 Cor 1:24, ‘Christ the dunamis of God and 
the sophia of God.’ Edwards argues against any substantive Greek, Stoic or Platonic sources for Justin’s logos 
doctrine, seeing it as authentically biblical and scriptural. 
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dunamis, in addition to Wisdom and Word.45 Piper says that Justin considers the ‘Logos’ and 
the ‘Spirit’ as the two original dunameis of God.46 
5.2.2   The Logos corrects the Jewish Nomos 
In the Prologue we read ‘The Law indeed was given through Moses; grace and truth came 
through Jesus Christ.’47 Paul contrasts adherence to Mosaic Law with justification through 
faith in Jesus Christ.48 Edwards points out that both The Preaching of Peter and Melito of 
Sardis, written in the same period as Justin, portray Christ as both Nomos, the author of a New 
Covenant, and Logos, the power by which God made the world.49 Christ replaces the Mosaic 
Law and covenant. We have seen that pagan and Hellenistic Judaic concepts of the logos 
provide a general background to John’s Gospel. So too we can, according to Edwards, 
presume that ‘Johannine terms for Christ’ were in Justin’s ‘own vocabulary,’ given that ‘the 
noun logos had served Christians for over half a century as a title of the Lord.’50  
The idea that Christ as Logos represents the fullness of a new nomos underpins the 
Dialogue with Trypho. The apologetic point at issue is the very bitter dispute between Jews 
and Christians over observance of Mosaic Law. Cosgrove helps us to understand the historical 
context of a Christianity struggling to retain continuity with Judaism while establishing its 
own distinctive identity.51 Boyarin blurs the distinction between Judaism and Christianity.52 
The putative ‘Council of Jamnia’ is a discredited concept and the Curse Against the Gentiles 
                                                             
45 Edwards, Justin’s Logos and the Word of God, p.265. 
46 Otto A. Piper, ‘The Nature of the Gospel According to Justin Martyr’, The Journal of Religion, Vol.41, No.3 
(July 1961), pp.155-168 at p.158. 
47 Jn.1:17 
48 e.g. Romans 3:21-22 
49 Edwards, Justin’s Logos and the Word of God, p.266. The Preaching of Peter is quoted in Clement’s 
Stromata, VI.5.41.5-6 and in Melito’s Homily on the Pascha. 
50 Edwards, Justin’s Logos and the Word of God, p.266 and p.288 
51 Charles H. Cosgrove, ‘Justin Martyr and the Emerging Christian Canon: Observations on the Purpose and 
Destination of the Dialogue with Trypho’, Vigiliae Christianae, 36 (1982) pp.209-232, (Leiden: E.J. Brill).  
52 Daniel Boyarin, ‘Justin Martyr Invents Judaism’, Church History, Vol.70, No.3 (September 2001) pp.427-461. 
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(birkath hamminin) has been exaggerated and over-simplified. He defers the emergence of 
fully developed orthodox Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism to the end of antiquity, preferring 
to describe Justin’s context as ‘Judaeo-Christianity’. It wasn’t a case of ‘combining two 
religions’ because ‘lines are not clearly drawn’.53 In the Dialogue we see both Christians and 
Jews developing the concept of heresy so that they can define themselves not only against 
each other but against groups within their own ranks. Justin’s ‘Nomos into Logos’ theology 
states that the Law was only given because of Jewish obduracy and that ‘an eternal and final 
law – namely Christ – has been given to us, and the covenant is trustworthy, after which there 
shall be no law.’54 
5.2.3   The Logos corrects Platonic epistemology with Jewish revelation  
Vermes holds that ‘A Christian theology, formally linked to Platonic philosophy, a system 
totally different from Jesus’ non-speculative mode of thinking, was born with the apologist 
Justin Martyr.’55 Justin’s initial adherence to Platonic philosophy is essentially 
epistemological. As a Platonist he is confident that ‘reason governs all.’56 He describes 
philosophy Platonically, as ‘the knowledge (epistēmē) of that which really exists (tou ontos)’. 
We could also translate this as ‘the science of reality.’ Philosophy provides ‘a clear perception 
(epignōsis) of the truth tou alēthous,’ and this gives rise to eudaimonia as the reward of 
sophia.57 There is ambiguity in the phrases tou ontos and tou alēthous, since both of them 
could be either neuter or masculine. Justin’s preference for ‘the true’ (ho alēthos) over ‘truth’ 
(alētheia) opens the door to the truth as the concrete personal reality of Christ; ‘He who is the 
True.’ Similarly, tou ontos, could be rendered as ‘He who is’, rather than the neuter ‘that 
                                                             
53 Boyarin, Justin Martyr Invents Judaism, p.460. 
54 Dial.11.2 
55 Geza Vermes, Christian Beginnings: From Nazareth to Nicaea AD 30 -325. (London: Penguin Books, 2103), 
p.239.Vermes, Christian Beginnings, p.239. 
56 ‘ton logon hēgemoneuonta pantōn’- ‘the logos which is the governor of everything’. 
57 Dial 3.2  
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which is.’ To on, Being, would then become the Christian ‘He Who Is’, via the God who 
disclosed Himself to Moses in the LXX version of Exodus 3:14 as ‘Ego eimi ho ōn,’ I am He 
who is.  
 However, the indescribable nature of the Platonic God leaves us with the 
epistemological inadequacy of the via negativa.58 Allert points out that in Dialogue 3-8, the 
Old Man, in Socratic style, pursues an epistemological path as he interrogates Justin.59 
Knowledge of the transcendent God cannot be attained in the same way as the knowledge 
appropriate to worldly disciplines. So how can we obtain knowledge of God? How can 
philosophers say something alēthes, when they have no epistēmē, having never seen or heard 
God? In his answer Justin cites Plato: through the mind (nous).60 The Old Man disagrees: 
when not instructed by the Holy Spirit, the mind of man cannot perceive God.61 Again 
quoting Plato, Justin persists in his Platonic epistemology: the mind of its own nature can see 
Being when it is pure, because it has a natural affinity and desire to see God. The ‘eye of the 
nous’ has been given to us for the purpose of perceiving to on, and to on is the cause of ta 
noēta, and is defined apophatically as having no colour, no form, no size, unutterable and 
inexplicable, a ‘Being (on) Beyond All Essence (ousia),’ ‘the Beautiful and the Good (kalon 
kai agathon).’ In well-born or well-dispositioned souls there is a natural affinity (suggeneia) 
and a desire to see this reality. The Old Man then destroys these Platonic constructs by 
disproving the immortality of the soul.  
There is a sense in which Justin is ripe for the Old Man’s introduction of the prophets, 
‘who spoke by the Divine Spirit’ and ‘announced the truth to men’ as ‘witnesses to the truth 
                                                             
58 See this chapter section 4.1.2 and note 18 above. God is described as arrhētos in Dial.127, essentially 
inaccessible to the human mind. See Piper, The Nature of the Gospel According to Justin Martyr, p.155. 
59 Craig. D. Allert, Revelation, Truth, Canon and Interpretation: Studies in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with 
Trypho, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002), pp.135-137. 
60 ‘monō nō katalēpton’ – literally ‘grasped by the mind alone’.  
61 The word for instructed is ‘kekosmēnenos’ – literally ‘beautified’.  
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above all demonstration.’ It is as if when he stood in his carefully chosen place of solitude, 
desperately trying to attain the transcendent, Justin already knew that this was not achievable 
through Platonic introspection.62 His (fictionalized?) reaction is instantaneous. Platonic 
philosophy might once have ‘leant wings to his mind’, but now ‘a flame was kindled in my 
soul, and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ possessed me.’63 
Now he can triumphantly conclude ‘I am a philosopher.’ His Middle Platonic epistemology 
has been replaced by a Christian epistemology, but both epistemologies share a common 
starting point and end point, the ‘knowledge of that which is.’ This Christian epistemology is 
a combination of the Old Testament Logos who inspired the prophets throughout the ages and 
the Christian Logos made flesh, John 1:18’s ‘God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s 
heart, who has made him known,’ or as Justin would express it, ‘they call him Logos because 
he carries tidings,’ especially to ‘the land destitute of the knowledge of God, the land of the 
Gentiles.’64 Justin’s main point is that ‘the revealing Logos is pervasive throughout salvation 
history.’65 Piper points out that ‘in genuinely Hellenic thought, no historical fact can be 
interpreted as the manifestation of the truth.’66 For Justin, because of Jesus ‘full knowledge of 
God has now become possible.’67 
Summary  
Like the author of the Fourth Gospel, Justin forges his logos theology from within the Judaeo-
Christian framework of biblical faith. This revealed faith provides knowledge which goes 
                                                             
62 ‘dialogos pros emauton’ – a dialogue with myself. 
63 ‘leant wings to the mind’ is a very popular Platonic trope. 
64 Dial.128.2 – ‘tas para tou patros homilias phereitois’- Williams translates this as ‘since he also bears to men 
the discourses that come from the Father’. See A. Lukyn Williams, Justin Martyr: The Dialogue with Trypho: 
translation, introduction and notes, (London: SPCK, 1930), p.265. Dial.69.6 ‘gnōseōs theou’ – ‘of the 
knowledge or gnōsis of God’. 
65 Allert, Revelation, Truth, Canon and Interpretation, p.110. 
66 Piper, The Nature of the Gospel According to Justin Martyr, p.158. 
67 Ibid., 158-159. 
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beyond anything human reason can attain by its own efforts, but it also goes beyond the 
inspired word of the biblical authors. What is revealed is a person, who not only provides the 
hermeneutical key to the Hebrew scriptures, but an ethical key to right action in accordance 
with the will of God. 
5.3: JUSTIN’S LOGOS THEOLOGYAND THE ETHICS OF STOICISM 
The predominant theme of this section is ethics. This section will examine Justin’s welcome 
and correction of Stoicism. The result will be the logos understood in three related modes, as 
Reason, as Seed of the Word, and as Christ. 
5.3.1   Justin and Stoicism 
Justin is naturally opposed to Stoicism. His Middle Platonic ontology of divine transcendence 
represents a firm rejection of the Stoic God, who is ‘a corporeal being who permeates the 
universe.’68 Justin criticises his Stoic teacher for having ‘no knowledge of God’ and for not 
even deeming such knowledge important.69 Justin famously, however, uses the Stoic term 
logos. Kelly describes the logos as ‘a fashionable cliché’ which is ‘more Philonic than 
Johannine.’70 The concept of the logos, whether or not it is justifiable to describe it as ‘a 
fashionable cliché’, is important in Stoicism, where logos is the solution to the mediating role 
between the material and the divine worlds. Logos endiathetos was inner apprehension or 
thought, logos prophorikos was speech, the outward expression of thought, logos spermatikos 
the rational principle present in all things.71 
                                                             
68 Runar M. Thorsteinsson, ‘Justin and Stoic Cosmo-Theology’, The Journal of Theological Studies, Vol.63, Part 
2, October 2012, pp.533-571, p.536. 
69 Dial.2.3 
70 J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th Edition, (London: Continuum, 1977), p.96. 
71 The distinction between logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos originates from Plato’s Theaetetus, 189E, 
where it functions simply as a distinction between thought in the mind and thought expressed verbally. 
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I will now show Justin using logos in three different modes. 
5.3.2   Logos as philologia 
I have shown in Chapter One that logos as reason or rationality is central to Platonic thought. 
In the First Apology I find Justin deploying logos in this sense twelve times. For example, the 
First Apology opens with these words: 
Reason (ho logos) directs those who are truly pious and philosophical to honour and 
love only what is true (t’alēthes), declining to follow traditional opinions (doxae), if 
these be worthless. For not only does sound reason (sōphrōn logos) direct us to refuse 
the guidance of those who did or taught anything wrong, but it is incumbent on the 
lover of truth, by all means, and if death be threatened, even before his own life, to 
choose to do and say what is right.72 
Here there is the Platonic contrast between alētheia and doxa, balanced by the Stoic doctrine 
of orthos logos and the primacy of the ethical.  When the Old Man encounters Justin in 
solitary contemplation it is because ‘places like this stimulate the love of logos.’73 Justin 
explains that his dialogos is unhindered and that such places are advantageous for philologia. 
The Old Man accuses Justin of being a philologos, a student of reason, but not a philergos, a 
lover of action or philēthēs, lover of truth or a seeker of wisdom (sophia). Justin responds: 
What greater work...could one accomplish than this, to show the logos which governs 
all, and having laid hold of it, and being mounted upon it, to look down on the errors 
of others and their pursuits? But without philosophy and right reason, prudence would 
not be present to any man. 
This is Middle Platonism, the desire to be alone to contemplate the Forms as the thoughts of 
God and so to apprehend the transcendent logos. But I detect a powerful strain of Stoicism 
here; the logos that is orthos is in harmony with ‘the logos which governs all.’ What Justin 
welcomes from the Greeks and offers to Christianity here is logos as reason, correctly used. 
                                                             
72 1 Apol. 2.1 Elsewhere, such as 2 Apol. 2.1, Justin uses the Stoic phrase orthos logos for ‘right reason’. 
73 Dial.3.2 
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Reason is correctly used if it is linked to alētheia. Alētheia for the Christian can never be 
ontological / theological truth alone: it must be linked to a practical ethics. It is a key 
Ratzinger principle, for which he claims Justin’s support, that in Christianity ‘the theological 
and the moral aspects are fused inseparably.’74 What is being proposed is the reasonableness 
of Christianity, both in its ontology and in its ethics: ‘Every nerve is strained to demonstrate 
that, on the assumptions every educated person would share, Christianity is reasonable.’75 
5.3.3   Logos as logos spermatikos 
In Albinus’ Middle Platonic anthropology the human logos, when disembodied, can gain 
epistēmē of the Primary Intelligibles, ta noēta, by means of God’s logos. Incarnated, the 
human logos can only access the Secondary Intelligibles, the Forms within natural objects. 
For such perception Albinus uses a Stoic term, physikē ennoia (‘natural perception’). 
Goodenough comments that in Stoicism, Middle Platonism and Philo, ‘the human mind is an 
especial expression and representation of God.’76 This concept finds its clearest expression in 
Justin’s logos spermatikos encountered in 2 Apol 13.3.  
What Justin welcomes in the Stoics is their ‘honourable’ or admirable’ (kosmiai) 
ethical system, for which they are willing to die.77 Justin equates Stoic ethics with the doctrine 
                                                             
74 J. Ratzinger, with Hans Schürmann and Hans Urs von Balthasar, trans. Graham Harrison, Principles of 
Christian Morality, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p.61. Original German publication Prinzipien 
Christliche Moral, (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1975). Ratzinger cites Justin Apology 1 61,1, providing the 
Greek in a footnote. This is rendered in the Anti-Nicene Fathers (op.cit. See note 19 above.) as ‘As many as are 
persuaded and believe that what we teach and say is true, and undertake to be able to live accordingly, are 
instructed to pray.’ 
75 Henry Chadwick, ‘The Gospel a Republication of Natural Religion in Justin Martyr’, Illinois Classical 
Studies, Vol.18 (1993), pp. 237-247, p.237. 
76 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p.48. 
77 2 Apol.8. Justin mentions Musonius and Thorsteinsson says that we know from Origen that Musonius was 
famous for his moral integrity (Thorsteinsson, p.542.) The reference in Origen is Contra Celsum, 3.66. Justin 
also refers to Heraclitus, who cannot be regarded as a Stoic, but to whose materialistic concept of all-pervading 
fire the Stoics are heirs. Justin’s reference to these two philosophers dying for their beliefs is a puzzle, as it does 
not apply to either of them. 
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of ‘the seed of that logos (sperma tou logou) which is implanted in the whole race of man.’78 
He goes on to say ‘for each seeing, through a part of the Seminal Divine Logos, (logos 
spermatikos) that which was kindred to those, discoursed rightly.’79 According to Justin, ‘all 
writers through the engrafted seed of the Logos, which was planted in them, were able to see 
the truth darkly.’ He then distinguishes between ‘the thing itself’ (auto), and the sperma, 
which is merely the ‘communication and imitation’ (metousia kai mimēsis) of reality, granted 
to each of us by charis according to our dynamis.80 
This doctrine of the spermatikos logos is Justin’s most distinctive contribution to 
Christian theology. Prestige translates this Stoic phrase as ‘immanent germinative principle’ 
and expands it to mean ‘the general belief in the rationality of the universe and in the 
prevalence of immanent forces governing particular objects.’81 With Albinus, he adopts the 
Stoic doctrine of physikai ennoiai, or natural conceptions,82 ‘those things which are always 
and everywhere good’ and expressly commends the Stoics for their sense of right and wrong: 
‘And those who followed the doctrines of the Stoics, since they were admirable in their 
ethical system; as were also the poets in some respects, because of the seed of that logos 
which is implanted in the whole race of men.’83 The logos explains how Greeks, Jews and 
Christians have all been able to express ethical truth. ‘What truth the philosophers and 
historians have been able to discover and relate they found and reasoned out by the 
instrumentality of this fragment of the Logos.’84 It is an ethical truth with which he is 
concerned: ‘Their Father teaches them by the Logos to do the same things as Himself.’85 This 
                                                             
78 2 Apol.7. 
79 2.Apol.13. 
80 auto – Daniélou translates as ‘reality.’ (Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, p.42.) 
81 G.L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (London: S.P.C.K., 1952), p.117. 
82 Williams, (p.197) translates this as ‘natural thoughts’. (p.197.)  
83 Dial.93.1. and 2 Apol.8. 
84 2 Apol.10 
85 2 Apol.9 
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logos to which he refers is Christ: ‘He was and is the Logos Who is in everyone.’86 So Justin 
can conclude that ‘whatever all men have uttered aright ... belongs to us as Christians.’87 In 
the ancient philosophers, the spermatikos logos sowed the spermata tou logou in their minds, 
but the Logos was present ‘in part’ (apo merous) which resulted in their philosophy being 
partial or incomplete. It could only be completed by participation in the revelation of the 
Logos through the Old Testament and then in ‘the Logos principle in its totality’ in the person 
of Christ.88 
Goodenough sums up Justin’s teaching: ‘in every man there is a divine particle, his 
reason, which at least before Christ’s coming was man’s best guide to life,’89 and ‘the highest 
mind of man is thus itself the Spermatic Logos of God.’90 Stoicism had used the terms 
metousia and mimesis, participation and resemblance. These concepts are also Platonic, for 
Plato used the term methexis for the soul’s innate resemblance to the realm of ideas, in which 
it participates as in its true home. Justin preserves this teaching, which will go on to inform 
Christian theology for centuries. The Logos is ‘the thing itself,’ the spermatic logos is a 
metousia and mimesis of the Logos, which is granted to humans by grace. 
5.3.4   Logos as theos 
Goodenough says that the Stoic God does not have personality; it is a primal fire or energy or 
pneuma, identified with reason or logos. ‘pneuma is rarified, dynamic matter which can 
think,’ the one fundamental material from which everything is made, ‘a material which is by 
                                                             
86 2 Apol.10. 
87 2 Apol.13. 
88 Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, pp.108-110. Grillmeier is commenting on 2 Apol.10. The Greek 
phrase is to logikon to holon, which Andresen translates as ‘the whole Logos principle.’ 
89 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p.214. 
90 Ibid., p.215. 
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nature a reasoning force.’91 Goodenough calls the Stoic logos ‘that phase of God which 
connected God’s otherwise Absolute nature with the world’ and ‘the effulgent Power of God 
which reasonably had shaped and now governs the world.’92 Plato and the Stoics are in 
agreement: ‘all things are pervaded, not merely controlled, by a single intelligence.’93 In 
Platonic dualism nous is immaterial, uncontaminated by matter, while in Stoic monism the 
logos is material. As time progresses, this distinction breaks down; the Stoic logos becomes 
more Platonic, ‘a second intermediary God or at least a distinction of function in the Deity.’94 
Justin repeatedly advances this distinction within the Deity: ‘God is the cause of His (the 
Second God’s) power and of his being Lord and God.’95 We have already encountered the 
potential significance of Philo as an influence on the Prologue and he may have provided the 
bridge between Stoicism and Justin’s Christian logos theology.96 Contra the Stoics, Philo 
returns to ‘the dualism of Plato between the Deity and Matter’97 but contra the Gnostics, 
Philo’s God is ‘immanent in almost the Stoic sense.’98  
Thorsteinsson uses the term ‘cosmo-theology’ to sum up the Stoic doctrine of ‘an 
immortal, all-encompassing, perfectly rational being, who is the creator and sustainer of the 
cosmos.’99  He identifies Justin’s enemy Crescens as a Stoic, but notes Justin’s praise of the 
Stoic Cleanthes for his ‘true theology’ of a self-governing, painless, perennial God.100 He 
finds within Stoicism a move towards a personal, transcendent God, analogous to the move 
made within Middle Platonism. De Vogel agrees that ‘the Stoic doctrine of a cosmic God, 
                                                             
91 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p.14. 
92 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p.139. 
93 Ibid., p.15. 
94 Ibid., p.18. 
95 Dial.129.1 
96 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, pp. 44-52 and pp.113-122. Goodenough concludes that ‘we have 
found the closest similarity between Justin’s and Philo’s speculations.’ (p.175.) 
97 Ibid., p.45. Goodenough cites Leg. Al. II. 2,3., in which God is amigēs allō, ‘unmixed with anything else.’ 
98 Ibid., p.46. here Goodenough cites Leg.Al.I.91, in which God is ‘hē...tōn holōn psychē’, the world-soul. 
99 Thorsteinsson, Justin and Stoic Cosmo-Theology, p.537. 
100 2 Apol.6. 
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though originally semi-material, was more and more spiritualized’ and that ‘several of the 
Stoics lived their life wholly dominated by the thought of God.’101  
Justin’s Christianity defends Platonic transcendence but needs to preserve God’s 
capacity to connect with the world as creation and as revelation. For anyone who requires a 
secondary divine personality, as we have seen in our work on the Prologue, there are plenty of 
sources on offer; it is in the Septuagint’s creative logos of Genesis, the revelatory logos of the 
prophets, the Talmudic memrā, the sophia of Proverbs, the Stoic logos, the logos of Philo, the 
Johannine logos. Following Philo, Justin’s Second God becomes prōtōtokos tō agennētō theō, 
the first-born of the unbegotten God, or prōtogonos tou theou, the first-begotten of God.102 
From the Book of Wisdom, he is archē pro pantōn poiēmatōn, ‘a beginning before all His 
creatures’ and ‘Offspring by God’, gennēma hypo tou theou.103 Justin’s three main epithets of 
the Logos’ relationship to the Father as gennēma, teknon and monogenēs.104 The impersonal 
logos of Philo becomes the personal Logos of the Christians. De Gaál explains that in Greek, 
especially Platonic thought, understanding is gained by contemplating the perfect forms and 
ideas of the kosmos noētos, and clearly Justin was influenced by this. But both John and Justin 
may have been influenced by Philo, who took two abstract Greek principles, archē (principle, 
beginning, primordial matter) and logos, and combined them into ‘the one reality of the 
dynamic and personal God of Israel’.105 As in the Prologue, the logos is defined by Justin in 
                                                             
101 De Vogel, Problems concerning Justin Martyr, pp.374-5. 
102 1 Apol.53.21 and Apol. 58.3 
103 Dial.62.4 
104 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p.97. 
105 de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift, p.120. de Gaál references Philo, De 
Opificio Mundi, Book I,i. Hellenistic Judaism was interested in the idea of emission or emanation and Philo had 
used the analogy of ‘fire from fire’ and ‘light from light’, in order to explain how God can remain eternally 
unchanged despite his outflowings. When Justin calls the logos the ‘Power’ (dynamis) of God, he is using this 
idea of emanation. Justin does use the analogy of fire, but also that of speech. Building on the Platonic / Stoic 
distinction between logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos, Justin uses the analogy of speech, in which 
thought gives rise to speech without abscission or diminution: logon gar tina proballontes, logon gennōmen, ou 
kata apotomēn, hōs elattōthēnai ton en hēmin logon, proballomenoi.’ ‘In giving forth anything rational, we beget 
speech, not giving it forth in such a way as to make an abscission so that the rational in us is diminished.’ 
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terms of eternal pre-existence in union with the Father, and generation or emission prior to the 
creation of the world.106  
Summary  
Justin corrects Stoic immanentism, but welcomes the Stoic logos and makes it central to his 
ethical thought. Stoicism enables Justin to formulate a logos theology which adopts an 
inclusive attitude to other belief systems by suggesting a divinely implanted capacity for 
apprehension of the truth.  
5.4: READING JUSTIN WITH RATZINGER 
5.4.1   Faith, Reason and the Hellenization debate 
Justin occupies a similar space to John in the Hellenization / dehellenization narrative which 
we have seen is so fundamental to Ratzinger’s theological positioning. He is a symbol of the 
‘privileged area of the encounter between paganism, Judaism and Christianity.’ Justin shows 
that the Old Testament and Greek philosophy ‘are like two paths that lead to Christ, to the 
Logos.’ Justin’s work is evidence that ‘Greek philosophy cannot be opposed to gospel truth, 
and Christians can draw from it confidently as from a good of their own.’107 Ratzinger recalls 
that John Paul II had described Justin as a ‘pioneer of positive engagement with philosophical 
thinking – albeit with cautious discernment.’ This ‘engagement’ and ‘discernment’ is what I 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(Dial.61.2) Williams translates: ‘For when we put forth any word, we beget a word, not putting it forth by 
scission, as though the word within us was diminished.’ See Williams, Justin Martyr, p.127. 
106 A critical question for Justin scholarship is the relationship between the Fourth Gospel and Justin. Vermes 
attributes to Justin ‘a philosophically grounded Logos doctrine borrowed from the Johannine Prologue.’ See 
Vermes, Christian Beginnings, p.239. Hill finds one virtual quotation and three intriguing parallels. The virtual 
quotation is 1 Apol. 61.4 ‘Except ye be born again, ye shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.’ cf. Jn.3:5 ‘no one 
can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and Spirit.’ (NRSV). An intriguing parallel to the 
Prologue is found in 1 Apol. 32.10 ‘he took flesh and became man’ (sarkopoiētheis anthrōpos gegonen), 
paralleling Jn.1:14 ho logos sarx egeneto. See C.E. Hill, ‘Was John’s Gospel among Justin’s Apostolic 
Memoirs?’ in Sara Parvis and Paul Foster (eds.) Justin Martyr and His Worlds, (Minneapolis, IN: Fortress Press, 
2007), pp.88-94. 
107 J. Ratzinger as Benedict XVI, Great Christian Thinkers: From the Early Church Through the Middle Ages, 
(London: SPCK, 2011), p.10. 
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call ‘welcome’ and ‘correction.’ At Regensburg Ratzinger calls for ‘the courage to engage the 
whole breadth of reason’ and asks for ‘reason and faith to come together in a new way,108 a 
way which can open up once again the ‘vast horizons’ represented by the two original objects 
of Greek inquiry, ‘the questions raised by religion and ethics.’109 According to Goodenough, 
‘the fact of the distinction between reason and revelation is Justin’s greatest contribution to 
Christian Apologetic.’110 Prior to his conversion, Justin had sought the truth of being, 
epistēmē tou ontos.111 Platonism had led him to believe that logos and dialogos was the path 
to metaphysical truth. Stoicism had led him to believe that every human person was endowed 
with a logos spermatikos or emphutos logos as a reliable if limited guide to ethical truth.  
After his conversion, Justin accepts that by philosophical reason alone he can attain 
valid metaphysical insights, but he cannot achieve salvation in the form of a relationship with 
a living God. This can only be achieved by accepting in faith an identification of the logos in 
the Old Testament and the Logos made flesh in Jesus Christ in the New Testament. The Logos 
of faith does not represent a replacement or denial of ordinary human logos, but the bringing 
of something partial into fullness and completion. Justin contrasts ‘those who live according 
to part of that logos spermatikos’ and ‘those who live by the knowledge and contemplation of 
the whole Logos, which is Christ.’112 Christianity is not rationalism, or what in Justin’s day 
would be called ‘sophism’; it is a profound respect for reason and the completion of reason by 
faith. Ratzinger sums Justin up in this way: 
                                                             
108 The Regensburg Lecture, para.56.  
109 Ibid., para.48. Note that ‘horizons’ is a favourite Ratzinger word. It is closely related to the central Ratzinger 
theme of the broadening of reason. In an early example we hear how the Old Testament prophecies ‘always 
opened on to a universal horizon.’ J. Ratzinger, Christian Brotherhood, (London: Burns & Oates, 1966), p.8. 
110 Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p110. 
111 Goodenough (p.64.) points out that to on refers to the Middle Platonic God, ‘the goal of mysticism.’ Plato 
would have said ta onta, referring to the material things that exist, or ‘the scientific field of inquiry.’ 
112 2 Apol.8. 
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Thus, the same Logos who revealed himself as a prophetic figure to the Hebrews of 
the ancient law also manifested himself partially, in “seeds of truth” in Greek 
philosophy.113 
Elsewhere, in his handling of the theology of religions, Ratzinger emphasizes the character of 
Christianity as fulfilment of Greek philosophy: 
Justin Martyr ... may be taken as representative of this accessibility of Christianity: he 
had studied all the philosophers and had finally recognized in Christianity the vera 
philosophia. In becoming a Christian, he had, in his view, not laid aside what he 
believed as a philosopher, but become for the first time a true philosopher in the full 
sense.114 
5.4.2   Ethical relativism 
In a surprisingly ‘modern’ move, Justin takes a stand against ethical relativism. Ratzinger at 
Regensburg laments that the ethical ‘be relegated to the realm of the subjective.’ The result is 
that ‘the subjective “conscience” becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical.’115 Justin 
likewise believes that the loss of the sense of divine providence will lead to ‘the loss of the 
sense of responsibility and the freedom to do and to say whatever they choose.’116  For him, 
ethical behaviour is related to right reason, orthos logos. He makes great play of the link 
between right action and reason in his opening appeal to the emperor. ‘Reason directs those 
who are truly pious and philosophical to honour and love only what is alēthes.’ ‘The lover of 
alētheia chooses ‘to do and say what is right.’117 Orthos logos will direct the emperor not to 
                                                             
113 Great Christian Thinkers, p.9. 
114 Truth and Tolerance, p.171. In the same work, p.228, Ratzinger says that ‘the alliance of Christian faith with 
enlightenment ... dominates Christian literature from Justin to Augustine and beyond.’ 
Cf. ‘This quest for a logic of faith allowed the Church Fathers to call the faith a philosophy, in the sense of a 
meaningful overview of reality.’ From ‘Eschatology and Utopia’ in Church Ecumenism and Politics, p.225.  
Vermes makes the comment that ‘Justin was the first to elevate Christianity to the pedestal of the only true 
philosophy.’ Vermes, Christian Beginnings, p.239. 
115 The Regensburg Lecture, para.48. 
116 Dial.1.5. 
117 1 Apol.2 
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convict the innocent; logos demands that when they have learned alētheia they will do what is 
just.118 The emperor must do nothing ‘un-logos-like.’119 Justin demands ‘what is just and true’ 
from ‘those who love the truth’ by ‘presenting the truth.’120 This is a clear stand against 
ethical relativism, building on the Platonic distinction between doxa and alētheia.121 Justin 
asks the emperor not to follow ‘traditional opinions’ but what is alēthes.122 He tells the 
emperor it is foolish ‘to prefer custom to alētheia.’123 Ratzinger notes that for Justin ‘it was 
the choice of the truth of being against the myth of custom.’124 He relates this to Tertullian’s 
famous statement Christ has called himself veritas, not consuetudo. Ratzinger updates the 
terms consuetudo  and consuetudines to mean ‘cultural fashion’ and ‘currents fads’ and relates 
this to the problem of relativism.125 Justin provides an early definition of relativism: ‘that 
neither virtue nor vice is anything, but that these things are only reckoned good or evil by 
opinion; which as the true logos shows, is the greatest impiety and wickedness.’126  Elsewhere 
he attacks the view ‘that virtue and vice are nothing’ on the grounds that it is ‘opposed to 
every sound idea, and reason and mind.’127 In other words, the relativist stance is not rational, 
a theme which will be revisited in Chapter Seven. 
 
                                                             
118 1 Apol.3 
119 ‘alogon’ – i.e. not in accordance with logos. 
120 1 Apol.12 
121 1 Apol.2. For Plato’s distinction between doxa and alētheia see Republic 508E – 509A. 
122 ‘doxais palaiōn’ – literally, the opinions of the ancients. 
123 1 Apol.12  ‘ta ethē’, Latin ‘consuetudines’. Ratzinger relates this to Tertullian’s later very famous statement 
that Christ has called himself veritas, not consuetudo. He updates the terms consuetudo and consuetudines to 
‘cultural fashion’ and ‘current fads’ and relates this to the problem of relativism. 
124 Great Christian Thinkers, p.10. 
125 Ibid., p.11. 
126 ‘ho alēthēs logos’ - 1 Apol.43 
127 2 Apol.7 ‘sophrōna ennoian kai logon kai noun’ – ‘wise concept and logos and nous’). Admittedly, the 
context here is not so much an attack on ethical relativism as on the Stoic identification of the deity with the 
material world, which leads to the unacceptable idea of a changeable and corruptible God, who is then 
potentially admixed with worldly vice. Nevertheless, the constantly changing deity leads to the idea of constantly 
changeable ethical values, while the Platonic / Christian idea of ethical truth is grounded in the Platonic / 
Christian ontology of an impassible, transcendent God. 
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5.4.3   Dialogic encounter 
Ratzinger commences the Regensburg Lecture with a portrayal of the ideal of the university 
as a place of ‘lively exchange’ based on ‘the right use of reason’ and concludes with an 
invitation to ‘the dialogue of cultures’ based on ‘listening and responding.’128 The Dialogue 
with Trypho likewise constitutes an explicit commitment to dialogue. The prologue to this 
work constitutes a self-contained dialogue between Justin and the startlingly vivid literary 
trope of the Old Man. The Old Man pursues a patently Socratic dialectic, forcing Justin to 
examine the presuppositions of his position and thereby to apprehend the truth of his own 
accord.129 Commentators have speculated on the factual or fictional nature of this encounter 
and on the identity or meaning of the Old Man. I believe a case can be made that the 
anonymity and ambiguity of the Old Man’s identity is a symbol of the Regensburg ‘dialogue 
of cultures’ and Justin’s logos theology emerges from a Regensburg-style ‘listening and 
understanding’.130 He is the pre-existent Logos when he is portrayed as anonymous and 
unnameable, while he also evokes the personal God, ‘kindly and grave’, a ‘Father’.131 There is 
arguably a case to say that he represents primordial philosophy, ‘venerable and elderly’, 
standing prior to all systems,132 as well as the Socratic philosopher of the Greek tradition, the 
one who uses Platonic dialectic. Perhaps a Jewish auditor will read Moses into the Old Man, 
as he leads Justin from slavery to the true freedom he seeks, or perhaps a Prophet, when he 
advocates the inspiration of scripture. In his person the Christian disciple is coming into the 
presence of the Word made flesh in Jesus Christ, the one who asks ‘Do you know me?’, or an 
                                                             
128 The Regensburg Lecture, paras.3, 4, 63 and 60. 
129 Further Socratic methods include use of definition, contradiction, reason and analogy, chance encounter, 
realisation of ignorance.  See Allert, Revelation, Truth, Canon and Interpretation, pp.135-7. 
130 The Regensburg Lecture, para.60. 
131 Edwards, Justin’s Logos and the Word of God, (p.273.) calls him ‘the mouthpiece of paternal revelation.’ 
132 Hyldahl advanced this view. See Niels Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der 
Einleitung zum Dialog Justins, Acta Theologica Danica IX, (Copenhagen: Prostant apud Munksgaard, 1966), 
pp.168-181. 
144 
 
Evangelist, who journeys in search of disciples.133 Finally, for me, the Old Man is the very 
embodiment of Justin’s key concepts, alētheia (3.3, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2), epistēmē (3.5, 3.6, 3.7), and 
phronēsis (3.3), all of which result from the use of right reason (3.3), to obtain the right 
ontology (3.5), epistemology (4.1) and ethic (5.3).134 
Trakatellis argues that Trypho represents the very best of what we can expect from a 
participant in interreligious dialogue. He finds ‘a genuine Jew who is courteous and gentle, 
open-minded, learned, and very eager to discuss what he considers to be the essence of 
philosophy, namely, the search for God.’135 In Dialogue 3 – 7 he finds ‘a man who gives 
precedence to the truth, and who does not hesitate to alternate between honest agreement and 
truthful criticism.’136 Barnard is impressed by Trypho’s ‘open and tolerant mind.’137 Williams 
opines that ‘the Dialogue is a very favourable example of the spirit in which controversies 
ought to be conducted,’138 while for Boyarin it is a model of ‘dialogic engagement.’139 Pelikan 
says much the same, quoting Williams’ comment that ‘there is no dialogue ... which is 
conducted on quite so high a level of courteousness and fairness.’140 
Herein lies an endorsement and perhaps a critique of Regensburg. The person 
engaging in dialogue must not be one who ‘sacrifices the truth for any conventionalities or 
pleasant words.’141 That person must be an ‘indefatigable explorer of the truth,’142 ‘agreeable 
                                                             
133 Hofer finds 15 striking similarities between the Old Man encounter and the Road to Emmaus narrative in 
Luke 24:13-35. See Andrew Hofer, ‘The Old Man as Christ in Justin’s “Dialogue with Trypho”’, Vigiliae 
Christianae, Vol.57, No, 1, (Feb.2003), pp.1-21. 
134 Van Winden’s Old Man ‘personifies wisdom, here Christianity,’ (Van Winden, p.127.) 
135 Demetrios Trakatellis, ‘Justin Martyr’s Trypho’, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol.79, No. 1/3, 
Christians among Jews and Gentiles: Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl in his Sixty-Fifth Birthday (Jan.-Jul., 
1986), pp.287-297, at p.290. 
136 Trakatellis, Justin Martyr’s Trypho, p.291. 
137 Barnard, Justin Martyr, His Life and Thought, p.24. 
138 Williams, Justin Martyr The Dialogue with Trypho, p.xxvi. 
139 Boyarin, Justin Martyr Invents Judaism, p.461. 
140 Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, p.15. Pelikan says he is quoting A.L. Williams’ Adversus Judaeos: A Bird’s 
Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance, p.42. 
141 Trakatellis, Justin Martyr’s Trypho, p.293. 
145 
 
yet uncompromising,’143 evincing ‘a spirit of freedom and wisdom.’144 Joyce concludes that 
‘Justin’s conversion shows a definite openness to the other that shows due respect to the 
process of seeking truth, inner conversion and peace, which dialogue aspires to.’145  Trypho’s 
concluding remarks provide a mission statement for contemporary interreligious dialogue: 
We have found more than we expected or than it was even possible for us to expect. 
And if we could do this more frequently we should receive more benefit, while we 
examine the very words of scripture themselves.... They departed, finally praying for 
my deliverance... and I prayed also for them.146 
There is potentially a correlative here of recent contemporary moves towards a ‘way of 
meeting’ called ‘scriptural reasoning’ where reason and revelation are both given room to 
breathe. We will return to this in our discussion of Islam in Chapter Nine. Ratzinger is 
interested in something Justin says in 1 Apol.36, ‘that the prophets speak sentences as though 
a person is speaking.’147 He draws our attention to the profound theological significance of 
literary philosophical dialogues, as if they embody the Word made flesh in a way that is 
almost sacramental:  
The literary device of having dramatic roles appear that enliven the presentation with 
their dialogue reveals to the theologian the One who is performing the real role here, 
the Logos, the prosōpon, the Person of the Word, which is no longer merely a role but 
a person.148 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
142 Trakatellis, Justin Martyr’s Trypho, p.294. 
143 Ibid., p.294. 
144 Ibid., p.295. 
145 Cullan Joyce, ‘The Seeds of Dialogue in Justin Martyr’, Australian ejournal of Theology (June 2006), pp.1-
11, p.11. Available at: 
http://aejt.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/395132/AEJT_7.5_Joyce_Seeds_of_Dialogue.pdf. (Accessed: 11 
December 2013). 
146 Dial.142.3 
147 ‘hōs apo prosōpou’ – ‘as though from a person’. 
148 Dogma and Preaching, p.183. 
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5.5: JUSTIN’S LOGOS THEOLOGY AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
5.5.1   A welcome to natural law 
Ratzinger’s central warning at Regensburg is against an extreme transcendentalism, which 
would sever the link between God and humanity so radically that there would be no 
connection between God’s good and what our human reason suggests is good. The theologies 
of both Ibn Hazm and Duns Scotus are accused of presenting a God who ‘is not even bound to 
truth and goodness,’ so that ‘our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror 
of God.’149 Ratzinger’s antidote is that ‘between God and us, between his eternal Creator 
Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy.’150 
Pelikan finds a ‘reductionist conception of natural law’ in Justin’s claim that the 
Christians retained whatever in the law of Moses was ‘naturally good, pious and righteous.’151 
He sees an important role being played by natural law in the effort of early theologians to deal 
with paganism.152 Justin’s concepts of metousia (participation) and syngeneia (affinity or 
kinship) are the equivalent of ‘analogy’. He repeatedly states that ‘eternal righteous decrees’ 
have always existed.153 Of pre-Christian writers he says that ‘seeing, through a part of the 
Seminal Divine Word, that which was kindred to those, discoursed rightly.’154  Edwards is 
                                                             
149 The Regensburg Lecture, para.26. 
150 Ibid., para.27. 
151 Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, p.16. Pelikan is quoting Dial. 45.3. 
152 Ibid., p.33. 
153 ‘ta aiōnia dikaia’. – ‘the eternal just decrees’. Williams calls them the ‘eternal acts of righteousness.’ See for 
example, Dial. 28.4; ‘though a man be a Scythian or a Persian, ... and keeps the everlasting righteous decrees,’ 
45.3: ‘what in the Law of Moses is naturally good and pious and righteous,’ 45.4; ‘those who did that which is 
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154 2 Apol.13 ‘hekastos gar tis, apo merous tou spermatikou logou to suggenes horōn, kalōs ephthengxato.’ to 
suggenes is ‘that which is kindred’, or ‘the kindred element’. There is in fact a problem of interpretation here 
arising from the ambiguity of the grammar and syntax. It is unclear whether each writer is discerning ‘that which 
is kindred’ to themselves, or ‘that which is kindred’ to the spermatic logos. If it is the former, then, we have 
support here for the quintessentially Greek doctrine, held in common by Platonists, Peripatetics and Stoics, of ‘a 
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aware that Justin speaks of ‘the seeds of truth among all’ but says that we cannot ignore the 
apparent rejection of syngeneia at Dialogue 4: ‘It is not on account of his affinity that man 
sees God, nor because he has a mind.’155 His explanation of these incommensurable 
statements is that the kinship is not between the mind of man and the mind of God, but 
between the fragments of God in the mind, and the totality of God. These fragments are not 
innate, but sown from an outside source.156  
For Ratzinger, the central message of Justin is that ‘every person, as a rational being, 
shares in the Logos, carrying within himself a “seed”, and can perceive glimmers of the 
truth.’157 In reviewing the history of natural law, the 2009 Report of the International 
Theological Commission makes use of Justin’s theology: ‘To conduct oneself in conformity 
with reason amounts to following the orientations that Christ, as the divine Logos, has set 
down by virtue of the logoi spermatikoi in human reason.’158 
Certainly Justin contrasts ‘those who live according to a part of that logos 
spermatikos’ and ‘those who live by the knowledge and contemplation of the whole Logos, 
which is Christ.’159 But he also, possibly influenced by Stoicism, allows for what looks like a 
universal natural moral law in this crucial quotation:  
For he exhibits among every race of men the things that are righteous at all times and 
in all places, and every race is aware that adultery is evil, and fornication, and murder, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
congenital intuition of sacred truth’ and ‘a natural affinity between the mind of man and his creator.’ See M.J. 
Edwards, ‘Justin’s Logos and the Word of God’, p.273. 
155 1 Apol.44 ‘para pasi spermata alētheias’ – ‘among all (men) the seeds of truth’ and ‘ouk ara, ephē, dia to 
suggenes hora ton theon, oud’ hoti nous estin.’ – ‘not however, said he, because of his affinity does (man) see 
God, nor is it because of his mind.’ 
156 See Edwards, Justin’s Logos and the Word of God, pp.270-4. 
157 Great Christian Thinkers, p.9. 
158 International Theological Commission, In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, 
2009. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20090520_legge-
naturale_en.html  (Accessed: 8 July 2014).  At para.26. 
159 2 Apol.8 
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and all suchlike things. And although all practise them, yet, nevertheless, they are not 
set free from knowing they do wrong when they practise them.160 
Inspired by Ratzinger, I propose a distinction in Justin, whereby epistēmē tou ontos refers to 
ontological knowledge of Being, and tou alēthous epignōsis to apprehension of ethical 
truth.161 Given that the Old Man rejects the Platonic theory of the possibility of divine 
knowledge, I understand Justin’s overall position as follows: partial epistēmē tou ontos and 
partial tou alēthous epignōsis was apprehended by the Jews through divine inspiration and by 
the Greeks through their plagiarism of divinely inspired Jewish writers.162 Full epistēmē and 
epignōsis comes from knowing the Word made flesh in Jesus Christ. What the logos 
spermatikos creates in every person is the desire for ontological truth and the innate capacity 
for moral behaviour. 
The Old Man uses ‘epignōsis’ alongside epistēmē and gnōsis.163 ‘Is there a knowledge 
(epistēmē) which affords understanding (gnōsis) of human and divine things, and then a 
thorough acquaintance (epignōsis) with the divinity and the righteousness of them?’164 I read 
                                                             
160 Dial.93.1 
161 The lexicography may not support this idea. ‘epignōsis’ means ‘full knowledge’ and so might be more 
appropriate to the ontological mode. ‘epistēmē’ has a wider range of meanings: ‘knowledge, understanding, skill, 
experience, wisdom’, which might lend themselves more to ethical mode. See Liddell and Scott, Greek-English 
Lexicon (abridged), Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1953), pp. 249 and 261. However, the United Bible Societies 
dictionary suggests ‘recognition’ and ‘consciousness’ for epignōsis, which takes us more into the ethical realm; 
we become conscious of the truths of revealed morality, of which previously the seeds of ethical truth had made 
us only dimly aware and so almost unconscious, or we recognise revealed morality as true because of its 
congruence with the ethical seeds of truth already sown within us by the creative Word. In Romans 1:28 Paul 
combines the ontological and ethical when he speaks of those who fail to hold God in their epignōsis (NKJV: 
‘knowledge’), and so gave themselves up to moral depravity resulting from ‘a debased mind’ (adokimon noun). 
(NJB says ‘unacceptable thoughts’). 
162 Van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher, p.61., notes that alētheias epignōsis is a New Testament 
shorthand for the Christian faith, as 1 Tim:24, 2 Tim 2:25, 2 Tim 3:7, Titus 1:1 and Hebrews 10:26. Justin is here 
speaking as a Platonist, not yet as a Christian.  Plato would have used alētheia, the truth, but Middle Platonism 
uses alēthos, the true, that which is true. Van Winden (p.62.) notes the ambiguity of tou alēthous, which could be 
parsed as neuter or masculine. Thus hidden within the concept of ‘the true’ in Middle Platonism is the Middle 
Platonic theology of the true as personal, which prepares the way for Justin’s Christianity to transform a Middle 
Platonic phrase for the Godhead into a phrase for Jesus Christ, the truth embodied in a person. 
163 Dial.3.5 
164 Williams, Justin Martyr The Dialogue with Trypho, p.8, provides a better translation: ‘Is there a science that 
affords cognizance of the human and the divine, and then cognition of the divinity and the righteousness of the 
latter?’ 
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this to mean that the task of philosophy is to ascertain not only the nature of divinity, but also 
how justice or righteousness affords a link between the human and the divine; epistēmē plus 
epignōsis produce eudaimonia.165 
5.5.2 A commitment to inclusivity 
Ratzinger at Regensburg is nervous that the desire to accommodate ‘cultural pluralism’ may 
tempt us to downplay the historical synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity. He welcomes 
plurality, but not pluralism as an end in itself. He proposes ‘the will to be obedient to the 
truth’166 and ‘inquiry into the rationality of faith’167 as the only sound basis for ‘that genuine 
dialogue of cultures so urgently needed today.’168 Justin’s doctrine of the logos spermatikos 
has impacted Christianity’s struggle to find a way of understanding its relationship with non-
Christian religions. Joyce emphasizes Justin’s relevance to our contemporary context; both 
then and now we are challenged by ‘the influx of differing viewpoints and perspectives that 
the Christian is asked to respond to’ and these now include irreligion.169 What he admires in 
Justin’s positioning vis-à-vis Greco-Roman thought is its balanced ‘assumption and critique ...  
without being marked by the sense of hostility.’170 Reflecting on the dangerous global forces 
destabilising the contemporary world, Ratzinger as Benedict XVI used Justin’s language:  
It is about broadening the scope of reason and making it capable of knowing and 
directing these powerful new forces, animating them within the perspective of that 
“civilisation of love” whose seed God has planted in every people in every culture.171 
                                                             
165 Van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher, p.64, points out that for Plato dikaiosunē  is essentially a 
divine virtue. He cites Republic 335 C 4: ‘All’ hē dikaiosunē ouk anthrōpeia aretē.’ – ‘Justice is not a human 
virtue’ or perhaps ‘justice is a more than human virtue.’ (my translations). 
166 The Regensburg Lecture, para.55. 
167 Ibid., para.57. 
168 Ibid., para.57. 
169 Joyce, The Seeds of Dialogue in Justin Martyr, p.10. 
170 Ibid., p.5. Joyce contrasts Justin’s approach with that of Tatian. 
171 Caritas in Veritate, p.38. 
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Vatican Council II asked missionaries to invite non-Christian ‘religious traditions’ to 
‘uncover with gladness and respect those Seeds of the Word which lie hidden among them.’172 
In similar vein, the Council considered those who ‘have not yet arrived at an explicit 
knowledge of God, and who, not without grace, strive to live a good life.’173 Building on the 
concept of praeparatio evangelica, developed by Eusebius and promoted by Rahner, the 
Council made a statement that could have been written by Justin, and perhaps also by the 
author of Jn 1:9:  
Whatever good or truth is found amongst them is considered by the Church to be a 
preparation for the Gospel and given by him who enlightens all men that they may at 
length have life.174  
Ad Gentes 3 repeated Lumen Gentium’s praeparatio evangelica doctrine, citing Irenaeus175 
and Clement.176 It would certainly be inappropriate to apply the labels of a 21st century 
paradigm to a 1st century writer, to whom the very concept of ‘religion’ or ‘the religions’ 
would have been alien. When Justin defined Christianity in relation to two great philosophic 
traditions, Platonism and Stoicism, as well as to the Jewish faith, he adopted an exclusivist 
apologetic, reserving the fullness of truth for Christianity. At the same time, he adopted an 
inclusivist position in three ways: i) he allowed people of other persuasions to have partial 
access to truth on the basis of their common humanity, ii) he was not afraid to use Greek 
                                                             
172 Ad Gentes (Decree on the Church’s Missionary Activity), para.11, in A. Flannery. O.P. (ed.) Vatican Council 
II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, (Leominster: Fowler Wright, 1981), p.825. No reference to 
Justin is provided in the footnotes to the document. This is curious, because an essential feature of Conciliar 
theology, influenced by de Lubac, is its self-conscious ressourcement in the patristic tradition. Ad Gentes alone 
makes over 40 patristic citations. Patristics scholars Yves Congar and Joseph Ratzinger served as periti in the 
crucial final stages of the composition of the document. See Stephen B. Bevans and Jeffrey Gros, Evangelization 
and Religious Freedom: Ad Gentes, Dignitatis Humanae, (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), pp.22-7. Bevans and 
Gros (p.39) confirm that Ad Gentes para.11 contains ‘a quotation from Justin Martyr.’ 
173 Lumen Gentium (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church), para.16, in Flannery, Vatican Council II: The 
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, p.368. 
174 Lumen Gentium 16. c.f. Jn 1:4, Jn 1:9, Jn 10:10. 
175 Adversus Haereses III, 18, 1. 
176 Protrepticus 112, 1 and Stromata, VI, 6, 44. 
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philosophical concepts and writings to express Christian truth, iii) he acknowledged the 
Christian debt to Jewish biblical faith. Here we have to accept his adherence to the doctrine of 
covenantal displacement and supersessionism whereby Christianity becomes the verus Israel, 
a theological position as unacceptable to Jews today as it was to Trypho and his friends.177  
5.5.3   Beginnings of a culture of human rights 
When Justin speaks of ‘the things that are righteous at all times in all places among every race 
of men’ he could almost be speaking of human rights. Granted, Justin has no interest in a 
‘universal ethic’ or legal system.  His significance for human rights is not that he solves 
problems or elaborates theories, but that he stands at the crossroads between the apostolic 
witness of the New Testament and the patristic tradition. The themes examined above 
demonstrate that Justin was one of the first, if not the first, Christian theologian to examine a 
whole nexus of interrelated issues which are major battlegrounds in modernity’s debates 
about human rights.  
Foremost among these is the human right of religious freedom. A significant aim of 
the Apologies is to appeal to the imperial sense of justice and to defend the Christians from 
charges of immorality.178 Here is a point of connection with human rights. Justin is coming 
before the highest judge of a respected, universalist legal system. In a statement that could 
almost come from the preamble to the Universal Declaration, he appeals to the impartiality of 
the legal principle that ‘every individual should be afforded due process and not merely 
condemned out of hand and should be tried in overt and impartial proceedings solely on the 
basis of moral character and conduct, free from hypocrisy and double standards.’179 Haddad 
                                                             
177 See for example Dial. 25-30, 48, 119, 120, 123, 135, 137, 140. 
178 1 Apol.2-3 and 1 Apol.7 
179 Robert M. Haddad, The Case for Christianity: St. Justin Martyr’s Arguments for Religious Liberty and 
Judicial Justice, (Lanham, MD: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2009), p.96. 
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explains that the legal nature of Roman religious tolerance is unclear and that the actual 
situation with regard to persecution of Christians is very confused, it being neither ubiquitous 
nor continuous. Justin’s argument sounds very convincing to us, that Christians should be 
granted religious tolerance ‘as long as we are not convicted of doing anything evil.’180 Given 
the Roman unity of state and religion, Haddad explains that it is bound to fail: ‘any refusal by 
Christians to accord such honours to the emperor ipso facto placed them in conflict with the 
established Roman order and, further, was considered an impiety that endangered the pax 
deorum, or goodwill of the gods on which the prosperity of the empire depended.’181 Roman 
persecution was ruthless, but not performed out of cruelty: ‘For Rome’s survival, 
they...needed to be eliminated.’182 
Gibbon described the second century C.E. as one of the human race’s ‘most happy and 
prosperous,’ but reading Justin gives the lie to this. It was a time as full of political violence 
and interreligious conflict as our own, and a milieu of comparable cultural diversity and 
complexity. Cosgrove provides a sociological reading of Justin, who exemplifies for him ‘the 
need for a minority group to define and legitimate itself vis-à-vis the larger world.’183 The Bar 
Kochba revolt of 135C.E. marked a time of violence and terror for Jews. Trypho is a sign of 
the plight of refugees resulting from that upheaval. In addition to Roman persecution, 
‘Judaizing’ Christians faced expulsion from synagogue worship. Jews and Christians 
competed over potential Gentile converts. Christianity also clashed with the philosophical 
schools as we can see from Justin’s dispute with Crescens. Christians had to look in yet 
another direction to ward off further conflicts and that was the activities of heretics such as 
Marcion. These considerations of ‘the pluralist, multicultural, Roman-inspired web that 
                                                             
180 1 Apol.8 
181 Haddad, The Case for Christianity, pp.96-7. 
182 Ibid., p.1. 
183 Cosgrove, Justin Martyr and the Emerging Christian Canon, p. 219. 
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embraced the entire civilised world’ lead postmodern theologian Rebecca Lyman to apply the 
tools of cultural criticism and ‘subaltern studies’ to Justin’s ‘colonial’ situation. Justin 
represents a ‘dominated culture’ faced with choices of ‘resistance’ or ‘complicity’ in a search 
for ‘authenticity’ and ‘identity’. Greek, Roman, Christian and Jewish identities are all caught 
‘in a process of negotiation’ resulting in mutual ‘menace’ and ‘instability’. There is 
endorsement of Regensburg: von Harnack’s dehellenizing project is roundly condemned as 
the product of the ‘racial dualisms’ of his own era’. There is also an implicit rejection, since 
Justin’s Christianity is not a beautifully synthesized ‘tertium quid’, but a complex amalgam of 
complicity, resistance and negotiation which Lyman dubs ‘proximity’. Something precious 
for human rights emerges from Lyman’s analysis, the ‘common humanity’ of Justin’s logos 
theology, in which ‘tradition, practice and culture are innovatively combined’ and which 
Justin presents to the ‘political religious violence’ of his world.184 
It is in this violent, complex world that Justin makes his plea for freedom of religion. 
This appeal involves a claim for the superiority of Christian ethical behaviour. This ethical 
appeal is twofold; a rejection of the Roman charges of immorality and perversion and a 
charge of immorality against the Jews. Ethics is crucial to Justin’s apologetic, which has to 
look in two directions. It has to show the Graeco-Roman Hellenistic pagan world that 
Christianity is not an embarrassing and ignorant superstition, laughably inferior to the 
magnificence of Greek thought and philosophy. It has to show the Jews that it is inextricably 
linked to their sacred scriptures, but represents their true fulfilment and completion. It 
addresses both problematics not so much through logical proof or argument, as by creating a 
                                                             
184 Lyman, Justin and Hellenism, pp.160-168. Perhaps these sentiments of Lyman had already been expressed in 
a less over-heated manner by Jaroslav Pelikan when he said that ‘The early church as a community and its 
theologians were obliged to clarify, for friend and foe alike, how the gospel was related to its preparations and 
anticipations in the nation where it arose as well as in the nations to which it was being borne.’ See Pelikan, The 
Christian Tradition, p.12. 
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narrative. This narrative tells a story of a primordial philosophy, to which Christianity is the 
sole true heir, philosophy being divided and degenerate, Judaism bigoted and blind in failing 
to recognise in Christ the fulfilment of its own prophecies. Justin also seeks to forge an 
orthodox Christology, and he does this by creating the concept of heresy, as a mirror image of 
the concept of heresy used by the Jews to anathematize the Christians.  
CONCLUSION 
Justin employs a strategy of welcome and correction as a Christian theologian doing 
groundwork in the areas of ontology, Christology, theology, epistemology and ethics. As a 
philosopher-theologian, he works at the interface of Greek, Jewish and Christian thought, at 
the interface we might say, of transcendence and immanence. He seeks to preserve Platonic 
transcendence, to reject Stoic materialism, while also rejecting Platonic epistemology and 
preserving the Stoic link between creator and created. Hellenistic philosophy theologizes 
Platonism, moving in the direction of theism, while Platonizing Stoicism, moving it away 
from outright materialism. Hellenistic Judaism philosophizes the God of Moses by moving it 
in the direction of Greek transcendence, while simultaneously Stoicizing the creative rational 
link between that transcendent rational power and rational human life. Justin’s logos 
welcomes and corrects the transcendent Platonic nous and the immanent Stoic logos, as well 
as the Jewish dabar and sophia as creative and mediating word, while also fulfilling pagan 
aspirations for salvation by a personal encounter with the Word made flesh in Jesus Christ. 
In forging this solution, the logos in Justin becomes a resolution of the conundrum of 
faith and reason. Platonic reason meets Judaic revelation, and effects a broadening of reason, 
a counterblast to ethical relativism, and an opening up to, but not a clearly developed 
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statement of, natural theology and ethical universalism. Justin’s work is therefore of relevance 
to ethics in general, and to the universalist ethical project of human rights. 
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CONCLUSION ON PART ONE: FOUNDATIONS OF LOGOS THEOLOGY 
On the basis of my explorations of Plato, John and Justin, a claim can be made that the central 
thesis of Regensburg holds good: Christianity bears within itself ‘a rapprochement between 
Biblical faith and Greek inquiry’. However, it should be conceded that the thesis needs to be 
corrected, not as a completely false dichotomy, but certainly as a potentially misleading over-
simplification. Firstly, modern scholarship has demonstrated the social, political and cultural 
complexity of the interactions between ‘Hellenism’ and ‘Judaism.’ Secondly, I have 
demonstrated the difficulty of pinning down the specific nature or content of what Ratzinger 
might mean by ‘the best of Greek thought.’ My exploration of Justin, for example, has shown 
that Stoicism is as important as Platonism, yet Ratzinger tends to fight shy of Stoicism, 
preferring to advert to what he calls ‘the Platonic element.’  
Nevertheless, my exploration of the foundations of logos theology has shown that 
Christian faith has developed by welcoming and correcting insights from Greek rationality. 
Furthermore, given the complex interplay of Hellenized Judaism, Greek philosophy and early 
Christianity, Ratzinger is right: the von Harnack project to purge Christianity of its Greek 
philosophical tradition is doomed to failure.  
I further suggest that having encountered religious Greek thought and rational Jewish 
thought, we must exercise caution in holding to a simplistic dichotomy of faith and reason. 
The distinction is valid, but my investigation into Justin shows that the exclusive attribution 
of faith or reason to this or that religion or belief system might be artificial, misleading and 
prejudicial. Yet herein lies a precious pearl of Ratzingerian wisdom: the Greeks were not 
faithless, their project was religious. And faith is not irrational, but is better understood as a 
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broadening of reason. This insight will bear fruit in Chapter Eight, where Habermas will 
demand that the post secular be open to metaphysical insights. 
Chapter Three took its lead from Ratzinger’s championing at Regensburg of the 
abiding significance of Platonic thought. This led to the claim that a logos theology should 
reserve the right to express Christian truths in a Platonic dialect which holds together the 
ontological primacy of being, the epistemological capacity of the human person to apprehend 
that which is beyond the material, and the ethical imperative to pursue a life in accordance 
with the true and the good. The culture of human rights will become less, not more inclusive, 
the less capable it is of engaging with religious cultures that still see the dignity of the human 
person in terms of relationship to the transcendent. Some capacity for an inclusive dialogue 
with secular modernity will also be lost, since the Western academic tradition is still engaged 
the questions raised by Socrates and Plato. 
Chapter Four’s exploration of the Prologue led to the claim that the logos has roots in 
a variety of cultures. This means that a logos theology will be open and welcoming to the 
multiple sources which have created the discourse of human rights, and will be happy to use 
them to recalibrate its own ethical discourse. A process of critical discernment took place in 
Christianity’s co-option of the non-Christian logos. Likewise, a logos theology must engage 
in discernment, to ask what needs to be questioned and what needs to be welcomed about 
modernity’s culture of human rights. 
Ontologically, a logos theology says that the human person is structured from the 
creative Word, which is the source of all that exists. Epistemologically, every human person is 
capable of receiving and reflecting a measure of the divine light. Ethically, the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights can be built on a light that can never be extinguished from 
humanity.  
Chapter Five found Justin Martyr at a historical crossroads where Greek, Jewish and 
Christian thought commingle. This confluence of the rival tributaries of three great traditions 
is a sign of open inclusivity at the start of the patristic tradition, a willing receptivity to the 
truth as well as a critical sensitivity which discriminates between what can be welcomed and 
what must be rejected. The logos theologian will not be surprised to find that the historical 
tapestry of human rights has been woven with Greek, Jewish and Christian threads. The logos 
theologian who listens to Justin Martyr will learn to deconstruct Greek thought at least into 
Platonism and Stoicism and will want a formulation of human rights which preserves 
transcendence as well as Plato and respects immanence as much as the Stoics. 
With the concept of the logos spermatikos, Justin creates a great inclusivism, 
recognizing the seeds of truth beyond the boundaries of Christianity and honouring a 
universal capacity for conscience and ethical awareness. Dialogue empowers Justin to do 
important foundational work on the relationship between faith and reason, thereby setting the 
Christian tradition on a trajectory which will always be committed to the logos of 
philosophical inquiry. Herein lies the question to be posed to Islam in Chapter Nine, to what 
extent it is open to a symbiosis of faith and reason, and open to a culture of human rights 
grounded in natural law and the dignity of the human person. 
The dignity of the human person can be understood in a universalist or inclusivist 
mode: the logos is the universal capacity of human rationality to participate in the Logos that 
is the source of all that exists. It can also be explicated in a particularist or exclusivist mode: 
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when the divine creative Logos was incarnated as a human person, as flesh, an infinite dignity 
or worth was conferred upon the human person.  
Part One of the thesis allows us to conclude that just as the early Christians engaged 
with the logos doctrine, so Christians today can, and perhaps must, engage with human rights, 
so that they can both welcome and critique the surrounding culture. If this is open 
inclusivism, then the same can be demanded from the secular world. Logos theology offers 
healing for secular human rights, providing a broadened rationality for rights and dignity, 
embracing the capacity for the transcendent and reuniting ontology, epistemology and ethics.  
This is the challenge to be explored by Ratzinger in his dialogue with Habermas. I would add 
that for Christianity also there is a healing, as it engages in a self-reflexive critique of its own 
beliefs and practices.   
Part Two will therefore explore contrasting perspectives of religious faith and secular 
rationality in the historical development of the concept of human rights. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
‘one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which  
would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit.’1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point for Chapter Six is the Regensburg Lecture’s narrative of three episodes in 
the story of the severance of faith and reason which result from the process of de-
Hellenization. The chapter examines the history of human rights and the Ratzinger theme of 
the self-limitation of reason through the loss of the Christian tradition. The chapter argues that 
it is naive and inaccurate to locate human rights in every historical culture but that it is equally 
simplistic and unhistorical to think they were created ex nihilo by the secular 18th century 
Enlightenment. A genealogy of human rights, employing the full breadth of reason, reveals 
both the losses and the gains which arose from a process that involved a transformation within 
the Christian tradition. This more honest approach opens the door to a richer and more 
universal concept of human rights, open to the depths of the riches of both secular and 
religious thought. 
In the Regensburg Lecture, Ratzinger narrates three stages of the rupture of faith and 
reason. Firstly, Luther seeks faith ‘in its pure, primordial form’.2 Philosophy and metaphysics 
has to be rejected so that faith can be liberated ‘to become more fully itself’. Following the 
same trajectory, Kant carries forward Luther’s thought ‘with a radicalism that the Reformers 
could never have foreseen’, confining both faith and reason to ‘practical reason’ or morality.      
Secondly, von Harnack seeks ‘to return simply to the man Jesus and to his simple message’, 
                                                             
1 The Regensburg Lecture, para.25. 
2 Ibid., para.34. 
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reducing Christianity to ‘a humanitarian moral message’ and bringing Christianity ‘back into 
harmony with modern reason.’ The third stage in this ‘self-limitation of reason’ is the 
contemporary desire to sunder the Christian message from its original inculturation in a Greek 
milieu, so that it can be more effectively inculturated into the diverse cultures of today.3   
Ratzinger rejects this approach on two grounds. Firstly, the Greek cannot be removed 
from the Christian, since both the New and the Old Testaments bear ‘the imprint of the Greek 
spirit’.4 Secondly, that Greek imprint represents a fundamental decision about the relationship 
between faith and reason, a decision that is so foundational that it can never be denied. 
Ratzinger laments in particular the development of voluntarism in the theology of Duns 
Scotus, which claims that we can only know God’s voluntas ordinata, ‘in virtue of which he 
could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done.’ He connects this to 
voluntarist tendencies in Islam, which in order to preserve divine transcendence sever the link 
between faith and reason.5  
This chapter will argue that the development of human rights is associated with a 
rupture between faith and reason. The chapter aims to compare Ratzinger’s history of ideas 
with some major contemporary genealogies, to relate Ratzinger’s history of ideas to his logos 
theology and to draw conclusions for the construction of an inclusive concept of human 
rights. 
The chapter will take particular note of the place of medieval nominalism and 
voluntarism in the genealogy of human rights and to the contributions of MacIntyre and 
Taylor to the genealogy of culture. 
                                                             
3 The Regensburg Lecture, para.40. 
4 Ibid., para.52. 
5 Ibid., para.25. 
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The chapter is written in awareness of the fact that as an exercise in the history of 
ideas, genealogy is fraught with difficulties. A ‘modern’ approach to genealogy will tend to 
reject Hegelian idealism, in which ideas take on a kind of inevitability and independent 
agency, and will take a realist approach to human history, in which what matters is economic 
and political power. A ‘postmodern’ approach will certainly avoid ‘the history of ideas’ and 
will be sceptical about genealogy. Its approach will always strive to emphasise the unique 
contextuality of every moment in history, and to deny it any universal application.  
Furthermore, genealogies have a tendency to be selective, homing in on only those 
thinkers from the past who will serve their grand narrative. They also run the risk of 
misrepresenting thinkers of the past, and of reading back into the past the ideas of today. In 
the case of human rights there is a tempting battle to be joined between secularists, who see 
the eighteenth century as the true source both of rights and of reason, and Christian 
theologians and philosophers, who prefer to see both rights and reason as rooted in religion.  
An appropriate response is to maintain that all things, including all ideas, (perhaps 
especially ideas), have a history. To inquire into the history of human rights is not only 
legitimate; it is a logical first step to understanding them. It will also be important, while 
exploring a number of key thinkers, to draw attention to the master-narratives which guide 
their approaches. This chapter presents its own master narrative, that a recovery of the 
Christian genealogy of human rights can contribute to an inclusive dialogue about human 
rights today. 
Genealogy and the foundations of logos theology 
As we embark on our genealogical journey, it will be helpful to bring with us the fruits of our 
investigations into the foundations of logos theology in Part One of the thesis. We may start 
by positioning the concept and culture of human rights as the contemporary expression of a 
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long tradition which we can call humanism, i.e. a tradition which upholds the dignity of the 
human person. In Plato we encountered a Greek humanism which built dignity upon the 
human passion for the true and the good, the human capacity for participation in transcendent 
truth and goodness and the rational capacity for metaphysical inquiry. From the Stoics we 
recalled a vision of the rational dignity of the human person in harmony with the rationality of 
the cosmos, the insight that action is ethical when conducted in accordance with right reason, 
resulting in a universalism based upon the cosmopolitan unity of humankind. 
 To this Greek vision we added the contribution of the Old Testament biblical faith and 
of John and Justin’s Christian logos theologies, which welcomed, corrected and fulfilled all 
that we found in Plato and the Stoics, thereby transforming logos into Logos. Human dignity 
could now be based upon participation in the divine through a personal relationship with the 
living God of faith in the person of Jesus Christ as Word made flesh. The world, and every 
person in it, was now not only created by reason or rationality, and illumed by the divine light 
of reason, but welcomed into a loving relationship by an immanent historical saviour and 
redeemer. The dignity of the human person was now tied to its origin in truth and love, and 
social justice anchored in non-material values known to human nature by natural revelation, 
as well as by the special revelation of the scriptures. Our aim in this chapter is to understand 
how this vision was broken down, what remained of it in the doctrine of human rights, and 
why its recovery could represent a healing of human rights. 
 
6.1: CONTRASTING GENEALOGIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
6.1.1 Micheline Ishay’s pluralism  
Ishay has sought to provide a comprehensive genealogy of human rights in terms of a broad 
sweep of cultural development that takes seriously the pre-Enlightenment history of human 
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rights. Her genealogy ‘does not privilege the messianic aspirations of a single generation but 
recognizes the dedication of a host of human rights couriers over time.’6 Ishay uses a ‘critical 
theory’ methodology which ‘presupposes that ideas and events are carried over from one era 
to another.’ Rather than suggesting a chain of causality, she lists early ethical contributions 
and distinguishes between ‘ancient values’ and ‘modern human rights,’ united by shared basic 
views of the common good.7 Ishay describes the story of human rights as ‘a journey guided 
by lampposts across ruins left behind by ravaging and insatiable storms’, but is careful to 
avoid the idea that ‘there is a perfect continuum from ancient to modern thinking about human 
rights.’8  
Ishay’s significance for my thesis is her desire to portray human rights as a broad 
church into which all cultures are to be welcomed. In her Human Rights Reader, she creates 
an invaluable resource, in which she gathers together key ‘human rights’ documents with a 
broad range of provenances. In her History of Human Rights, she welcomes the Old 
Testament, the New Testament, the Babylonian Hammurabi Code, the Analects of Confucius, 
Plato, Socrates, the Stoics Epictetus and Zeno, Cicero, the Qur‘an and precepts of Buddhism 
and Hinduism. Rather than telling a simplistic story of ‘human rights’, Ishay looks in detail at 
underlying notions: universalism, liberty, tolerance, equality, economic and social justice and 
fraternity. She chooses these because they were ideas embodied in laws, with the result that 
that ‘India, China, Roman Christendom, and the Arabic and Islamic world’ were recognised 
as ‘the great civilisations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.’9 Ishay simultaneously 
explores six controversies in human rights, the first of which concerns the origins of human 
                                                             
6 Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, (Berkeley, 
CA:  University of California Press, 2008), p.2. 
7 Ibid., p.7. 
8 Ibid., p.3 and p.5. 
9 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, p.64. 
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rights. Her multicultural account of the origins of human rights is designed to restore the 
importance of religion in providing ‘important humanistic elements that anticipate our modern 
conceptions of rights’ and to establish that it is wrong ‘to view religion as antithetical to a 
secular view of universal rights.’10  
Ishay uses the Universal Declaration as the template for her entire study. She is 
impressed how the 1945 Human Rights Commission was able to use a UNESCO 
questionnaire to engage contributors from diverse traditions ‘to look at all the world’s great 
religions and cultures for the universal notions of the common good that had inspired the 
Enlightenment’s human rights visionaries.’11 Ishay is particularly impressed by the 
contribution of René Cassin, one of the main drafters of the Universal Declaration, who 
maintained that the concept of human rights comes from the Bible, from the Old Testament 
and from the Ten Commandments. She quotes Cassin: ‘We must not forget that Judaism gave 
the world the concept of human rights.’12 Ishay agrees that one can find ‘the spirit of some 
religious injunctions in modern human rights.’13 She suggests a genealogical relationship 
between the Hammurabi Code and Jewish precepts. She balances Cassin with the contribution 
made by Richard McKeon on the influence of the Greeks, especially Stoic cosmopolitanism, 
which in turn was influenced by Plato and Socrates, who ‘showed their allegiance to a 
universal view of human goodness and, in a sense, human rights.’14 Epictetus emphasised the 
role of reason, Diogenes and Socrates ‘were Epictetus’ heroes, for they (like the Buddha and 
Confucius) called for a detached love of the common good, of the gods, and of their real 
                                                             
10 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, p.5. 
11 Ibid., p.17. 
12 Ibid., p.19. René Cassin, (1887-1976) was a French jurist, law professor and judge. He received the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1968 for his work in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A full account of his 
role in the drafting of the Universal Declaration can be found in Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: 
Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (New York: Random House, 2001). 
13 Ibid., p.369. 
14 Ibid., p.23. 
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country, the universe.’ Cicero, like the Greeks, ‘sanctified individuals’ capacity to reason’ but, 
being a practical Roman, went on to articulate this in the concept of natural laws, iures 
naturales, to be distinguished from customary laws. Ishay then says that Christianity, in a 
manner akin to Stoics and Cicero, ‘promoted a notion of equal moral status for all human 
beings’ because it was grounded in equal capacity to love neighbour and to be loved by 
God.15 
Ishay’s approach is guided by a master-narrative, expressed in her earlier work, which 
believes that ‘the historical foundation of human rights lies in the humanist strand running 
through the world’s great religions.’16 She provides one of the most authoritative, and up-to-
date treatments of human rights available and it is difficult to do justice to the detailed 
argument and complexity of her work.  For my purposes, she makes two convincing 
arguments: i) there is common conceptual ground in the pre-modern world which provides a 
pre-history of human rights, ii) there is an actual strong genealogical line from Jewish, Greek 
and Christian ideas such as the common good, universalism and equality, to human rights. 
Ishay’s presentation is balanced in that it is profoundly multicultural, but still acknowledges 
the importance of the Western Judaeo-Christian-Classical tradition. Buddhist, Hindu and 
Islamic sources are welcomed into her discussion of the key concepts of tolerance, justice and 
fraternity. However, she concludes that despite the widespread congruence of a ‘worldwide 
ethical heritage’,17  it cannot be denied that Western ethics was the major contributor to the 
development of human rights. In other words, the key active ingredient in the genesis of 
human rights is the Judaeo-Christian heritage, and this cannot be separated from the heritage 
of the Greeks and Romans. Ishay provides support for an approach to human rights that is 
                                                             
15 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, p.25. 
16 Micheline R. Ishay, The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Writings, Essays, Speeches and Documents 
from the Bible to the Present, (London: Routledge, 1997), p.xiv. 
17 Ishay, The History of Human Rights, p.60. 
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cognizant of its roots. At the same time, her broad church approach shows how powerful, (but 
not problem-free) human rights discourse can be if it is presented in a pluralist framework. 
Ishay’s work could be described as pluralist, but it is not relativist. It has criteria. ‘Open 
inclusivism’ might be a better description. Ishay wants to be honest and accurate about 
historical processes, while keeping the door of the concept of human rights open as wide as 
possible to all cultures. 
6.1.2 Samuel Moyn’s exclusive secularism 
Moyn provides a useful contrast to Ishay because he is quick to dismiss the ‘progress ascent’ 
view which sees human rights as ‘age-old and obvious’, ‘a saving truth, discovered rather 
than made in history.’18 He mocks the typical genealogy which runs from Greeks to Jews to 
medieval Christians to early modern philosophers, to democratic revolutionaries, to 
abolitionist heroes, to American internationalists, to anti-racist visionaries. Such genealogies 
are naïve and unproductive, based on the false a-historical myth of the inevitability of rights. 
He agrees that the Greeks and the Jews both demanded justice, but believes that they forfeit 
any claim as sources of contemporary morals because of ‘their alien conceptions’ and the 
dubious nature of their moral legacy.19  He rejects outright the view that ‘if the Greeks or the 
Bible announced that mankind is one ... then they must have their place in the history of 
human rights.’20 He is aware that ‘it is the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics that always is 
presented as the major leap toward modern conceptions.’ He admires the Stoic view that 
‘since all humans share in reason, they form part of the same polity’, but he points out that 
this cosmopolitanism was ‘divorced from social improvement’ and never translated into ‘a 
                                                             
18 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknapp Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2010), p.6. 
19 Moyn, The Last Utopia, pp.14-15. We can presume by ‘alien conceptions’ Moyn means the Classical – 
Judaeo-Christian-Thomistic synthesis of faith and reason and the participation of the human in the divine, 
concepts which modernity has rendered completely alien and unintelligible. 
20 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p.13. 
169 
 
reformist political project.’21 Christianity ‘has no necessary role in the history of human 
rights.’22  He allows it to be ‘self-evidently universalistic’ and famous for its egalitarianism, 
but dismisses the view that ‘there is only one move from particular cultures to universal 
morality to be made – and Christianity is it.’23 Moyn therefore confines himself to the 18th 
century as the true source for human rights and goes on to undermine any inevitability of the 
progress of rights by pointing out how tied up they have always been with national 
sovereignty, right up to what he regards as the real breakthrough in human rights discourse in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
Moyn’s master-narrative is that human rights are irreducibly political, not moral or 
religious. In this sense he is as sceptical about the very concept of rights as he is about 
fanciful genealogies, which are all too prone to degenerating into what Bloch called the ‘idol 
of origins.’24 He sees the contemporary human rights movement as the ‘last utopia’, i.e. the 
last political ideal left standing after the discrediting of both Western liberalism and 
internationalist communism, and ‘the most inspiring mass utopianism Westerners have had 
before them in recent decades.’ 25  
However, even Moyn admits that the concept of human rights can ‘capture many 
longstanding values’.26 Furthermore, despite his dismissal of Christian claims for human 
rights, Moyn repeatedly adverts to the Christian and Catholic contribution to the formulation 
of the 1948 Declaration, while always asking us to be cautious about human rights, which 
‘meant different things to different people from the beginning.’27  He refers to Pius XI, to 
Bishop Robert Lucey, to Maritain, concluding that ‘rights talk seems to be dominated by 
                                                             
21 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p.15. 
22 Ibid., p.16. 
23 Ibid., p.16. 
24 Moyn (p.38) refers to Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam, (New York, 1993), chap 1. 
25 Ibid., p.9. 
26 Ibid., p.9. 
27 Ibid., p.50. 
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Catholics.’28 Moyn points out that framers of the Declaration, John Humphrey, Charles Malik 
and Eleanor Roosevelt, were all Christian, and that ‘speeches were laced with Roman 
Catholic social philosophy.’29 Lest we become too impressed by Christian / Catholic 
connections to human rights, Moyn reminds us that ‘the Catholic Church’s long-term 
vilification of this political language is a classic fact.’30  On the other hand, Moyn notes how 
the plight of Cardinal Mindszenty became a post-war human rights cause celèbre which 
highlighted the right to religious freedom. He is also aware of how rooted the human rights 
concept was in Heidegger’s Christian personalism, how it was a consequence of ‘the political 
hegemony of Christian democracy’ and the energetic leadership of Catholic Christian 
personalist Robert Schumann that a mere human rights declaration became a legal instrument 
in the 1950 European Convention.31  The genesis of the 1948 Declaration owed much to the 
idea that ‘no number of claims for human rights, without spiritual sanctions, will save us from 
destruction,’ that ‘the rights of men derive directly from their condition as children of God 
and not of the State’, that human rights ‘live wholly from their ground in faith’ and that 
human rights are ‘a Christian bequest to be defended against the legacy of the French 
revolution.’32  
Moyn provides us with a salutary warning about naïve attempts to appropriate human 
rights and incorporate them unthinkingly into a self-serving Christian genealogy. Moyn’s first 
chapter, ‘Humanity before Human Rights’, is eloquent in its polemic but lacking depth and 
detail in its history. This is perhaps inevitable when dealing with the entire pre-Enlightenment 
period in just one introductory chapter and Moyn is consistent in that he does not provide any 
detailed history of Eighteenth century human rights. He is in no sense anti-Christian and is 
                                                             
28 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p.55. 
29 Ibid., p.66. 
30 Ibid., p.74. 
31 Ibid., p.78. 
32 Ibid., pp.75-76. 
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highly rigorous and detailed as a historian when in Chapter Two he comes to tell the story of 
the Universal Declaration. His overarching purpose is to preserve the power of human rights 
discourse by protecting it from a proliferation and hyper-inflation that would render it 
meaningless and powerless.  In terms of genealogy, this means restricting the history of its 
origin to the first generation civil and political rights. Ishay’s broad church approach would be 
anathema to him. His message for today is to be highly cautious when human rights discourse 
adopts what he calls ‘the burden of morality’ and become ‘a general slogan or worldview or 
ideal.’ It would be far better if human rights restricted themselves to ‘a few core values that 
demand protection’ and surrendered the ambition to ‘be all things to all people.’33 For Moyn, 
this would provide a far more effective and honest route to an inclusive approach to human 
rights, than one that is girded with philosophy, morality or religion. 
6.1.3   Nurser’s revisionist history of the Universal Declaration 
Moyn himself acknowledged the contribution to the Universal Declaration made by O. 
Frederick Nolde. The pivotal role played by Nolde was brought to light by Nurser in 2005.34 
Nurser reinstated the profoundly Christian genealogy of the Declaration in a ground-breaking 
revisionist study which countered the unquestioned assumption, widespread even in Christian 
circles, that the Declaration stands firmly in the genealogical tradition of the French 
Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and that human rights and religion have little 
to do with each other. The Declaration was designed to give the United Nations a soul and 
had two main sources. The first was the World Council of Churches, which since the start of 
the century had been exploring how social and economic structures could be Christianized. 
The resources they were able to draw on were, on the theological level, a vibrant history of 
Protestant / Evangelical mission, on the practical level, organizational structures such as the 
                                                             
33 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p.227. 
34 John S. Nurser, For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights, (Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005). 
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World Council of Churches and the YMCA.  Their key doctrinal contribution was the right to 
religious freedom. The second source was Catholic thinkers such as the philosopher Maritain 
and Jesuit priest de Chardin, who were trying to build a Catholic response to the modern 
world. The resources they were able to draw on were, on the theological level, the revived 
tradition of natural law, and on the practical level, a worldwide church with a unified global 
network of communication. Their key doctrinal contribution was the dignity of the human 
person. Nurser’s study supports a conclusion that we do not make human rights more 
inclusive by denying the fact of their Christian hinterland. He also sets down a powerful 
challenge to Christians, to make human rights central to their ecclesiology and to their 
missiology, since these were the driving forces of the engagement of Nolde and his colleagues 
in the drafting of the Declaration, a document that was purposefully free of any hint of 
Christian triumphalism. I conclude that the Universal Declaration has a partial but significant 
Christian genealogy. Furthermore, its choice of a purely secular expression is best understood 
as designed to be inclusive, rather than exclusive of religious principles. 
6.2: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
6.2.1 Nominalism  
Ishay makes no reference to the Middle Ages in her detailed genealogy of rights. However, 
the 13th and 14th centuries have emerged as key moments of controversy in the genealogy of 
human rights, and indeed, the genealogy of liberal modernity. The concept of nominalism is 
associated with the Franciscan theology of Duns Scotus (1266 – 1308) and William of 
Ockham (1288 – 1347). Both of these theologians have been held responsible for the collapse 
of the classical view of the relationship between God, nature and the human person.  
In brief, a Platonic approach to reality, i.e. realism, claims that alongside the 
particulars of reality there are ‘universals’ which are related to the shared characteristics of 
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the particulars. If you believe that the human mind can only access the particulars, then you 
will think of the universals as mere nomina or names, just concepts we use to express the idea 
that particulars have shared characteristics. In nominalist thinking, a ius or right sounds 
universal, e.g. the right to property, as if it corresponded to some objectively real relationship, 
but it is just a word we use to express a particular personal right. If we have a ius or right, it is 
not because it corresponds to anything real or objective. It is just a decision we make to agree 
that this particular right belongs to this person as subject. In other words, we are beginning to 
arrive at the notion of personal subjective rights, void of any Platonic / Thomist participation 
in anything real or objectively true.  
O’Mahoney’s genealogy of rights focuses on this pre-modern development.35 He 
explains that it was Villey, who exposed Ockham as the originator of the notion of subjective 
rights, thus providing another revisionist account of rights which shattered the received 
wisdom that the notion of subjective right was an invention of the 18th century.36 Villey’s 
approach was given broader dissemination by Tuck,37  so that O’Mahoney can say that 
‘Ockham has become widely viewed as the originator of personal rights.’ The received 
wisdom became that Ockham established ‘the unique significance of individuals as contrasted 
with universals’ and who established ‘freedom as the outstanding characteristic of human 
beings.’38  O’Mahoney points out that Tuck’s theory was countered by Tierney, who argued 
that the idea of subjective right did not originate in nominalist philosophy but in 12th and 13th 
century canon law, where ‘a rich language already existed’ to express the concept of rights.39 
 
                                                             
35 J. O’Mahoney, The Challenge of Human Rights: Origin, Development and Significance, (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007). See Chapter One, ‘Human Rights in History.’ 
36 Michel Villey, Leçons d’Histoire de la philosophie du droit, (Paris: Duzot, 1962). 
37 R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993). 
38 O’Mahoney, The Challenge of Human Rights, p.5. 
39 Ibid., p.42. 
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6.2.2 Douzinas and the view from postmodernity 
Costas Douzinas calls Part I of his work ‘The Genealogy of Human Rights’ and gives the 
Middle Ages credit for invention of the individual.  
The first radical step in this direction was taken by the Franciscan Nominalists Duns 
Scotus and William of Ockham. They were the first to argue, in the fourteenth century, 
against the dominant neo-Platonic views, that the individual form is not a sign of 
contingency nor is the human person the concrete instantiation of the universal. On the 
contrary, the supreme expression of creation is individuality, as evidenced in the 
historical incarnation of Christ, and its knowledge takes precedence over that of the 
universal forms of the classics.40  
Nominalism, expressed in this way, does feel deeply theological and Christian, but it is not 
hard to hear modernity waiting in the wings. Douzinas believes that its implications cannot be 
overstated, as it opened the road to ‘the sovereign individual, the centre of the world.’ Writing 
principally from a legal perspective, Douzinas has his own master-narrative, which sits 
comfortably with the Ratzinger project; if human rights are to survive in a postmodern world, 
then ethics needs to be restored to law. A human rights discourse that limits itself to 
individual will has cut itself free from the ethical sources by which it needs to be both 
sustained and restrained. 
6.2.3 Milbank and the medieval origins of modernity 
One might expect Christian commentators to be thrilled that the genealogy of subjective 
rights can be demonstrated to have convincing Christian origins which pre-date 18th century 
rationalism by several centuries. It would mean that Christianity can take credit for one of 
modernity’s most cherished foundations, the individual subject and her subjective rights.  But 
if you regard modernity’s autonomous self as a cultural disaster, you are forced to admit that 
Christianity is to blame for what you regard as one of modernity’s most pernicious features. 
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Publishing, 2000), pp.61-62. 
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For ‘radical orthodox’ theologians such as John Milbank, Franciscan nominalism is the villain 
of the piece.41 His ‘radical orthodox’ project is to revive the notion of human nature as 
metaphysical participation in a cosmic harmony, the framework destroyed by the Franciscans.  
For the Dominicans, according to Milbank, the right to property had been a legal ius, granting 
usus or dominium, while the Franciscan view was that ‘ownership’ preceded the law.42 It was 
a subjective right, i.e. a right belonging to the subject as subject. Milbank calls this simplex 
usus facti – the mere fact that I am possessing it, a ‘radical dispossession.’43 In Milbank’s 
master-narrative, human rights as absolute must be rejected because they lose sight of the 
relational; not just the horizontal relationality between persons, but the vertical relationality 
between the material and the spiritual. Milbank agrees with Villey that subjective rights 
emerge with the Franciscans. For him this is a wholly negative development, which ruptures 
the participative harmony between man and the cosmos. It substitutes ‘an extreme rationalist 
reductionism’ which is then used to prove ‘absolutism’ of the will, a move that can only end 
in violence.44 This absolutism of the will leads us to the topic of voluntarism. 
6.2.4 Voluntarism 
The story of nominalism is also a story of voluntarism. Plato’s Euthyphro had first posed the 
question as to whether an action was right because God willed it, or whether God willed it 
because it was right. The first view, that an action is right because God wills it, is what is 
meant by Divine Command Theory or theological voluntarism. A key feature of this kind of 
voluntarism is that it severs any logical or natural link there might be between what we 
                                                             
41 John Milbank, ‘Against Human Rights: Liberty in the Western Tradition’, Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion, (2012), pp. 1–32. Available at: http://english.duke.edu. (Accessed: 6 May 2014). 
42 The concept of private property was central to the Decalogue and also to Roman law. It took centre stage in 
the 13th and 14th centuries because of the centrality of poverty to the Franciscan charism. The Franciscans found 
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framework allowed them to own things in name only. The real legal ownership of their property was ascribed to 
the Pope. 
43 Milbank, Against Human Rights, p.21. 
44 Ibid., p.21. 
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naturally want as persons and what God wants for us, thereby rendering God’s will opaque, 
inscrutable and even arbitrary.  Villey located Ockham within a long-term drift towards 
voluntarism, which he associated with ‘logicism’ and individualism. All were based on the 
idea that the only things it is possible to get a rational understanding of are finite realities. 
Milbank accuses the Franciscans of separating will from reason. This rupture results in 
‘the sense that there is a ‘raw’ freedom independent of ends, of which one can never be 
legitimately robbed.’45 Again we are half way to the 18th century notion of subjective rights. 
‘Modern subjective rights do have a medieval root in the Franciscan tradition and do not only 
emerge with Hobbes and his epoch.’46 This means that ‘Modern liberalism either depends 
upon, or is hostage to, certain unacknowledged theological positions.’47 Where Villey was 
merely hesitant about human rights, Milbank is unequivocally hostile. Like liberal modernity 
itself, of which they are an intrinsic part, subjective rights can be traced to the wrong turn 
taken by Franciscan theology.48 
Their buried foundation lies in a questionable theological voluntarism and a 
questionably atomising metaphysic. In either case the same logic upholds both the 
absolute negative liberty of the individual and the unrestricted formally-grounded 
power of the sovereign political power. And only the latter can render the former 
operable, only the latter can effectuate positively the supposedly ‘natural’ character of 
rights.49 
It is worth noting, in anticipation of the next chapter, that recent Roman Catholic thinking on 
natural law has drawn upon Ratzinger’s comments on voluntarism: 
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48 Steven Shakespeare expresses the problem with voluntarism in this way: ‘as God is no longer related to us by 
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Voluntarism proposes to highlight the transcendence of the free subject in relation to 
all conditioning. Against naturalism that tended to subject God to the laws of nature, it 
emphasizes, in a unilateral way, the absolute freedom of God, with the risk of 
compromising his wisdom and rendering his decisions arbitrary.50 
 
Douzinas, writing from a different perspective, also sees this medieval Franciscan philosophy 
as a disaster for Christianity and for civilisation. He expresses the implications of voluntarism 
with characteristic verve and clarity.  
The separation of God from nature and the absolutisation of will prepared the ground 
for God’s retreat and eventual removal from earthly matters. The celebration of an 
omnipotent and unquestionable will was both the prelude for the full abdication of 
divine right and the foundation stone of secular omnipotent sovereignty. Legal 
positivism and untrammelled state authoritarianism found their early precursor in 
these devout defenders of the power of God. And in a move that was to be repeated by 
the political philosophers of the seventeenth century, the Franciscan combined 
absolute legislative will with the nominalist claim that only individuals exist.51   
Thus two inventions, conventionally ascribed to the 18th century, Hobbes’ sovereign power 
and Rousseau’s naturally free individual, are discovered to be the product of Scotus’, and later 
Ockham’s, nominalism and voluntarism. As we have seen, this conclusion is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, it undermines the conventional wisdom that natural subjective rights 
are a product of a rationalist and secular Eighteenth century. On the other hand, it 
simultaneously identifies Christianity both as architect of its own demise, and as progenitor of 
the politically dangerous concept of subjective right and its even more pernicious 
concomitant, the will to power. 
 
                                                             
50 International Theological Commission, In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, 2009, 
para.29. This passage uses the footnotes to reference the Regensburg Lecture.  Available at: 
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6.2.5 Coleman: Negotiating the medieval in the modern 
Political theorist Janet Coleman also emphasizes the crucial role played by medieval 
nominalism and voluntarism in the development of modern political theory. She presents us 
with two traditions. The Augustinian / Franciscan ‘voluntarist’ tradition, emphasizing original 
sin and divine freedom, sees us as ‘self-lovers’ first, and holds that ‘the philosophical order of 
rationality gives us no access to the other order of rationality, that of God and His absolute 
Will.’52 It posits a dysfunctional relationship between divine and human nature, reason and 
will and between the individual and the common good. The Aristotelian / Scholastic 
‘intellectualist’ tradition, emphasizing the imago Dei and divine creation, sees us as 
‘community-lovers’ first, and holds that we have access to the principles of natural law 
‘innately and intuitively to guide our behaviour’ and that the self is a normative self, its 
normativity derived from God. In this view, the imago Dei is somehow in us in ‘what is best 
in our nature’, ratio recta is available to all and the moral rules of natural law are accessible to 
rational comprehension, but must be supplemented by the divine law of the Decalogue. Here 
there is a congruence between divine and human nature, reason and will and between the 
individual and the common good.  
The logical corollary of the Augustinian tradition, carried forward by Scotus, Ockham 
and Hobbes, is the transference of individual will and freedom, by way of the voluntarist 
principle, to a sovereign person or body, in the interests of peace and security. The logical 
corollary of the Aristotelian tradition, by way of natural law, is to try to constitute the political 
as a sacred ordering according to our knowledge of God’s will, which we find a priori 
inherent in the structures of the world. This view, according to Coleman, persisted in both 
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Catholic and Protestant thought into the Eighteenth century, but the neo-Augustinian ‘realist’ 
view of politics prevailed as a ‘modern’ ideological project, partly as a result of ‘a wilful 
forgetting of the past’.53 It is predicated on the human person as a self-interested individualist 
who cherishes the freedom to realise personal will. Modernity’s cultural framework is 
consequently relativist, its ethics utilitarian, its legal system positivist.54 Politics is devoted to 
the reduction of harm, as in the civil and political rights, not the realisation of moral goods, as 
in the economic social and cultural rights.  
I would add this crucial observation: Ratzinger opts for the Aristotelian tradition. 
However, as an Augustinian, Ratzinger upholds the independence of church and state and the 
relative autonomy of the political sphere. He is consequently cross-pressured in his attitude to 
the enlightenment and liberal democracy. These issues will be revisited in Chapter Eight’s 
discussion of Habermas. For now, we can observe that the tradition of human rights bears 
within itself a struggle for priority between politics and ethics. 
Summary 
The concept of rights belonging to the subject as subject does not start in the Eighteenth 
century, but has its origins in developments in medieval Franciscan philosophy and theology. 
Whether these developments are viewed benignly or negatively, the concept of human rights 
is shown to be ultimately based on theological presuppositions and not simply on imperatives 
in the civil and political realm. Ontologies and epistemologies have unavoidable ethical 
implications. 
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6.3: REPLACEMENT, SEVERANCE AND MUTATION 
6.3.1 Rowland’s three academic stables. 
Tracey Rowland suggests that we situate genealogies of culture within three ‘academic 
stables’, which she styles replacement, severance and mutation.55 The example she gives of a 
replacement genealogy is Hegel, for whom the classical – theistic synthesis of faith and 
reason had to be replaced by something new, the age of reason. According to Rowland, 
radical orthodox theologians Milbank and Pickstock belong to the ‘mutation’ stable. For 
them, the classical – theistic synthesis of faith and reason does not disappear or become 
defunct. It mutates, and in the process loses its original mooring, context and power as it takes 
on the meanings of liberal modernity. Rowland sees MacIntyre and Von Balthasar as 
adherents of ‘severance’ genealogy. This approach laments the cultural process whereby 
reason becomes severed from faith. She gives no examples, but I find that MacIntyre 
expresses the idea in this way: 
…the precepts that are thus uttered were once at home in, and intelligible in terms of, 
a context of practical beliefs and of supporting habits of thought, feeling and action, a 
context in which moral judgements are governed by impersonal standards justified by 
a shared conception of the human good. Deprived of that context and of that 
justification, as a result of disruptive and transformative social and moral changes in 
the late middle ages and the early modern world, moral rules and precepts had to be 
understood in a new way and assigned some new status, authority and justification.56  
I suggest that Rowland may be incorrect to think of MacIntyre in terms of severance.  After 
all, MacIntyre’s genealogical approach is to talk of traditions. He offers three traditions, i) 
Homer – Aristotle – Albertus Magnus – Aquinas, ii) Bible – Augustine – Aquinas and iii) a 
Scottish tradition of Aristotle – Calvin – Hume. It may be fair to describe MacIntyre’s 
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genealogies in terms of severance, but MacIntyre himself explains genealogy as a ‘movement 
of thought’ whereby ‘those engaging in that movement become aware of it and of its direction 
and in self-aware fashion attempt to engage in its debates and carry its enquiries forward.’57 
MacIntyre is implacably opposed to belief in human rights, which he famously 
dismisses as akin to belief in witches and unicorns.58 The rights concept is non-existent in 
Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Arabic traditions prior to 1400C.E.59 His genealogical approach 
prepares the way for Taylor. Both understand that genealogy has to look at the ‘conditions of 
belief.’ It is when these change, that old beliefs die and new beliefs are born. It is as 
impossible not to believe in the autonomous self today, as it was impossible not to believe in 
the past in the self that participated in the transcendent.  
6.3.2   Taylor and the false genealogy of subtraction 
Taylor believes genealogies are important, because in order to understand where we once 
were, and where we are now, ‘we have to go back and tell the story properly.’60  Where we 
once were, (c1500CE), was a place where we could rely on three ‘bulwarks of belief’: i) the 
natural world, as understood in terms of order, purpose and creation, ii) human society and 
government as rooted in something higher, iii) God as the guarantor that good would triumph 
over the forces of evil. This was a place where we enjoyed three dimensions of transcendence: 
i) a transcendent good, beyond human flourishing, ii) the possibility of transformation, 
beyond mere human improvement, iii) eternal life, beyond this life. Where we are now, 
(c2000CE), is the world of ‘exclusive’ or ‘self-sufficient’ humanism, which accepts no goals 
beyond human flourishing. The self, which had been ‘porous’ to spirits, demons and cosmic 
forces, is now ‘buffered’, disengaged from everything outside the mind. The ‘buffered self’ 
                                                             
57 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth Press, 1988), p.326. 
58 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.69 
59 Ibid., p.67. 
60 Taylor, A Secular Age, p.29. 
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views itself as invulnerable and as the source of all its own meanings. The natural world is 
now outside the self, disenchanted from any inherent teleology and so available for 
manipulation and exploitation. 
Taylor’s master-narrative seeks to debunk the ‘subtraction’ genealogy which has 
hitherto held unquestioned sway. This subtraction theory says that liberal modernity, with its 
materialist atheism and instrumental scientism, could only emerge once transcendental 
religion had been subtracted from culture.61 Taylor sets out to show, through a close analysis 
of key moments in history, how changes and mutations within Christianity itself were 
responsible for the emergence of liberal modernity. One of the moments he looks at is the 
nominalism and voluntarism of the Middle Ages. In discussing reformed notions of God’s 
freedom and sovereignty, which meant that God could not be manipulated by any ‘white 
magic’ rite, Taylor comments that  
We can see a certain affinity between this spiritual sense and Scotist – Occamite 
theology, which also stressed the unfettered sovereign power of God. That this was 
more than just an affinity can be seen in the way Luther drew on this stream of 
thought.62  
Taylor regards human rights as a crucial element in what he calls the ‘Modern Moral Order’, 
and regards the ‘endorsing of human rights and welfare as one of our crucial goals’ and ‘a 
theme which has emerged as central in my narrative.’63  He admires human rights for 
promoting a ‘sense of inter-human solidarity,’64 which he compares to the breakthroughs 
achieved by the Buddha, the Stoics, Christ and Muhammed. At the same time, he is sceptical 
about human rights, when they are conceived within a subtraction genealogy of modernity. 
                                                             
61 There seems to be little difference between Taylor’s ‘subtraction’ and Rowland’s ‘severance.’ 
62 Taylor, A Secular Age, p.73. 
63 Ibid., p.608. 
64 Ibid., p.608. 
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The ‘Modern Moral Order’ has a tendency to become what he calls a ‘Closed World System’, 
a structure of thought accepted by modernity but grounded in unquestioned assumptions or 
myths, such as ‘science refutes religion’, ‘Christianity is incompatible with human rights’, 
‘there was once a time when religion could flourish, but ... this time is past.’65  
He also speaks of the nominalist revolution which broke down the Thomist – 
Aristotelian synthesis of faith and reason, in which ‘once having created humans, God cannot 
but will what their nature defines as their good.’ For the Franciscan voluntarists, it seemed 
vital that God remained free to determine what was good. ‘The good is whatever God wills; 
not God must will whatever is (determined by nature as) good. This was the most powerful 
motive to reject the ‘realism’ of essences for Occam and his followers.’66 Taylor uses the 
phrase ‘Social Imaginary’ to denote ‘the ways in which they imagine their social existence,’67  
‘that largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation.’68 The 
modern moral order’ is a social imaginary built on i) the individual ii) society as a system of 
mutual benefit iii) freedom iv) rights and v) equality. In Taylor’s genealogy, this social 
imaginary was constructed from four ‘mutations’ of culture, in which i) the economy was 
elevated into an objectified reality, ii) the public sphere was invented as a place of discourse 
on matters of common interest, iii) the people came to be regarded as the sovereign power and 
iv) the people felt they were no longer part of a hierarchy, but of a ‘direct-access society.’69  
Summary 
In pre-modernity, the dignity of the individual derives from participation in the divine 
transcendent order and society is premised on a web of mutual obligations and privileges. If 
                                                             
65 Taylor, A Secular Age, p.590. 
66 Ibid., p.97. 
67 Ibid., p.171. 
68 Ibid., p.173. 
69 Ibid., pp. 173 - 211. 
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modernity’s culture of human rights has arisen only through severance and subtraction of this 
pre-modern schema, then a recovery of the sense of participation can only weaken human 
rights. If modernity is a mutation of pre-modernity, then pre-modernity is a genetic 
inheritance that can both nourish and purify the cherished beliefs of modernity. This is the 
belief of Joseph Ratzinger. 
6.4:  DOING GENEALOGY WITH RATZINGER 
6.4.1 Ratzinger’s double helix genealogies 
Rowland observes that ‘Ratzinger has not written one all-encompassing exposition of his own 
genealogy, but has offered pieces of the puzzle.’70  This thesis argues that he does offer us a 
number of signposts designed to point us in the right direction if we wish to construct a 
‘thick’ theory of human rights that will be truly inclusive and therefore both durable and 
effective. This entire thesis argues that the prime signpost offered by Ratzinger is his critique 
of reason. This theme is presented as the key to his entire project, and to what he considers 
needs to be welcomed and corrected in the theory of human rights.  
Ratzinger offers us a genealogy of reason, of logos, which inevitably becomes by 
implication a genealogy of Western civilisation and liberal modernity. Rowland calls 
Ratzinger’s genealogy a ‘double-helix’ presented as ‘two sets of three intellectual 
moments.’71 Having set up the three stables, Rowland is not sure whether to portray Ratzinger 
as mutation and severance, but she is sure of one thing:  
His genealogy of modernity does not follow the school of thinking which reads 
modernity as an entirely new culture, completely severed from all Christian roots. He 
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71 Ibid., p.108. 
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believes it is entangled with the Christian heritage, however much secular liberal elites 
may want to deny this.72  
She decides that in Ratzinger ‘the severances are accompanied by mutations.’73 The 
voluntarist controversy is central to Ratzinger’s Regensburg thesis, because he wishes to warn 
Islam of the dangers of subscribing to an extreme voluntarism, which ‘might even lead to the 
image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness.’74 The result would 
be that ‘our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, 
whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual 
decisions.’75 He accepts ‘in all honesty’ that Christianity itself has been guilty of just such a 
move:   
…in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this 
synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-
called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a 
voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the claim that we can only know 
God’s voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God’s freedom, in virtue of 
which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done.76   
This is why the logos is so important. The purpose of the Regensburg Lecture is to reaffirm 
that ‘Not to act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary to the nature of God.’ 
6.4.2   The loss of the concept of creation 
The first helix is the story of the loss of the concept of creation. ‘The foundations of 
modernity are the reason for the disappearance of ‘creation’ from the horizons of historically 
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influential thought.’77 A noteworthy feature of this account is its highly negative approach to 
both Hellenization and de-Hellenization.78 This severance or mutation took place in three 
stages.  
The first stage is a moment of ‘re-Hellenization’, associated with Bruno.  Reverting to 
the divine cosmos of the Greeks means letting go of the Judaeo-Christian faith in creation, 
‘relinquishing the Christian so that the Greek can be restored in all its pagan purity.’79  The 
contingency of individual things becomes indisputable, ‘but the contingency of the world as a 
whole is not accepted.’  
Galileo represents a second moment of re-Hellenization, in that he reverts to the 
mathematical vision of Plato. ‘God wrote the book of nature with mathematical letters.’80  
Creation mutates into mere nature, God reverts to the Platonic, a mere first cause, a scientific 
hypothesis. The result is that God is confined to ‘the inner world of piety’ and thereby 
becomes meaningless.  
The third moment is one of de-Hellenization, associated with Luther. Where Bruno 
and Galileo had wanted to get back ‘beyond the synthesis of Christianity and ancient Greece, 
to something purely Greek,’81  Luther wants ‘to establish a pure Christianity, free from Greek 
influence.’82 For Luther, creation is a curse, marked through and through by sin; redemption is 
being set free from nature by grace. 
 
                                                             
77 Ratzinger, J. ‘In the Beginning...’ – A Catholic Understanding of Creation and the Fall, trans. Boniface 
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opposite pole, de-Hellenization, has only gradually gained an epochal significance.’ 
79 ‘In the Beginning ...’, p.83. 
80 Ibid., p.84. 
81 Ibid., p.86. 
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6.4.3   Three forms of concealment 
Ratzinger’s narrative of the loss of the concept of creation resulted from what he calls ‘three 
forms of concealment.’ Firstly, the concept of creation was concealed by ‘the scientific 
concept of nature.’ The result was that ‘theological argument about the “nature of humans” or 
“natural rights”, resting as they do on the concept of creation, meet a look of blank 
incomprehension; in fact, they seem nonsensical, the relic of an archaic “natural 
philosophy”’.83  
Secondly, the concept of creation was concealed by modernity’s negative and 
pessimistic view of human nature, the human mind and human freedom, which in modernity’s 
view, lack nature’s pure impartial beauty and balance.84  The result is that ‘To restore the 
balance, humans must be healed of being human.’85  This is highly relevant to human rights. 
Ratzinger traces this essentially nihilistic view of the human person all the way back to 
Rousseau, a key figure in the genealogy of human rights. 
Thirdly, the concept of creation was concealed by Christian theologians, who denied 
the importance of physical nature in order to emphasise spiritual grace. Ratzinger proposes a 
profound maxim: ‘first the physical, then the spiritual.’86 By ‘physical’ he means ‘acceptance 
of myself as his creature’. To deny our own creation is to deny our very selves.  ‘A 
selflessness that tries to abolish one’s own “I” degenerates into “I-lessness,” and then “Thou-
lessness” follows directly. Human rights as the sense of the importance of the other person 
disappears in the face of the self-obsession with the self and its own salvation by grace. Over-
                                                             
83 ‘In the Beginning ...’, p.92. 
84 This is a view Ratzinger claims to find in Levi-Strauss and Skinner. 
85 Ibid., p.94. 
86 Ibid., p.94. This is based on I Cor 15:46 “But it is not the spiritual that is first but the physical, and then the 
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emphasis on God’s grace, and downplaying of the goodness of God’s creation, leads only to 
an odium generis humani, that can never produce a deep sense of human rights. 
6.5:  RATZINGER, REASON AND RIGHTS REVISITED 
6.5.1   The false ontology of materialism 
The threefold schema of ontology, epistemology and ethics that underlies this thesis will help 
to explicate the purposes of Ratzinger’s engagement with genealogy. 
In terms of ontology, Ratzinger’s genealogy is ultimately a genealogy of belief in 
God. As such it is a genealogy that rejects exclusive materialism. For Ratzinger, the question 
of God can never be consigned to the dustbin that contains the false illusions humanity has 
entertained in the past.  
‘Inquiry about God is not the forlorn effort of the obsolete world that is trying to keep 
itself alive after its time has run out, but the most necessary thorn in the flesh of our 
minds, forcing us constantly to search for ourselves and to expose ourselves to the full 
responsibility of being human – a responsibility that cannot be reduced to the language 
of calculus.’87  
This is the point made at Regensburg; to avoid the Socratic question, to exclude the 
ontological, not to allow that matter ‘points beyond itself’,88 to despise and mock ‘all talk 
about being’ is to ‘suffer a great loss’ and to be ‘deprived of the truth of existence’.89  
6.5.2 The false epistemology of positivism 
In terms of epistemology, Ratzinger calls for science to go ‘beyond the possibilities of its 
methodology’.90 He is swift and sincere in his acceptance that positivism delivers great 
benefits to humanity. But elevated to a complete philosophy of life, it not only excludes the 
question of God, it spells ‘the end of humanity’.  ‘The logos, the intellect of man reaches 
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farther than formal logic.’91 The scientific method owes its origin to Plato’s basic assumption 
‘that the world is mathematically and rationally structured.’92  Copernicus, Galileo, and 
Newton were all Platonists. At Regensburg, Ratzinger reminds us that ‘This modern concept 
of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and 
empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the success of technology.’93 But reason is now guilty 
of self-limitation: ‘the laws of method that brought it success have, through being generalized, 
become its prison.’94  Ratzinger has always insisted on the rationality and intelligibility of the 
material world.  
…in the old Pythagorean saying about the God who practises geometry there is 
expressed that insight into the mathematical structure of being which learns to 
understand being as having been thought, as intellectually structured; there is also 
expressed the perception that even matter is not simply non-sense that eludes 
understanding, that it too bears in itself truth and comprehensibility that makes 
intellectual comprehension possible. In our time, through the investigation of the 
mathematical construction of matter and the way it can be conceived and evaluated in 
mathematical terms, this insight has gained an amazing solidity. Einstein said once 
that in the laws of nature “an intelligence so superior is revealed that in comparison all 
the significance of human thinking and human arrangement is a completely worthless 
reflection.” 95  
We need to remind ourselves that reason precedes the world. ‘The Logos, Wisdom, about 
which the Greeks spoke, on the one hand, and the Israelites, on the other, has been taken back 
into the material world and cannot be addressed outside of it.’96   
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6.5.3 The false ethics of utilitarianism 
In terms of ethics, the dominance of an exclusive scientific reason has led to ‘attempts to 
construct an ethic from the rules of psychology and sociology.’97 This is simply inadequate. 
Within the discipline of natural science, the self-limitation of reason is right. Elevated to be 
the only legitimate form of human thought, it becomes ‘amputated reason’.98  This reason is 
self-contradictory, because it does believe in a congruence between human rationality and the 
rationality of the universe, but then denies the capacity of human rationality to engage 
questions of life and death, human destiny and morality.  
The implications for justice, peace and human rights are very serious. ‘The 
disintegration of man, thus brought about, results equally in a pathological form of religion 
and a pathological form of science.’99  This is the issue Ratzinger seeks to address at 
Regensburg, the fact that ‘pathological forms of religion are constantly increasing.’100  He is 
also concerned that ‘science becomes pathological and a threat to life when it takes leave of 
the moral order of human life, becomes autonomous, and no longer recognizes any standard 
but its own capabilities.’101   Ratzinger challenges us to come out of the prison we have 
fashioned for ourselves.  
‘What we need is something like what we find in Socrates: a patient readiness, opened 
up and looking beyond itself. This readiness to look at things, in its time, brought 
together the two eyes of reason, Athens and Jerusalem, and made possible a new stage 
in history.’102  
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Summary 
Christianity damaged itself when it severed the link between a participatory, logos-based 
reason and ordinary human rationality. Christianity’s own self limitation of reason is a key 
source of modernity. Modernity’s rationality is consequently limited, in denial of, or unaware 
of, its own religious origins and wedded to scientific positivism as the sole and universal 
rationality. Utilitarianism can never be the basis of an inclusive formulation of the concept of 
human rights. 
6.6: LOGOS THEOLOGY, GENEALOGY AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Adamantia Pollis says that ‘the absence of a genuine consensus on human rights necessitates 
rethinking and a search for new foundations for the construction of a reconstituted human 
rights theory.’ She has asked that ‘the liberal doctrine of human rights should be as subjected 
to discourse and dialogue as are non-Western values.’103  Ratzinger is thus not alone in his 
concerns and ideas. He shares Ishay’s respect for the centrality of religion in general, and 
Christianity in particular, in the construction of a humanism to preserve and enrich the 
discourse of human rights. He would warm to Ishay’s portrayal of the Universal Declaration 
as a hugely fertile moment of dialogic encounter and overlapping cross-cultural consensus. 
With Moyn he shares a concern about the precarious and ephemeral status of human rights, 
and their potential weakening through proliferation. There is common ground with Milbank; 
modernity has taken a wrong turn by cutting itself off from the Platonic– Biblical–Thomist 
conviction that the immanent must be related in a participatory way with the transcendent. 
Both Ratzinger and Douzinas have a desire to restore the link between ethics and law. He 
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192 
 
shares Taylor’s view that Christianity is the place to look for most of modernity’s key 
features, for better or for worse.  He is on common ground with MacIntyre; the big story to 
tell is the story of rationality and its implications for morality.  
Ratzinger makes clear at Regensburg that his critique of reason ‘has nothing to do 
with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of 
the modern age.’104 Ratzinger’s genealogy is as critical of Christianity and religion as it is of 
positivism and materialism and is often positive about the Enlightenment. Ratzinger’s 
genealogy of reason, his view of human rights and his love of the logos come together at 
Subiaco, where he makes it clear that he has no desire to reject either the Enlightenment or 
modernity. He reminds us that from the beginning, Christianity has understood itself as the 
religion of the logos, as the religion according to reason. He makes clear his view of the 
relationship between the Enlightenment and Christianity: ‘the Enlightenment is of Christian 
origin and it is no accident that it was born specifically and exclusively within the sphere of 
the Christian faith.’105   Christianity has only itself to blame.  It degenerated to becoming 
‘mere tradition’ and a ‘religion of the state’ and of domesticating ‘the voice of reason’ which 
had always been such a positive element in Christianity. In a stunning endorsement of 
modernity, he goes even further; the Enlightenment should be praised for re-introducing 
reason and ‘giving back to reason its own voice.’106 
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CONCLUSION 
If it degenerates into a chauvinistic championing of a particular tradition, i.e., an exclusivism, 
be it secular or religious, then the discipline of genealogy is fruitless and damaging. If it 
consists of a patient excavation of the true sources of modernity’s most precious values, then 
genealogy can prise open the intransigent certainties of modernity, be they secular or 
religious, and open the door to a new inclusivism, based on the full breadth of reason. As 
Ratzinger insists, ‘It is necessary that both sides engage in self-reflection and be willing to 
correct themselves.’107 Christianity must rediscover itself as the religion of the logos, based 
on faith ‘in the Creator Spirit’, from which proceeds everything that exists, ‘a faith that comes 
from the ‘Logos’, from creative reason, and that, because of this, is open to all that is truly 
rational.’108  Secular humanity must rediscover that ‘the world comes from reason, so that its 
criterion and goal is reason.’ Religious and secular can meet in a ‘dialogue of cultures’ to 
rediscover ‘this great logos, the breadth of reason.’109 
Traditionally, this breadth of reason, embracing the religious and the secular, and 
maintaining the great tradition of the Classical – Judaeo-Christian synthesis by playing a role 
on the genealogy of human rights, has been the tradition of natural law theory, and it is to this 
that we turn in our next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RATZINGER, RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW  
‘the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal 
Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy’.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point for Chapter Seven is the Regensburg Lecture’s claim that once religion is 
excluded from what is reasonable, the subjective ‘conscience’ becomes the sole arbiter of 
what is ethical.2 The chapter examines the Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason 
through the loss of the classical tradition of natural law. The chapter will argue that cut adrift 
from their original moorings in the tradition of natural law, human rights lack ultimate 
justification, lose their power to critique the law and lose the universality they need for the 
dialogue of cultures. Human rights can be healed by being reconnected to natural law, but 
natural law itself needs to be healed by being reconnected with its own scriptural foundations. 
In the Regensburg Lecture, Ratzinger argues that without religion, humanity tends to derive 
its rules from theories of evolution, or from psychology, or sociology.3 Positivistic reason 
prevails, and considers itself the only approach that has universal validity. Ratzinger proposes 
an alternative: 
Listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, 
and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it 
would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding.4 
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Natural law is part of that great tradition of humanity. At the heart of natural law thinking, lies 
the conviction, re-proposed at Regensburg, that there is a link between human rationality and 
the rationality of the divine creator. This chapter engages with Regensburg by examining the 
prospects for natural law theory to reconnect with human rights and with its own tradition. 
The chapter proposes natural law as a grounding for human rights and a basis for a dialogue 
with secular and religious constituencies. The chapter will follow a pattern of endorsement 
and critique of natural law, as found in Ratzinger, the Roman Catholic tradition and the 
scriptures. It will examine the role of natural law in the formation of a non-relativistic 
formulation of human rights and will conclude by applying this role to the dialogue between 
the secular and the religious. 
Natural law and the foundations of logos theology 
We have already encountered some of the elements of natural law thinking in our 
investigations into the foundations of logos theology in Part One of the thesis. Plato, we 
learned, lived by a commitment to alētheia, a commitment embodied in Socrates’ 
demythologizing questioning of the ontological, epistemological and ethical certainties of his 
day, which he exposed as myth. Socrates and Plato contrasted opinions and truth, and 
believed that we should have sufficient epistemological confidence to trust that ethical truth 
can be sought and attained. Their trust was based on the idea of participation, or methexis, the 
natural orientation of the human person towards the beautiful, the good and the true. This 
natural capacity resided in the daimonion, an indwelling spirit of truth or presence of God. 
The voice of truth could be manifested, enlivened, or incarnated through the almost sacred 
process of dialogue, which could trust in the process of rational discourse as epistemological 
pathway to the metaphysical.  
196 
 
This vision of human dignity found its fulfilment in the Prologue to John’s Gospel, 
where the logos-light which enlightens every man is fulfilled in the Logos responsible for the 
whole of creation and intimately united with man in Christ. Justin, based on the personal 
experience of his own faith journey, discovered that the epistemology of Socrates and Plato, 
relying on natural revelation or natural theology, could only get so far, and would always 
come up against the in-built limitations of the human logos. It could only be truly fulfilled 
when linked to the special logos spoken by the biblical witnesses, and the person of Jesus 
Christ as Logos made flesh. Stoic natural law, Stoic right reason or orthos logos, could only 
be fulfilled when linked to the positive natural law of the Old Testament, which in turn could 
only be fulfilled by transformation of the biblical nomos into the Logos of Christ. Building on 
the Stoics, and in harmony with St.Paul, Justin taught that by virtue of the logos spermatikos 
humankind had always enjoyed partial access to ethical truth, to God’s ‘eternal righteous 
decrees’, what we might call today the overlapping consensus on non-negotiable values across 
all cultures. Thus the Hellenized Judaeo-Christian tradition constitutes a humanism, which 
believes in a natural law written into creation and readable therein. This eternal, universalist 
natural law is understood as congruent with the Word speaking in the scriptures as well as the 
historical Word incarnate.  
This chapter will explore natural law as the underpinning of human rights and will ask 
whether natural law can be constructed purely from the logos, from universal rationality, and 
whether it can be strengthened and fulfilled by the Logos as Divine Word. The answer to this 
question will determine what kind of natural law discourse can be taken into the dialogue of 
cultures between Christianity, the secular and the religions. 
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7.1:  RATZINGER AND NATURAL LAW 
I will extract five key themes from Ratzinger’s statements on natural law, presenting them as 
five ‘promises’ and noting in each case Ratzinger’s serious reservations.  
7.1.1 The promise of an ancient tradition 
Ratzinger sees Roman Catholic moral theology prior to Vatican II as ‘constructed 
substantially on the foundation of natural law and therefore in the form of a philosophical 
reflection based on the ancient Stoic tradition that had in large measure been appropriated by 
Christianity throughout its history.’5 When St. Paul said that the Gentiles were able to ‘do 
instinctively what the law requires’ because ‘what the law requires is written on their hearts’,6 
this is an example of ‘Stoic teaching transformed by the theology of creation.’7 
He comments that ‘constitutional theory in classical antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and 
even in the conflicts of the modern period, has appealed to the natural law that can be known 
by “right reason” (ratio recta).’8 The Greeks realised that ‘there must be a law that derives 
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6 Romans 2:14 (NRSV). This famous passage is also cited in the address to the German Parliament. See Benedict 
XVI, The Listening Heart: Reflections on the Foundations of Law, Visit to the Bundestag, 22 September 2011, 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2011/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe20110922_reichstag-berlin_en.html (Accessed: 1 January 2014). 
7 Truth and Tolerance, p.239. Elsewhere Ratzinger sounds a note of caution. Paul is not giving us ‘a non-specific 
pointer to whatever contemporary reason regards as good.’ J. Ratzinger, (with Hans Schürmann and Hans Urs 
von Balthasar), trans. Graham Harrison, Principles of Christian Morality, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 
p.63. 
8 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.27. These comments are taken from Chapter 1, ‘To Change or To Preserve? – 
Political Visions and Political Praxis’, originally delivered as a lecture entitled Politische Vision und Praxis der 
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from the nature, from the very being, of man himself.’9  Then the discovery of native peoples  
inspired Francisco di Vitoria to develop the (already existing) ius gentium, ‘a law that 
transcends all legal systems, a law that is binding on men qua men,’ a law ‘which is 
antecedent to the Christian legal form and is charged with ordering the right relations among 
all peoples.’10 Then the conflicts within Christian Europe, triggered by the Reformation, 
caused Grotius to develop the idea of a natural law ‘which transcends the confessional borders 
of faith by establishing reason as the instrument whereby law can be posited in common.’11   
In the contemporary world, he claims that natural law has remained (especially in the 
Catholic Church) a key issue in dialogues with the secular society and with other communities 
of faith ‘in order to appeal to the reason we share in common and to seek the basis for 
consensus about the ethical principles of law in a secular, pluralist society.’12 
However, he has serious reservations. The habitat in which natural law flourished has 
disappeared and natural law has become extinct, along with everything that made it make 
sense.13 The Stoic view of nature was pantheistic, ‘nature, full of gods and divinities, was 
saturated with the signs of the divine will and of the path to divinization’, and this could 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Politik in Trent, September 20, 2002. It was first published in Italian in Joseph Ratzinger, Europa: I suoi 
fundamenti oggi e domani (Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 2004), pp.43 – 59. 
9 Dialectics of Secularization, p.67. 
10 Ibid., p.68. de Torre notes that ‘The first comprehensive study of human rights in the context of natural law 
was made by Francisco di Vitoria (1486-1546), who devoted no less than a decade at the University of 
Salamanca to provide the basis for the equality of rights of the natives of the newly conquered lands by Spain 
and Portugal. He based his whole study on the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas.’ Joseph M. de Torre, “Human 
Rights, Natural Law, and Thomas Aquinas”, online resource, available at 
http://www.catholicsocialscientists.org/CSSR/Archival/2001/Torre_187-206.pdf  (Accessed: 21 March 2014). 
11 Ibid., p.69. 
12 Dialectics of Secularization, p.69. 
13 In a somewhat opaque statement, Ratzinger says that ‘of the various dimensions of the concept of nature on 
which the earlier concept of the natural law was based, only one remains.’ We can presume that he means simply 
the laws of nature discoverable by science. Ratzinger refers to 3rd century C.E. Ulpian who referred to the simple 
laws which governed the natural biological world when he said ‘ius naturae est, quod natura omnia animalia 
docet.’ Ratzinger reminds us that in Ulpian’s, and in the classic medieval formulation, natural law was 
understood on the three levels of what man shared with a) everything, b) everything sentient, c) what was unique 
to himself as man: ‘the dynamism of Being as a whole; the orientation of that nature which is common to men 
and animals (Ulpian); and the specific orientation of the rational nature of man.’ See Dialectics of 
Secularization, footnote, p.70. 
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combine readily with the Christian view of creation, whereby nature ‘expresses the language 
of the Creator, who lets himself be perceived through creation.’14  This view of nature 
informed Aquinas’ theology: ‘It is not surprising that the doctrine about the dignity of the 
person, fundamental for the recognition of the inviolability of man’s rights, matured in realms 
of thought that took up the legacy of St. Thomas Aquinas, who had a very lofty concept of the 
human creature.’15 
This classical view has been destroyed by the theory of evolution: ‘nature is no longer 
the expression of a creating reason’ and so ‘no longer has any metaphysical transparency.’16 
Ratzinger says that ‘the divine light does not appear’ because ‘human reason has lost the 
capacity to see, in the world and in itself, the transparency of the divine.’ Natural law was 
designed to recognize ‘the moral principles inscribed in being’ but in a world which is the 
product of evolution, nothing is inscribed, and so ‘the possibility of recognizing the intrinsece 
bonum aut malum naturally also disappears.’17  Once the concept of nature had ‘undergone 
                                                             
14 J. Ratzinger, ‘The Renewal of Moral Theology’, in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio, Vol. I, p.189. Cf. ‘This 
word for many today is almost incomprehensible due to a concept of nature that is no longer metaphysical, but 
only empirical.’ Benedict XVI, Address to the Participants in the International Congress on Natural Law, 
Clementine Hall, 12 February 2007. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2007/february/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20070212_pul_en.html. (Accessed: 30 June 2014). 
15 General Audience, St. Peter’s Square, 16 June 2010. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20100616_en.html  
(Accessed: 1 July 2014). 
16 The conclusion that nature is non-rational is a philosophical, not a scientific stance. Ratzinger refers to Jacques 
Monod’s influential 1971 treatise, Chance and Necessity. Monod is one of the thinkers, like Sartre, against 
whom Ratzinger has been able to develop his theological thought. Ratzinger admires Monod as the philosopher 
who has most consistently and impressively expressed the philosophy of evolution. Ratzinger also refers to 
Monod in para.43 of the Regensburg Lecture, interestingly describing him as a Platonist, by which he means one 
who ‘presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality.’ In Truth and Tolerance (p.178.) 
Ratzinger references Monod as a ‘classic instance’ of ‘a comprehensive theory of evolution, intended to explain 
the whole of reality,’ which ‘has become a kind of “first philosophy”, which represents, as it were, the true 
foundation for an enlightened understanding of the world.’ 
17 The Renewal of Moral Theology, p.189-190. In Natural Law and Public Discourse: The Legacies of Joseph 
Ratzinger, (p.241), Hittinger sees the connection of natural law and being as central to Ratzinger, and traces it all 
the way back to an address given in Cambridge in 1988, where Ratzinger spoke of ‘the conviction that in man’s 
being there lies an imperative ... he comes upon it in the being of things’. Based on this lecture, Hittinger is 
convinced that Ratzinger has always seen interreligious dialogue, not the public square, as the prime location for 
the application of natural law. 
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radical change’, then natural law ‘became part of a past that is gone without recovery,’ 
rejected by modernity, ‘because it reeks of metaphysics.’18  
7.1.2. The promise of a broadening of ethical reasoning 
Natural law results from early Christianity’s positive decision in favour of philosophy: ‘it was 
highly significant that Christian theologians aligned themselves ... on the side of philosophy, 
and that they acknowledged reason and nature in their interrelation as the universally valid 
source of law.’19  In Christian ethics ‘there is a place for reason, which is capable of 
discerning the natural moral law,’ and, according to St. Thomas, ‘on their own ... all men, 
believers and non-believers, are called to recognize the exigencies of human nature expressed 
in natural law.’20  Natural law represents the use of the full breadth of reason. ‘Where 
positivist reason dominates the field to the exclusion of all else ... then the classical sources of 
knowledge for ethics and law are excluded.’21 Ratzinger calls for dialogue to broaden the 
scope of reason and ‘to grasp anew the relevance of the question of whether there might exist 
a rationality of nature and, hence a rational law for man and for his existence in the world.’22 
This will be a dialogue between ‘the followers of different religions and between believers 
and non-believers.’23 
                                                             
18 The Renewal of Moral Theology, p.189. and Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.56. 
19 Benedict XVI, Address to the German Parliament, 22nd September, 2011. 
20 Benedict XVI, General Audience, St. Peter’s Square, 16th June 2010.  
21 Address to the German Parliament, 2011. Matláry sees Ratzinger as a ‘philosopher of rationality’, rather than 
a political scientist. She suggests Weber’s critique of Zweckrationalität, or ‘functional rationality’, as an 
influence on Ratzinger’s critique of positivist reason. Janne Haaland Matláry, ‘Can Natural Law Be Restated? 
The Catholic Contribution’, in European Unity as a Challenge to Religious Communities, (Oslo: Norwegian 
Academy of Science and Letters, 2007), pp.1-13, at p.1. and p.4.  
22 J. Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, trans. Brian McNeil, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2006). 
23 Benedict XVI, The Human Person, The Heart of Peace, Message for the 40th World Day of Peace, 1 January 
2007. Available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_mes_20061208_xl-world-day-peace.html  (Accessed: 11 January 2016). 
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Natural law, however, no longer seems to work, having seemingly become too vague or 
generalized to deliver the judgements required by today’s ethical dilemmas.24 ‘Unfortunately, 
this instrument has become blunt’ and ‘I do not intend to appeal to it for support.’25 In 1984 
Ratzinger had expressed misgivings about the Roman Catholic Thomist tradition, which 
tended to overload Aristotle’s idea of natural law with ‘too much Christian content’ with the 
result that the necessary ability to compromise with secular society was lost. ‘They fought for 
too much.’26 Ratzinger believes the Thomists interpreted natural law ‘too statically and 
definitively’, forgetting that knowledge is a by-product of the alternation of theory and 
practice.27 
7.1.3 The promise of a grounding for human rights 
Rights are grounded in a human nature which is at once both rational and moral. Being 
derived from ‘the nature of man’, they have an ontological dimension: ‘inherent in being itself 
                                                             
24 In Values in a Time of Upheaval, Ratzinger combines these two misgivings; ‘this right reason seems to have 
ceased delivering answers to our questions’ because ‘natural law is considered no longer as the insight of all 
persons, but rather as a specifically Catholic doctrine.’ See Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.27. 
25 Dialectics of Secularization, p.69. Matláry (op.cit., p.8.) claims that she questioned Ratzinger face-to-face on 
this point: ‘The Pope, when he was still a Cardinal, made the point to me that natural law has to be re-made in 
modern language.’ Matláry is a convert from atheism to Catholicism and a proponent of natural law. At the time 
of writing she was a Member of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. Maria Hölscher claims that in 
unpublished remarks made at the event, Ratzinger gave the impression that his reluctance to deploy natural law 
reasoning was not based on philosophical-theoretical considerations, but was of a pastoral or church-political 
(kirchenpolitische) nature. See Maria Raphaela Hölscher, Das Naturrecht Bei Joseph Ratzinger / Papst Benedikt 
XVI: Das Bedeutung des Naturrechts in Geschichte und Gegenwart, (Heiligenkreuz im Wienerwald: Be&Be, 
2014), p.227, n837. Hölscher (p.227) quotes the opinion of Schockenhoff, who describes Ratzinger’s 
relationship with natural law as one of discontinuity, his enthusiasm as Pope representing a change of heart 
(Gesinnungswandel). Schockenhoff says that ‘For a long time Pope Benedict XVI counted as one of the astute 
theological critics of natural law. As a young theologian, he complained about its ideological susceptibility and 
its unexplained dependence on the positive law of the church.’ (My translation). Hittinger by contrast offers a 
narrative of continuity. 
26 J. Ratzinger, ‘A Christian Orientation in a Pluralistic Democracy? On the Indispensability of Christianity in 
the Modern World’, in Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Endeavours in Ecclesiology, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2008), pp. 193-208, at p.201. 
27 J. Ratzinger, ‘Eschatology and Utopia’, in Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Endeavours in Ecclesiology, 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), pp.223-238, at p.237. 
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there is an ethical and legal claim’ and this has practical implications for justice. ‘Nature bears 
spirit within it, bears ethical value and dignity.’28  
However, once again Ratzinger is uncomfortable. Natural law is not scriptural or 
Christological.  In the post-war period many Catholic scholars, including Ratzinger, 
developed reservations about a methodology which marginalized the scriptures, (‘the 
atmosphere of the Scriptures was totally lacking’), and made no reference to Christ (‘a living 
encounter with a living person’).29  
It is useful here to reflect on Ratzinger’s seminal article on the relationship between 
grace and nature, in which he uses Bonaventure, plus a subtle engagement with scripture, to 
restore a healthy Christian anthropology.30 Barth’s bracing reminder of fallen human nature is 
acknowledged as a valid counterweight to ‘the great universal Yes of the analogy of being.’ 
Ratzinger wants to recover human nature as the true universal, which ‘lies at the basis of 
every human person’ even though ‘in no man is it present without warping and falsification.’ 
Ratzinger’s conclusion to this article provides a perfect summary of his idea of natural law as 
the grounding of human rights: 
…there is in fact something like common sense, a sound human understanding in 
which the consciousness of the abiding order of creation makes itself known; man 
should allow himself to be corrected again and again by this awareness and to be 
called back to the ground of reality. 
 
 
                                                             
28 Truth and Tolerance, p.238. 
29 The Renewal of Moral Theology, p.184. 
30 J. Ratzinger, trans. Michael J. Miller and Matthew J. O’Connell, ‘Gratia Praesupponit Naturam: Grace 
Presupposes Nature’, in Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2011), pp.143-161.  
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7.1.4 The promise of a bulwark against relativism 
This point is intimately connected to human rights. Ratzinger laments the depreciation of 
natural law and metaphysics, which mean that ‘the very concept of law is losing its 
definition.’31 Ratzinger asks for public reason to address ‘the great fundamental structures of 
value’ by using a ‘reason common to all men.’ Secular modernity does have values, such as 
justice and peace, but these must be grounded in the more fundamental values of respect for 
man and his dignity. ‘The defence of man’s universal rights and the affirmation of the dignity 
of the person postulate a foundation. Is not the natural law precisely this foundation, with the 
non-negotiable values that it indicates?’32 There are non-negotiable values which are 
‘incomprehensible without the presupposition that man qua man, thanks simply to his 
membership in the species “man”, is the subject of rights and that his being bears within itself 
values and norms that must be discovered – but not invented.’ 
Human rights, based on natural law, provide the ‘non-relativistic kernel’ of 
democracy.33 The idea of human rights ‘stands against the absolutism of the state, against the 
arbitrary will of positive legislation.’34 Being ‘prior to all our institutions’, natural law 
upholds ‘the rights of the individual over against the state and against institutions’ and in the 
                                                             
31 J. Ratzinger, Crises of Law, Address delivered by Cardinal Ratzinger on the occasion of being conferred the 
degree of Doctor Honoris Causa by the LUMSA Faculty of Jurisprudence, Rome, 10 November, 1999. 
Available at: http://www.ewtn.com/library/Theology/LAWMETA.HTM  (Accessed: 2 February 2015). 
32 General Audience, St. Peter’s Square, 16 June 2010. Ratzinger here quotes John Paul II’s Evangelium Vitae 
para.71: ‘It is therefore urgently necessary, for the future of society and the development of sound democracy, to 
rediscover those essential and innate human and moral values which flow from the very truth of the human being 
and express and safeguard the dignity of the person: values which no individual, no majority and no State can 
ever create, modify or destroy, but must only acknowledge, respect and promote.’ 
33 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.55. This phrase appears in Chapter 4, ‘What is Truth? – The Significance of 
Religious and Ethical Values in a Pluralistic Society’, originally published as Die Bedeutung religiöser und 
sittlicher Werte in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft in Communio 21, no 6 (1992): 500-512; republished in 
Wahrheit, Werte, Macht: Prüfsteine der pluralistischen Gesellschaft, 3rd edn. (Freiburg im Br., 1995), 11-24. 
34 Truth and Tolerance, p.238. 
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doctrine of human rights ‘it is seen as being the nature of man ... that he has rights against 
society, rights that have to be protected from society.’35 
All human beings, believers and non-believers, are called upon to recognize natural 
law and to ‘draw inspiration from it’ in the formulation of positive laws. Failure to do this 
paves the way for ‘ethical relativism at the individual level and to totalitarianism of the State 
at the political level.’36 
However, yet again, there is a problem.  Roman Catholic theology has become the sole 
academic milieu willing to harbour the beleaguered theory. This undermines its credibility: 
‘The idea of natural law is today viewed as a specifically Catholic doctrine, not worth 
bringing into the discussion in a non-Catholic environment, so that one feels almost ashamed 
even to mention the term.’37  Natural law, we might say, is compromised by its association 
with Catholicism and thereby rejected as sectarian and toxic for the public square.38 
7.1.5   The promise of a convincing Catholic social teaching 
The truth is that Ratzinger has been wary of natural law since very early in his theological 
career, a wariness which he connects to reservations about the effectiveness of the whole 
tradition of Catholic social thought. The issues were set out with great clarity in 1964 in an 
article exploring the relationship between natural law, the Gospel and what Ratzinger called 
‘ideology’, a term which can be translated as ‘the history of ideas’, or as ‘socio-historical 
                                                             
35 Truth and Tolerance, p.239. 
36 General Audience, St. Peter’s Square, 16 June 2010. 
37 Address to the German Parliament, 2011. 
38 The comment made by the German Bishops in preparation for the General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops 
to be held in Rome in Autumn 2014 is relevant here. In response to a world-wide canvassing of the views of 
practising Catholics, which had sought their views on natural law, the German Bishops found that ‘very few 
people are familiar the term “natural law”. It has virtually no role to play at institutional and educational level or 
in everyday culture.’ See Hittinger, Natural Law and Public Discourse: The Legacies of Joseph Ratzinger, 
p.259, n.58. 
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developments’.39 In this article, Ratzinger questions the sources, the authority and the 
legitimacy of the whole edifice of Catholic social thought, and thereby in my view calls into 
question Catholic teaching on the dignity of the human person and human rights. 
He identifies three sources (Quellen) for Catholic social teaching and, by implication, 
for human rights: natural law, the scriptures and the history of ideas.40 We have already 
encountered these three sources through an examination of the genealogy of human rights in 
Chapter 6. The purpose of Chapter 7 is to explore natural law as a source for human rights, 
especially within Catholic social teaching, a story which Ratzinger says appears simple at first 
glance, but has a long history and development. He makes clear from the start that this is no 
mere academic exercise, but an issue of huge importance in the light of the crisis of positive 
law, with its ever-present tendency, amply evidenced in the twentieth century, to slip into its 
opposite. For Ratzinger, unsurprisingly, this is a Socratic question, a Platonic search for 
something permanent behind the world of appearances. In the Middle Ages, as seen in the 
Decree of Gratian, the Greek concept of natural law, the physei dikaion, was mixed with the 
Gospel and found expression in the Golden Rule.41 This settlement worked well enough when 
the res publica was Christian. However, Christian positive law came under strain when it 
encountered the non-Christian world in the form of Islam and then of the native peoples of the 
Americas. It was only then that the concept of pure nature or natural law came to dominate 
Catholic social teaching and assumed a normative validity. The result of this over-emphasis 
on natural law was an eclipse of the lex evangelii, and a consequent opening up of the Church 
                                                             
39 Ratzinger, J. ‘Naturrecht, Evangelium und Ideologie in der katholischen Soziallehre: Katholische Erwägungen 
zum Thema’, in Ratzinger, J., Gesammelte Schriften Band 4: Einführung in der Christentum: Berkenntnis, 
Taufe, Nachfolge, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2014), pp.769-776. Originally published in Christliche Glaube 
und Ideologie, (Mainz: Bismarck / Dirks, 1964). 
40 He also calls the three sources ‘elements’ (Elemente), ‘layers’ (Schichten) and ‘building blocks’ 
(Aufbauelemente). 
41 The Decretum Gratiani, (also known as the Concordantia Discordantium Canonum), is a collection of canon 
law completed around 1140 by Gratian, a Benedictine monk who taught in Bologna. 
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to modernity’s secularity. Catholic social teaching found itself adopting ‘a strange kind of 
positivism’ in an attempt to demonstrate the rationality and universal acceptability of the 
teachings of the faith. The Church settled on a formula whereby ‘natural law should reinforce 
the positive law of the Church, but for its part the Church should be held by natural law.’42 In 
its attempt to open itself to the non-Christian world the Church opened for itself a sort of 
‘reverse door’, through which enlightenment thought flowed freely into theology and began to 
colour the teachings of the magisterium. It is this turn to modernity which we have already 
seen at work in the genealogy of human rights and which will be examined in the 
development of the concept of natural law. 
The Gospel no longer stood as the constitutive principle of Catholic social teaching, 
but nor should it in Ratzinger’s view, since its material principles can only really be derived 
from socio-historical realities. In fact, Ratzinger claims that Catholic social teaching as such 
does not really exist. What does exist is a process whereby socio-historical developments such 
as human rights are critiqued through the lens of the Gospel. 
A genuinely theological social teaching does not exist: only the search for a new 
‘evangelization’ of social teaching and vice versa, a new ‘realization’ of the Gospel in 
the concrete social history of mankind.43 
Herein, says Ratzinger, lies the problem. A close inspection of natural law is likely to reveal  
that either the Gospel, or socio-historical reality, has not been taken up into it with sufficient 
seriousness, resulting in what Ratzinger calls ‘a double incognito’. We sense a double 
frustration in Ratzinger. Here, in 1964, he is expressing his generation’s disillusion with a 
                                                             
42 Naturrecht, Evangelium und Ideologie, p.772. 
43 Ibid., p.774. 
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natural law expressed in abstract formulae and void of respect for historicity. At the same 
time, he will soon be expressing disquiet at the social teaching approach of Gaudium et Spes, 
which he suspects of making an accommodation to socio-historical realities while 
disrespecting the centrality of the Gospel. Natural law becomes a ‘pseudonym’ for a social 
teaching which is neither truly Greek, nor truly Christian, nor truly socio-historical, and which 
mixes together these three ingredients in an ill-considered ratio. As a result, natural law, as 
sometimes propounded by the Church, remains alien to the world of technical and industrial 
modernity to which it is designed to appeal and the Church thereby loses its capacity to 
engage civil society and critique the law. Ratzinger concludes with the recommendation that 
the attempt to re-apply natural law, as a synthesis of Greek and biblical thought, must never 
be abandoned, but must in every period be ventured anew. 
7.1.6   Summary of Ratzinger and natural law 
Ratzinger is ambivalent, or we might say balanced, in his view of natural law. He 
admires the reason that produced Greek and Christian metaphysics. Because natural law 
embodies this reason, he respects it and proposes it as the theoretical grounding of human 
rights. He believes that natural law and human rights can provide a critique of positive law 
and rescue culture from utilitarianism and relativism by reminding it of certain non-negotiable 
values. 
In Western culture, natural law has assisted humanity in the search for common ethical 
ground, but its framework was dismantled by the Enlightenment. The incommensurability 
between classical and Enlightenment frameworks of natural law reduce the efficacy of natural 
law as a discourse in today’s dialogue with the secular. Detachment from scriptural roots has 
compromised its authenticity in Christian discourse and in the dialogue with religious 
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cultures. Modernity’s last vestige of natural law is human rights. Rights can only inform a 
discourse for the dialogue of cultures if they are reinvested with the classical tradition of 
natural law, and that includes a scriptural foundation. 
As we proceed with our survey of natural law in relation to human rights, we must 
take with us Ratzinger’s 1964 imperative to bring together the philosophical and scriptural 
elements. In the two culminating chapters of this thesis, Chapters 8 and 9, we will observe 
whether natural law can be deployed in the two great cultural dialogues faced by the Church, 
the dialogue with the secular, as represented by Habermas, and the dialogue with the 
religions, as represented by Islam. 
7.2: THE CLASSICAL TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW 
7.2.1 Aquinas 
Aquinas is representative of the classical tradition because he has served as a touchstone for 
all subsequent thought on natural law.44 In this section Aquinas’ words will be presented 
within the theoretical framework of ontology, epistemology and ethics, with key teachings 
italicized.  
Aquinas starts with ontology: ‘the whole community of the universe is governed by 
Divine Reason’45 and this ‘government of things in God, the ruler of the universe, has the 
nature of a law.’46  This law is rational, eternal, but intimately related to the creation. Aquinas 
                                                             
44 Aquinas’ exposition of his natural law theory is contained in his Treatise on Law, which constitutes 
Quaestiones 90 – 108 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica. 
45 The Stoic background to Aquinas can be seen here by a comparison with Cicero: ‘That which we call Nature 
is therefore the power which permeates and preserves the whole universe, and this power is not devoid of sense 
and reason.’ From this he concludes ‘God and the world of nature must be one, and all the life of the world must 
be contained within the being of God.’ Quoted in Matthew Levering, Biblical Natural Law, p.72., taken from 
Cicero, The Nature of the Gods, trans. Horace C.P. McGregor (New York: Penguin, 1972).  
46 S.T. I-II, Question 91, Article 2. All English quotations from the Summa are taken from St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican 
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defines natural law as ‘the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.’47 This means 
that the eternal law is the ontological grounding of the natural law.  Human nature ‘has a 
share of Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end.’48 From 
this we learn that the human person is designed by God to have a natural end that is good and 
in harmony with natural inclinations towards attaining this good.49 Secondary precepts of 
natural law can be related to a threefold ontology of human nature, in its commonality with i) 
‘all substances’, ii) ‘other animals’ and iii) ‘human nature.’50  
In terms of epistemology, humans have the rational capacity to recognise natural 
inclinations as a moral law which binds because it is part of human nature. There are two 
modes of rationality, the speculative and the practical: ‘the precepts of the natural law are to 
the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Province, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Christian Classics, 1948). Hereafter quotations will be referenced simply by the 
number of the Question followed by the number of the Article.  
We note here the Stoic background of a divine reason ruling the entire universe. 
47 91.2. The Latin is ‘participatio legis aeternae in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur.’ Literal translation: 
The law is properly called participation in the eternal law in a rational creature.’ The Latin text is taken from the 
Corpus Thomisticum. Available at: www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth2090.html.  (Accessed: 9 September 2014).  
It is based on the 1892 edition of the Leonine Text in Rome.  
We note here the Platonic background. Like the Platonic methexis, participatio suggests the profound intimacy 
of the relationship between the human person and the creator, a ‘holding – with’ or ‘being alongside.’ Plato’s 
thought provides the teachings which form the theory’s foundation. The cosmos is a harmonious unity ordered 
towards the Good. When the well-lived life is oriented towards the Good it achieves its purpose which is 
eudaimonia. This Good is the true ground of our being and is intelligible by our human reason. Our souls are 
able to see ‘the eternal norms that are the true standards for the various ethical virtues.’ Martha Nussbaum, The 
Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1994), p.17. Dupré uses the Gorgias to illustrate Plato’s commitment to harmony and order. Louis Dupré, 
Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture, (Yale: Yale University Press, 
1993), p.20. Hobbs uses the same text to illustrate Plato’s passionate concern for ‘what sort of man one should 
be’ and ‘how one should live.’ Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal 
Good, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.50. Hobbs takes these phrases from Gorgias, 487e – 
488a and 500c. 
48 91.2. 
49 That nature has a teleology is a central feature of Aristotelian thought. It is a perfective norm, which contains 
within itself both the imperative for development (energeia), as well as the criteria for that development. Dupré 
sums this up as ‘an ontotheological vision of the real.’ Dupré, Passage to Modernity: p.27. 
50 94.2. In common with all substances, we have preservation of life, in common with animals, procreation and 
nurture, in common with all humans, to know the truth about God and to live in society. 
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because both are self-evident principles.’51 The primary precepts of natural law are not 
derived, deduced or inferred from facts or observations. 
‘Whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law.’52 Citing 
Psalm 4:5-6, ‘The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us,’53 Aquinas explains 
that ‘the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is 
the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light.’54 
There is a unity between the scriptures and philosophy.55 
In terms of specific ethics, there is only one primary principle of natural law: ‘good is to 
be pursued and done, and evil is to be avoided.’56  Human laws can be ‘derived from the 
general principles of the natural law by way of conclusions’ from the premises.57 Human law 
should be related to natural law: ‘every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as 
is derived from the law of nature.’58 Human law can be unjust: ‘if in any point it deflects from 
the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.’59                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Proceeding from the primary to the secondary to the particular, certitude is impossible: 
‘practical reason’ is concerned with contingent matters and that ‘the more we descend to 
                                                             
51 94.2. The important Latin phrase here is ‘per se nota,’ translated as ‘self-evident’. 
52 94.4. Aquinas cites Gratian’s statement that ‘the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel.’ 
53 NRSV: ‘Offer right sacrifices, and put your trust in the Lord. There are many who say, “O that we might see 
some good! Let the light of your face shine on us, O Lord!’ 
54 The term ‘imprint’ powerfully communicates the inseparability of the human and the divine, but also the 
distinction and non-identity. 
55 It is worth noting that of 96 articles in the Treatise on Law, 52 deal with the scriptures and only 6 with natural 
law. Questions 90-95 contain 37 references to scripture, 25 to Augustine and 24 to Aristotle. 
56 94.2: ‘bonum persequendum et faciendum at malum vitandum.’ Schall says that the principle is pre-Christian, 
from Aristotle and Cicero. James V. Schall S.J., Pope Benedict on Natural Law, online post. Available at: 
http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2007/schall_b16naturallaw_mar07.asp  (Accessed 15 January 2016). 
57 95.2. 
58 95.2. 
59 95.2 
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matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.’60 Natural law is not just 
individual or personal: ‘it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, 
made by him who has care for the community, and promulgated.’61 
Aquinas’ natural law theory models the inseparability of ontology, epistemology and 
ethics, the harmony between Christian and Greek thought, as well as the intimate relationship 
between reason and revelation, in a manner that is in accordance with the Ratzinger project. 
7.2.2   Grotius  
Most scholars concur with Ratzinger in identifying Grotius as the crucial turning-point in the 
loss or transformation of the classical tradition. Horror at religious conflict led him to 
conclude that war ‘ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of rights.’62 
Grotius’ rights are intelligible to reasoning, grounded in the social nature of the human 
person, apply to all equally, must be recognised in law and are connected to morality. Hence 
his definition of a right: ‘a moral quality of a person, making it possible (for that person) to 
have or to do something lawfully.’63 The groundwork of the revolution’s liberty, equality and 
fraternity has been laid and the ‘anthropocentric shift’ has begun.64 
Taylor believes that ‘the older conception of order, derived ultimately from Plato, 
whether in the Aristotelian renewal of Thomas, or in the world of Pseudo-Dionysos, was one 
                                                             
60 94.4.  Aquinas is here answering the question ‘Whether the natural law is the same for all men?’.  He 
illustrates his point by showing how we start with the first principle, that it is right and true for all to act 
according to reason. From this follows the secondary principle, that goods entrusted to another should be 
restored to their owner. There may be exceptions to this secondary principle, since it may happen in a particular 
case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust. He concludes that the 
greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the condition may fail.  
61 90.4.  
62 Grotius, Hugo, De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, Vol 2, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1925, Vol 1: Latin original, Vol 2: English translation), p.18. The date of Grotius’ De Iure belli ac Pacis, 1625, 
is important to realise that Grotius is writing in the middle of, and reacting to, the 30 Years’ War (1618 – 1648) 
and the wider wars of religion which tore Europe apart from the German Reformation one hundred years earlier. 
63 Grotius, H., De Iure Belli ac Pacis, p.18. 
64 See Levering, M., Biblical Natural Law: A Theocentric and Teleological Approach, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp.83-86. 
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of the forms which were seen as already at work in reality.’65 In Grotius’ version, ‘the plan is 
a norm proposed to reason and not one which is already at work in being.’ Aquinas’ self-
preservation, sociability and human rationality, are used by Grotius, but with ‘a new twist.’66 
Natural law is based no longer on the ends of human nature, but on reason working out what 
‘is appropriate for’ or ‘suits’ a being who is both rational and sociable, that is, life, liberty and 
property.67 God is there in the background, but the system works, etsi Deus non daretur.68 It 
has to, to avoid conflict. But with the self-sufficiency of human reason and will, natural law 
becomes anthropocentric and programmatic, aiming at the reconstruction of man and society. 
Taylor believes that this movement within natural law theory marks an important stage in the 
historical development of what he calls ‘exclusive humanism’.69 This is the ‘re-writing’ of 
natural law theory, but here is the paradox for Taylor: the Christian faith was attacked from 
within Christendom and ‘dethroned’, but this led to ‘a great advance in the practical 
penetration of the gospel in human life.’70  
7.2.3 Summary of natural law in the classical tradition 
In Aquinas, the human person has a metaphysical ontology. Endowed with ends, the person is 
capable of recognizing these ends by the light of both reason and revelation, and is sure of the 
pursuit of the good as the one certain natural law. Grotius abandons ontology, leaving the 
autonomous human will to apply its reasoning to whatever promotes human flourishing. In 
Ratzinger’s eyes, this is a self-limitation of ethical reason.  
                                                             
65 Taylor, A Secular Age, p.125. 
66 Taylor, A Secular Age, p.126. 
67 The Latin word used by Grotius for ‘suits’ is convenit, literally, ‘comes together with’ recalling Cicero’s 
convenienter, but also Plato’s methexis and Aquinas’ participatio. Taylor uses A.C. Campbell’s translation of De 
Iure Belli ac Pacis, (New York and London: Walter Dunne, 1901), p.21. 
68 The phrase can be located in Kelsey’s translation, p.13. 
69 Taylor, A Secular Age, p.130. 
70 Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity? Marianist Award Lecture, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p.29. 
213 
 
7.3:  NATURAL LAW IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC TRADITION 
7.3.1 The 19th Century revival of natural law  
The publication of Aeterni Patris in 1879 gave a significant boost to the Thomist tradition of 
natural law within the Roman Catholic Church.71 This version of Thomism was characterized 
by its ahistoricity and rigidity.72 Nevertheless, it produced impressive fruit in Rerum 
Novarum,73 a powerful endorsement of the core human rights of property, labour and 
family.74 The growing importance of rights in the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching found 
its culmination in Pacem in Terris, which still stands as the magisterium’s key document 
endorsing human rights. Its approach is clearly based on natural law.75  
                                                             
71 ‘Among the Scholastic Doctors, the chief and master of all towers Thomas Aquinas, who, as Cajetan observes, 
because "he most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, in a certain way seems to have inherited the 
intellect of all." The doctrines of those illustrious men, like the scattered members of a body, Thomas collected 
together and cemented, distributed in wonderful order, and so increased with important additions that he is 
rightly and deservedly esteemed the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic faith.’ Aeterni Patris, Encyclical 
of Pope Leo III on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy, 4 August, 1879, para.10. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-
patris_en.html 
(Accessed: 10 September 2014). 
72 All versions of Thomism, as of Platonism, carry polemical baggage. Kerr describes the Leonine revival as 
‘sound philosophy’, but notes MacIntyre’s objection that it misuses Aquinas as a counterblast to Descartes. See 
Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), pp.17-19. Ratzinger as 
seminarian admired Aquinas’ ‘clear-cut logic’ but famously found the Thomist diet indigestible, ‘too closed in 
on itself, too impersonal and ready-made’. J. Ratzinger, Milestones, p.44. Similarly, he told Peter Seewald 
‘Scholasticism has its greatness, but everything is very impersonal’. Salt of the Earth, p.61. Rowland reports 
Kerr’s observation that ‘almost every significant Catholic theologian after the Second World War (including 
Ratzinger) was in some sense in rebellion against this’. Tracey Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, (London, T & T Clark, 2010), p.3. Georg Ratzinger recalls that he and his brother ‘appreciated very 
much’ the popularized guide to the Summa, written by Joseph Bernhart (1881-1969). See Georg Ratzinger, My 
Brother the Pope, trans. Michael J. Miller, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2011). 
73 Rerum Novarum, Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labour, 15 May 1891. Available at:  
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-
novarum_en.html  (Accessed 10 September 2014). 
74 The historical context was the plight of the industrialized working class and the growing strength of Marxist 
ideology. 
75 ‘All created being reflects the wisdom of God,’ and ‘the world’s creator has stamped man’s inmost being with 
an order revealed to man by his conscience.’ The laws which govern human beings are not the same as those 
which govern nature. ‘The father of the universe has inscribed them in man’s nature’ and ‘these laws clearly 
indicate how a man must behave toward his fellows in society.’ Pacem in Terris, Encyclical of Pope John XXIII 
on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, 11 April 1963, paras.6- 9. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html   
(Accessed: 8 July 2014).  Hittinger, calls this ‘a most extravagant appeal to natural law’ in which ‘the Pope had 
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7.3.2 John Paul II 
The long pontificate of John Paul II brought both natural law and human rights centre stage in 
Catholic teaching. Centesimus Annus, for example, places human rights at the heart of 
theology and Christology.76 At the same time the natural law approach came to be associated 
with the magisterial condemnation of contraception,77 abortion,78 euthanasia,79 in vitro 
fertilization80 and homosexuality.81   
                                                                                                                                                                                              
taken the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights and laid it out in the language of natural law.’ This was a high 
point for the reception of the magisterial application of natural law: ‘inside and outside the church there was 
hardly a murmur of complaint.’ Hittinger, Natural Law and Public Discourse: The Legacies of Joseph Ratzinger, 
p.254. A further comment made by the German Bishops in preparation for the General Assembly of the Synod of 
Bishops to be held in Rome in Autumn 2014 is relevant here: ‘there is a great deal of sympathy for the general 
validity of human rights, but this normally takes place without consideration for their theoretical foundation.’ 
Natural Law and Public Discourse, p. 259, n.58. 
76 ‘Thus the Church's social teaching is itself a valid instrument of evangelization. As such, it proclaims God and 
his mystery of salvation in Christ to every human being, and for that very reason reveals man to himself. In this 
light, and only in this light, does it concern itself with everything else: the human rights of the individual, and in 
particular of the "working class", the family and education, the duties of the State, the ordering of national and 
international society, economic life, culture, war and peace, and respect for life from the moment of conception 
until death.’ Centesimus Annus, Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II, 1 May 1991, para.54. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-
splendor_en.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
77 ‘The Church, nevertheless, in urging men to the observance of the precepts of the natural law, which it 
interprets by its constant doctrine, teaches that each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic 
relationship to the procreation of human life.’ Humanae Vitae, Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI, 25 July 1968, 
para.11. Available at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
78 ‘Respect for human life is not just a Christian obligation. Human reason is sufficient to impose it on the basis 
of the analysis of what a human person is and should be. Constituted by a rational nature, man is a personal 
subject capable of reflecting on himself and of determining his acts and hence his own destiny: he is free.’ 
Declaration on Procured Abortion, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 18 November 1974, 
para.8. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19741118_declaration-
abortion_en.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
79 ‘the denial of a natural instinct to live’. Declaration on Euthanasia, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, 5 May 1980, #I. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_e
n.html.  (Accessed 6 September 2014). 
80 ‘Such fertilization is neither in fact achieved nor positively willed as the expression and fruit of a specific act 
of the conjugal union. In homologous IVF and ET, therefore, even if it is considered in the context of 'de facto' 
existing sexual relations, the generation of the human person is objectively deprived of its proper perfection: 
namely, that of being the result and fruit of a conjugal act.’ Donum Vitae, Instruction on Respect for Human Life 
in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day, Congregation for the 
Doctrine of Faith, 22 February 1987, para.5. Available at: 
215 
 
The high point of John Paul II’s endorsement of natural law, with Ratzinger’s 
collaboration, must be taken as Veritatis Splendor, with its renowned insistence on 
exceptionless moral norms.82 The document is fully conscious of postmodernity’s obsession 
with historicity and culture and its horror of essentialism.83 John Paul’s response is that there 
is something in man which transcends those cultures: 
This "something" is precisely human nature: this nature is itself the measure of culture 
and the condition ensuring that man does not become the prisoner of any of his 
cultures, but asserts his personal dignity by living in accordance with the profound 
truth of his being.84 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-
human-life_en.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
81 ‘For according to the objective moral order, homosexual relations are acts which lack an essential and 
indispensable finality... homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and can in no case be approved of.’ Persona 
Humana, Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19751229_persona-
humana_en.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
This document was referenced by Ratzinger in his Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral 
Care of Homosexual Persons, 1 October 1986, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, #3: ‘These were 
described as deprived of their essential and indispensable finality, as being "intrinsically disordered", and able in 
no case to be approved of.’ Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19861001_homosexual-
persons_en.html 
(Accessed: 6 September 2014). 
82 ‘The negative precepts of the natural law are universally valid. They oblige each and every individual, always 
and in every circumstance. It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a given action semper et pro semper, 
without exception, because the choice of this kind of behaviour is in no case compatible with the goodness of the 
will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbour. It is 
prohibited — to everyone and in every case — to violate these precepts.’ Veritatis Splendor, Encyclical Letter of 
Pope John Paul II, 6 August 1993, para.52. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-
splendor_en.html (Accessed 6 September 2014). Hittinger, Natural Law and Public Discourse: The Legacies of 
Joseph Ratzinger p.256, says that Veritatis Splendor took six years to write. 
83 Veritatis Splendor, para.53. 
84 Ibid., para.53. 
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7.3.3 The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church further develops this Christological and Trinitarian 
shift.85 Natural law is the work of divine Wisdom, which finds its fullness in Christ who is the 
way of perfection and the end of the law.86 Aquinas’ concept of participation is invoked; man 
participates in the wisdom and goodness of the Creator.  
As regards exceptionless moral norms, in faithfulness to Aquinas, a balance is struck 
between the ‘immutable and permanent’ natural law as ‘the first and essential precepts’ which 
govern moral life, and its application, which ‘varies greatly’ throughout the variations of 
history.87 Natural law may often be rejected, but it cannot be destroyed or removed from the 
heart of man. ‘It always rises again in the life of individuals and societies.’88 It is intimately 
related to the revealed Old Law, which is a ‘preparation for the Gospel,’ specifically the 
Decalogue, and the New Law, especially the Sermon on the Mount, which presents ‘a law of 
love, a law of grace, a law of freedom.’89 
                                                             
85 Catechism of the Catholic Church, (London, Geoffrey Chapman, 1994). The compilation of the Catechism 
was conducted by Ratzinger at the instruction of John Paul II. It can justifiably be regarded as the crowning 
achievement of his time in the role of Prefect of the Congregation for the Faith. In conversation with Peter 
Seewald, Ratzinger expressed satisfaction with the end-product, and explained that ‘It took almost exactly five 
years. The 1985 Synod had expressed the desire for the Catechism. The Pope then established the commission in 
1986. We were able to start work around the fall of 1986. Then, after six years, we were able to present the 
Catechism.’ Salt of the Earth, p.92. 
86 Catechism of the Catholic Church, paras.1950 and 1953. 
87 Ibid., paras.1955 and 1957. 
88 This view finds its echo in secular thought: ‘natural law thinking can never become extinct.’ Herman Belz, 
‘Americanization of Natural Law: A Historical Perspective’, in The Good Society, Volume 12, No.3, 2003, pp.7-
13, at p.9. Belz (p.12) also quotes secular political scientist Craig L. Carr: ‘Natural theorizing, it seems, will not 
die, even in this so-called postmodern era – this is reason to think there is something true about natural law 
doctrine.’ Rommen says ‘There is manifestly something invincible and eternal about that body of spiritual and 
moral ideas which for thousands of years has been called natural law.’ Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law: 
A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), p.119, originally 
published as Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts, Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1936). Hittinger quotes Roman 
Catholic historian Etienne Gilson, ‘The natural law always buries its undertakers.’ Russell Hittinger, The First 
Grace, p 237. 
89 Catechism of the Catholic Church, paras.1964 and 1985. 
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The Catechism demands that natural law be the foundation ‘for building the human 
community’ and to provide ‘the necessary basis for the civil law with which it is connected.’90 
There is a refreshing, we might say Barthian, reticence with regard to what human reason can 
discern, and a balance between faith and reason, or reason and revelation: ‘sinful man needs 
grace and revelation so moral and religious truths may be known.’91   
Most importantly, the Catechism identifies natural law with human rights: ‘It 
expresses the dignity of the human person and forms the basis of his fundamental rights and 
duties.’92 
7.3.4   Summary of natural law in the Roman Catholic tradition 
The Roman Catholic tradition of natural law supports modernity’s moral order of human 
rights, but draws conclusions in sexual and bioethical matters which are abhorrent to that 
same moral order. This raises questions about the efficacy of Catholic natural law discourse, 
not only ad extra, with the secular and the religious, but even ad intra, with its own faithful.93 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
90 Catechism of the Catholic Church, para.1959. 
91 Ibid., para.1960. 
92 Ibid., para.1978. 
93 Gerard Hughes, in his commentary on this section of the Catechism, says ‘the faithful have largely accepted 
the contemporary social teaching of the Church with gratitude, whereas they may have many more reservations 
in other areas.’ pp.353-4. Gerard J. Hughes S.J., ‘Our Human Vocation’, in Commentary on the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church, ed. Michael Walsh (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), pp.336-356. 
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7.4   NATURAL LAW IN POSTMODERN THEOLOGY 
7.4.1   Scriptural revivals 
A biblical, theological and Christological approach to natural law can be found in the work of 
Matthew Levering. He claims to be following Ratzinger’s search for ‘knowledge for which 
faith provides evidence, knowledge that is later recognized as rational and pertaining to 
reason as such.’94 Human nature is imbued with an ‘ecstatic theological grammar toward the 
good, a natural love, a natural ordering, taken up and elevated into supernatural clarity in the 
call of God in Christ.’95 Ecstasis refers to our capacity to come out of ourselves in self-giving 
love.96 Human rights are self-referential, so that the human person is subject to a law he has 
created and can therefore endlessly change.97 In his detailed study of Grotius and successors, 
Levering finds human thought trapped within itself. Descartes’ mind, Hobbes’ self-
preservation, Hume’s passions, Rousseau’s liberty or Kant’s practical reason all lose sight of 
the creature’s capacity for a teleological relationship of ‘fruitful receptivity’  to the creator.  
Levering proposes ‘an understanding of the human being as God’s creature who is ecstatically 
ordered to the particular flourishing or perfection that is personal communion with God.’98 
                                                             
94 Levering is quoting from Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, Without Roots: The West, Relativism, 
Christianity, Islam, trans. Michael F. Moore, (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p.130. 
95 Levering, Biblical Natural Law, p.10. 
96 Ecstasy is also a Ratzingerian concept, expressed as ‘being related beyond oneself’, learned from du Lubac’s 
idea of a ‘transition from a natural to a supernatural love.’ See J. Ratzinger, ‘Gratia Praesupponit Naturam’ in 
Dogma and Preaching, p.160. 
97 An inspiration for Levering’s concept of ecstasis is Aquinas’ participatio, updated by Martin Buber’s 
emphasis on the I-Thou call of God and expressed in Ratzinger hero Hans Urs von Balthasar’s ‘self-
expropriation in favour of the divine good and the good of one’s fellow man.’ Levering cites Martin Buber, 
‘What Are We to Do About the Ten Commandments?’, in Martin Buber, On the Bible: Eighteen Studies, ed. 
Nahum N. Glatxer (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 118 – 121 and Hans Urs von Balthasar, ‘Nine 
Propositions on Christian Ethics’, in Heinz Schürrmann, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
Principles of Christian Morality, p.92.  
98 Levering, M., Biblical Natural Law, p.138. 
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Levering admires the work done by Barton and Novak to demonstrate that natural law 
is an integral part of biblical teaching.99 This teaching produces four principles: natural law is 
teleological, theocentric, related to divine command, related to grace. In other words, there is 
a balance and a harmony between extrinsic and intrinsic formulations of natural law. These 
insights provide Levering with a project: ‘Christian moral theology requires a philosophically 
sophisticated natural law doctrine in order to do justice to the teachings of divine 
revelation.’100 Honouring his commitment to scripture, Levering concludes by recommending 
the Prologue to John’s Gospel and the Wisdom Literature as fertile sources for further 
reflection on natural law.101 
Reed issues a similar challenge, to ‘think ethically about ... human rights on Christian 
theological grounds, for the sake of God’s kingdom.’102 She takes two contrary statements as 
her starting points. In support of human rights, she accepts that ‘the recognition and 
development of human rights law is...the best guarantee of promoting a just and tolerant 
society in our pluralist democracy’. Against human rights she quotes Vigen Guroian’s 
warning that ‘in deism, God is removed from his creation, and the incarnation is denied ... In 
the concept of the rights of man, humanity gains an autonomy that a consistently incarnational 
faith will not permit.’103 Taking the first statement to heart, the Christian runs the risk of 
                                                             
99 John Barton, Ethics and the Old Testament, (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998.) and David 
Novak, David, The Election of Israel: The Idea of the Chosen People, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995). 
100 Levering, Biblical Natural Law, p.67. Levering believes scholars like Servais Pinckaers have already 
embarked on this task. Pinckaers has identified the philosophical damage inflicted by nominalism upon the 
relationship between individual freedom, happiness and flourishing on the one hand and God’s will, law, nature 
and society on the other. See Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 3rd edn., translated by Mary 
Thomas Noble, OP (1985), (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). 
101 Here Levering draws in particular on Ben Witherington III, John’s Wisdom: A Commentary on the Fourth 
Gospel, (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995). See Levering, Biblical Natural Law, pp.230-231. 
102 Esther D. Reed, The Ethics of Human Rights: Contested Doctrinal and Moral Issues, (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2007), p.3. 
103 Reed (p.1) cites Vigen Guroian, ‘Human Rights and Modern Western Faith: An Orthodox Christian 
Assessment,’ in Journal of Religious Ethics 26, no 2 (1998), reprinted in and cited from Elizabeth M. Bucar and 
Barbra Barnett, eds., Does Human Rights Need God? (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2005), p.44. 
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accommodation to modernity, taking the second point, the temptation to disengagement. Reed 
welcomes the scriptural turn in the Roman Catholic tradition.104 She notes that Kerr reads the 
Summa as ‘christologically informed throughout’, especially in the Tertia Pars, where we are 
assured that ‘in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power whereby it acts.’105 
Cronin is used for his exegesis of natural law as a covenantal relationship between God and 
humanity.106 Hollenbach is praised for his extensive work on the tradition of Catholic Social 
Teaching on the common good, which Reed sees as offering a solution to modernity’s oft-
criticised over-emphasis on subjective rights.107 The Roman Catholic tradition is admired for 
its loyalty to ‘a cosmic, metaphysical, and ontological unity of divine purpose.’108 
However, Reed is conscious of Barth, warning Christians that ‘if we only lend our 
little finger to natural theology, there necessarily follows the denial of the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ.’109 For Barth, ‘the command of God...is the starting point of every ethical 
question and answer.’110 Reed concludes that if natural law is ‘independent of God and His 
will, it is mere idolatry.’ A ‘Christologically revised natural law’ will propose ‘an ethic of 
divine command’ and ‘a firmly Christocentric theology of the “natural”’.111 A way may be 
opened through Bonhoeffer: ‘Things work out quite differently when the reality of God and 
the reality of the world are recognised in Christ. In that way, the world, the natural, the 
profane, and reason are seen as included in God from the beginning.’112 In her exegesis of 
                                                             
104 She cites John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor and its usage of John 1:9 as well as Romans 2:15. 
105 S.T. IIIq 19a 1. See Kerr, After Aquinas, p.163. 
106 See Kieran Cronin, Rights and Christian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
107 See David Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition, 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1979) and The Global Face of Public Faith: Politics, Human Rights, and Christian 
Ethics, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003). 
108 Reed, E., The Ethics of Human Rights, p.8. 
109 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II.1, paras.26 and 173.  
110 Ibid., II.1, paras.36 and 519. 
111 Reed, The Ethics of Human Rights, pp.69-70. 
112 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol.6, ed. Ilse Tödt et al., trans. Reinhard Krauss et 
al. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), p.59. 
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Genesis, Reed models a way forward based not on human rights, but on ‘middle axioms’ that 
support human rights, such as life, dominion, justice. 
7.4.2   Distrust of natural law 
Hauerwas, like MacIntyre, advances the insight that if virtue is to be promoted in any 
practical sense, it can only be from within a living tradition.113 He emphasises the virtues, 
which can only be formed when Christian stories are narrated and lived out in Christian 
communities. The Enlightenment’s Lockean principle of non-interference is totally 
inadequate as a principle for true human community. Human rights merely produce an 
atomised society of conflict and a culture of blame. Natural law is a fiction since we have no 
common beliefs. 
Milbank shares with Hauerwas an acute revulsion at the violence of modernity. 
Human rights are ‘indissolubly linked with an augmentation of arbitrary will’ and ‘a logical 
slide of liberalism into a nihilism of enthroned will.’114 Milbank tells a story of radical 
discontinuity between natural law and natural rights.115 Modernity’s ‘juridical notions of 
natural human nature’ are divorced from theological ideas of ‘cosmic harmony, participation 
and divine grace.’116 He is at home with natural law, if it means that on the basis of natural 
reason ‘we can infer from natural relations between people, and between people and things, 
the ends of these relationships and the proper way of composing them according to a “right 
distribution”.’ For Milbank, the Catholic obsession with exceptionless moral norms has 
obscured the sense of gift that should underlie all action and relations. We need ‘the idea that 
                                                             
113 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics, (Notre Dame IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
114 Milbank, Against Human Rights, p.8. 
115 Milbank finds fault with Tierney’s genealogical argument for the compatibility and continuity between 
classical natural law and modern natural rights. 
116 Ibid., p.18. 
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human beings mediate the material and the spiritual and that they are made in the image of 
God’ and enjoy a relational status ‘within the created hierarchical ordering of reality.’117 
7.4.3   Summary of natural law in postmodern theology 
The direction of travel of postmodern theology seems to be towards a restoration of 
metaphysics, ontology and teleology, a return to scriptural sources and a disillusion with 
secular ethics. This can go in two directions: support of human rights (Levering, Reed) or 
rejection (Hauerwas, Milbank). 
7.5 NATURAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
7.5.1 The post-war revival of natural law 
Natural law was an important part of the intellectual hinterland that resulted in the 1948 
Declaration, and Maritain was at the heart of that enterprise. He insisted that the ‘true’ 
philosophy of human rights is based upon the ‘true’ idea of natural law, ‘as looked upon in an 
ontological perspective and as conveying, through the essential structures and requirements of 
created nature, the wisdom of the Author of Being.’118 Maritain sees natural law as ‘a heritage 
of Greek and Christian thought.’ Aquinas ‘alone grasped the matter in a wholly consistent 
doctrine.’119 Aquinas’ lack of clarity resulted in subsequent distortion by the likes of 
Grotius.120  The Enlightenment replaced the ontological element, ‘the normality of 
                                                             
117 Milbank, Against Human Rights, p.18. 
118 Maritain, J., Man and the State, (Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), p.84. Maritain’s 
philosophy of natural law and human rights is further developed in Christianity and Democracy and The Rights 
of Man and Natural Law, trans. Doris C. Anson, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986, 1943). While Maritain 
provides his own philosophical underpinning of human rights, he famously allows every human rights 
stakeholder to provide their own: ‘we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why.’ See Mary 
Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (New 
York: Random House, 2001), p.77. 
119 Maritain, Man and the State, p.84. 
120 Maritain provides a simple genealogy of natural law which runs as follows: Sophocles, the Stoics, Cicero, St. 
Paul, Church Fathers, Augustine, Aquinas, di Vitoria, Suarez, Grotius. Like many authors, (Maritain uses 
George Young’s 1906 translation) he quotes from Antigone Act Two, verses 452-460:  
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functioning which is grounded in the essence of being,’ with Kant’s ‘Autonomy of the Will’ 
and Rousseau’s ‘Freedom.’ Grotius’ Nature, Reason and Natural Law became ‘abstract 
divinities sitting in a Platonic realm.’121 All three would continue to exist without a deity, who 
was a mere ‘superadded guarantor.’122 Grotius’ etsi deus was proposed as an antidote to 
conflict, but the 18th century’s trumpeting of the independence of the human subject fostered 
endless violence. This morphed inevitably into a 19th century scepticism about human rights 
and an eclipse of natural law. However, a 19th century ‘conservative historical school’ of 
natural law survived, and was championed by Roman Catholicism’s Thomist revival. The 
interwar years saw a further revival of interest in natural law.123 For Schenk, Maritain 
represents a healthy ‘theology of critical engagement’ and foreshadows ‘the revival of 
metaphysics’.124  
Since Maritain there has been a significant Catholic-led academic revival, dubbed ‘the 
new natural law’, in the form of a ‘school’ led by Finnis, Grisez, and George, as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
‘The unchangeable unwritten code of Heaven;  
This is not of today and yesterday,  
But lives forever, having origin  
Whence no man knows. 
The Sophocles passage is a privileged text of natural law history, and is cited by almost all guides to the history 
of natural law thinking, including the document of the International Theological Commission on Natural Law, In 
Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, 2009, See para.18, where the passage is used to 
illustrate the Ratzingerian theme that ‘there exists a norm of justice ... prior to positive juridical determinations’. 
121 Maritain, J., Man and the State, p.88. 
122 Ibid., p.83. This was the point Grotius made with his ‘etsi deus non daretur,’ the theme to which Ratzinger 
repeatedly returns. 
123 For example, Charles G. Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1930) and Heinrich A. Rommen, Die ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts, (Leipzig: Hegner, 1936).  
Moving to the USA to escape Nazism, Rommen became highly influential through his The Natural Law: A Study 
in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, (Liberty Fund Inc: 1998, 1936). I suggest that Rommen is the 
source of much of Ratzinger’s approach to natural law and of his interest in Grotius. Rommen’s Chapter 3, 
pp.62-66, is devoted to Grotius as ‘The Turning Point’. 
124 Richard Schenk OP, ‘Vatican II and Jacques Maritain: Resources for the Future? Approaching the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Council’, Logos, Vol.13, No.1, (Winter 2010), pp.79-106, pp.79-106, at p. 97. Ratzinger 
explicitly endorses Maritain’s project and contrasts it with the antireligious natural law formulation of Rousseau. 
See Values in a Time of Upheaval, pp.63-4. 
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reaction and critical engagement by Budzizewski, Hittinger, and MacIntyre.125 The story of 
this natural law revival, and reactions to it, illustrates the ongoing durability, but controversial 
nature, of natural law thinking. It reminds us that there are many species of Thomism and no 
definitive interpretation of Aquinas. In favour of natural law, the fact-norm problem may not 
be insurmountable. Against natural law, its exceptionless moral norms and specific moral 
prohibitions remain offensive to postmodern sensibilities.126 Nevertheless, the view persists 
that natural law provides ‘the only shared and widely intelligible vocabulary we have for 
talking about ultimate human goods and ends.’127 
7.5.2 Secular endorsement of natural law as the ground of human rights 
Cranston is an example of a secular voice, who, like Ratzinger, sees a role for natural law to 
critique positive law. ‘The idea of natural law as a universal moral law which transcends the 
law of states is one by which European thinking about politics has been permeated for more 
than two thousand years.’128 He offers a hermeneutic of continuity from pre-modern to 
modern versions and argues that the rights to life, liberty and property are better understood as 
natural laws rather than as contractual agreements. In similar vein, but thinking more of its 
                                                             
125 John Finnis is a legal scholar and philosopher who has held professorships at the Universities of Oxford and 
Notre Dame. He is author of Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) and Moral 
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and author of A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame IND., University of Notre Dame Press, 
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(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) and Lawrence Cunningham (ed.), Intractable Disputes about the Natural Law: 
Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics, (Notre Dame IND., University of Notre Dame Press, 2009). 
126 O’Donovan describes the demand for exceptionless moral norms as ‘an impossible requirement.’ Oliver 
O’Donovan, ‘John Finnis on Moral Absolutes in Biggar and Black’, in The Revival of Natural Law, pp.111-128, 
at p122. 
127 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Natural Rights and Human History’, in The National Interest, No.64, (2001), p.19. 
128 Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights, (London: The Bodley Head, 1973), p.11. 
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application in the dialogue of cultures, Bielefeldt sees natural law as ‘one of the most 
important sources of human rights in the Western tradition,’ important because ‘it has 
unconditional authority prior to legislation and yet is also independent of divine revelation or 
any tradition, be it religious or secular.129 
Ignatieff’s liberal vision of negative rights sees rights as safeguards of personal 
autonomy and purposive agency, not as ‘guarantors of social justice’.130 We have rights 
‘because we are purposive agents who should be treated as such by our fellow human 
beings.’131 He acknowledges that the Universal Declaration rests on multiple moral and 
metaphysical foundations such as dignity, equality, reason and conscience, but he also 
approves of the framers’ policy to eschew all mention of metaphysical foundations. He 
believes, nevertheless, that the Universal Declaration represents a return by the European 
tradition to its natural law heritage, but concludes that ‘there is also a good reason for a 
human rights regime to welcome a plurality of nonexclusive claims concerning the ways in 
which human rights can legitimately be grounded in religious and secular claims of various 
sorts.’132 Renteln, like Ignatieff, restricts human rights to the civil and political. If natural law 
was invoked, rights would be ‘inflated beyond recognition’ and lose credibility.133 
Although a committed secularist, Moyn speaks wistfully of the cogency of the natural 
law construct: ‘natural law, derived most often from God’s will and thought to be embedded 
in the fabric of the cosmos, was the classic Christian version of universalism...Natural law as 
something objective, which individuals must obey because God made them part of the natural 
                                                             
129 Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘ “Western versus “Islamic” Human Rights Conceptions? A Critique of Cultural 
Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights’, Political Theory, Volume 28, No.1 (February 2000), pp90-
121, at p.93. 
130 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p.x. 
131 Ibid., p.xviii. 
132 Ibid., p.5 and p.xxiii. 
133 Alison Dundes Renteln, ‘The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights,’ 
Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 7, No.4 (November 1985), pp.514-540, at p.519. 
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order he ordained.’134 He subscribes to the narrative of discontinuity: human rights in their 
18th century and subsequent natural rights incarnations had nothing to do with this natural law 
and everything to do with the political requirements of the emerging European sovereign 
state. 
Liberal orthodoxy rejects the view that rights are ‘an independently intelligible moral 
idea’. They are simply ‘a collective political enterprise.’135 Their object is ‘to protect urgent 
individual interests against predictable dangers...to which they are vulnerable under typical 
circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states.’ In this view, rights have 
no ontology, no existence in some separate normative order.  
Douzinas describes rights as ‘the dual banners of humanity and right’, ‘the noblest 
creation of our philosophy and jurisprudence’ and ‘proof of the universal aspirations of our 
modernity.’136 In common with Moyn, he laments the loss of the capacity of rights to critique 
society. They started as ‘a defence against conventional wisdom and institutional lethargy’ 
and ended up as ‘the legitimating device of some of the most sclerotic regimes and 
powers.’137 Douzinas fears that the loss of the utopian dimension will spell ‘the end of human 
rights.’ He sees human rights as ‘a final mutation in the long trajectory of natural law.’138 As 
an unashamed advocate of the ethical dimension of the law, Douzinas characterizes rights as 
‘a critique of legal humanism inspired by a love of humanity.’139 He supports the long 
tradition of ‘rational natural law’ which morphed into natural rights under the influence of 
Hobbes and Locke and which has always aimed ‘to acknowledge and protect the central and 
                                                             
134 Moyn, The Last Utopia, p.21. 
135 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
136 Douzinas, The End of Human Rights, p.1. 
137 Ibid., p.380. 
138 Ibid., p.380. 
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immutable characteristics of human nature.’140 He is fully aware of how the ideals of natural 
human rights are subverted by the power of sovereign states. But natural law and human 
rights share ‘a common tradition of resistance and dissent from exploitation and degradation’ 
and a desire for a political and ethical utopia, ‘the epiphany of which will never occur but 
whose principle can stand in judgement of the present law.’141 Human rights are supported by 
a tradition of natural law which Douzinas patiently re-narrates, with detailed exposition of its 
classical as well as its early modern versions. He concludes that ‘Natural law, the progenitor 
and companion of human rights, unlike other classical theories and practices, does not belong 
fully to any one epoch.’142  
7.5.3 The challenge to natural law from Alasdair MacIntyre 
MacIntyre contrasts the promise of natural law, a shared moral rationality, with ‘the facts of 
moral disagreement.’143 Any discussion of natural law has to take on board his teachings on 
the traditioned nature of rationality and of ethical traditions.144 Famously, for MacIntyre, 
human rights are fictions and the liberal social contract of natural rights lacks any vision of 
the good. His proposal is a revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics, acknowledged as a tradition-
centred inquiry. Relativism is the result of the Enlightenment’s unreasonable requirement of 
epistemological certainty. It saw itself as a view from nowhere, from which it could cast 
rational judgement on all. Then it learned that its own rationality was traditioned. No longer 
able to claim superiority, it found itself without criteria with which to choose between 
traditions.  
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MacIntyre’s solution is to accept that by standing confidently within a tradition we can 
make judgements between traditions.  Practising the virtue of ‘intellectual and moral 
asceticism,’145 our differing rationalities can meet in ‘shared enquiry.’146 For this process we 
need rules that look very much like Aquinas’ principles of natural law. On one level he is 
sceptical about the Thomist natural law project, because the superiority of Aquinas’ precepts 
does not emerge from rational enquiry and debate.  He also fears that over-reliance on natural 
law’s ‘self-evident’ principles results merely in ‘shrill assertion and counter-assertion of 
incompatible first principles.’147 On another level, he believes that rational debate between 
rival rationalities depends on four commitments: not to harm, to speak the truth, to keep 
promises and to maintain security. These, MacIntyre says, are commensurate with Aquinas’ 
principles of natural law, and like them, are universal, exceptionless, presupposed rather than 
derived. One of the central claims of natural law theory is thereby upheld: the possibility of 
self-evident exceptionless moral absolutes. The search is still on for a universal morality 
through a kind of worldwide consensus of all rational persons, a promise on which MacIntyre 
says the Enlightenment fails to deliver. In their enquiries into rationality, Ratzinger and 
MacIntyre share a similar critical space and are separated by respective emphases on 
Plato/reason and Aristotle/virtue. Both approaches are compatible with natural law. 
7.5.4   Summary of natural law and human rights 
Secular philosophers acknowledge natural law as the most important historical source of 
human rights. Consensus converges on a schema of three moments in the history of both 
natural law and human rights. i) the Classical phase, ii) the Enlightenment phase and iii) the 
Universal Declaration. Where controversy arises is whether this story of natural law and 
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human rights should be narrated in a hermeneutic of continuity or discontinuity.148 The 
prevailing contemporary understanding of human rights is as positive law. There is 
widespread scepticism about the value of understanding human rights today in terms of 
natural law, with or without its metaphysical foundations. At the same time, there is a 
widespread acceptance that only natural law can provide an ethical critique of positive law 
and an antidote to ethical relativism.  
7.6: NATURAL LAW AND RELATIVISM 
Ratzinger’s attack on relativism, at the Mass held for cardinals prior to the conclave which 
would see his election as Pope, caught the world’s attention.149 Apart from the Regensburg 
Lecture, this homily on the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ is the defining moment in Ratzinger’s 
teaching role. Bloor described this as ‘the best-publicized denunciation of relativism in recent 
times.’150 In fact, Ratzinger summarized relativism in three tropes: letting oneself be tossed 
about by every wind of doctrine, not recognizing anything as definitive, and making one's 
own ego and desires one’s sole aim. This is a wide-ranging critique, which I believe bundles 
together related but discrete phenomena. The issue of relativism is so central to Ratzinger’s 
teaching on the self-limitation of reason, that it is vital to try to unpick the variety of views 
expressed in the furious ensuing debate. I therefore now turn to six different rebuttals of 
Ratzinger’s anti-relativism campaign. 
                                                             
148 Kerr explains that the hermeneutic of a discontinuity between pre-modernity and modernity was made 
popular by Joseph Kleutgen, who developed the concept of a Vorzeit, in two monumental works, the three 
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7.6.1. Relativism does not exist 
Committed secularist Geertz dismisses relativism as ‘largely a fantasy.’151 Genuine nihilists 
are hard to find, since no one really adheres to a ‘radical, culture-is-all historicism.’152 It is ‘a 
drained term’, ‘yesterday’s battle-cry,’153 ‘the anti-hero with a thousand faces.’154 Catholic 
commentator Allen questions Ratzinger’s wisdom in taking on such a ‘diffuse, amorphous, 
unsystematic opponent’ as relativism.155 Ratzinger’s critics fear that relativism is ‘an 
exaggerated caricature and ‘straw man’, used to attack liberation theology, Marxism, 
relativism, pluralism, Asian religions and philosophy and ‘New Age’ approaches to life and 
religion.’156 
Stout repeats Geertz’s point: it is hard to find absolute relativists, so relativism is ‘a 
feeble foe’ which can be refuted by ‘only a little reflection.’157 Smith says relativism does not 
exist: ‘the relativism denounced is elusive, protean, and open to many interpretations.’158 
Ratzinger’s habitual ‘broad brush’ approach bundles together egoism, subjectivism, Marxism, 
liberalism, libertinism, hedonism, individualism, atheism, mysticism, agnosticism and 
syncretism. Smith dismisses relativism as ‘the chimerical beat–part straw man, part red 
herring...a fantasy heresy.’159 John Hick, in a notable rebuttal of Ratzinger, made the point 
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that Ratzinger’s address ‘mixes together several different issues under the elastic heading 
Relativism.’160 
7.6.2   Relativism does exist and we need it 
Mong points out that ‘relativism for more than two thousand years has been able to resist 
refutation and continues to attract supporters.’161 He cites as an example Baghramian’s 
defence of relativism on the grounds that ‘we do not have access to univocal answers to our 
diverse problems.’162 Relativism could be defined as ‘all assessments are assessments relative  
to some standard or other, and standards derive from cultures.’163 Stout sees relativism as 
essential to democracy, which requires us to consider opposed answers to moral questions and 
recognize that ‘we have to decide the cases that fall in the vicinity of the fuzzy border.’164 We 
must honour the complexity of ‘our epistemic circumstances’ and adhere to ‘commitments 
under conditions of uncertainty.’165 
Likewise for Smith, a healthy relativism is ‘an acute consciousness of the historical 
and cultural contingency of human perceptions, interpretations and judgements (including 
one’s own).’166 This healthy relativism will question ‘standard views of what is natural, 
necessary, or inevitable for members of the species to do, feel, or think,’ but at the same time 
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will retain some sort of universalism, ‘the pragmatic unity of mankind’ and ‘various species-
wide (“universal”) cognitive capacities.’167  
On the ethical front, healthy relativism is not ‘anything goes nihilism,’ ‘everybody has 
his own opinion’ and ‘who’s to say what’s good or bad.’ Smith wants to pass the Hitler test 
by rejecting what she calls ‘politically objectionable neutrality.’168 But she rejects natural law, 
rejecting notions of objective truth or transcendent value, or ‘reality’ if it is understood as ‘an 
autonomous, absolute, privileged realm of being.’169 
Counterintuitively, I read Ratzinger as supporting a healthy relativism. He is only 
against the attempt to turn relativism into a rule, a totalizing dogmatism.170 The ideal situation 
will never exist in human history and the perfect ordering will never be achieved. The 
liberated world of the future is a myth: ‘We can only ever construct relative social orders, 
which can only ever be relatively right and just.’171 Central to the Ratzinger project is the 
conviction that all utopias must be demythologized, leaving us to face the fact that  
It is our task always to struggle for the relatively best possible framework of human 
coexistence in our own present day and, in doing so, to preserve anything good that 
has already been achieved, to overcome anything bad that exists at the time, and to 
guard against the outbreak of destructive forces.172 (my emphasis).  
Clearly there is a problem: the catch-all charge of relativism can be deployed in a manner that 
is indiscriminate, imprecise and intellectually lazy.  
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7.6.3. Relativism does exist and it is dangerous 
As an anti-relativist, Ratzinger keeps company with a movement of anti-relativists, which 
includes philosophers, Islamic spokespersons, human rights activists and left-wing thinkers. 
Perusek agrees that the problem is ‘a generally relativistic post-modern zeitgeist’ which runs 
the risk of morphing into full-blown ‘absolute relativism’ and ‘hyper-subjectivism.’173 It is 
generally accepted that relativism arose within anthropology. Perusek believes that cultural 
relativism has reified ‘culture’, absolutizing it into an idolatry, a pre-emptive conclusion 
about the world instead of a healthy approach to the world. This is perhaps what Gimello is 
referring to when he laments ‘the world’s increasingly doctrinaire and aggressive 
relativism.’174 Here we are approaching Ratzinger’s ‘dictatorship of relativism’. 
The campaign of anti-relativism was initiated between the wars. Positivism, scientism, 
the revival of natural law and the Habermas’ Frankfurt School of Critical Theory were all 
engaged in the attempt to shore up objectivist and universalist values in a move against 
positivism and scientism. Although vehemently opposed to the Ratzinger project, Kristeva 
praises both Ratzinger (and Habermas) because ‘they understand the crisis.’175 She sees 
today’s anti-relativists as correctly continuing the struggle against the reign in the academy of 
multiculturalism, identity politics, culture wars, history wars, theory wars, constructivism, 
pragmatism, postcolonialism, feminism and poststructuralism.176 
The counter argument is that relativism exists as a natural and necessary aspect of the 
human condition.  
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7.6.4   Relativists are absolutists 
Stout notes the internal incoherence of the absolute claim that all truth is relative: ‘the claim 
that truth is relative cannot account for itself.’177 This applies not just to theory, but to 
practice: Oakes highlights ‘the relativity paradox’ that ‘everyone is an absolutist about 
something.’178 The relativizers are not without their absolutes, as can be seen in the pluralist 
command to dissolve orthodox Christology. Corkery is convinced that if Ratzinger had 
ignored relativism, ‘he would simply be allowing Christianity to be demolished at its very 
centre.’179 There are no true relativists, because ‘closet absolutism always lurks in relativistic 
rhetoric.’180 Allen comments that relativism masquerades as respect for tolerance and 
diversity, while opening the door to totalitarianism, ‘by undercutting any basis for asserting 
that there are moral limits to what secular power can do.’181 This is Ratzinger’s position. 
7.6.5   Some absolutism is needed 
Stout praises the Vatican view that ‘horrific violations of justice ... are simply impermissible, 
regardless of the situation.’182 Even Geertz rejects extreme relativism, as ‘a kind of spiritual 
entropy...in which everything is as significant, thus as insignificant, as everything else.’183 
Bloor respects the Ratzinger project: ‘the statements from the Vatican are clear. There is no 
evasion of fundamental issues. The necessary choices are confronted and the consequences 
embraced.’184 He appreciates that Ratzinger’s position is based on God as the ground of a true 
                                                             
177 Stout, A House Founded on the Sea, p.390. Another expression of the internal incoherence of relativism is 
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there are no grounds to prefer one belief over another.’ Hollenbach, The Global Face of Public Faith, p. 33. 
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ontology, epistemology and ethics: ‘God is the source of all true standards, and these are, 
accordingly, absolute and not relative.’185 He notes that belief in the Incarnation makes this 
position coherent and moves that absolutism is not susceptible to a decisive philosophical 
refutation. Like Ratzinger, Bloor sees relativism as inextricably linked with atheism and 
naturalism, but he strongly objects to caricatured portrayals of relativists as moral cynics.186  
This takes us back to Geertz, who wrote not to promote relativism, but to denounce 
anti-relativism, on the grounds that the absolutism of the absolutist relativists is less 
dangerous than the absolutism of the absolute anti-relativists! Hence he is an ‘anti anti-
relativist.’ Consequently, he is anti-Ratzinger. 
7.6.6   Anti anti-relativism 
According to Bloor, absolutists like Ratzinger are found among ‘powerful and dangerous 
enemies of rationality and moral decency.’ It is not the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ we should 
fear, but ‘the dictatorship of absolutism.’ He concludes that ‘a properly formulated relativism 
should be warmly welcomed’ and we should put our trust in historic traditions of humanity 
and decency.187 Bloor suggests that if absolutists like Ratzinger were to honestly examine 
their non-negotiables they would find they were ‘mired in relativities.’188 Secondly, 
absolutists are found on both sides of key moral debates such as torture, so that if we were all 
absolutists about our positions then society would descend into unresolvable conflict.189  
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Smith occupies similar ground when she equates the denunciation of relativism with 
the demand for dogmatism.190 Smith reads Pro Eligendo as an intra-ecclesial power play 
which ‘censures questioning’ and lacks all credibility because it ‘authorizes itself by what it 
authorizes as authoritative.’191 Ratzinger seeks to ‘maintain the traditional privileges of the 
powerful, reinforce the prejudice of the ignorant, and confine, demean, and devastate millions 
of human beings around the globe,’ and all this ‘in the name of the Son of God, love, truth, 
goodness, and friendship.’192 Smith locates ‘full-throated denunciations of relativism’ in three 
quarters. The first two, positivist-scientism and realist-rationalist epistemology, are both 
condemned by Ratzinger at Regensburg. The third is Ratzinger himself and his ‘Vatican 
infallibilities,’ incapable of historical and cultural contextualization or self-reflexivity.193  
For Kristeva, Ratzinger’s obsession with normative conscience is as ‘obsolete’ as his 
preoccupation with ‘the reason-revelation duo.’194 Kristeva shares with Ratzinger a belief that 
strictly rationalist humanism is a delusion and a dead end but is adamant that this is a problem 
that ‘no religion or established moral order or ideal of normative conscience will ever 
resolve.’195 Kristeva prefers ‘new forms of humanism’ based on the soul’s ‘pre-religious need 
to believe’. This can be forged from ‘a generosity that free intellectuals can acquire but that 
the standards of normative conscience are intended to extinguish.’196  
Geertz, contra Ratzinger, says that the norms of reason were not fixed in Greece; we 
cannot cling to ‘lost simplicities of a less strenuous past,’197 or to false universals such as ‘The 
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Human Person’ or ‘Reason’. Vattimo, on the other hand, admires Ratzinger’s desire for a 
truth ‘that can be trusted without doubts and hesitations, one that guarantees the continuity of 
our interior life, the fidelity to an ideal, the cohesion of the community in which we live.’198 
But this ‘adoration of Truth’ is just the ‘last idolatry.’199 Nor is absolutism actually possible: 
‘in the makeup of any genuine Christian, Joseph Ratzinger not excluded, a relativist 
component must necessarily abide.’200 
Ratzinger would ask who is more free, the university intellectuals who trust in their 
private judgement, or those faithful to a conscience informed by a tested tradition of inquiry. 
7.6.7   A possible synthesis 
I have dwelt on the issue of relativism because it brings into focus the relationship between 
reason, religion, rights, natural law, public reason, democracy, secularity, and the dialogue of 
cultures. Naas addresses this matrix of issues in a reflection inspired by Derrida’s Laïcité.201 
Derrida deconstructs the supposed secularism of liberal modernity by disclosing its 
‘Abrahamic filiation.’202 Derrida occupies the territory explored in Chapter Six, which 
exposed the religious genealogy of modernity and specifically the theological origins of the 
political notion of sovereignty. The Enlightenment thought it was inventing this concept and 
thereby creating modernity, whereas in fact ‘sovereignty’ has an onto-theological origin in 
what Derrida calls the ‘egological ipseity’ of the Divine.203 Likewise, Derrida deconstructs the 
ostensibly secular concept of ‘tolerance’ as ‘a good face of sovereignty’, a Christian virtue 
exercised as ‘a kind of condescending concession’ from a position of power.  
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Ratzinger is naturally opposed to Derrida: ‘all that remains is reason’s dissolution, its 
deconstruction, as, for example, Jacques Derrida has set it out.’204 Nevertheless, Derrida and 
Ratzinger share an interest in the broadening of reason. But where Ratzinger laments 
dissolution, Derrida proposes deconstruction as a project of repair and recovery. Naas says 
that  
instead of diagnosing a crisis of European reason and proposing a reform or 
rehabilitation of it, Derrida wishes to demonstrate the faith – which would not be 
Jewish or Christian or Muslim – that makes science and religion possible in the first 
place and that is at the origin of our belief in these today. 
 
In the dialogue of cultures, Naas concludes 
a deconstructive reason might be more promising than a return to Greek logos for the 
kind of interfaith dialogue the Pope himself was seeking to promote.205 
 
 Perhaps there is a task here, to re-express natural law in a mode that can speak to 
postmodernity. Ratzinger would then be right to champion a broadening of reason, but wrong 
if he dismissed modernity. Secularism is an unhealthy dogmatism, but Ratzinger’s theological 
anti-relativism may run the same risk. We know that ‘radical orthodoxy’ eschews ways of 
meeting between the religious and the secular. Perhaps there is something called ‘radical 
secularity’ in which the religious and the secular can find a way of meeting to acknowledge 
their common origin. That sounds like a genealogical project, to which Ratzinger would 
whole-heartedly subscribe, as long as alongside the endorsement of modernity/postmodernity, 
it used the full breadth of reason and encompassed, rather than ruled out of court, the human 
person’s capacity for transcendence, and the venerable tradition of natural law.  
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The capacity for the religious and the secular to find common cause in the human 
person will therefore be the subject of the two final chapters of the thesis, which will explore 
how the Regensburg dialogue of cultures plays out in reality in the dialogue with the secular 
and the dialogue with Islam. 
7.7: LOGOS THEOLOGY, NATURAL LAW AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
Conscious of his own ambivalence about both natural law and human rights, Ratzinger in 
2005 asked the International Theological Commission to seek a way forward for both. I 
conclude this chapter by using the Commission’s report as a signpost towards a logos 
theology of human rights within the tradition of natural law.206  
The word logos is used 20 times in the text, tracing the transition from the Stoic 
logos207 to the Patristic Logos.208 In this transition, the Stoic immanentist vision of a 
pantheistic cosmos is replaced by the transcendent wisdom of the Creator: ‘To conduct 
oneself in conformity with reason amounts to following the orientations that Christ, as the 
divine Logos, has set down by virtue of the logoi spermatikoi in human reason.’209 The 
concept of the logos is deployed to lament the loss of the metaphysics of being, the 
                                                             
206International Theological Commission, In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law,  
2009. Available at: 
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metaphysics of creation, and the moral significance of nature.210 But it is also used to propose 
Jesus Christ as the correct framework for an understanding of natural law: 
The very person of Christ, Logos and Wisdom incarnate, thus became the living law, 
the supreme norm for all Christian ethics. The sequela Christi, the imitatio Christi are 
the concrete ways of carrying out the law in all its dimensions.211 
In terms of the tradition and genealogy of natural law, In Search offers a definition of natural 
law in line with Aquinas, avoiding any overt connection to the scriptures or religious belief.  
This law, in substance, affirms that persons and human communities are capable, in 
the light of reason, of discerning the fundamental orientations of moral action in 
conformity with the very nature of the human subject and of expressing these 
orientations in a normative fashion in the form of precepts or commandments.212 
Two genealogical pathways are identified. A Hellenized route leads from Plato and Aristotle 
via Stoicism and Philo to Paul and the Fathers. A scriptural route leads in from the Decalogue, 
the Wisdom literature and the Sermon on the Mount. Late medieval voluntarism is identified 
as the precursor of a secularization of Aquinas, resulting in Hobbes’ auctoritas, non veritas 
facit legem, and Grotius’ etsi Deus non daretur. 
In terms of the Roman Catholic tradition, the maximalist, rationalist excesses of pre-
conciliar natural law are acknowledged; its human nature essentialism is ahistorical, its 
excessive intrinsicism a bracketing of sin and grace, its deductive a priori reasoning 
unacceptably rigid and over-ambitious in its code of rules covering every eventuality. The 
link between natural law and human rights is central to the document. 
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After the Second World War, the nations of the entire world were able to create a 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which implicitly suggests that the source of 
inalienable human rights is found in the dignity of every human person. The present 
contribution has no other aim than that of helping to reflect on this source of personal 
and collective morality.213 
Like the Universal Declaration, it addresses itself to the question concerning ‘objective moral 
values which can unite human beings and bring them peace and happiness’ and the 21st 
century’s need ‘to search for this common ethical language.’214 
  Natural law is linked to the battle against ‘relativistic individualism’, a battle which 
is traced back to Plato’s confrontation with the Sophists. Natural law is upheld as a guarantor 
of freedom of conscience, or ‘the duty of disobedience’.  
Central to the search are the two themes which form the subject of the following 
chapters. Natural law and human rights are linked as the ethical underpinning of democracy 
and the priority of natural justice over the state’s positive law is constantly emphasised: 
The norms of natural justice are thus the measures of human relationships prior to the 
will of the legislator. They are given from the moment that human beings live in 
society. They express what is naturally just, prior to any legal formulation. The norms 
of natural justice are expressed in a particular way in the subjective rights of the 
human person.215  
Natural law is also seen as an ally in the dialogue of cultures, making possible an intercultural 
and interreligious dialogue in the interests of peace. Modelling this strategy, Chapter One of 
the document open-mindedly and inclusively explores natural law thinking in the world’s 
major religions, acknowledging the particularism and voluntarism of the Islamic approach to 
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law, but suggesting that many elements of Islamic law ‘take up again or repeat the great 
elements of the moral patrimony of humanity.’216 
CONCLUSION   
The I.T.C. report on natural law is exclusive, in that its vision of human rights and natural law 
is unapologetically Christological. But the Report is also inclusive, in that it embraces the 
non-Christian sources of human rights and natural law. It invites partners to a dialogue about 
a universal ethic, a dialogue which is open to the universal capacity of human rationality to 
participate in the wisdom of the creator, a dialogue with both the secular and religious worlds. 
It is to this dialogue with the secular and religious worlds that we turn our attention in Part 
Three of the thesis. 
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CONCLUSION ON PART TWO: 
RESTORING THE LOGOS TO THE CULTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Chapter Six was a response to Ratzinger’s Regensburg suggestion that the creative 
synthesis between Greek and Christian thought, so carefully nurtured in biblical and patristic 
theology, was pulled apart by Christians themselves as early as the Middle Ages. This chapter 
raised the question of the history of human rights and the role played by Christianity in the 
development of the concept of universal subjective rights. It also involved the question of 
what attitude a Christian should take to the modern moral order of exclusive humanism within 
which the contemporary culture of human rights is promulgated. This culture is now 
predicated on a rationality based on an ontology of materialism, an epistemology of 
positivism and an ethic of utilitarianism. 
A logos theology of human rights will be built on a broader rationality which 
embraces a thick theory of human rights, grounded in what God has ordained, not on a 
restricted rationality which can only countenance a thin theory of human rights couched in 
terms of what society has legislated for itself out of prudential self-interest.  
A logos theology of human rights will have to take a position on the issue of 
theological voluntarism. If the theology of human rights is based simply on obedience to the 
Divine Will that God as Word has expressed, then all legislative power must be handed to the 
interpreters of God’s word in the scriptures. If it is based on a patient listening to what the 
logos has spoken in the past in the great philosophical and religious traditions of humanity, 
and continues to speak in the logos of the human person, and the logos of civil and political 
discourse, then the construction of a good society is a collaborative task for all. The Universal 
Declaration does not claim to be an expression of the will of God, but nor does it claim to be 
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merely the expression of the will of a particular ruler, or State, or constitution or culture. 
Instead it sees itself as something in between, something constructed, certainly, but also 
something ‘recognized’, something that is as much gift as artefact. 
The Universal Declaration is a ‘big tent’, a place of meeting for all the cultures of the 
world. This tent can simply be accepted as a structure where certain working rules abide, but 
it will be strengthened if each culture is left free to attach its own rope to support that 
structure. Its fabric is the dignity of the human person, which can be translated into many 
different languages and dialects. For a logos theology, the central pole which supports the 
whole structure is the logos, a rationality which is tall enough to reach right up and pierce the 
tent itself, because it participates in the supreme Logos, the creative Word made flesh. A 
logos theology does not seek to impose these transcendent roots of human dignity on the 
wider world. It certainly professes them to the Christian community. It further brings to the 
dialogue of cultures a genealogy of human rights which reminds humanity of how it came to 
the liberating discourse of human rights by finding, losing, and potentially finding again a 
rationality that could encompass both logos and Logos. The relationship between the concept 
of human rights and Christianity and is like that of a child that has left home for many years, 
and comes back changed, with a certain worldly wisdom to impart to its parent, but also with 
the need to be healed of its wounds by a reminder of wisdom of the home it left. 
Chapter Seven responded to Ratzinger’s adherence at Regensburg to the doctrine of an 
analogy between God and the human person, between God’s Creative Word and our created 
reason. This doctrine finds ethical expression in the theory of natural law. A logos theology is 
a theology which still believes in natural law and which holds natural law to be the true 
underlying thought structure of the framework of human rights. The concept of the logos is an 
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appropriate way of encapsulating a theology which adheres to natural law, because it is the 
central term in the Stoic philosophy which lies at the origin of natural law.  
The logos is as much a biblical as a philosophical term and so the type of natural law 
proposed by a logos theology will be as scriptural as it is philosophical. Logos theology will 
elucidate human rights and the dignity of the human person through three types of natural 
law. The classical formulation of Thomas Aquinas holds ontology, epistemology and ethics 
together in a cosmic order. The eighteenth century version of Hobbes and Rousseau strips the 
divine ontology out of the system of natural law, leaving it free to champion the freedom of 
either the individual or the state. There is finally the intermediate natural law of Locke and 
Grotius, which retains almost all the key features of the classical formulation, but emasculates 
the divine by reducing it to a merely notional deist guarantor.  Ratzingerian theology will 
insist that natural law should serve the role of a higher law with which to critique the positive 
law of the liberal democratic state and will expect human rights, as an expression of natural 
law, to fulfil this purpose.  
The contemporary modern, or postmodern, world has a choice as to how to understand 
human rights. Rights can stand simply as historical, culturally-conditioned, expedient and 
prudential constructs of legal positivism. Or they can be invested with the ethical imperatives 
of peremptory norms. Their resilience and authority can come from the fact that they have 
been agreed upon, and they can be rendered justiciable through embodiment in legal 
instruments. Alternatively, it can come from their grounding in the dignity of the human 
person. Dignity itself can be understood within a secular, immanent anthropology, based on 
the conditions of human flourishing, or dignity can be based on a religious or theological 
anthropology, grounded in the human capacity for transcendence.   
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Natural law can embrace both these translations of dignity, because natural law itself 
in history has been formulated both in purely philosophical or secular modes as well as in 
truly theological and scriptural expressions. Natural law belongs to no one, and to everyone. 
  Part Three will put this theory to the test, by exploring the capacity of logos theology 
to dialogue with the secular and religious worlds. 
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PART THREE 
THE LOGOS AT WORK IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT:    
RATZINGER, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC REASON 
CHAPTER NINE: 
RATZINGER, ISLAM AND RIGHTS 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RATZINGER, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC REASON  
 ‘For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences 
and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in 
particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of 
our listening and responding’.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point for Chapter Eight is the Regensburg Lecture’s critique of secular reason 
and rationality when it separates itself from religious faith. The chapter examines the 
Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason through the loss of the voice of religion in the 
public square. This chapter will argue that dominant theories of political philosophy demand 
that the State be secular and impose restrictions on religious voices in the public square. 
Logos theology claims that religious voices gain legitimacy by critiquing and strengthening 
the moral foundations of political processes. The public discourse of human rights becomes 
stronger when seen as a meeting place of the religious and the secular. 
In the Regensburg Lecture, Ratzinger criticizes secular modernity, when it separates 
itself from the tradition of religious faith and adopts a reason or rationality that is so narrow 
that it refuses to listen to the voice of the great religious traditions.  
This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing 
pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced 
that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it.2 
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249 
 
This chapter uses the debate between Joseph Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas to 
provide a systematic exposition and critique of the arguments used on both sides of the 
contemporary debate about public reason and the role of religion in democratic discourse. The 
chapter aims to use the implications of the Ratzinger – Habermas debate as building blocks 
for an inclusive logos theology of human rights. 
Democracy, public reason and the foundations of logos theology 
The previous chapter has suggested that natural law can only carry complete conviction when 
its Greek origin in the logos of cosmic and human rationality is integrated with the Logos of 
Christian faith, the Word responsible for the whole of creation, which has spoken through the 
scriptures and which speaks as the natural law inscribed in the human heart. We have seen 
how objective natural law was turned into subjective natural rights by a dethronement of the 
Judaeo-Christian God and an enthronement of the autonomous self. Once epistemological 
confidence was shattered, and the metaphysical declared out of bounds, the human could no 
longer gain access to the divine, nor even to its own ontology. What was left was an empirical 
inquiry into human behaviour, conducted by a restricted rationality based not on human ends 
as given, but on an instrumental inquiry into human flourishing.  The resulting vision of the 
human person as rational, autonomous, free and equal, has generally been regarded as the 
necessary foundation of the democratic state and its culture of human rights and the dignity of 
the human person. Much of contemporary society has not just lost the vision of the Judaeo-
Christian Logos, of Christ as the foundation stone upon which a good society is built. It has 
even lost the vision of the Platonic / Stoic logos which sees society and the individual as set in 
order by a rationality which precedes them as a given. What is left is logos as the dialogos of 
democratic discourse. This is not Platonic participation, but at best a consensual equilibrium, 
divorced from the laws of God or the foundation of a God-designed human nature and 
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forgetful of the Hellenized Judaeo-Christian tradition which gave it birth. This is the dilemma 
addressed in this chapter, which observes what happens when a representative of Christian 
humanism, of the theological rationality of the Logos of Christ as Word made flesh, meets a 
representative of atheistic humanism, the philosophical rationality of secular enlightened 
modernity. The chapter explores the possibility of a new logos, which both these sides can 
share as a broadened reason and an expanded humanism. It asks whether a secularized 
rationality, which has become hollowed out, attenuated, self-referential, enclosed and 
exclusive, can recover its universality and inclusivity when it responds to an invitation from 
the logos theology of Hellenized Judaeo-Christianity, to listen and respond to an ancient 
wisdom tradition, alive in the Church and operative in the light which enlightens every man. 
The Ratzinger-Habermas encounter is not a self-indulgent academic debate, but rather an 
urgent intercultural encounter, and a mutually reparative exchange concerning nothing less 
than the capacity of contemporary culture of democracy to secure its future health as socio-
political safeguard of human rights and guarantor of the dignity of the human person. 
8.1:  THE RATZINGER – HABERMAS DEBATE 
On 19 January 2004 a debate was staged at the Catholic Academy of Bavaria between Jürgen 
Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger on the subject of secularization and the relationship between 
reason and religion.3 I will consider this debate through the three areas of ontology, 
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general and of Roman Catholic doctrine in particular. Ratzinger’s contribution is re-issued as Chapter 2 of 
Values in a Time of Upheaval. Although Brian McNeil is again credited as the translator, the translation is quite 
different from the version found in Dialectics of Secularization. Rourke describes this debate as ‘one of the most 
intriguing, yet still poorly publicized, intellectual confrontations’, and describes Habermas as ‘the most highly 
respected Continental philosopher in the field of political philosophy.’ See Rourke, The Social and Political 
Thought of Benedict XVI, p.96. Rosellό describes the encounter as ‘the most unique carried out to date on the 
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epistemology and ethics, deconstructing the arguments around six core values of enlightened 
modernity and the secular liberal state: rationality, law, democracy, solidarity, secularization 
and pluralism.  
8.1.1 Rationality: the ontological foundation of democracy and human rights 
I will start with reason because, just like Regensburg, first and foremost, this is a debate about 
reason or rationality, in which the stakes are high and the issues grave.4 Habermas stands in 
the enlightenment tradition of Kant, ‘the tradition of a rational law’.5 His legitimation of 
democracy is procedural rationality, by which he means ‘an inclusive and discursive 
formation of opinion and will’ which ‘establishes an assumption that the results will be 
rationally acceptable’.6 Inspired by Kant, Habermas claims that ‘the basic principles of the 
constitution have an autonomous justification and that all the citizens can rationally accept the 
claim this justification makes.’7 
Ratzinger has appealed all his life for a return to reason ‘in the sense of 
reasonableness.’8 He appeals to ‘the reason we share in common’, which forms ‘the basis for 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
matter in hand.’ Meritxell Rosellό, Religion and Secularism: An Impossible Binomial for Interculturality, p.196, 
Available at: http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/qm-16-
originals/roselloMeritxell_review%20religion%20and%20secularism_qm16.pdf  (Accessed: 9 December 2015). 
Nemoianu disagrees with Rourke and says the dialogue ‘stirred unusually high waves in European intellectual 
life.’ Virgil Nemoianu, ‘The Church and the Secular Establishment: A Philosophical Dialogue Between Joseph 
Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas’, Logos Vol.9, Issue 2, (Spring 2006), pp. 17-43, at p.18. 
4 Rourke (p.99) concludes with this point: ‘This dialogue is a reflection of his constant thinking, which has 
always been open to the world of philosophy. Benedict knows that this debate is not really about faith vs. reason. 
Rather, it is about the ultimate status of reason and its role in preserving systems of government, freed from the 
dual pathologies of Stalinism and Pol Pot on the one hand, and Bin Laden and the Taliban on the other.’ 
5 Dialectics of Secularization, p.24. Le Monde calls Habermas ‘le meilleur représentant de la philosophie des 
Lumières’. Daniel Vernet, ‘Benoît XVI, la foi, la raison et la modernité, Le Monde, 6 January 2006. Available at: 
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2005/08/17/benoit-xvi-la-foi-la-raison-et-la-
modernite_677835_3214.html?xtmc=habermas_benoit_xvi&xtcr=10 (Accessed 21 January 2016). 
6 Dialectics of Secularization, p.26. 
7 Ibid., p.28. 
8 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI, The Conscience of Our Age, p.78. 
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a consensus about the ethical principles of law in a secular society’.9 He deplores ‘the 
pathologies of reason’ seen in the application of scientific and technological expertise to such 
products as the atomic bomb and human cloning.10 He speaks of the ‘hubris of reason’, the 
elevation of empiricism to the status of sole legitimate epistemology.11 Such reason ‘must be 
warned to keep within its proper limits.’12 Ratzinger even-handedly warns of ‘pathologies of 
religion’ and, as at Regensburg, calls for religion to subject itself to ‘the divine light of 
reason’.13  
Ratzinger claims that the secular rationality of enlightened modernity has an inherent 
philosophical problem, since ‘it comes up against its limitations when it attempts to 
demonstrate itself.’14 Ratzinger asks ‘that we free ourselves from the blindness typical of our 
age, that is, the idea that faith has nothing more to say to contemporary man because it 
contradicts his humanistic idea of reason...’. For Ratzinger, there is ‘a necessary relatedness 
between reason and faith’.15 
Habermas deplores postmodernism’s acceptance of ‘a self-destructive intellectual and 
societal rationalization.’16 He asks philosophy to engage with the cognitive challenge of 
                                                             
9 Dialectics of Secularization, p.69.  Ratzinger the theologian uses the terms ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ over 30 
times in his paper, the philosopher Habermas just 7. 
10 Ibid., p.77. 
11 Sarto comments that for Ratzinger, ‘the main, constant battlefront is his encounter with secular reason.’ See 
Pablo Blanco Sarto, ‘Logos and Dia-Logos: Faith, Reason, (and Love) According to Joseph Ratzinger’, Anglican 
Theological Review, Vol.92, Issue 3.  Available at: 
http://www.anglicantheologicalreview.org/static/pdf/articles/sarto.pdf  (Accessed: 23 September 2014). 
Nemoianu is in the same area when he says that ‘there are few places in the current world where reason finds 
more reliable support than inside the Catholic magisterium’. Nemoianu, The Church and the Secular 
Establishment, p.32. 
12 Dialectics of Secularization, p.78. 
13 Ibid., p.77. 
14 Ibid., p.76. 
15 Ibid., p.78. He aligns himself with the patristic tradition which taught that religion needed to be ‘purified and 
structured by reason’. (p.26.) 
16 Ibid., p.37.  Bernstein comments that ‘In a time when it has become so fashionable to attack, mock, ridicule 
the claim to Reason, Habermas is not afraid to appear ‘old-fashioned.’ Richard J. Bernstein, ‘An Allegory of 
Modernity / Postmodernity: Habermas and Derrida’, in Lasse Thomassen,(ed.) The Derrida-Habermas Reader, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p.79. Habermas’ critique of enlightened modernity is influenced 
by the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School and stands in the tradition of Adorno and Horkheimer, who drew attention 
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religious belief and is pleased that both philosophers and theologians have been involved in a 
‘self-reflection’ on philosophy’s ‘religious-metaphysical origins.’17 But he clings to one 
irreducible certainty, the ‘generic distinction’ and ‘grammatical borders’ between ‘the secular 
discourse that claims to be accessible to all men’ and ‘the religious discourse that is dependant 
upon the truths of revelation.’18 
Nevertheless, out of ‘the respect due to persons’ and to the integrity and authenticity 
of religious convictions, Habermas asks reason to desist from passing cognitive judgement on 
the truth claims of religious traditions.19 Going further, he calls for philosophy to ‘be willing 
to learn from religious traditions’. There is an ‘assymetry’ between the epistemological claims 
of philosophy and theology, in favour of theology.  Habermas speaks of an ‘ethical absence’ 
and wants philosophy to admit that something has been lost from a society to which ‘every 
universally obligatory concept of a good and exemplary life is foreign’.20 
Habermas shows a profound respect and admiration for the communal life of the 
religions, for their vibrant traditions of scriptural interpretation, their capacity to touch ‘lives 
that have gone astray’, to heal society’s ‘pathologies’, to give direction to peoples’ plans for 
their lives, and to heal ‘the deformation and disfigurement of the lives that people share with 
one another’.21 Habermas admires the Roman Catholic tradition’s respect for the lumen 
naturale of reason.22 He even shares an interest in Ratzinger’s Regensburg theme of the 
Hellenization of Christianity, agreeing that there was ‘mutual compenetration of Christianity 
and Greek metaphysics’. Where Ratzinger is interested in what Christianity learned from 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
to the totalitarian nature of the Enlightenment, where ‘self-preservation’ leads to ‘social coercion’. Horkheimer 
and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.9. 
17 Dialectics of Secularization, p.38. 
18 Ibid., p.42. 
19 Ibid., p.42. 
20 Ibid., p.43. 
21 Ibid., p.44. 
22 Ibid., p.25. 
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philosophy, Habermas is interested in what philosophy learned from Christianity.  He 
acknowledges the debt owed to Christianity for such ‘heavyweight’ secular concepts as 
‘autonomy’ and ‘individuality.’23 He recommends a process he calls ‘transformation’ or 
‘translation’.24 Philosophy transformed the theological concept of the imago Dei by 
translating it into ‘the identical dignity of all men that deserves unconditional respect’.25 
Religion is helping philosophy here, by providing it with the depth it cannot achieve on its 
own. But philosophy is helping religion, making it intelligible to secular culture, which has 
lost all contact with its Christian roots, and to other religious cultures unfamiliar with those 
roots. 
Conclusion on reason 
Both interlocutors agree that there is an intimate relationship between reason and faith, 
between philosophy and religion and in the potential for ongoing cross-fertilization between 
the two.26 Philosophy would recover an ethical depth and purpose that can only come from 
                                                             
23 Dialectics of Secularization, p.44. Habermas lists ‘responsibility, autonomy, and justification; or history and 
remembering, new beginning, innovation, and return; or emancipation and fulfilment; or expropriation, 
internalization, and embodiment, individuality and fellowship’. 
24 Welker points out that the German word for translation, Aufhebung, is a loaded term with a pre-history in the 
thought of Kant, Marx and Hegel. Welker ascribes to it a ‘Hegelian double meaning’ of ‘sublation’ and 
‘maintenance’, implying a kind of subversion through transposition. See Michael Welker, ‘Habermas and 
Ratzinger on the Future of Religion’, Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol.63, Issue 04, (November 2010), pp.456-
473, at p.456. Cavanaugh comments wryly that ‘Christian symbols must be run through the sausage-grinder of 
social ethics before coming out on the other end as publicly digestible policy.’ William T. Cavanaugh, 
Theopolitical Imagination: Christian Practices of Space and Time, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2003), p.5. 
25 Elsewhere, Habermas, following Kant and contra Carl Schmitt, is adamant that we must retain the concept of 
dignity as the moral core of human rights. Dignity is no mere ‘smokescreen’, but a ‘portal’ through which 
equality is cashed out in ‘legal currency’, and a line is trod between realism and ‘the utopian impulse.’ See J. 
Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’, Metaphilosophy, 
Volume 41, No. 4, (July 2010), pp.464-480, at pp.469-470 and p.478. 
26 Skidelsky says that although the Habermas / Ratzinger encounter had all the makings of ‘an epic duel’, 
between ‘two old men’, the extent of agreement between the two meant that ‘the duel never took place.’ Edward 
Skidelsky, ‘Habermas v. the Pope’, Prospect Magazine, 20 November 2005. Available at: 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/opinions/jurgen-habermas-pope-benedict-xvi-ratzinger 
(Accessed: 3 December 2015). Somewhat mischievously, Skidelsky describes Habermas as ‘the darling of the 
68ers’ and Ratzinger as ‘the apotheosis of reaction’. Hovdelein sees Ratzinger speaking ‘in irenic terms’, on an 
‘equal footing’ and in ‘mutual respect.’ Olav Hovdelein, ‘Post-Secular Consensus?’, Australian ejournal of 
Theology, Vol.18, No.2, (August 2011), available at 
http://aejt.com.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/00004/374413/AEJT10.33_Fomatted_Hovdelien_Post-
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metaphysics and a renewed sense of its ethical mission. Theology would reject extremism and 
recover the philosophical language with which to explore and express its truths. Habermas 
emerges as positive and constructive, evincing a warm sense of the plight of the real people 
and the potency of living faith. With his combined themes of transformation and 
proceduralism, he has thought through the actual mechanics of a dialogue between reason and 
faith. Ratzinger’s more negative tone results from his greater fear of the evils of technology, 
as well as his acute sense of the perils of religious fundamentalism. In Ratzinger’s scheme, 
modernity’s reason seems to face a double challenge: it needs to be reined in and limited, to 
prevent it performing the unethical, but it also requires a Regensburg-style broadening, in 
order to embrace the insights of faith, and recover the capacity for the ethical. Habermas, we 
have seen, is in sympathy with both these moves. Both men doubt the universality and 
inclusivity of secular rationality, both demand a dialogue, and blur the boundaries, between 
faith and reason. 
8.1.2   Communicative action or natural law: the epistemological foundation of law and 
democracy 
8.1.2.1 Law 
For Habermas the law is ‘a straightforward matter of de facto legislation’.27 It finds its 
theoretical underpinning and legitimation in the democratic means by which it has been 
formulated. The constitution is something the citizens give to themselves. Because it is self-
legitimated, Habermas dismisses the need for any ‘pre-political foundations of the democratic 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Secular_Consensus.pdf. (Accessed: 21 September 2014), p.108. For Nemoianu, Ratzinger displays ‘supple 
intelligence, diplomatic tact, and quiet, patient meekness.’ Nemoianu, The Church and the Secular 
Establishment, p.28. 
27 Dialectics of Secularization, p.22. 
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constitutional state.’ His stance is that ‘there is no ruling authority derived from something 
antecedent to the law’.28 
Ratzinger, however, insists on these ‘pre-political moral foundations’. Democratically 
created law is always called into question by the fact that democratic majorities can be ‘blind 
or unjust’.29 We have to face ‘the question of the ethical foundations of the law’, of ‘its own 
inherent criteria’, a question which ‘goes generally unanswered.’30 These inherent criteria, or 
‘normative elements’, represent ‘something that is of its very nature inalienably law’, are 
found in human rights, standing outside majority decision-making.31 Ratzinger does ground 
human rights in natural law, despite misgivings about its unintelligibility to the contemporary 
mind. He concedes, however, that natural law has become a blunt instrument and does not 
place it at the centre of his appeal.32 
Habermas’ defence of democracy is conducted in the shadow of the Holocaust and 
‘moral indignation at massive breaches of human rights.’33 Like Ratzinger, Habermas 
maintains that there is a continuity between human rights and the natural law tradition.34 
However, like Ratzinger, he finds a discontinuity; the Enlightenment vision of ‘a state 
authority with a neutral world view’ is a product of 17th and 18th century philosophy. 
                                                             
28 Dialectics of Secularization, p.27. Ratzinger also associates this view with H. Brunkhorst, ‘Der lange Schatten 
des Staatswillenspositivismus’, Leviathan Vol 31 (2003): pp.362-381. The title can be translated as ‘the long 
shadow cast by the positivist theory of the will of the State’. Hauke Brunkhorst (b.1945) was Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Flensburg and studied under Habermas as part of the ‘Frankfurt School’. He is a 
specialist in political theory and European constitutional affairs. 
29 Ibid., p.60. 
30 Ibid., p.59 and p.56. 
31 Ibid., p.60. 
32 ‘The natural law has remained (especially in the Catholic Church) the key issue in dialogues with the secular 
society and with other communities of faith in order to appeal to the reason we share in common and to seek the 
basis for a consensus about the ethical principles of law in a secular, pluralistic society. Unfortunately, this 
instrument has become blunt. (abgestumpft: ‘dulled’, ‘truncated’) Accordingly, I do not intend to appeal to it for 
support in this conversation.’ Dialectics of Secularization, p.69. 
33 Dialectics of Secularization, p.34. 
34 ‘Naturally, the history of Christian theology in the Middle Ages, and especially of late Spanish Scholasticism, 
forms part of the genealogy of human rights’. Dialectics of Secularization, p.24. 
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Conclusion on law  
Both interlocutors understand that the disasters of the 20th century have raised the question of 
the liberal state’s foundations. For Ratzinger, this foundation is human rights, which he 
regards as the last surviving element of natural law.35 For Habermas, the foundation is the 
constitution.36 For Ratzinger, human rights sit outside the constitution and being prior to it, 
are able to pass judgement on it. For Habermas, the constitution can legitimate and regulate 
itself through the rational democratic procedure by which it comes into being. Pursued 
logically, Habermas’ position means that the foundational laws of a society may have any 
imaginable content, as long as this is legitimized as a product of a democratic process.37 For 
Ratzinger, human rights still beg the question of their own legitimation, and so in his mind we 
must regress one more step: natural law is the theoretical legitimation of human rights and the 
distancing mechanism from which to evaluate the justice of democratically derived laws.  
Habermas excuses himself from this move to natural law, on the grounds that the liberal state 
was forged out of the philosophical reflections of the enlightenment and not from natural 
law.38 We could say that Habermas is still influenced by ‘an age of widespread suspicion and 
hostility to the very idea of universally binding moral truths.’ 39 
 
                                                             
35 Rourke (p.97) sees Ratzinger’s reliance on human rights as ‘in some ways in tension with his typical 
emphases’.  
36 Habermas retains the idea of human rights, but only as a process of socialization. They provide the conditions 
for communicative action, but they are not pre-political, as in classic Lockean liberalism. See James Gordon 
Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.111-113. 
37 This point is made by Hovdelein, Post-Secular Consensus? p.111. 
38 There are in fact three permutations of the relationship between positive law and natural law. Natural law may 
be expected to provide both the content and the legitimation of positive law (as in Aquinas), or merely the 
legitimation, or merely the content. See Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.157. Bobbio (1909-2004) puts Hobbes in the third 
category. 
39 Matthew T. Eggemeier, ‘A Post-Secular Modernity? Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Ratzinger, and Johann Baptist 
Metz on Religion, Reason, and Politics’, The Heythrop Journal, Volume III, (2012), pp.453-466, p.455-456. 
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8.1.2.2   Democracy and solidarity 
Habermas’ passionate concern for people in their real life situations, alongside his strong 
commitment to constitutional democracy, leads him to emphasise the need for some means of 
fostering social solidarity. An active, virtuous citizenry is vital to the democratic project, 
which is predicated on citizens as willing subjects of a law they have co-authored.   
Habermas is simultaneously cognizant of the deleterious effects of modernity’s ‘isolated 
monads acting on the basis of their own self-interest’ and using human rights ‘as weapons 
against each other’.40 Solidarity is crumbling in the face of the global economy and its ‘trade 
mechanisms that aim at profit and at the realization of individual preferences’.41  Habermas 
professes confidence that the liberal state can produce its own ‘motivational 
presuppositions’.42  The freedom of communication which is granted to citizens is a uniting 
bond that encourages engagement in topics that concern everyone.43 The alternative 
viewpoint, which Habermas rejects, is the one attributed to Böckenförde, which is that the 
liberal state depends for its solidarity on the ‘pre-political ethical convictions of religious or 
national communities’.44 Yet Habermas concedes that true solidarity can only arise ‘when the 
                                                             
40 Dialectics of Secularization, p.35. Nemoianu expands on this point: ‘Thus individualist and selfish 
centrifugality changes the codes of human rights into arsenals providing armament and ammunition in the 
conflicts between groups and between individuals, each seeking higher moral validation and, basically, a larger 
slice of the socioeconomic pie in general.’ Nemoianu, The Church and the Secular Establishment, p.25. 
41 Dialectics of Secularization, p.36. Elsewhere Habermas speaks of ‘the four big moral-political liabilities of our 
time.’ These are listed as i) Third World hunger and poverty, ii) torture and human rights violations in autocratic 
regimes, iii) social inequality in the First World and iv) the nuclear arms race. See J. Habermas, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990). 
42 Dialectics of Secularization, p.31. 
43 Rorty admires Habermas’ ‘philosophy of intersubjectivity’ which involves ‘treating as true whatever can be 
agreed upon in the course of free discussion.’ Richard Rorty, “Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of 
Philosophy” in Thomassen, The Derrida-Habermas Reader, p.48. 
44 Dialectics of Secularization, p.27. Michael Welker explains that Böckenförde was a constitutional judge. In 
1968 he contributed an article to a ‘Festschrift’, (i.e. a book honouring a respected academic), produced in 
honour of E. Forsthof and entitled ‘The Emergence of the State as a Process of Secularization’. Böckenförde’s 
article was entitled ‘The liberal secularized state exists based on presuppositions it cannot guarantee.’ Welker 
comments that this line could qualify for the Guinness Book of World Records as the most frequently quoted 
jurisprudential statement of the twentieth century. See Welker, Habermas and Ratzinger on the Future of 
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principles of justice have penetrated more deeply into the complex of ethical orientations in a 
given culture’.45 In other words, he knows that the kind of solidarity democracy needs cannot 
be imposed by law. He openly expresses doubt that modern society will be able to achieve 
stability ‘on the basis of the secular forces of a communicative reason’ and fears that ‘the 
sources of this solidarity may dry up altogether’.46 With equal candour, he hopes that religious 
fellowships might be given ‘the possibility of bringing their influence to bear on society as a 
whole’.47 He calls for public recognition of the religions ‘in view of the functional 
contribution they make to the reproduction of motivations and attitudes that are societally 
desirable.’48 
Habermas’ meditation on solidarity and the failures of the Western project could 
easily be read as coming from the work of Ratzinger.  However, Ratzinger relies less on 
socialization; ethics must place a brake on the untrammelled application of scientific and 
technological capabilities. He is also more concerned with global solidarity, fractured by 
fundamentalist terrorism and only capable of being healed through a Regensburg-style 
mending of the rupture between religion and reason. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Religion, p.460. The Böckenförde reference is Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Die Entstehung des Staates als 
Vorgang der Säkularisierung’, in Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, 
Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 92-114. Korf explains that the  
Böckenförde dictum enjoys ‘canonical’ status in Germany and that Böckenförde was influenced by the writings 
of Carl Schmitt, an important interwar critic of the liberal state. See Benedikt Korf, Review of The Dialectics of 
Secularization, Article first published online: 16 August 2010. Available at: 
www.researchgate.net/publication/227377324_Book_review_The_Dialectics_of_Secularization_on_Reason_and
_Religion_-_By_J._Habermas__J._Ratzinger_Ignatius_2006  (Accessed: 25 November 2015). 
45 Dialectics of Secularization, p.34. 
46 Ibid., p.38 and p.22. Cooke makes the point that for religious adherents, religion is ‘a source of energy that 
nourished and invigorates their entire lives.’ Maeve Cooke, ‘A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? 
Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the Place of Religion’, Constellations, Vol.14, No.2, (2007), pp.224-517 
at p.232. 
47 Dialectics of Secularization, p.49. 
48 Ibid., p.46. Rosellό comments that ‘religion can have the function of going to the hearts of people, speaking to 
them with its wisdom and tradition, changing the egotistical mentality characteristic of human beings without 
ignoring the secular ethics of non-believing citizens who pursue the same end.’ Rosellό, Religion and 
Secularism. p.196. 
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Conclusion on democracy and solidarity 
We may conclude that Habermas instrumentalizes religion. It is a means to the end of social 
solidarity and democratic legitimacy which is his version of inclusivity and universality.49 For 
Ratzinger, religion is prior to democracy. It enjoys an ontological status as a source of ethical 
truth and therefore of the only authentically inclusive and universal source of democratic 
solidarity.50 
8.1.3   Secularization and pluralism: the ethical foundation of the post-secular 
8.1.3.1 Secularization 
Habermas self-consciously counters the central tenet of the traditional secularization thesis, 
that religion is in decline.51 A recurrent theme of this thesis is that there is an inevitable 
historical process taking place, whereby the ignorance and superstition of religious faith is 
retreating in the face of the enlightened reasonableness of atheistic humanism. Habermas 
rejects this; he recognizes the fact of the persistence of religious belief, admitting that 
                                                             
49 Adams says that Habermas wants to ‘feed on’ religion’s normative power, while keeping his distance from its 
authoritative air. Nicholas Adams, Habermas and Theology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
p.14. 
50 Skidelsky (op.cit.) comments that despite a ‘cosy cultural convergence’, ‘significant differences remain’. 
51 Taylor would call this claim ‘secularization 2’, ‘the falling off of religious practice’, (Taylor, A Secular Age, 
p.2.), or as Smith expands: ‘secularization theory is usually a confident expectation that societies will become 
secular 2 – that is, characterized by decreasing religious belief and participation’, James K.A. Smith, How (Not) 
to be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014). David Martin began to question 
the proposal ‘that secularization is a very long term or inevitable trend’ as early as 1978. See David Martin, A 
General Theory of Secularization, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). By 1994 José Casanova was able to ask ‘who still 
believes in the myth of secularization?’ See José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.11. One of Casanova’s myths is ‘The Decline of Religion Thesis’, by 
which he means the widespread sociological assumption ‘that religion in the modern world was declining and 
would likely continue to decline’, (p.25.) At the end of the 1990s key thinker on secularization Peter Berger 
distanced himself from his earlier 1960s stance with the words ‘The assumption that we live in a secularized 
world is false’. See Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World 
Politics, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999). 
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‘religion is holding its own in an increasingly secular environment and that society must 
assume that religious fellowship will continue to exist for the foreseeable future.’52 
A second and related secularization thesis, more ideological than empirical, holds that 
the secular and the religious are conceptually incommensurable. The most they can hope for is 
a grudging tolerance. Habermas by contrast calls for something much more positive: a 
mutually enriching relationship which he calls ‘a complementary learning process’.53 
A third permutation of secularization theory is the philosophical assumption of 
cognitive or epistemological superiority on the part of secularists. In this view, the rational is 
all on the side of the enlightened secular, while inferior religion languishes in the ever-
retreating darkness of the superstitious and irrational. Habermas objects on philosophical 
grounds. Secularists must grant ‘that religious convictions have an epistemological status that 
is not purely and simply irrational’, while ‘naturalistic world views’ based on scientific reason 
‘do not in the least enjoy a prima facie advantage over competing world views or religious 
understandings.’54 
There is a fourth, essentially political, point. A common secularist stance is that the 
insights of religious adherents, especially if expressed in religious terms, must be excluded 
from the public sphere of democratic debate, where secular rationality and discourse must 
reign supreme. Habermas again demurs: ‘religious images of the world have the potential to 
                                                             
52 Dialectics of Secularization, p.46. 
53 Ibid., p.47. Flynn explains that the Habermas project is to use postmetaphysical thinking as the common 
ground on which can be built a triangulation of the three institutions of democracy, science and religion. See 
Jeffrey Flynn, Review of J. Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, trans. Ciaran 
Cronin, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), posted online 31 May 2009, Available at: 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24033-between-naturalism-and-religion-philosophical-essays. (Accessed: 30 
September 2104). 
54 Dialectics of Secularization, p.51. 
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express truth’ and this means that secularists must not ‘refuse their believing fellow citizens 
the right to make contributions in a religious language to public debates.’55 
These admonitions to the secular do not mean that the religious escape all restriction. 
Certainly, religious freedom is a bedrock of the liberal democratic settlement. However, 
believers must accept that the state is neutral, not confessional; they must submit to a 
‘universalistic legal order’ and an ‘egalitarian societal morality’, doing everything they can to 
accept these cornerstones of modernity into their own religious ethos, ‘in such a way that the 
one consistently proceeds from the other.’56 
There is little here with which Ratzinger would disagree.  Rather than engaging 
specifically with the secularization thesis, he views the secular through the lens of rationality: 
Although the secular culture is largely dominated by the strict rationality of which 
Jürgen Habermas has given us an impressive picture, a rationality that understands 
itself to be the element that binds people together, the Christian understanding of 
reality continues to be a powerful force. The closeness and the tension between these 
two poles varies: sometimes they are willing to learn from each other, but sometimes 
they reject each other to a greater or lesser degree.57 
He then uses a wide angle lens to incorporate something ‘absolutely essential’ which is 
lacking in Habermas’ exposition: ‘the intercultural dimension and its consequences.’58 The 
world has changed, such that discussions about law, democracy, rationality, secularization 
‘cannot be carried on exclusively either within the Christian realm or within the Western 
                                                             
55 Dialectics of Secularization, p.51. 
56 Ibid., p.49. 
57 Ibid., p.74. 
58 Ibid., p.73. 
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rational tradition’.59 Admittedly these two traditions still have global dominance, but 
European-style secularization may fall short of universality. 
…our secular rationality may seem very obvious to our reason, which has been formed 
in the West; but qua rationality, it comes up against its limitations when it attempts to 
demonstrate itself. The proof for it is in reality linked to specific cultural contexts, and 
it must acknowledge that it cannot as such be reproduced in the whole of mankind. 
This also means that it cannot be completely operative in the whole of mankind.60 
Ratzinger expresses a Regensburg-style concern for Islamic culture, which he sees as 
being capable of both ‘fanatical absolutism’ and ‘tolerant rationality’.61 The very existence of 
Islam and of the other great religious traditions of the world is evidence that an exclusively 
secular reason will never be the universal culture that binds the world together. 
Conclusion on secularization 
On the subject of secularization, I conclude that Habermas makes a convincing move beyond 
traditional secularization theory to a recognition of the ‘postsecular’, a move which is 
philosophical, not sociological.62 Ratzinger meanwhile, counter-intuitively, wants secular 
rationality to preserve itself. A healthy secularity preserves the secular values of democracy 
and human rights, but recognizes its own historical contingency and denies ideological 
                                                             
59 Dialectics of Secularization, p.73. 
60 Ibid., p.76. Jiménez Lobeira understands Ratzinger’s position to be that both the Christian and the 
Enlightenment cultures are universal de iure, on a theoretical level, but that they are not universal de facto, on an 
empirical level. Pablo Cristobal Jiménez Lobeira, Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional 
State: Europe and the Habermas-Ratzinger Debate, posted July 2010. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633715  (Accessed: 9 October 2014). 
61 Dialectics of Secularization, p.74. 
62 Welker is less impressed by Habermas’ move to the postsecular. He finds Habermas ‘half-hearted’ because he 
tries to cling to the Enlightenment and does not fully confront its ‘repression of religion’. Welker, Habermas and 
Ratzinger on the Future of Religion, pp.470-471. 
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secularism. Ratzinger’s move to the postsecular means other cultures renouncing violence and 
appreciating democracy and human rights.63 
8.1.3.2   Pluralism  
Both interlocutors question whether the human communities of the world can hold together, 
or whether they will disintegrate into violence and conflict. Both interlocutors, in different 
ways, seem to advocate a mutually enriching co-existence sustained by dialogue and 
reasonableness. 
Ratzinger rejects Küng’s global ethic project, on the grounds of both humility and 
realism: ‘the rational or ethical or religious formula that would embrace the whole world and 
unite all persons does not exist; or at least, it is unattainable at the present moment. This is 
why the so-called ‘world ethos remains an abstraction.’64 Ratzinger also makes the point that 
‘a renewed ethical consciousness does not come about as the product of academic debates’.65  
Habermas advocates a ‘double learning process’.66 Both thinkers are open to self-
limitation on both sides of the secular/religious divide, aimed at ‘a polyphonic relatedness’ 
and based on ‘the essential complementarity of reason and faith’.67  Habermas knows that we 
live in ‘a society with a plurality of world views’.68 However, he focuses on the situation 
                                                             
63 This point is expressed by Skidelsky (op.cit.) in these words: ‘If the modern West is to be perceived as more 
than merely “godless”, if it is to inspire not just fear, but also respect, it must recover its ethical substance. And 
this in turn demands some kind of reconciliation with its own religious inheritance.’  
64 Dialectics of Secularization, p.76. Ratzinger believes that Robert Spaemann has provided a convincing 
critique of Küng’s world ethos proposal in R. Spaemann, ‘Weltethos als Projekt’, Merkur, No 570 / 571: pp.893-
904. Robert Spaemann (b.1927) belongs to the same generation as Habermas and Ratzinger and is regarded as 
one of Germany’s foremost Catholic philosophers. He has held professorships of philosophy at Stuttgart, 
Heidelberg and Munich. Rosellό sees the Weltethos project as the solution: ‘this should become the ultimate 
cause ruling humanity regardless of ideology, religion or social and national origin.’ Rosellό, Religion and 
Secularism, p.196. Adams is inclined to disagree: Küng’s project is another Western powerplay. ‘The idea that 
(worldviews) can be unified is a mask of violent imperialism.’ Nicholas Adams, Habermas and Theology, p.13. 
65 Dialectics of Secularization, p.56. 
66 Ibid., p.23. 
67 Ibid., p.79. 
68 Ibid., p.22. 
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within Western democracies, rather than the global crisis of cultures.69 He is concerned to 
steer modern philosophy out of its enlightenment cul-de-sac, both for the sake of philosophy 
itself and its most precious product, the liberal state. In order to restore society’s lost 
solidarity, Habermas wants philosophy and religion to heal their rupture.70 Ratzinger wants 
this also, but has an eye for the broader picture, effectively issuing a Regensburg-style 
challenge to religion in general, and to Islam in particular, to reunite the rational with the 
religious. 
Conclusion on pluralism 
On the subject of pluralism, I conclude that where Habermas offers the rational proceduralism 
of deliberative democracy, Ratzinger does, in the final analysis, offer natural law: ‘that which 
holds the world together’ is found in ‘the essential values and norms that are in some way 
known or sensed by all men’.71 
Habermas wants a ‘postsecular society.’72 The false certainties of the secularization 
thesis must be set aside in order to allow ‘the constitutional state to deal carefully with all the 
cultural sources that nourish its citizens’ consciousness of norms and their solidarity.’73 
                                                             
69 Habermas fully understands contingency and plurality, but the German 20th century experience has left him 
with a horror of nihilism and relativism. Bernstein, in Thomassen, The Derrida-Habermas Reader, p.77, says 
that Habermas is greatly influenced by Horkheimer’s Marxist critique of Western rationality. Habermas accepts 
Horkheimer’s rejection of scientistic reason, but rejects Horkheimer’s pessimism about the Enlightenment 
project in general and democratic process in particular.  
70 Eggemeier (p.455) identifies four historical moves in the relationship between philosophy and religion: Kant 
opens philosophy to the content of religion, Hegel submits religion to a hostile takeover by philosophy, Leo 
Strauss and Carl Schmitt return philosophy to a pre-modern metaphysics, Nietzsche and Heidegger dissolve 
philosophy into a postmetaphysical mythos. This helps us to understand Habermas’ postsecular move as still 
Kantian: it is an opening of philosophy to the content of religion. 
71 Dialectics of Secularization, p.80. Skidelsky calls Habermas’ approach ‘democratically enlightened common 
sense’. 
72 Ibid., p.46. Habermas provides a citation for the phrase ‘postsecular’: K. Eder, ‘Europäïsche Säkularisierung – 
ein Sonderweg in die postsäkulare Geselleschaft?’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie 3 (2002): 331 -343. Eder’s 
title can be translated as ‘European Secularization – An Exception in Postsecular Society?’ Klaus Eder, (b.1946) 
belongs to the next generation after Habermas and has been greatly influenced by Habermas’ work. He is a 
sociologist who has published widely on the debate about ‘the public sphere’. 
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  Ratzinger has recourse ‘to the strength of the law’, (not ‘the law of the stronger’), but 
this strength of the law cannot come from Habermas’ merely contingent, constitutional 
factors. It can only come from ‘something that is of its very nature inalienably law’.74 But 
Ratzinger does not propose his own religion or any metaphysical basis as the legitimating 
force behind democracy and is not dogmatic in tone.75 
Summary 
This formal dialogue between a prominent atheist and a champion of religious orthodoxy 
shows that secular reason and religious faith have the potential to both endorse and critique 
each other when they engage in dialogue about the core values of enlightened modernity and 
the secular liberal state: reason, law, democracy, solidarity, secularization and pluralism.76 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
73 Dialectics of Secularization, p.46. Habermas includes within this concept the idea that religions should find 
justification for human rights from within their own systems, rather than merely conforming to ‘the normative 
principles of the secular order.’ See J. Habermas, ‘Religious Tolerance – The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights’, in 
Thomassen, The Derrida-Habermas Reader, p.202. (Originally published in Philosophy, Vol 79, Issue 01, 
January 2004, pp.5-18). 
74 Dialectics of Secularization, p.60. 
75 This point is noted by Sally Paddock, Review of The Dialectics of Secularization by Jürgen Habermas and 
Joseph Ratzinger, 11 February 2009. Available at: http://www.liberalevangelical.org/index.php/reviews/recent-
and-relevant/140-the-dialects-of-secularization-by-juergen-habermas-and-joseph-ratzinger. (Accessed 20 
November 2014). Skidelsky (op.cit.) agrees, describing Ratzinger as ‘a humane intellectual, not the dogmatist 
sometimes portrayed in the liberal press.’ Nemoianu also agrees. Far from being ‘strict and rigid’, Ratzinger is 
‘colloquial’, ‘open’, ‘experimental’, ‘playful’, a ‘discursive mode’ which Nemoianu believes Ratzinger learned 
from the German Protestant School. See Nemoianu, The Church and the Secular Establishment, pp.19-20. 
76 Skidelsky sums up the debate in these words: ‘While Habermas makes his peace with religion, Ratzinger 
bestows his blessing on the modern multicultural state.’ Welker states that Ratzinger was not over-impressed by 
the debate, and provided the press with the somewhat grudging conclusion that there had been ‘some agreement 
in operational ways.’ See Welker, Habermas and Ratzinger on the Future of Religion, p. 470. Rourke (p.99) 
concedes that ‘there is obviously still divergence’. The debate with Habermas was not Ratzinger’s only debate 
with a prominent atheist. In 2004 Marcello Pera gave a lecture at the Pontifical Lateran University (12 May) 
followed by a lecture by Ratzinger (13 May) to the Italian Senate. Revised versions of these lectures, together 
with an exchange of letters, were published as Joseph Ratzinger and Marcello Pera, Without Roots: The West, 
Relativism, Christianity, Islam, trans. Michael F. Moore, (New York: Basic Books, 2006).  
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8.2:   CRITIQUING HABERMAS  
Habermas and Ratzinger both uphold ‘thick’ theories of the democratic state, Ratzinger from 
a religious or metaphysical perspective and Habermas from a post-metaphysical, 
philosophical perspective. An alternative, potentially ‘thin’ theory of rights is preferred by 
John Rawls.  
8.2.1 Habermas and Rawls 
Habermas and Rawls are both adherents of political liberalism, but they disagree on its 
rationale.77  Both focus on how the democratic state’s legal and constitutional structures 
acquire legitimacy, (the question of justification) and how it secures the loyalty of its citizenry 
(the question of acceptance). Rawls’ answer to both questions is to be found in his concept of 
an ‘original position’. Rationally self-interested citizens override their own autonomy and act 
out of principles of fairness or justice. Rawls regards his approach as superior to that of 
Habermas, because his political liberalism is just that, political. It ‘leaves philosophy as it is’ 
and ‘leaves untouched all kinds of doctrines, religions, metaphysical and moral, with their 
long traditions of development and interpretation.’78 His core starting point of citizens as 
rational, free and equal is not a philosophical position, but simply a description of the familiar 
features of actual liberal democratic political culture. He insists that his approach is neither 
                                                             
77 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.92, No.3 (March 1995), pp. 109-131 and John Rawls, ‘Political 
Liberalism: Reply to Habermas’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.92, No.3 (March 1995), pp.132-180. Habermas 
and Rawls shared enough common ground for Habermas to describe this debate as ‘a familial dispute’ in which 
he offered ‘a constructive critique’, (Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason, p.110.) The respect in 
which Rawls held Habermas was indicated by the fact that this was ‘one of the only substantive public 
exchanges that Rawls ever engaged in.’ See Todd Hedrick, Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism and the 
Claims of Political Philosophy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p.4. Hedrick (p.2.) describes Rawls 
and Habermas as ‘two giant figures in recent political thought’. Rawls took Habermas’ criticisms seriously 
enough to offer a 48-page reply, expressing gratitude ‘for forcing me to rethink things I have said’. Rawls, Reply 
to Habermas, p.132. Habermas in conversation with Ratzinger makes explicit reference to Rawls and the ‘fact of 
pluralism.’ See Dialectics of Secularization, p.21. 
78 Rawls, Reply to Habermas, p.134. 
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Platonic nor Kantian (both ‘thick’); it is intelligible and contradiction-free. In the original 
position citizens ‘are situated in reasonable conditions and constrained by these conditions 
absolutely’. Free and equal citizens reach agreement about political principles under 
conditions that represent those citizens as both ‘reasonable and rational’.79 And the proof or 
validation of this (imaginary) process is the ‘considered judgements’ we must make in actual 
democratic discourse. Society is ‘a fair system of cooperation’, which proves its 
reasonableness by reaching ‘reflective equilibrium’.80 
Rawls’ criticism is that Habermas’ theory of communicative action is ‘a 
comprehensive doctrine’ which has implications for meaning, truth, morality, theoretical and 
practical reason. This forces Habermas to take up positions on citizens’ metaphysical and 
naturalist views, where Rawls feels he has the advantage: he never has to deny or question 
these doctrines.  
Habermas does have a riposte. In the original position citizens recognize the rights of 
liberty and equality and fairness, proceeding from their autonomy. Now if these principles or 
rights are moral norms or exceptionless obligations, then the construction is Kantian. But if 
they are really primary goods then they are not norms but values, expressing what is good for 
people. In that case they are either Aristotelian, (teleological) or perhaps utilitarian, (oriented 
towards goals of human flourishing). Either way, Rawls, despite his protestations, is offering 
a ‘thick’ or substantive theory, based on unprovable presuppositions.81 The same ambiguity, 
however, affects Habermas, as to whether his postsecular is ‘empirical’ or ‘normative’.82 
                                                             
79 Rawls, Reply to Habermas, p.139. 
80 Dialectics of Secularization, p.141. 
81 Habermas later provided a detailed discussion of Rawls’ theory of justice and came to the conclusion that 
Rawls himself is unclear as to whether he is offering a historical-sociological description of what in fact works 
or has worked, or a theoretical prescription of how just judgements should be made. See Jürgen Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg, 
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Habermas concludes that he has a better solution: dispense with the original position 
and its inherent ambiguities and contradictions and keep ‘the procedural conception of 
practical reason free of substantive connotations by developing it in a strictly procedural 
manner’.83 The test of moral truth or validity is fully rational acceptance in ‘the ideal 
discourse situation’.84 Adams would challenge both theorists on the grounds that 
communication is not ‘something one can have a theory about.’85 Yet it is in the twin theories 
of ‘communicative action’ and ‘reflective equilibrium’ that the differences between Habermas 
and Rawls dissolve: 
Reflective equilibrium ... is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get 
closer to it in the sense that through discussion our ideals, principles, and judgements 
seem more reasonable to us and we regard them as better founded than they were 
before.86 
This is inadequate for Ratzinger.  Reflective equilibrium is little more than contentment with 
consensus and evasion of the issue of truth.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 56-65. Habermas reads Rawls as adopting the latter position, but failing to 
appreciate that his system depends for its health and success on ‘a culture in which basic liberal convictions are 
already rooted through tradition and political socialization in everyday practices and in the intuitions of 
individual citizens.’ Between Facts and Norms, p.61. 
82 Cooke, A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? p.227. Cf. Finlayson: ‘Habermas does not make clear to 
what extent he is recommending a normative ideal of deliberative or discursive democracy and to what extent he 
is offering an empirical theory.’ Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, p.119. 
83 Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason, p.116. 
84 Ibid., p.142. 
85 Adams, Habermas and Theology, p.98. The point Adams wants to make is that ‘there is no deductive or 
discursive route from thinking to the grounds of thinking.’ Ibid., p.183. This same idea is expressed by de Gaál: 
‘one cannot prove the reasonableness of reason. It would require an outside agent other than reason.’ de Gaál, 
The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI, p272. 
86 Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public use of Reason, p.142. 
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8.2.2:  Ratzinger and Rawls 
The Westminster Address represents an important instance of the exercise of the religious 
voice in the public square.87 Here Ratzinger sounds positive notes, such as endorsement of 
pluralist democracy,88 alongside an impressive account of cooperation between church and 
state.89 
On the critical side, three challenges are offered.  Firstly, he confronts the British 
establishment with the Böckenförde question, ‘the ethical foundations of civil discourse’ and 
‘the moral principles underpinning the democratic process’. In an implied criticism of Rawls, 
he rejects ‘social consensus’ as an adequate foundation and he does this against the 
background of ‘the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century’.   
Secondly, his diagnosis of the problem is the Regensburg theme of reason: reason 
uncorrected by faith produces ideology, while faith uncorrected by reason produces 
fanaticism. His remedy is dialogue: secular rationality and religious belief ‘should not be 
afraid to enter into a profound and ongoing dialogue, for the good of our civilization’. The 
voice of religion should not be silenced or ‘relegated to the purely private sphere’. Rather it 
should be welcomed into ‘the national conversation’, not as ‘a problem for legislators to 
solve’ but as ‘a vital contributor’.  
                                                             
87 Ratzinger, J., as Pope Benedict XVI, Address to Representatives of British Society, including the Diplomatic 
Corps, Politicians, Academics and Business Leaders, Westminster Hall, City of Westminster, 17 September 
2010. Available at: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2010/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20100917_societa-civile_en.html. (Accessed: 11 October 2014). 
88 The list includes freedom of speech, freedom of political affiliation, respect for the rule of law, respect for the 
individual’s rights and duties and the equality of all citizens before the law. 
89 The list is as follows: the arms trade, human rights, the spread of democracy, debt relief, fair trade, 
immunization and the environment, all placed in a framework of ‘solidarity to the poor’ and turning ‘solidarity 
into effective action’. 
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Thirdly, the Church does not propose a political programme of its own, but it does 
propose ‘the unique dignity of the human person’ and this essentially is the moral truth the 
Church offers to the state.  
Truth in Ratzinger is invariably linked to the issue of freedom discussed in the 
Subiaco Address.90 The Rawlsian project, like the Enlightenment itself, is predicated on 
freedom as the ‘fundamental value that measures everything’ which necessitates the exclusion 
of the voice of religion from the public square. Ratzinger wholeheartedly endorses 
modernity’s cherished freedoms.91 He becomes uncomfortable when this ‘canon’ of freedoms 
is elevated to the status of ‘a universally valid philosophy’, becomes, in fact, an ideology.92  
Enlightenment philosophy is based on a materialist/naturalist ontology, a 
positivist/empiricist epistemology and a utilitarian/relativist ethic. This rationality is cut off 
from ‘the memory of humanity’.93 In its determination to deny and exclude the religious and 
metaphysical, Western secular culture denies the very freedom which is its own most precious 
ideal. ‘A confused ideology of freedom leads to dogmatism, which is showing itself 
increasingly hostile to freedom’.94  
At Westminster Ratzinger criticizes the view that Christians in public roles should be 
required at times to act against their consciences. In his letter to Marcello Pera he sees 
relativism, in the name of freedom, morphing into dogmatism and intolerance.95 Modernity 
                                                             
90 Ratzinger, J., The Subiaco Address, in Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith. Pope John Paul II died on the following 
day and Joseph Ratzinger was elected as Pope on 19 April. The full text is published as an appendix to Rowland, 
pp.156 – 165, but also, as stated above, constitutes the greater part of Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures. 
91 The list is familiar: freedom of religion, the religious neutrality of the state, freedom of opinion, freedom of 
the judiciary and freedom of democratic participation. 
92 The Subiaco Address, in Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, p.160. 
93 Ibid., p.161. 
94 Ibid., p.160. 
95 Cooke has similar concerns about the lack of true tolerance or equality in the Habermasian postsecular state, 
which is ‘unnecessarily restrictive’ in its demands on believers, thereby threatening their freedom of religion and 
freedom of opinion. Cooke, A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? p.226. 
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imposes ‘a single way of thinking and speaking’ which masquerades as having ‘reached 
greater heights than the loftiest philosophical achievements of the past’ but is really ‘a new 
pseudo-enlightenment’, which threatens freedom of thought as well as freedom of religion’.96 
A second, deep reservation about the secular is Ratzinger’s suspicion concerning the 
unholy alliance between Rawlsian political liberalism and exploitative capitalism. We have 
seen Habermas expressing a nervousness about ‘the dynamic of the global economy’ which 
has spun out of control and ‘could well slacken the democratic bond and exhaust the kind of 
solidarity that the democratic state needs but cannot impose by law.’97 Ratzinger sees a 
parallel between the false freedom of the secular sphere, which seeks to exclude the religious, 
and the false freedom of the capitalist market, which seeks to exclude the ethical from its 
operations. Like the secular state, the free market hides ‘its tacit philosophical 
presuppositions’ which are essentially deterministic and contradictory to true freedom, 
because it excludes the reality of human freedom.98  
There is a third area where I believe Ratzinger exhibits far greater realism about the 
actual practice of democracy than either Habermas or Rawls. In conversation with Habermas, 
he questions the concept of consensus, which in reality involves delegation through 
representatives and majority voting. Elsewhere he provides a full critique of the realities of 
democratic processes.99 
                                                             
96 Without Roots: p.128. 
97 Dialectics of Secularization, p.35. 
98 J. Ratzinger, ‘Church and Economy: Responsibility for the Future of the World Economy’, trans. Stephen 
Wentworth Arndt, in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio Volume 1: The Unity of the Church, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2013), pp.78 – 84, p.79. Ratzinger, as Benedict XVI, following the global financial crisis of 2008, 
provided a widely admired critique of global economic systems in the papal encyclical Caritas in Veritate: 
Charity in Truth, (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 2009). The extent of support for Ratzinger’s critique can be seen 
in the work of Adrian Pabst (ed.) The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict XVI’s Social Encyclical and 
the Future of Political Economy, (Cambridge: James Clark and Co, 2012). 
99 J. Ratzinger, ‘Truth and Freedom’, trans. Adrian J. Walker, in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio Volume 2: 
Anthropology and Culture, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), pp. 147-167, p.155-156. ‘The feeling that 
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Furthermore, despite the emphasis on consensus and communication in Rawls and 
Habermas, both might be guilty of a dialogic deficit. Paskewich, for example, praises 
Ratzinger for striking an appropriate balance between the potentially opposing forces of moral 
values and secular autonomy, and for achieving the goal of keeping religion involved in 
politics while maintaining the distinction between church and state. Ratzinger’s theological 
grounding of the dignity of the human person may appear to be a limitation in dialogue with 
the secular, but a significant strength in dialogue with Judaism and Islam.100 
Finally, on the level of theory, as Paskewich notes, liberalism is not born ex nihilo. If 
Habermas is right, then both he and Rawls are both to some extent compromised by 
comprehensive doctrines, the very thing they set out either to overcome or exclude. That 
renders the contributions of Ratzinger and of other religious voices as worthy of respect in the 
public square as those of Habermas and Rawls. 
Summary 
Rawls has an aversion to comprehensive doctrines, and believes democracy can be sustained 
by political discourse. Both Habermas and Ratzinger believe it is legitimate to bring their 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
democracy is not the right form of freedom is fairly common and is spreading more and more. The Marxist 
critique of democracy cannot simply be brushed aside: how free are elections? To what extent is the outcome 
manipulated by advertising, that is, by capital, by a few men who dominate public opinion? Is there not a new 
oligarchy who determine what is modern and progressive, what an enlightened man has to think? The cruelty of 
this oligarchy, its power to perform public executions, is notorious enough. Anyone who might get in its way is a 
foe of freedom, because, after all, the lie is interfering with the free expression of opinion. And how are 
decisions arrived at in representative bodies? Who could still believe that the welfare of the community as a 
whole truly guides the decision-making process? Who can doubt the power of special interests, whose dirty 
hands are exposed with increasing frequency? And in general, is the system of majority and minority really a 
system of freedom? And are not interest groups of every kind appreciably stronger than the proper organ of 
political representation, the parliament? In this tangled power play, the problem of ungovernability arises ever 
more menacingly: the will of individuals to prevail over one another blocks the freedom of the whole.’ 
100 J. Christopher Paskewich, ‘Liberalism Ex Nihilo: Joseph Ratzinger on Modern Secular Politics’, Politics, Vol. 
28, Issue 3, (October 2008), pp.169-176. 
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comprehensive doctrines, from the secular and religious perspectives respectively, to make 
contributions in the public square.101 
8.3: CRITIQUING RATZINGER 
I see the biggest question mark hanging over Ratzinger’s position as his ambivalence over the 
question of natural law as a bridge between the religious and the secular and a common 
foundation for human rights. Hittinger agrees with Ratzinger, that the human rights 
conventions, as originally conceived, were based on the concept of ‘a natural human dignity’ 
as ‘a norm for what can be counted as rational in the domain of conduct and conventions or 
contracts’.102 Hittinger also agrees that the classical world view has been lost, with the result 
that now the ‘human’ is found in the conventional. This means that human rights are regarded 
as nothing more than conventions, their norms derived from Habermasian procedure or 
Rawlsian consensus, not from the nature of things. This leaves Ratzinger / the Roman 
Catholic Church, confident in proclaiming ‘a high doctrine of natural law’ ad intra, but 
diffident in the deployment of natural law thinking ad extra, ‘across institutions and 
traditions,’ a position which is neither theoretically coherent nor dialogically efficacious.  
Rourke sees a disjunction between the Ratzinger who backs away from affirming 
natural law as the common ethical language of humanity, and the Ratzinger who ‘still clearly 
believes’ in natural law as the only place where reason, morality and democracy can 
                                                             
101 Rourke (p.98) finds in the Habermas – Ratzinger debate ‘a fairly broad consensus that scientific reason by 
itself is not a sufficient basis to ground a democratic ethos, and that religion has at least some role to play in the 
dialogue about the sources and content of that ethos.’ Eggemeier (p.456) points out that Ratzinger steers a 
difficult path, ‘to resist the Scylla of instrumental-positivistic reason while also avoiding the Charybdis of 
postmetaphysical reason and its commitment to the position that truth is socially constructed.’ 
102 Russell Hittinger, ‘Natural Law and Public Discourse: The Legacies of Joseph Ratzinger’, pp. 241-271, at 
p.261. Posted online 27 September 2014. Available at: 
http://law.loyno.edu/sites/law.loyno.edu/files/Hittinger-FI-WLM-PROOF.pdf. (Accessed: 5 December 2015). 
Hittinger finds Ratzinger’s disavowal of natural law ‘a startling remark’ p.260. Rourke likewise regards it as 
‘most surprising.’ See Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI, p.97. 
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reunite.103 This point is reinforced by Kirchhoffer who questions the efficacy of Ratzinger’s 
broad brush endorsement of ‘the dignity of the human person’ as the grounding of human 
rights. Kirchhoffer provides a threefold deconstruction of dignity. Ontologically, it is the 
given fact of life. Epistemologically, it is the capacity for reason (truth), for freedom 
(morality), for love (charity) and for community (solidarity). Ethically it becomes 
teleological, a task to be performed and a purpose fulfilled. For the believer, this all sits 
beautifully within a theology of gift and creation. But for the secularist, it can be dismissed as 
fundamentalism and superstition.104  
Welker regards Ratzinger’s Hegelian trope of ‘Reason’ as a barrier to building bridges 
across the religious secular divide.105 He would prefer him to speak, like MacIntyre, of 
‘rationalities’. Ratzinger will never be listened to if he demonizes all scientific rationality as 
scientism. He is naive about the complexity and sophistication required for any meaningful 
dialogue between philosophy and science. Both Habermas and Ratzinger show a marked lack 
of cultural and political realism.106 Welker doubts whether such a philosophy exists and is 
certain it cannot be found in natural law. Revivals of natural law have always ‘failed 
miserably’ and the idea of natural law as a basis for dialogue is ‘exaggerated and misguided’. 
Natural law is theologically suspect in itself and consists of little more than ‘humans talking 
to themselves.’ It cannot guarantee any genuinely Christian results and is therefore not a 
practicable basis for dialogue with the world religions. If used in interreligious dialogue, its 
true identity will be unmasked: ‘a philosophically embellished relic of Western hegemonic 
                                                             
103 Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI, p.97-98. 
104 David G. Kirchhoffer, ‘Benedict XVI, Human Dignity, and Absolute Moral Norms’, New Blackfriars, 
Vol.91, Issue 1035, (September 2010), pp.586-608. 
105 Sarto seems to share this concern when he asks ‘Is this an idealistic, romantic vision of reason?’ Sarto, Logos 
and Dia-Logos: Faith, Reason, (and Love) According to Joseph Ratzinger, p.509. 
106 Welker, Habermas and Ratzinger on the Future of Religion, p.456. 
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thought.’107 Welker is even-handedly critical of Habermas, whom he suspects of translating 
religious statements, ‘all the while hoping religion will go away.’ He would prefer Habermas 
to ‘take a real, constructive interest in the development of religion as a valid dialogue 
partner.’108 The next section will show that Habermas does exactly this. 
8.4:  MYTHOS AND LOGOS IN THE DIALECTICS OF SECULARIZATION  
8.4.1 Habermas in search of that which is missing  
To the consternation of secularists, in 2001 Habermas signalled a remarkable change of 
direction, when he began to speak of the meaning-endowing function of religious discourse, 
the bankruptcy of the secularization thesis and the need for democracy to engage the religions 
in constructive dialogue.109 He put this principle into practice not only in the debate with 
Ratzinger, but in a further colloquium with the German Jesuits.110  
                                                             
107 Welker, Habermas and Ratzinger on the Future of Religion, p.472. Welker believes that his misgivings are 
given added weight by the fact that he has been involved in ‘20 years of more or less successful international and 
interdisciplinary research cooperation.’ (p.472). 
108 Ibid., p.464 
109 That same year Habermas called for ‘mutual respect for the sincerely attested power of opposed traditions’ 
and ‘mutual esteem of alien cultures and ways of life, despite differences in fundamental value-orientations.’ See 
J. Habermas, The Liberating Power of Symbols: Philosophical Essays, trans. Peter Dews, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2001), pp.35 and 43. For many years Habermas had already accepted that the ethical life of modernity was 
built on the Platonic foundation of the ‘ideas’ and the Judaeo-Christian concept of salvation. The task of 
philosophy is now to provide ‘transmission’ and ‘transformation’ of ‘the great world traditions.’ J. Habermas, 
Postmetaphysical Thinking, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p.15. In the same work (p.51.) Habermas already 
expresses doubts about his own project: ‘Philosophy, even in its postmetaphysical form, will be able neither to 
replace nor to repress religion as long as religious language is the bearer of a semantic content that is inspiring 
and even indispensable, for this content eludes (for the time being?) the explanatory force of philosophical 
language and continues to resist translation into reasoning discourses.’ Nemoianu makes the point that Noberto 
Bobbio (philosopher and law scientist), Jacques Derrida (radical sceptic and relativist) and Emmanuel Lévinas 
(philosopher and religious thinker) all show in their later years an openness to religion. See Nemoianu, The 
Church and the Secular Establishment, p.22. 
110 Jürgen Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, trans. 
Ciaran Cronin, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). This volume resulted from a podium discussion between 
Habermas and representatives of the Jesuit School of Philosophy, which took place in Munich in February 2007. 
The publication gave contributors an opportunity to formalize and develop their contributions to the debate. 
Hovdelein describes Habermas’ change of heart as ‘nothing less than remarkable.’ Hovdelein, Post-Secular 
Consensus?, p.109. 
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Here he speaks in an almost plaintive tone of modernity’s ‘melancholy over something 
which has been irretrievably lost’.111 Just like Ratzinger, he speaks of ‘the cognitive advance 
from mythos to logos’ represented by the Platonic / Mosaic breakthrough. This leads him to 
place the origins of secular reason in ‘Jerusalem and Athens’.112 Like Ratzinger, he criticizes 
‘the blinkered enlightenment which is unenlightened about itself and which denies religion 
any rational content.’113 Like Ratzinger, he rejects naturalism as ‘a naive faith in science’ and 
worries that an out-of-control modernity is threatening the ‘morality of justice’. Using 
strikingly religious motifs, Habermas, the Kantian, concedes that Kant is not enough: 
‘practical reason fails to fulfil its own vocation’ because it cannot address violations of 
solidarity throughout the world and is silent in the face of ‘what cries out to heaven.’114  
Like Ratzinger, Habermas asks us to revisit the genealogy of reason. His conclusions, 
however, differ from Ratzinger’s. Indeed, he explicitly rejects the argument of the 
Regensburg Lecture. For Habermas’ taste, Ratzinger is ‘unexpectedly critical of 
modernity’.115 As ‘a child of the Enlightenment’, Habermas cannot feel as negatively as 
Ratzinger about the three stages of de-Hellenization.116 Certainly, Scotus produced 
                                                             
111 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.15. 
112 Ibid., p.17. Habermas adheres to the Jaspers Axial Age formulation that ‘The religions which have their roots 
in this period achieved the cognitive leap from mythical narratives to a logos that differentiates between essence 
and appearance in a very similar way as did Greek philosophy.’ J. Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, 
European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 14, No.1, (2006), pp.1-25, at p. 17. 
113 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.18. Cf. Habermas’ objection that analytic materialism is a 
metaphysical position: ‘the scientistic background assumption that the natural sciences...do in general furnish the 
model and ultimate authority for all knowledge that is still acceptable.’ True science accepts its own fallibility 
and is characterized by ‘unprejudiced openness.’ Postmetaphysical Thinking, p.21. and p.36. For Habermas’ 
desire to build an inclusive genealogy that acknowledges both the Greek and the Judaeo-Christian traditions, see 
Between Naturalism and Religion, pp.238-239. 
114 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.19. In order to understand Habermasian genealogy correctly, 
we must understand that he critiques Kant for clinging to the ancient tradition of Plato. In styling his own 
philosophy ‘post-metaphysical’, Habermas seeks to distance himself from ‘a philosophical idealism that goes 
back to Plato and extends by way of Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Cusanus and 
Pico de Mirandola, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, up to Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.’ Postmetaphysical 
Thinking, p.29. 
115 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.22. 
116 Ibid., p.23. Eggemeier notes that here Habermas keeps company with Johann Baptist Metz. Both are happy 
with de-Hellenization, because it is ‘an opportunity to return Christianity to its Jewish roots in order to prioritize 
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nominalism, and nominalism produced the Protestant voluntarist deity, but Scotus also gave 
rise to modern science, so we cannot have one without the other. Likewise, if you reject 
Kant’s critique of reason and its limitation of reason’s capacity to apprehend the truth about 
God, then you may have to reject ‘the concept of autonomy which first made possible our 
modern European understanding of law and democracy.’117 The Habermas / Ratzinger debate 
leaves us with a post-secular choice between ‘a salvaging deconstruction of religious 
discourse’ or ‘a salvaging recovery of a derailed modern project.’118 Habermas and Ratzinger 
alike seem to be forever caught in this double bind of respecting both modernity and religion. 
We see this in the comments made by John Milbank. 
8.4.2   Milbank in search of a postmodern orthodoxy 
Milbank provides a useful appraisal of the stances of Habermas and Ratzinger, discussed 
against a Regensburg-like background of Dawkinsesque ardent secularism and violent 
religious fundamentalism.119  Habermas offers ‘pragmatized transcendentalism’, Ratzinger ‘a 
revived blend of Greek reason with biblical faith’. Milbank welcomes Habermas’ postsecular 
move, but rejects his demand that religion recognise ‘the absoluteness of secular norms’.120 
Habermas offers a ‘trade-off’, outlawing both Ratzinger’s metaphysics and Dawkins’ 
scientism. Milbank dislikes Kant’s ‘secular consecration’ of the separation of reason and 
faith.121 Ratzinger is right, orthodoxy demands ‘the neoplatonic logic of participation in God’.  
Nominalism and voluntarism are ruptures of orthodoxy. Scotian theology severs the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
praxis over metaphysics’, happy with Kant, ‘as an opening that makes possible the emergence of political 
theology’ and they ‘do not lament nominalism as the gateway to modernity’s history of decay.’ Eggemeier, A 
Post-Secular Modernity? pp.461-463. 
117 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.23. 
118 Eggemeier, A Post-Secular Modernity? p.463. 
119 Milbank, J., ‘What Lacks is Feeling: Hume versus Kant and Habermas’, in Craig Calhoun, Eduardo Mendieta 
and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.) Habermas and Religion, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2013), pp.322 – 346. 
120 Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p.15. 
121 Milbank, What Lacks is Feeling, p.324. 
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relationship between nature and grace, creating an independent category called ‘nature’, and 
separating theology from philosophy. Ratzinger is ‘more prodigious historicist’ because 
Habermasian genealogy is false.122 Medieval science flourished perfectly well before the 
advent of nominalism. Constitutional governance was developing long before Kant. Ratzinger 
is the ‘more radically historicist’ because he believes ‘that events can disclose truths’ and 
trumps Habermas ‘metacritically’.123 If Kant is a development of medieval nominalism and 
voluntarism, he may not be as original as Habermas hopes. Subscribing to the de-
Hellenization thesis, Habermas unwisely keeps company with von Harnack, whose views are 
falsified by the fact of biblical Hellenization and by scholarly consensus which rejects 
Hellenic/Hebraic opposition as an overblown dichotomy.124 
Habermas’ postsecular certainly looks postmodern. But in fact it is ‘manifestly 
outdated in the face of the manifest revival of metaphysics’.125 Habermas retreats into ‘a 
modern humanist comfort zone that is no longer sustainable’.126 Meanwhile, ‘the octogenarian 
ex-Pope’ looks ‘cool’, being more switched on to ‘the post postmodern zeitgeist’.  Here is the 
irony: the religious Ratzinger argues for the broadening of reason, the secular Habermas for 
its limitation.127 The point at issue is serious. Ratzinger’s ‘advocacy of a generous extension 
                                                             
122 Milbank, What Lacks is Feeling, p.325. Ratzinger is never a-historical in his thought. For him, ‘metaphysical 
and moral reason comes into action only in a historical context.’ But his position is subtle: ‘At one and the same 
time, it depends on this context and transcends it.’ (my emphasis). Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.68. 
123 Milbank, What Lacks is Feeling, pp.325-326. 
124 With his wry aside, ‘outside Germany, at least’, Milbank shows that he regards the whole Hellenization 
debate as to some degree a German preoccupation. (What Lacks is Feeling, p.327.) Friedo Ricken thinks that the 
difference between Habermas and Ratzinger on the subject of Hellenization is not a fundamental one, but is 
caused by the fact that Ratzinger locates the process of Hellenization in the Old Testament and in the New 
Testament, while Habermas is interested in the tradition of Hellenization that runs from Augustine to Aquinas. In 
other words, Habermas would happily accept the Hellenization of biblical faith, while remaining nervous of the 
neoplatonic Hellenization of the patristic and medieval periods. See Friedo Ricken S.J., ‘Postmetaphysical 
Reason and Religion’, in Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, pp.51-58. 
125 Milbank, What Lacks is Feeling, p.323. 
126 Ibid., p.326. 
127 Milbank shares both Habermas’ and Ratzinger’s distaste for the limited nature of modernity’s instrumental 
reason, describing it as ‘bastardized.’ See J. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and 
the Representation of the People, (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), p.7. 
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of reason’ represents the far surer ‘guard against terror’ than Habermas’ ‘confinement of 
reason to formal checkability’.128  
So Milbank helps to clarify the choice offered to modernity by the Habermas-
Ratzinger debate: ‘pragmatically normative criteria for communication’ or ‘the infinite 
communication of the Logos by the divine Father who created finite reality’.129 Milbank 
admires Habermas for his misgivings about modernity and his move from secular exclusion 
of religion to post-secular openness to religion. However, he sees the metaphysical Logos 
theology of Joseph Ratzinger as the more convincing antidote to the pathologies of religious 
and scientistic fanaticism.  
Habermas, too, characterizes his rationality as logos. Haunted by transcendence, he 
espouses an immanent, postmetaphysical philosophy, in full consciousness of philosophy’s 
transcendental origins. Taking a lead from Josef Schmidt, Habermas admires the Decalogue’s 
demand ‘to transcend everything within the world’, an intuition to which philosophy ‘must 
hold fast’.130 Habermas concludes his dialogue with the Jesuits with these words: 
We can only “master” a language of whose logos we heed; at the same time, this logos 
liberates us from the subjection to the immediacy of events and occurrences in the 
world, because we gain intentional distance from the world as a whole through 
intersubjective communication about something in the world. 
                                                             
128 Milbank, What Lacks is Feeling, p.327. 
129 Ibid., p.327. 
130 J. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing, p.82. Josef Schmidt S.J. provides a contribution entitled 
‘A Dialogue in Which There Can Only Be Winners’, in An Awareness of What is Missing, pp.59-71. Schmidt 
says that the purpose of Christian theology has always been ‘to understand and communicate the talk of “theos” 
as “logos”, and this as logos of the “Word” of God and of itself, and at the same time of the shared “logos” 
which unites human beings, which is “the Light”, which “enlightens everyone {!}” (Jn.1:9)’. (Schmidt’s 
exclamation mark). 
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 Thus Habermas’ logos is an immanent transcendence in the Nussbaum/Taylor vein. 
Ratzinger’s Logos is rooted in divine transcendence, and incarnated in the empirical 
immanence of the scriptural witness and the historical reality of Christianity.  
Summary 
The crux of the Habermas/Ratzinger divide lies in the Habermasian concept of translation. 
Both accept the congruence between secular and religious concepts and their genealogical 
connection. But for Habermas, it is religious discourse that must retranslate itself into, and 
therefore conform to, the secular discourse of so-called public reason. This sets up religion as 
the inferior partner and presupposes an absolute divide between the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ 
which simply doesn’t exist. For Ratzinger, the secular discourse of public reason is the 
inferior partner, since it is cut off from its historical metaphysical roots and has substituted 
‘consensus’ for moral truth. The modern moral order of human rights, freedom, equality and 
fairness needs to be reinvested with its substantive core and this can only come from natural 
law and from the Old Testament. Habermas does not think the Ratzinger project is possible 
because we can never get back behind post-metaphysical reason. There is substantial 
disagreement here, and neither side is changed by the debate. Nevertheless, if the health of 
our public life needs ‘better models for apprenticeship in public argumentation’, then I believe 
such a model is found in the Habermas /Ratzinger encounter.131 
 
 
                                                             
131 Adams, Habermas and Theology, p.202. In fact, Adams shows no interest in Ratzinger or in the Habermas – 
Ratzinger debate, despite devoting an entire chapter to ‘Habermas in dialogue with theologians’. Adams (p.200) 
makes the point that Habermas has never sought dialogue with theologians. ‘It is the theologians who have 
beaten a path to his door.’ 
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8.4.3 Martin in search of a logos without mythos 
As early as 1978, sociologist David Martin began to question the secularization thesis ‘that 
secularization is a very long term or inevitable trend’.132 Surveying historical relationships 
between church and state, he asserted a principle that ‘where there exists one religion 
possessed of a monopoly, society splits into two warring sides’,133 the religious and the 
secular. Ecclesial monopoly creates ‘abrasive division and militant secularism’ and a hostility 
to pluralism and to democracy. However, Ratzinger’s German experience has been of a 
‘duopoly’ of Protestantism and Catholicism, creating greater openness to democracy and 
human rights.134 
  In 2011 Martin provided an insightful analysis of ‘Catholicism and Modernity’.135 
Adenauer’s post-war Catholic Christian democracy, in which Ratzinger grows to maturity, 
flourishes in reaction to the three horrors of Nazism, Communism and capitalism. All three 
themes powerfully inform Ratzinger’s theology, as they do Catholic endorsements of human 
rights: 
                                                             
132 Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p.12. In a similar vein, Berger, a doyen of secularization theory, 
distanced himself from his earlier 1960s stance, with these words: ‘The assumption that we live in a secularized 
world is false.’ Peter L. Berger (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, 
quoted in Hovdelein, ‘Post-Secular Consensus? On the Munich-dialogue between Joseph Ratzinger and Jürgen 
Habermas’. 
133 Martin, A General Theory of Secularization, p.17. 
134 Skidelsky (op.cit.) explains that post-war German democracy rests on a unique combination of Christianity as 
kulturprotestantismus and constitutional patriotism. Nemoianu sees German democractic socialism as very close 
to Catholic social teaching and a major contributor to German social consciousness. Nemoianu, The Church and 
the Secular Establishment, p.31. Jiménez Lobeira agrees that the starting point for both Habermas and Ratzinger 
is the German Vaterland. Jiménez follows George Weigel in summarizing Catholic social teaching in four 
principles: the dignity of the human person, human rights, the common good and subsidiarity. Jiménez Lobeira,  
Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State, p.12. 
135 David Martin, The Future of Christianity: Reflections on Violence and Democracy, Religion and 
Secularization, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp.31-37. 
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From having defended up to quite recently the special rights of the Church in collusion 
with the state, the politics of Catholicism moved to the defence of the rights of the 
person, including the free exercise of religion.136 
But it is only the disentangling of the Church from power which enables Ratzinger to see the 
Catholic Church as offering society ‘a stance of critical solidarity’.137 Martin’s vision for the 
role of the Catholic Church in the 21st century is almost identical to Ratzinger’s: 
The most the Church can expect is to exercise broad cultural influence as a pressure 
group, while distancing itself from any dangerous identification with power elites in 
the state. It has to arrive at workable compromises in the field of politics, while 
retaining a critical or prophetic role.138 
In 2014 Martin provided an updated perspective on the relationship between religious and 
secular power.139 His provocative subtitle takes us into the heart of the Ratzinger project and 
its obsession with the transition from mythos to logos. Martin even-handedly castigates both 
Habermas and Ratzinger. Both characterize themselves as logos, true reason, not realizing that 
they are always still mythos, unprovable belief or story-telling.140 We all have such stories, 
‘whether we are Catholics, Protestants or secularists’ and these are always redacted and 
communicated in symbol and image. If we accept Martin’s thesis, we will read Ratzinger’s 
Platonic/Johannine/Patristic logos as a pictogram, or ‘floating signifier’, ‘to be read at 
different times by different people in different lights’.141 
Nevertheless, Martin subscribes to the Jaspers genealogy whereby the Axial 
revolution brings us out of ‘the shadowy realm of Plato’s cave’ and achieves ‘critical distance 
                                                             
136 Martin, The Future of Christianity, p.32. Martin sees Ratzinger’s criticism of the United Kingdom’s 2010 
Equality Act for infringing natural law as part of this direction of travel. 
137 Ibid., p.32. 
138 Ibid., p.34. 
139 David Martin, Religion and Power: No Logos without Mythos, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014). 
140 Adams advocates that we need to be ‘more circumspect about the difference between “mythic” and “modern” 
thought.’ See Habermas and Theology, p.3. 
141 Martin, Religion and Power, p.176 and p.174. 
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from immemorial givens’, facilitating the vision of ‘a universal humanity under a universal 
law’.142 However, this vision comes at a cost, because ‘the moment you embrace universality 
and the idea of truth you are entangled in a struggle with the partisans of particularity and of 
alternative versions of universal truth’.143 
Human rights may hide ‘an enduring will-to-power behind a claim to nurturance’.144 
The canonical secular story of human rights and the radical orthodox counter-narrative may 
both be guilty of indulging in ‘the ritual recitation of an impeccable genealogy as the Party of 
Humanity’. The Enlightenment produced not democracy but racism, violence, imperialism 
and autocracy. There again, ‘Christianity did much the same some 1,500 years earlier’. We 
call ourselves secular or religious, when both of us are both; we tell ourselves our cherished 
Heilgeschichte, and ‘rest with unquestioning faith on the religious advances we violently 
disavow’.145 
Summary 
Martin challenges Ratzinger’s distinction between mythos and logos, suggesting that even 
logos theology is just another myth. But Martin agrees with Ratzinger, that Western 
civilization, democracy and the modern moral order of human rights, all rest on forgotten 
presuppositions of the Socratic/Platonic demand for truth and for peace.  
 
 
                                                             
142 Ibid., p.178. 
143 Milbank, like Jaspers, Martin and Ratzinger, recognises that ‘original philosophy was a monistic revolt 
against myth’, defining the Axial enlightenment as a transition ‘from the rule of synecdoche and metonymy to 
that of universalist monism.’ See Beyond Secular Order, pp.11-12. 
144 Martin, Religion and Power, p.179. 
145 Ibid., p.180. 
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8.5: LOGOS THEOLOGY, THE SECULAR AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
8.5.1   Logos and dialogos 
Nemoianu admires the ‘seamless continuity’ between the levels of Ratzinger’s ‘coherent and 
organic thinking system.’ The essence of this system is this: 
Faith, reason and love constitute the three main elements – the three pillars – of the 
thought of Joseph Ratzinger. Reason and relation, truth and love, logos and dia-logos 
take us back to “creator Reason,” to the Logos that existed “in the beginning” (John 
1:1), which created through love. Logos, truth and love are all intimately united: there 
is an alliance between the divine and the human, because as the Word is made flesh 
(John 1:14), he has to redeem everything that is human, including reason.146 
For Ratzinger, as always, it is the logos that can be used as a place-holder, both to critique a 
secularized construct of the socio-political sphere and to endorse a ‘universal breathing –
space’ where social solidarity is based on charity. 
In truth, charity reflects the personal yet public dimension of faith in the God of the 
Bible, who is both Agape and Logos: Charity and Truth, Love and Word. Because it is 
filled with truth, charity can be understood in the abundance of its values, it can be 
shared and communicated. Truth in fact, is logos, which creates dia-logos, and hence 
communication and communion. Truth, by enabling men and women to let go of their 
subjective opinions and impressions, allows them to move beyond cultural and 
historical limitations and to come together in the assessment of the value and 
substance of things. Truth opens and unites our minds in the logos of love.147 
In his characteristic style, Ratzinger articulates his Christian vision against the backdrop of 
the Axial Platonic/Socratic inquiry into the ‘value and substance’ of things. The logos or 
                                                             
146 Thomassen, (ed.) The Derrida-Habermas Reader, p.500. 
147 Ratzinger, Caritas in Veritate, paras.3-4, p.5 
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rational argument of the Platonic dialogue aimed for alētheia, but its aim could only be 
realised in the alētheia of Christ, in whom logos is transformed into agapē, dialogos into 
koinōnia. 
Here we see the centrality of dialogue in Ratzinger’s theology. Habermas is right: 
communication is key and so is solidarity. But deep communication is communion, deep 
solidarity is love. So Habermas is wrong: communication does not derive its value as a 
strategy or procedure, but as the expression of the deepest nature of the human person, of the 
world and of God. That nature is logos, word, a word that by its very nature manifests in a 
dialogue of love and truth. 
Rawls is right: democracy requires its citizens to adopt an original position, to set 
something of themselves aside as they meet each other in the public square in the interest of 
the profound values of freedom, equality and fairness. But these non-negotiable secular values 
in turn must be grounded in something even deeper. So Rawls is wrong: the original position 
democracy needs is not a calculation of self-interest but conscience, as a realization of the 
original position, where biblical faith grasps the dignity of the human person, created by love 
and oriented towards truth; faith, grounded in conscience has a public dimension and can 
never just be personal. 
 8.5.2  Primordial Conscience – the ultimate grounding of natural law and human rights 
It is conscience that impels personal morality to become a public solidarity and demand for 
justice. This, I propose, is the missing ingredient which Habermas is searching for ‘when 
things fall apart’. For Ratzinger ‘justice is both the aim and intrinsic criterion of all 
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politics’.148 Catholic social doctrine has no intention of giving the Church power over the 
state, or of imposing the Church’s ways of thinking or behaving on those who do not share its 
faith.  Its true task is ‘to help purify reason’ in the interests of justice. It does use natural law, 
but has no desire to impose natural law: 
The Church’s social teaching argues on the basis of reason and natural law, namely on 
the basis of what is in accord with the nature of every human being. It recognizes that 
it is not the Church’s responsibility to make this teaching prevail in political life. 
Rather, the Church wishes to help form consciences in political life and to stimulate 
greater insight into the authentic requirements of justice as well as greater readiness to 
act accordingly, even when this might involve conflict with situations of personal 
interest.149 
Those who withstand totalitarian injustice need the personal courage to jeopardize their own 
self-interest, but first they will need to be capable of discerning authentic justice, and for this 
they will need conscience, a conscience informed by natural law. For Ratzinger, 
totalitarianism is the existential question of our age, because the destruction of conscience has 
always been the precondition for totalitarian obedience.150  This is why the figure of Thomas 
More, just like Socrates, is an enduring icon for Ratzinger, as he makes clear in the 
Westminster Address.151 Ratzinger expresses the indispensability of conscience for the health 
of democracy in his essay ‘Conscience in its Time’.152 He speaks against the backdrop of 
                                                             
148 Deus Caritas Est para.28, p.35. 
149 Ibid., para.28, p.35. Emphasis added. 
150 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI, p.107.  
151 Russian dissident Andrey Sakharov occupies a very similar position in Ratzinger’s thought. Ratzinger 
brought this out in the acceptance speech he made when he was elected as an associate foreign member of the 
Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques of the Institut de France, on November 7, 1992, in an address 
entitled ‘Freedom, Law, and the Good: Moral Principles in Democratic Societies.’ The speech is published as 
Chapter 3 of Values in a Time of Upheaval, pp.45 – 52. 
152 Joseph Ratzinger, ‘Conscience in its Time: A Lecture Given to the Reinhold Schneider Society’, in  
Ratzinger, J., Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New Endeavours in Ecclesiology, trans. Michael J. Miller et al., 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), pp.165-172. Originally published as ‘Das Gewissen in der Zeit: Ein 
Vortrag von der Reinhold-Schneider-Gesellschaft’, in Internazionale katholische Zeitschrift Communio 1 (1972), 
pp.432-442. 
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Germany’s totalitarian nightmare, in which it was Hitler’s self-declared aim to liberate people 
from ‘a chimera called conscience and morality’ and in which Göring could proudly proclaim 
‘I have no conscience! The name of my conscience is Adolf Hitler’.153 Conscience is the only 
true safeguard against tyranny and totalitarianism, just as the abolition of conscience is always 
totalitarianism’s top priority. The ‘primal level of conscience’, as Twomey calls it,154 is 
‘something sacred that must remain inviolate and that in its ultimate sovereignty eludes all 
control’.155 Twomey also refers to it as ‘primordial conscience’ and connects it to natural law, 
defining it as ‘our innate consciousness of the natural law which has to be “formed” in 
dialogue with one’s religious tradition.’156 Of course, appeals to conscience can become a 
mere smokescreen for the enthronement of the ego, ‘an alibi for one’s own wrong-headedness 
and lack of docility’, the absolutization of the will and consequently a voluntarism which 
opens the door to relativism.157 Nevertheless, insists Ratzinger, the phenomenon of the misuse 
of conscience does not diminish its greatness. He appeals to Reinhold Schneider’s definition 
of conscience as ‘the knowledge of one’s responsibility for all creation before him who 
created it’, such that when we look at others we acknowledge the creator in them.158 Drawing 
further on Schneider’s novel, Ratzinger returns to the historical moment of the discovery of 
America, when ‘the question of what right belongs to man as man, the question of human 
rights, was posed in a new form for Christian Europe.’159 In Schneider’s narration of the story 
of Bartolomé de las Casas, three modes of conscience are embodied in three characters: the 
apparently powerless conscience of the suffering girl, the awakened conscience of the brutal 
conquistador and the conscience of the powerful in the emperor who is responsible for the 
                                                             
153 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, p.160. 
154 Twomey, Conscience of Our Age, p.122. 
155 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, p.160. 
156 D. Vincent Twomey, Moral Theology after Humanae Vitae: Fundamental Issues in Moral Theology and 
Sexual Ethics, (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), p.63. 
157 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, p.164. 
158 Ibid., p.164. 
159 Ibid., p.165. 
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law.160 The message is that conscience ‘ceaselessly disturbs the peace of those whose power 
comes at the expense of others’ rights.’161 
 Rourke, like Twomey, shows clearly that in we must speak of conscience and natural 
law in the same breath. The Habermas dialogue demonstrates clearly that the democratic state 
can never make itself the source of norms. Behind the state’s laws are the moral norms which 
lie beyond the reach of the state.  
‘These norms, what philosophers call the first principles of natural law, are preserved 
in the Ten Commandments and the Christian moral tradition based on them. The 
Church has a mission, not only to preserve them intellectually, but to witness to them, 
to live them out in a vibrant way so as to guarantee the ongoing renewal of the social 
sense that these norms are genuine, true, and worthy to be transmitted.’162  
This makes conscience essential, since it preserves the norms on which the entire social order 
is based. These norms are natural laws, coming not from the outside, but from inside, from 
human nature. ‘It is by following the inner voice of conscience, which reaffirms the society’s 
moral norms, that these norms are preserved.’163 In fact conscience has two roles. Firstly, it is 
‘the ultimate repository’ upon which the state is based and secondly, it serves as a limit on the 
power of the state. Rourke concludes:  
‘There is no element in his political thinking on which Benedict places more emphasis 
and where he is more unique than in his insistence that totalitarianism is an issue of 
our time and that the power of conscience is the only force capable of resisting it.’164 
                                                             
160 Ratzinger gives the reference for Schneider’s novel as Las Casas vor Karl V: Szenen aus der 
Konquistadorenzeit, which was published in Germany by Ullstein Verlag in 1968. It had been translated into 
English by Walter Oden and published in 1948 under the title Imperial Mission in New York by the Gresham 
Press. 
161 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, p.170. 
162 Rourke, The Social and Political Thought of Benedict XVI, p.68. 
163 Ibid., p.68. 
164 Ibid., p.69. 
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Political power becomes truly great only when it allows itself to be moved by conscience and 
the Church attains its authentic greatness only when ‘it is capable of giving conscience its 
voice’.165  
It is here then, in primordial conscience, in openness to natural law, that the theme of 
the full breadth of reason finds perfect expression, where the Christian faith finds the true 
grounding of the dignity of the human person and human rights, where a true interculturality, 
an authentic universalism and a genuine antidote to relativism and totalitarianism is located. 
Ratzinger’s conscience, consequently, is intensely practical and real, more challenging and 
effective than Habermas’ solidarity: 
In the last century (as in every century), it was in fact the testimony of the martyrs that 
limited the excesses of power, thus making a decisive contribution to what we might 
call the convalescence of reason.166 
Counterintuitively then, the approach of Habermas and Rawls represents the greatest threat to 
human rights, while Ratzinger’s political thought constitutes its greatest safeguard. 
Otherwise, if the only basis of human rights is to be found in the deliberations of an 
assembly of citizens, those rights can be changed at any time, and so the duty to 
respect and pursue them fades from the common consciousness. Governments and 
international bodies can then lose sight of the objectivity and ‘inviolability’ of rights. 
When this happens, the authentic development of peoples is endangered.167 
Conscience, not communication, is the aspect of human nature which provides a great 
universality, ‘a beacon for all cultures’ and the truest grounding of human rights.168 A healthy 
                                                             
165 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, p.170. 
166 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.29. 
167 Caritas in Veritate, para.43, p.54 
168 Casarella, ‘Culture and Conscience’, in Cavadini, Explorations in the Theology of Benedict XVI, p.81. 
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democracy is utterly dependant on the ethical health of its citizens, ‘insofar as they are truly 
trying to act in accordance with their conscience.’169 
8.5.3  Etsi deus non daretur... 
Ratzinger is haunted by the Enlightenment demand to set the question of God aside and build 
a political morality as if there were no God. Grotius did this in the interests of peace and out 
of a desire for consensus, but the tragedies of the twentieth century show us that this project 
‘leads us increasingly to the edge of the abyss’. At Subiaco, Ratzinger makes his provocative 
offer to the secular world:  
We must reverse the axiom of the Enlightenment and say: Even one who does not 
succeed in finding the way of accepting God, should, nevertheless, seek to live and to 
direct his life ‘veluti si Deus daretur’, as if God existed. In this way, no one is limited 
in his freedom, but all our affairs find the support and criterion of which they are in 
urgent need.  
I take this to mean that, in order to be truly post-secular and post-postmodern, it might be in 
the interests of secularists to posit a hypothetical metaphysical grounding for their most 
cherished ideals and values. These are human rights, plus the ‘canon of values’, which 
Ratzinger insists ‘deserve our approval’: peace, justice, the preservation of Creation, equality 
of men regardless of race, the equal dignity of the sexes, and freedom of thought and belief.170 
If constitutional democracy is rooted in the humus of the Judaeo-Christian tradition then 
‘there is a strong case for that component to be investigated, specified, acknowledged and 
                                                             
169 Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age, p.119. 
170 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.27 and p.28. Eggemeier (p.458) reads the etsi deus proposal as Ratzinger’s 
alternative to natural law: ‘In place of natural law, Ratzinger proposes an alternative approach to translation, in 
which he invites non-believers to share with believers the moral certainties of the Christian tradition.’ (my 
emphasis). Ratzinger’s proposal of a concrete historical tradition becomes a critique of the Enlightenment’s 
mistakenly abstract and ahistorical rationality. 
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preserved if liberal constitutional democracies wish to continue as such.’171 Perhaps it is not 
so far from Habermas’ commitment that post-metaphysical thought is prepared to learn from 
religion, ‘but remains agnostic in the process.’172 
I believe that the distinction between ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ discourse may 
also be useful here.173 In the Habermas debate, I read Ratzinger as oscillating between these 
two modes, thinking in first order terms himself, but offering a second order way of meeting 
between the secular and religious. Related to this point is Ratzinger’s suggestion that the Ten 
Commandments might provide a guide to the essential values required by democracy if it is to 
sustain its culture of human rights and dignity of the human person.174 The suggestion might 
seem offensive from a secular perspective, but Ratzinger points out that the Decalogue does 
not belong exclusively to Christianity, or even to Judaism: ‘it is a sublime expression of moral 
reason, and as such it finds echoes in the wisdom of the other great cultures.’175 
Summary 
If we want a firm foundation for democracy, we have to either believe in God, or posit some 
sort of equivalent as guarantor of our deepest values. 
 
                                                             
171 Jiménez Lobeira, Pre-political Foundations of the Democratic Constitutional State, p.14. 
172 Habermas, Religion in the Public Square, p.17. 
173 By ‘first order’ discourse I mean ‘confessional’ discourse, speaking in an ‘assertive’ tone. By ‘second order’ I 
mean ‘notional’ discourse, speaking in a more neutral tone. The etsi deus proposal may then represent a more or 
less successful attempt to collapse the one into the other. For an explanation of these two ‘prominent types in 
theological thinking’ see Cheetham, Ways of Meeting, p.39. Hovdelein (p.114), for example, reads Ratzinger in 
conversation with Habermas as a first order thinker, (‘there is much potential theological power in this way of 
thinking’), while Nemoianu (p.34), reads him as strategically adopting a second-order frame of reference which 
is essentially ‘sociohistorical’ and refuses ‘to withdraw haughtily into the domain of dogmatic theology.’  
174 The suggestion was actually made by Gad Lerner, when moderating a debate between Ratzinger and the 
Italian philosopher Paolo Arcais de Flores. The debate took place in the year 2000 in Rome and was entitled ‘A 
Controversy on God, the Church, Ethics, Politics and Secularism,’ covering much the same ground as the debate 
with Habermas. De Flores is an atheist secularist and theorist of public reason, but has clashed with Habermas as 
well as Ratzinger.  
175 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.29. 
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CONCLUSION 
Habermas and Ratzinger ask for the voice of religion to be heard in the public square. They 
call for a dual debate about the scope of reason and the ethical foundations of democracy and 
human rights.  The debates encountered in this chapter represent powerful evidence that it is 
possible for secular atheists and Christian theologians both to debate and to find common 
ground on both these points.176 The public addresses by Ratzinger provide evidence that the 
voice of religion can be admitted into the public square.177 Whether it has any effect, 
however, is questionable. Many who listened politely to the Westminster Address doubtless 
regarded its demand for pre-political moral foundations as quite unnecessary; the ethical 
standard by which democratic legislation can be judged has already been established in the 
Modern Moral Order of liberty, equality and fairness, realized through the framework of the 
Human Rights and Equality Acts and worked out by procedural parliamentary reason. For 
some, to admit Ratzinger’s natural law-derived non-negotiable moral values would be to take 
politics in the direction of theocracy, and theocracy for the ardent secularist is not just a ghost 
from Europe’s medieval past, but a spectre looming as a clear and present danger in the form 
of both Christian and Islamic fundamentalism. 
We have seen clearly that Ratzinger’s interaction with the world of secular atheistic 
modernity emphatically does not consist of an attempt at the imposition of Christ as Word 
made flesh upon an unwilling audience, nor an attempt at the restoration of ecclesial socio-
political power and influence through the imposition of religious law. Nor does it demand 
even to bring theological discourse into the realm of public debate. Ratzingerian logos 
                                                             
176 The Habermas-Ratzinger debate and the Habermas-Jesuits debate. 
177 Westminster Hall, 2010 and the German Parliament, 2011. 
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theology merely requests that rationality be broadened so that the human capacity for 
transcendence is not ruled out of court. 
Yet there is a religious culture which, in some of its manifestations, adheres to the 
importance of socio-political power and influence through the imposition of religious law, 
and does demand that religious discourse be part and parcel of discourse in the public square. 
That culture of Islam, in some of its forms, was critiqued by Ratzinger in the Regensburg 
Lecture, and is widely regarded by secular atheistic modernity as intrinsically incompatible 
with democracy, with rationality, with the concept and culture of human rights and its 
accompanying belief in the dignity of the human person. 
If the Habermas - Ratzinger encounter is still but a dual debate, and a Euro-centric 
debate, it may reveal a ‘blind spot’ in both interlocutors.178 There seems to be an urgent 
requirement that both the global and the European debate should be broadened to become a 
tripartite debate between Christianity, the secular, and the religions in general, and Islam in 
particular. My attempt to position Ratzinger as an important theorist of intercultural dialogue 
is not complete. Ratzinger’s suggestion that the wisdom of the world’s great cultures might be 
enlisted in support of the culture of human rights leads us back to Regensburg and the 
relationship between Islam and human rights: my final chapter must therefore confront head-
on the relationship between Ratzinger’s logos theology, secular modernity’s ultimate value of 
pluralistic tolerance, and the ultimate value of Islamic religious faith, namely the revealed 
truth of the Qu‘ran. 
                                                             
178 This phrase is used by Korf, Review of The Dialectics of Secularization, p.483. 
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CHAPTER NINE    
 RATZINGER, ISLAM AND RIGHTS 
‘not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s Nature.’1 
INTRODUCTION 
The starting point for Chapter Nine is the Regensburg Lecture’s citation of Surah 2,256 
‘There is no compulsion in religion’, whereby Ratzinger raises ‘the central question’ of the 
relationship between religion and violence. This involves the relationship between reason and 
God’s nature and ‘the essential relationship between faith and reason.’ The chapter will 
examine the Ratzinger theme of the self-limitation of reason through the possible loss of the 
philosophical tradition in Islam. The chapter will argue that cut off from its philosophical 
tradition, Islam can fall prey to an extreme voluntarism. Reconnected with its own rationality, 
Islam has a natural relationship with the culture of human rights. Islam has much to offer to 
an inclusive and universalist dialogue about human rights and the dignity of the human 
person. 
Ratzinger’s argument proceeds as follows: Islam teaches God’s absolute 
transcendence. As a consequence, God’s will is not bound up with God’s rationality, or 
connected to human rationality. So acting unreasonably does not contradict God’s nature and 
consequently it is not unacceptable for a Muslim to spread faith by violence. In Greek 
philosophy, God’s will is bound to the truth and goodness recognised by human reason. 
Christianity embraced Greek philosophical thought to produce a profound synthesis of faith 
and reason. Christians therefore say, with the Greeks, that not to act with reason is contrary to 
God’s nature. The word logos symbolizes the historical Christian encounter with Greek 
                                                             
1 The Regensburg Lecture, para.14. 
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thought, the rationality of the divine nature, and the connection between God and our created 
reason. The extreme voluntarism and transcendentalism of Islamic theology has made 
violence intrinsic to Islam, while Christian logos theology, with its Greek inculturation, has 
made reasonableness and opposition to violence intrinsic to Christianity. 
The aim of this chapter is to engage critically with Ratzinger’s evaluation of Islam by 
testing it against Islamic voices participating in the dialogue of cultures. The chapter will 
examine Islam’s relationship with reason, democracy and human rights and will conclude by 
calling for a tripartite dialogue between Islam, Christianity and the secular, on the subject of 
human rights. 
Islam and the foundations of logos theology 
Our contention has been that Ratzingerian logos theology, which attempts to remain loyal to 
the Hellenized Judaeo-Christian tradition, constitutes what can be called a ‘Platonic Christian 
humanist utopia’. This is an expanded humanism, which restores the humanist ideal to its full 
dignity and rescues it from its own historical self-limitation. In several ways this humanism 
bears the authentic mark of inclusivism and universalism. Firstly, it knows that it itself is the 
result of an inclusive intercultural encounter in which elements were welcomed or corrected 
according to the criterion of truthfulness. Secondly, it does not prohibit talk of God as illicit, 
or deny the universal human capacity for transcendence or the essential universality of 
rational human nature. Thirdly, in its belief in the Logos as self-communicative Word of God 
made flesh in Christ, it rescues God from extreme transcendence, simultaneously rescuing 
humanity from a merely self-referential rationality, into a rationality fulfilled in an analogical 
relationship between God and man and therefore a relationality between human and human. 
Fourthly, it restores and draws inclusively upon centuries of ethical reflection, legal tradition 
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and societal development in its desire to go beyond the empirical and to search for the 
universal values by which the empirical is set in order. Fifthly, it clings to conscience, to the 
universal light which enlightens every man, and seeks to illuminate conscience with the 
wisdom of the great religious traditions of humanity. Nevertheless, it remains authentically 
Christian, secure in the knowledge that the delicate plant of democratic conscience, predicated 
on the dignity of the human person and the concept and culture of human rights, has grown up 
uniquely in Christian soil, and still stands today as the only secure safeguard against 
dictatorship in any of its various forms of unbridled capitalism, intolerant secularism, 
totalitarian fascism or socialism or religious extremism. 
Our task in this chapter is to search for a new logos as ‘a common word’ between the 
utopian ideals of Islamic faith and a logos theology understood as a Platonic Christian 
humanist utopia. This is a search for a broadening of reason in the form of an expanded 
humanism which can embrace the secular, the Christian and the Islamic visions of the good 
society. 
9.1:  RATZINGER, REGENSBURG AND ISLAM 
9.1.1   Criticism of Regensburg 
Ratzinger’s citation of the words of Manuel II,2 appeared to many as at best insensitive and at 
worst inflammatory:  
Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things 
only evil and inhuman...3   
                                                             
2 The Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaiologus reigned 1391-1425. 
3 The Regensburg Lecture, para.12. 
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Secular commentator Fassin says that ‘the Pope should never have expressed so candidly his 
theological views on Islam’,4  while Roman Catholic theologian Mannion finds this reference 
‘ill-advised’ and ‘grossly offensive’, accusing Ratzinger of employing ‘inaccurate, 
generalized and stereotypical accounts of the Islamic faith and its cultural heritage.’5 Corkery 
acknowledges  that Christian acts of violence would have served just as well to illustrate the 
lecture, but that Ratzinger was making a vital point: dialogue must welcome rational critique.6 
Mannion disagrees, on the grounds that Ratzinger’s superior tone ‘throws the sincerity 
and purpose of any inter-church or inter-faith dialogue into doubt.’7 He ignores the mystical 
tradition in Islam, schematizing religion in a way that is ‘crude and/or even forced.’8 Apart 
from overtly violent reactions, Makin’s Indonesian case-study helpfully identifies three 
Muslim tendencies:9 
i) Apologetic and radical stances, which are aimed at ‘closing the door to 
dialogue.’10 
ii) Less radical approaches, which engage with Regensburg, while ‘retaining the old 
suspicious attitude.’11 
                                                             
4 Eric Fassin, ‘The Geopolitics of Vatican Theology’, Public Culture, Vol.19 No.2, (Spring 2007), pp.233-237, 
at p.233. 
5 Boeve and Mannion, The Ratzinger Reader, p.146. Mannion claims that Ratzinger was advised to remove this 
passage by a number of journalists who had read the text of the lecture early in the morning of the day on which 
it was due to be delivered. Jane Kramer, claiming Vatican correspondent and friend of Pope Benedict Marco 
Politi as her source, says that journalists received the text of the lecture at 6am on the day of the address and 
assembled at 10am in a makeshift press room to advise Federico Lombardi, the Vatican spokesman, ‘that the 
passage was going to be incendiary.’ See Jane Kramer, ‘The Pope and Islam: Is there anything that Benedict 
XVI would like to discuss?’, New Yorker Magazine, 2 April 2007. Available at: 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/02/the-pope-and-islam. (Accessed: 12 December 2015). 
6 Corkery, Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological ideas, p.102 
7 Boeve and Mannion, The Ratzinger Reader, p.147. 
8 Ibid., p.149. 
9 The Regensburg Lecture was delivered on 12 September 2006, just one day after the fifth anniversary of the 
‘9/11’ terrorist attacks in the United States. Violent reactions to the lecture included attacks on Christian 
churches and the shooting dead of a 68-year-old Catholic nun, Sr. Leonella, in Mogadishu, the capital of 
Somalia, outside the children’s home where she worked. See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/5353850.stm. 
10 Al Makin, ‘Benedict XVI and Islam: Indonesian Public Reactions to the Regensburg Address’, Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol.20 No.4, pp.409-421, at p. 411. 
11 Makin, Benedict XVI and Islam, p.411. 
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iii) Progressive responses expressing a willingness to respond positively to the Pope’s 
call for dialogue.12 
Makin’s analysis is in line with Ratzinger’s view that in Islam ‘there is a broad spectrum, 
from ... absolute fanaticism ... to attitudes that are open to embrace a tolerant rationality.’13 
Makin hopes that ‘open-minded voices’ in favour of interfaith dialogue will prevail against 
‘the rising sway of radicalism.’14 Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan makes the point that 
uncontrollable outpourings of emotion ‘end up providing a living proof that Muslims cannot 
engage in reasonable debate and that verbal aggression and violence are more the rule than the 
exception’ and are often the result of Muslim leaders ‘manipulating crises of this kind as a 
safety valve for both their restive populations and their own political agenda.’15 
One serious charge against the Regensburg narrative, hinted at by Mannion, is that of 
‘orientalism’ or ‘essentialism’. These cultural stances, associated with colonialism and 
Eurocentrism, attribute fixed essences or characteristics to ‘superior’ European and ‘inferior’ 
non-European peoples.  ‘Europe’ is certainly a core concern of Ratzinger, who propounds ‘an 
essentialist understanding of Europe, revolving around Christianity, which stigmatises Islam 
as “the Other”.’16 Ratzinger’s essentialism is grounded in his story of Hellenization. Asad 
challenges this: 
There is a problem for any historian constructing a categorical boundary for 
“European civilisation”, because the populations designated by the label “Islam” are, 
                                                             
12 Makin, Benedict XVI and Islam, p.413. 
13 Values in a Time of Upheaval, p.41. This title was published in German in 2004 and 2005, and in English in 
2006. It is a compilation of eleven lectures or addresses, delivered between 1992 and 2004 and therefore 
predating the Regensburg Lecture. 
14 Makin, Benedict XVI and Islam, p.416. 
15 Cited in Jane Kramer, The Pope and Islam, op.cit. 
16 Luca Mavelli, ‘Political Church, Procedural Europe, and the Creation of the Islamic Other’, Journal of 
Religion in Europe Vol 1, (2008) pp.273 – 301, at p.276. Mavelli (p.274) defines ‘nominal proceduralism’ as ‘a 
political approach that promotes a system of communal allegiances based on the acceptance of and compliance 
with universally shared principles.’ Mavelli suggests that the rejection of all non-secular sources of moral and 
ethical judgement falls into Charles Taylor’s helpful category of a ‘social imaginary’, i.e. a system of meanings 
underpinning social institutions and organisation. 
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in great measure, the cultural heirs of the Hellenic world – the very world in which 
“Europe claims to have its roots.17 
Mavelli observes that where Ratzingerian Christians essentialise Europe as ‘Christian’, 
European secularists essentialise ‘Europe’ in terms of Habermasian ‘proceduralism’. This 
leads both to demonise Islam, as the natural enemy of both Christianity and secularism. Both 
practise a dialectic of exclusion, whereby Islamist terrorism ‘would appear not just a 
deviation, but a structural component of an irrational religion.’18 Thus Ratzinger, who sets 
himself against modernity’s restricted rationality, is unmasked as a child of modernity, whose 
‘critique of Islam ... resonates with dominant Western – and for this reason, also partly 
secularised – discourses.’ ‘Orientalism’ in theory has disappeared, under the influence of two 
opposing tendencies, globalization, which renders obsolete any notional boundaries between 
‘oriental and occidental cultures’, and postmodernism, which extols ‘the richness and 
complexity of local meanings’.19 The irony or tragedy of Regensburg, then, could be that, 
because of the perceived orientalist denigration of Islam, its auditors become deaf to its 
critique of modernity’s restricted rationality, and fail to see that this is a critique shared by 
Islam, which also has ambitions to fill the void left by the instrumental materialism and moral 
vacuity of procedural Europe. There is a threat here for Roman Catholicism, which finds itself 
attacked both by secularists and Islamists. But they also attack each other, so there is a unique 
opportunity, which Ratzinger tries to seize at Regensburg, to find commonality between all 
three, on the basis of a broadened rationality. 
                                                             
17 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), p.168. 
18 Mavelli, Political Church, Procedural Europe, p.277. Mavelli emphasises the political dimension or context 
of Regensburg, which comprises the debate over the European constitution, the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, 
the publication of the Danish cartoons, French controversies over the wearing of the veil and Turkey’s candidacy 
for membership of the European Union. Mavelli (p.279.) believes that because the Roman Catholic Church is ‘a 
transnational actor’ with a ‘global presence’ and a ‘universal vocation’, Regensburg can never be adequately 
theorised by mere philosophical and theological analyses. It is unavoidably political. 
19 Bryan S. Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, (London: Routledge, 1994), p.9. 
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9.1.2   Defence of Regensburg 
Schall admires Ratzinger’s ‘intellectual courage’ in confronting an issue which ‘had to be 
addressed by any responsible thinker seeking to understand the central issues of our era.’20 It 
was neither unfriendly nor prejudiced to ask ‘is it or is it not true that Mohammed or the 
Koran permits violence in the name of religion’ and ‘whether Islam, or many of its followers, 
thinks that it has the right and duty to use terror to further its religious goals.’21 Ratzinger 
explicitly distances himself from Manuel’s rhetoric by referring to ‘startling brusqueness, 
brusqueness which leaves us astounded.’ Furthermore, published editions contain Ratzinger’s 
footnoted apology and clarification.22 Marcinkowski notes a significant difference between 
the English translation ‘evil and inhuman’ and Ratzinger’s original German ‘bad and 
inhumane.’23 On the other hand, the published translation is a somewhat sanitised version of 
Ratzinger’s original words.24 
Reflecting on Regensburg in 2010, Ratzinger says that ‘The political reading ignored 
the fine web of argument, ripping the passage out of its context and turning it into a political 
statement.’25 He notes the success of his visit to Turkey, where he showed his respect for 
                                                             
20 Schall, The Regensburg Lecture, p.36. 
21 Ibid., p.26 and p.37. 
22 ‘In the Muslim world, this quotation has unfortunately been taken as an expression of my personal position, 
thus arousing understandable indignation. I hope that the reader can see that this sentence does not express my 
personal view of the Qur’an, for which I have the respect due to the holy book of a great religion. In quoting the 
text of the Emperor Manuel II, I intended solely to draw out the essential relationship between faith and reason. 
On this point I am in agreement with Manuel II, but without endorsing his polemic.’ 
23 Marcinkowski points out that ‘evil and inhuman’ would be ‘böses und unmenschlich’, whereas the words 
Ratzinger actually used in the Aula Magna were ‘schlechtes und inhumanes’. See Christoph Marcinkowski, 
“Religion, Reason, ‘Regensburg’: Perspectives for Catholic-Muslim Dialogue” in Islam and Civilisational 
Renewal, Vol. 1 No. 1, published and distributed by International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS) 
Malaysia, available at http://www.iais.org.my/icr/index.php/icr/article/view/251. (Accessed 24 June 2015). 
24 The word Djihad, for example, has been removed from the original spoken text, where it was used in 
apposition to ‘holy war’ (para.11). Marcinkowski also points out that where the original spoken German had 
‘wendet er sich in erstaunlich schroffer, uns überraschend schroffer Form’, (‘he addresses his interlocutor in an 
astoundingly harsh – to us surprisingly harsh – way’), the word überraschend (‘surprising’) has been redacted to 
read ‘unannehmbar’, so that the official English version now reads ‘he addresses his interlocutor with a startling 
brusquenesss, a brusqueness that we find unacceptable.’  
25 J. Ratzinger, Light of the World, p. 97. 
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Islam as ‘a great religious reality’. He concludes that ‘this controversy led to the development 
of a truly vigorous dialogue.’26 He refers to the letter written by 138 Islamic scholars 
containing an invitation to dialogue. But he still insists: ‘Islam needs to clarify two questions 
in regard to public dialogue, that is, the questions concerning its relation to violence and its 
relation to reason.’27 
9.1.3   Ratzinger beyond Regensburg 
The wider Ratzinger view of Islam is one of admiration for its religious vitality or ‘inner 
power.’28 In the light of the ‘Islamic soul reawakened’29, Ratzinger views Muslims as natural 
allies in his critique of secular modernity and an implicit challenge to ‘the deep moral 
contradictions of the West and of its internal helplessness.’30  He can empathise with the 
Muslim position: 
“We are somebody too; we know who we are; our religion is holding its ground; you 
don’t have one any longer... the Christian religion has abdicated; it really no longer 
exists as a religion; the Christians no longer have a morality or a faith; all that’s left 
are a few remains of some modern ideas of enlightenment. ... We have a moral 
message that has existed without interruption since the prophets, and we will tell the 
world how to live it, whereas the Christians certainly can’t.”31 
He knows that ‘there is a noble Islam’, and that one must not identify terrorism and Islam. 
Christianity and Islam are ‘on the same side of a common battle’ such that ‘radical secularism 
stands on one side, and the question of God, in its various forms, stands on the other.’32 His 
proposal is ‘to discover what we have in common and, wherever possible, to perform a 
                                                             
26 Light of the World, p.98. 
27 Ibid., p.98. 
28 J. Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, p.246. 
29 Ibid., p.246. 
30 Ibid., p.245. 
31 Ibid., p.246. 
32 Light of the World, pp.99-100. 
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common service in this world.’33  The contemporary secularist narrative is one of ‘enlightened 
reason’ against ‘a fundamental and fanatical form of religion,’34 but Rowland points out that 
Ratzinger does not want Islam ‘to undergo its own eighteenth-century style Enlightenment.’35 
Ratzinger’s central message is that ‘to the other cultures of the world, there is something 
deeply alien about the absolute secularism that is developing in the West’ which means that 
‘we can and must learn from that which is sacred to others.’36 
Nevertheless, he believes that there is an inherent Islamic problem in relation to 
democratic and pluralist society. The Qur‘an regulates the whole of political and social life 
and Islam does not have a separation of the political and religious sphere. This means that if it 
reduced itself to just another non-governmental organisation, ‘it would be an alienation from 
itself.’37 Ratzinger had earlier stated that ‘the separation of faith and law, of religion and tribal 
authority, was not completed in Islam and cannot be accomplished without disturbing Islam at 
the very core.’38 This was a sentiment that seems to have dominated an informal discussion 
which took place at the Ratzinger Schülerkreis at Castel Gandolfo in September 2005, just 
months after Ratzinger’s election as Pope.39 
                                                             
33 Light of the World, p.100. 
34 Ibid., p.108. 
35 Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, p.120. 
36 Ibid., p.80 and p.79. 
37 Salt of the Earth, p.244. 
38 J. Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics: New Endeavours in Ecclesiology, (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2008), p.211. The words quoted were written in 1979.  
39 The Schülerkreis (student circle) is an annual meeting between Ratzinger and a group of his former doctoral 
students. The meetings started when Ratzinger was Theology professor in Bonn and continued after he became 
Archbishop of Munich and again after he became Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 
Rome. The year before the death of John Paul II, it had already been decided that the theme of the September 
2005 Schülerkreis would be Islam. The meeting took place as usual behind closed doors over a weekend at the 
papal summer residence at Castel Gandolfo in September 2005. Although the discussions were never published, 
participant Joseph Fessio S.J. spoke of them in a radio interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show on 5 January 2006. 
The Islam experts presenting at the study weekend were Samir Khamil Samir, an Egyptian Jesuit and professor 
of Islamic Studies at the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut and at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome, and 
Christian Troll SJ, (b.1937). Troll, who delivered the main presentation at the seminar, is a graduate of the 
universities of Tübingen, Bonn, Beirut and the London School of Oriental and African Studies, with a doctorate 
in Contemporary Islamic Thought. Troll’s teaching career includes 12 years at the Vidyajyoti Institute of 
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The politicised ideology of Islamism was again uncompromisingly condemned post-
Regensburg: 
A partisan image of God, which identifies the absoluteness of God with one’s own 
community or its interests, thereby elevating something empirical and relative to a 
state of absoluteness, dissolves law and morality. The good now becomes whatever 
helps maintain one’s own power, the real distinction between good and evil 
disintegrates. This is made even worse by the fact that the intention to act on behalf of 
one’s cause is charged with a fanaticism, and thus becomes completely brutal and 
blind. God has become an idol in which human beings adore their own will.40 
When Seewald poses the challenge that ‘in countries where Islam dominates State and 
society, human rights are trampled upon and Christians are brutally oppressed’, Ratzinger 
replies: 
The important thing here is to remain in close contact with all the currents within 
Islam that are open to, and capable of dialogue, so as to give a change of mentality a 
chance to happen even where Islamism still couples a claim to truth and violence. 
The remainder of this chapter will therefore provide a brief survey of these ‘currents within 
Islam’ by listening to Islamic voices on the subject of the relationship between Islam and 
reason, human rights, democracy, religious pluralism and dignity. Islamic scholar Abdulaziz 
Sachedina has described his own project thus:  
to initiate a substantial theoretical discussion of an inclusive foundational conception 
of human rights that would appeal to suspicious traditional authorities in the Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Religious Studies in New Delhi, 5 years at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at 
the University of Birmingham and 6 years at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome. According to Fessio, Troll 
concurred with the position of Fazlur Rahman, that Islam is capable of reinterpreting the Qu‘ran and reconciling 
itself to democracy, human rights and to other religious cultures. Fessio also reports that Ratzinger, while very 
keen that this should happen, is uncertain as to the possibility of such a move, given that it would require such a 
radical overhaul of Islam’s understanding of itself. See Sandro Magister, ‘Islam and Democracy: A Secret 
Meeting at Castel Gandolfo’, online post available at http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/45084?eng=y 
(Accessed: 23 January 2016). It should be noted that this was a private, not a ‘secret’ meeting. 
40 Light of the World, p.109. 
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world, apparently threatened by secular ideologies that they believe are determined to 
destroy the spiritual and moral foundations of a global community to make room for 
liberal secular ideas of inalienable human rights. 
My aim is to follow the trajectory indicated by both Ratzinger and Sachedina in order to 
clarify the principles at stake and to identify the strategies which might endorse their projects. 
For the sake of clarity, this enquiry will be conducted under three headings, reason, 
democracy and human rights. 
9.2:  ISLAM AND REASON 
9.2.1   A strong relationship 
…the Qur‘an,...in numerous verse, invites individuals, or the community, to reflect 
and reason independently.  
With these words Islamic scholar Abdullahi Ahmed An Na‘im seeks to rehabilitate a 
foundational intimacy between Islam and rationality. For him ‘human reflection and 
understanding is the whole purpose of the Qur‘an.’41 A Common Word, the Islamic scholars’ 
response to Regensburg, includes a tripartite vision of rationality which feels very close to 
both the Platonic and the Christian:  
…the mind or the intelligence, which is made for comprehending the truth; the will 
which is made for freedom of choice, and sentiment which is made for loving the good 
and the beautiful.42 
Indeed, the document refers to the Shema,43 where love of God involves heart (lev), soul 
(nefesh) and strength or might (me’od). Matthew uses heart (kardia), soul (psyche), and mind, 
                                                             
41 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im and Louis Henkin, ‘Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate’, 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol.94 (April 5-8, 2000), pp.95-
103, at p.98. An Na‘im cites verse 12 of chapter 2 and verse 43 of chapter 3. 
42 Available at www.acommonword.com. (Accessed: 6 July 2015). 
43 Deuteronomy 6:4-5 
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rationality or intellect (dianoia),44 where Mark has will or strength (ischys).45 The document is 
advocating the full breadth of rationality represented by the Qur‘anic ‘heart’, as ‘the organ of 
spiritual and metaphysical knowledge.’46 In the Qur‘an there is a unity of ontology, 
epistemology and ethics: 
God orders people to fear Him as much as possible, and to listen (and thus to 
understand the truth); to obey (and thus to will the good), and to spend (and thus to 
exercise love and virtue.’47 
Sachedina is a key Islamic interlocutor who places rationality at the heart of Islam: 
In Islam, human ability to know right from wrong is part of the divine endowment for 
humanity through the very creation of human nature (fitra), the receptacle of intuitive 
reason.48 
The whole process of Qur‘anic interpretation constitutes a profound synthesis of faith and 
reason: 
Revelation actually depended on reason for its validity; and reason sought to validate 
its conclusions by showing their correlation to the revelation.’49 
Delacoura likewise sees reason at the heart of Islam because although shar‘ia is based on the 
Qur‘an, ‘considerable leeway’ is allowed in interpretation, drawing on hadith, what the 
Prophet said or did, ijtihad, independent reasoning and ijma, legal consensus.50 Johnson also 
finds the Qur‘an repeatedly exhorting its readers to use their reason (‘acquala).51 Ijtihad plays 
                                                             
44 Matthew 22:37 
45 Mark 12:30 
46 A Common Word, p.14. footnote iv. 
47 Ibid., p.6. 
48 Abdulaziz Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p.38. 
49 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.38. 
50 Katerina Delacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for International Relations, (London, 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998, revised edition 2003), p.65. 
51 David L. Johnston, ‘Islam and Human Rights: A Growing Rapprochement?’, American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, Vol.74, No.1 (January 2015), pp.113-148 at p.132. 
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an important role in El Fadl’s understanding of the process of shar‘ia, through which human 
beings are ‘charged with the duty to investigate a problem diligently and then follow the 
results of their own ijtihad.’52 As their conclusion on Islamic rationality, the post-Regensburg 
scholars’ letter claimed that  
In their most mature and mainstream forms the intellectual explorations of Muslims 
through the ages have maintained a consonance between the truths of the Qur‘anic 
revelation and the demands of human intelligence, without sacrificing one for the 
other.53 
To put it another way ‘The human mind should not be restricted or crippled by the other gift 
of God, which is represented in his guiding messages.’54 
9.2.2   Hellenization of Islam and Islamization of Christianity 
The failure to acknowledge this tradition of ijtihad can be deemed a significant lacuna in the 
Regensburg narrative. An equally noticeable omission is a theme which might be called ‘the 
Hellenization of Islam.’ Islam has its own philosophers, the falāsifa.  These were Muslims, 
Christians and Jews ‘committed to the legacy of Greek philosophy, mainly a Neoplatonic 
interpretation of Aristotelianism.’55 Islam has its own philosophy of religion, called the 
kalam, a term applied to the standard version of the cosmological argument.56 Ibn Sina 
adopted Aristotle’s substance/accident distinction via the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and 
                                                             
52 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam, p.138 of online resource. Available 
at:  www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/Wanted-KAEF-EN.pdf. (Accessed 6 July 2015). This online version is 
an edited version of an article first published in Joseph Runzo and Nancy Martin, (eds.), Human Rights and 
Responsibilities, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003). 
53 Open Letter: Written and Signed by leading Muslim Scholars and Leaders in response to Pope Benedict XVI’s 
remarks on Islam at the Regensburg Lecture. Available at: theislamicmonthly.com/open-letter-to-pope-benedict-
xvi. (Accessed 6 July 2015). 
54 Fathi Osman, ‘Democracy and the Concept of Shura’ in Alan Race and Ingrid Shafer (eds.) Religions in 
Dialogue: From theocracy to democracy, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp.85-97, at p.87. 
55 Zain Ali, Faith, Philosophy and the Reflective Muslim, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p.160.  
56 Kerr points out that Aquinas’ ‘Third Way’, the belief that God is ipsum esse subsistens, is found in Ibn Sina 
and also in Plato, Aristotle, and Philo. See Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas, p.71. 
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Proclus.57 Burrell reminds us that ‘the cultural heritage embodied in notable achievements in 
medicine, mathematics, astronomy, as well as logic, philosophical commentary, translation, 
and original work in metaphysics begun in tenth-century Baghdad, represented a legacy 
coveted by western medieval thinkers.’58 
Kraemer lists the broader tenets of Greek inculturation, adopted by both Roman, 
Christian and Islamic culture: a sense of the unity of humankind, a commitment to the 
formation of intellect and character and ‘humaneness’, or love of mankind. Many writers have 
studied this ‘Islamic Humanism’, locating it in particular in the Mu’tazilite School: 
The intellectual weapons wielded by the Mu’tazilites in their polemics with heretics 
and non-Muslims were foreign concepts and modes of discourse. After this initial step, 
interest in Greek sources grew, Greek authors were translated into Arabic, and even 
the state authorities lent their support to the translation activity.59 
Kraemer shows that this is a particularly German debate, in which Troeltsch and Jaeger 
essentialised Islam as Oriental and ‘other’, while Becker and Schaeder included Islam in the 
Western / European story.60 According to Kraemer, all these authors have doubts about the 
                                                             
57 See F.C. Copleston, Aquinas: An Introduction to the Life and Work of the Great Medieval Thinker, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1955), p.88 and David B. Burrell, ‘Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers’, in Norman 
Kretzman and Eleonore Stump (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp.60-84 at p.71. 
58 Burrell, ‘Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers’, p.61. 
59 Joel L. Kraemer, ‘Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: A Preliminary Study’, Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, Vol.104, No 1, Studies in Islam and the Ancient Near East Dedicated to Franz Rosenthal 
(January – March 1984), pp. 135 -164, at p.142. See also J. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), Marcel A. Boisard, Humanism in Islam, (Indianapolis, IN: American Trust 
Publications, 1988), originally published in 1961 in Paris by Albin Michel, and Lenn E. Goodman, Islamic 
Humanism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Boisard (p.6) reminds the West that ‘the civilization which 
took charge of the Mediterranean culture for the seven centuries of the Middle Ages was that of Islam’, while 
Goodman (p.4) says that ‘Every Western historian knows that between classical antiquity and the modern age, 
“the Arabs - Muslim thinkers and scientists ... brought to the West a new knowledge of philosophy, mathematics, 
astronomy and medicine.’ 
60 Kraemer draws on the following works: E. Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Erste Buch: Das 
logische Problem der Geschichtphilosophie in Gesamte Schriften, III (Tübingen, 1922), W. Jaeger, 
Humanistische Reden und Vorträge, C.H. Becker, ‘Der Islam als Problem’ in Islamstudien (Leipzig, 1924), 
H.H. Schaeder, ‘Der Orient und das griechische Erbe’ in Der Mensch im Orient und Okzident, ed. G. Schaeder, 
(Munich, 1960). 
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depth and efficacy of the Greek / Islamic inculturation and the true extent of Islam’s 
appropriation of classical ‘humanism’. Kraemer reports Schaeder’s view of the ‘tragic 
sterility’ of the Greek heritage in the Orient. The goal of Oriental culture was not humanitas 
but salvation (Heilung) and redemption (Erlösung). No concept was developed of the ‘free, 
virtuous citizen’. Greek texts were translated from the 9th century onwards, but only for 
utilitarian purposes, serving religion and science. Avicenna was a mere ‘compiler’, of little 
significance for Islamic science or culture. In Schaeder’s view, ‘Though logos or ratio 
permeated the entire spiritual production of the Orientals, it did not transform the Oriental 
spirit.’61  
Kraemer then counters this view with a detailed account of ‘the Renaissance of Islam’, 
focusing on the work of the falāsifa of the 9th century ‘Abbāsid epoch, and their emphasis on 
education and cultural refinement.62 A key concept for Kraemer is insāniyya, the rational 
human nature shared by all mankind. Sachedina believes that it was the ‘rationalist impulse’ 
already present in the Qur‘an that enabled the Mu’tazilite (and Shi’ite) theologians to speak 
about ‘the innate moral worth of humanity’ and to advocate ‘a substantial role for human 
reason to discern moral truth.’63 
The ‘Islamization of Christianity’ is a way of expressing the commonplace theme in 
cultural history of the role played by Islam in the preservation, discovery and dissemination of 
classical texts in the early Middle Ages.  The most significant locus of this process for 
                                                             
61 Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, pp.141-142. 
62 Johnston, p.129, explains that it was during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph Mamoun (813-833 C.E.) that the 
rationalist school of the Mu’tazilites became the dominant creed. An important doctrine, which the Caliph 
endorsed, was the Mu’tazilite teaching that the Qur’an was created by God, and so was not an eternal entity in 
itself. 
63 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.86. 
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Christian theology is Aquinas, where the influence of ‘Avicenna’ is widely acknowledged.64 
Aquinas was remarkable for ‘the depth and breadth’ of his respect for Islamic Avicenna and 
the Jewish Maimonides, seeing both as ‘valued co-workers in the vast project of clarifying 
and supporting revealed doctrine by philosophical analysis and argumentation.’65 He 
respected them as ‘fellow travellers’ and was willing ‘to learn from them in his search for 
truth.’66 
9.2.3   A relationship ruptured 
The ‘Hellenization of Islam’ and the debt owed to Islam by Roman Catholic theology, found 
no place in the Regensburg Lecture. However, Ratzinger is fully aware that ‘again and again 
over the course of history there has been rapprochement between Islam and the intellectual 
world of Greece.’ But he is equally convinced that ‘it has never lasted’ and so firmly believes, 
over 25 years before Regensburg, that Islam ‘shuts itself off from Greek rationality and the 
resulting culture.’67 A key protagonist in this story is Al-Ghazālī, who serves both as a symbol 
of philosophical Islam, and of its repudiation.68 His Incoherence of the Philosophers used 
philosophical reasoning to attack the philosophical reasoning of the falāsifa. His work is still 
                                                             
64 Kerr, (p.213, note 13) states that ‘Abu ‘Ali al Husain ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Sina (990 -1037), ‘Avicenna’ to 
Thomas, Muslim philosopher, physician to Iranian princes, wrote in Arabic but widely known in Hebrew and 
Latin translations; at least as significant as Aristotle in Thomas’ philosophical framework.’ Nichols holds that 
‘Thomas’ own metaphysics are closer to those of the Muslim thinker Avicenna than they are to Aristotle.’ See 
Aidan Nichols O.P., Discovering Aquinas: An Introduction to his Life, Work and Influence, (London: Darton, 
Longman and Todd, 2002), p. 45. 
Kerr, (p.7 and p.207) further states that Aquinas’ first composition, De ente et essentia, is ‘heavily indebted to 
Ibn Sina’ and gives Aquinas the opportunity to expound ‘the metaphysical doctrines held in common by 
Christians, Jews and Muslims at the time.’ Kerr comes to a major conclusion that ‘We have to find ways of 
reading Thomas that put him into conversation ...with Ibn Sina ...’, a conclusion he draws from the work of 
David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), and 
Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). 
65 Kretzman and Stump, The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, p.10 
66 Ibid., pp.60 and 61. 
67 Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism, and Politics, p.211. These words are taken from a chapter entitled ‘Europe: A 
Heritage with Obligations for Christians,’ which was originally published in 1979 in the Katholische Academie 
Bayern, as ‘Europa – verpflichtendes Erbe für die Christen.’ 
68 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (c1058 – 1111) was a Muslim theologian, jurist, philosopher and mystic of Persian 
descent. 
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highly revered, and reveals ‘a sceptical attitude toward the reliability of human reason, and 
the conviction that religious belief is sui generis.’69 The alternative view is that Islam affords 
the human mind extensive scope for creativity to cope with change, since ‘the human mind is 
also God’s gift which has to be fully used and developed.’70 
Here Ratzinger finds support from Islamic commentators who regret the triumph of 
Ash’arite over Mu’tazilite theology, and agree with Ratzinger that what is at stake is 
theological voluntarism and divine transcendence. Sachedina admires Mu’tazilite thought and 
regrets that historically the Sunni ulema prevailed.71 This promoted Ash’arite theological 
voluntarism that taught the primacy of God’s will over the intellect, ‘which led to identifying 
morality with divine positive law and denying that ethical values can have any other 
foundation but the will of God.’72 Bin Talal also bemoans the suppression of Mu’tazilite 
humanism.73 Like Ratzinger, Sachedina sees the debate over theological voluntarism as a 
lynchpin in the Islamic rupture with reason: 
For the Sunni ulema, nature and reason were insufficient for ethics. An action is not 
good because it is construed so by the essential nature of a human being, but because 
God so wills.74 
This meant that there was no standard of good and evil, however minimal, available to all 
rational creatures, such that 
The notion of God as an unlimited and arbitrary power implied reduction of all moral 
laws to inscrutable manifestations of divine omnipotence.75 
                                                             
69 Ali, Faith, Philosophy and the Reflective Muslim, p.45.  
70 Osman, Democracy and the Concept of Shura, p.87. 
71 Ulema is a term for a body of Muslim scholars who are recognized as having specialist knowledge of Islamic 
sacred law and theology. See www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ulema 
72 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.86. 
73 El Hasan bin Talal, ‘Religion, Common Values and Dialogue’, in Race and Shafer, Religions in Dialogue, 
pp.xv – xx, at p.xv. 
74 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.86. 
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Mayer laments ‘the pervasive hostility on the part of members of the Islamic establishment 
toward rationalist currents in Islamic philosophy.’76 Rahman also bemoans the victory of the 
Ash’arite School, ‘which reduced man to impotence in the interests of saving the omnipotence 
of God.’77 Delacoura wants to insist that ‘the door of ijtihad was never really shut,’ but 
implicitly concurs with Ratzinger’s call for a balance between reason and revelation. She sees 
the marginalization of Mu’tazilite thought as a lost opportunity for a rational culture to 
become established in the Islamic world.78 Nevertheless, we should remember that in the 
Shi’ite world, philosophy and the use of ijtihad for deducing new laws for new situations 
continued to be used, ‘if not to flourish.’79 Conversely, Shaukat Ali accepts that over time 
ijtihad ‘lost more and more of its creativity.’80 El Fadl also concedes that ‘puritan’ Islam 
holds that ‘dominion belongs to God alone, who is the sole legislator and lawmaker’ and so 
considers ‘all moral approaches that defer to intuition, reason, contractual obligations, or 
social and political consensus to be inherently whimsical and illegitimate.’81 
9.3:  ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
We have seen in our discussion of the Habermas debate how Ratzinger positions Christianity 
in relation to the procedural rationality of liberal democracy and the legal framework of the 
secular state. We have also heard Ratzinger’s view that Islam does not match Christianity’s 
de-sacralization of the state and cannot accommodate itself to pluralist society without 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
75 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.86. 
76 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ‘The Dilemmas of Islamic Identity’, in Leroy S. Rouner (ed.) Human Rights and the 
World’s Religions, (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp.94 – 110, at p.95. 
77 Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes in the Qur’an, (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994), p.23. As noted 
above (note 41), it was Rahman’s attempt to reinterpret the themes of the Qu‘ran for contemporary Muslims that 
informed Troll’s presentation of Islam to Ratzinger at the September 2005 Castel Gandolfo Schulerkreis. 
78 Delacoura refers to B. Lewis, The Arabs in History, (London: Hutchinson, 1970), pp. 139 – 143. 
79 Johnston, Islam and Human Rights, p.134. 
80 Zeenat Shaukat Ali, ‘Democracy at the Heart of Islam’, in Race and Shafer, Religions in Dialogue, pp. 99-109, 
at p.105. 
81 El Fadl, The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam, p.122. The puritanical rebellion of the Khawarij 
school took place as early as the 7th century C.E. In the debate about God’s sovereignty, the ‘hakimiyyat Allah’, 
the puritans insisted that ‘dominion belongs to God.’ See El Fadl, p.133. 
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betraying its essence. We must also acknowledge that there is a widespread view that, because 
of its foundational commitment to the inseparability of religion, law and governance, Islam is 
essentially incompatible with secular democracy. The issue of shari‘a law is generally 
regarded as central to this debate. 
An examination of these issues can be found in the work of An Na‘im.  He is useful 
for this study because of the prolific and comprehensive nature of his output, which represents 
both indigenous Sudanese and U.S.- based Islam, and involves both theoretical and empirical 
research. An Na‘im enjoys a high status in the academy and has been calling for ‘an Islamic 
Reformation’ since 1990.82 Drawing on range of An Na‘im sources, I will organise his 
contribution into foundational principles and a positive proposal. 
9.3.1   Foundational principles 
The principle of interpretation is fundamental. Islamic Law is not of the same status as the 
Qur‘an. Although it is derived from the fundamental divine sources of Islam, the Qur‘an and 
Sunna, Shari‘a is not itself divine, but is the product of human interpretation of those 
sources.83 It is derived from ‘human understanding in specific historical context.’84 It does not 
‘descend from heaven ready-made.’85 Since interpretations differ, there is no Islamic 
consensus or authoritative guide to the content of Islamic Law. This is a positive feature 
                                                             
82 An Na‘im is a Sudanese-born Islamic scholar who holds degrees from the Universities of Edinburgh and 
Cambridge. At the time of writing An Na‘im teaches at Emory University where he is the Charles Howard 
Candler Professor of Law as well as Senior Fellow of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion. An-Na‘im 
teaches courses in international law, comparative law, human rights, and Islamic law and has conducted research 
into women and land in Africa, Islamic family law and the role of shari‘a. 
83 Abdullahi Ahmed An Na‘im, Toward and Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and 
International Law, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p.185. 
84 An Na‘im and Henkin, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality Debate, p.97. 
85 An Na‘im takes this phrase from Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1998), p.116. 
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which points to ‘a clear appreciation of the permanent social, cultural and political diversity 
among Muslims’, particularly in relation to their understanding of Islam.86 
An Na‘im is painfully aware of the negative principle of power and its abuse. This is 
seen when particular interpretations are attributed to God and then used to silence alternative 
interpretations.87 There is a tendency in religion for the ‘guardians of orthodoxy’ to claim 
‘eternal validity’ for their own legal interpretations and practices.88 Uncertainty of 
interpretation ‘opens the door to manipulation’ by political élites.89 
Islamists often draw on the negative principle or myth of ‘original perfection’. 
‘Islamic State’ narratives are then built on the imperative of restoring the lost historical 
realization of divine law, associated by some with the Prophet’s rule in Medina, by others 
with the subsequent rule of the four Caliphs. An Na‘im points out that there is no agreement 
about the nature of the ‘Medina model’ or how it could be applied today. The result is 
obsession with ‘an unrealistic ideal that is honoured only in theory but never in practice,’90 the 
pursuit of an objective ‘that can never be realized anywhere.’91  
A key principle in An Na‘im’s thought is that the very concept of Islamic state law is 
flawed. There may be states which claim to be predicated on ‘Islamic law’, but in the absence 
of any authoritative version of such a law, it falls to the state to determine the content of 
                                                             
86 Abdullahi Ahmed An Na‘im, ‘Why Should Muslims Abandon Jihad? Human Rights and the Future of 
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‘Islamic law’.92  Whatever law a state develops is actually secular state law, not Islamic law. 
Once Islamic law becomes state law, therefore, it is secular, not religious in nature. Islamic 
law and state law are therefore distinct, both in theory and in practice, and the notion of an 
Islamic state is ‘a contradiction in terms.’93  Furthermore, any Islamic state law would have to 
be imposed, because its proponents ‘would not permit each other the freedom to disagree.’94 
Farhang would add that a unified legal system, accepted by all Muslims, simply does not 
exist. Indeed, he points out that ‘Muslims, for the greater part of their history, have lived 
under regimes which had only the most tenuous link with shari‘a or the religious law.’95 The 
principle that religious adherence must be voluntary underpins An Na‘im’s hopes for an 
Islamic reformation. He opens his 2008 study with this declaration: 
In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only way one can 
be a Muslim, I need a secular state. 
We see here a belief in a style of faith based on personal decision and an aversion to state-
imposed belief and practice. ‘Self-determination’ is ‘a core human value’ as well as a global 
political reality.96 He expresses his stance pithily: ‘human beings do not truly believe, where 
disbelief is not an option.’97 This is no mere concession to Western secular modernity. He 
claims support from 114 Qur‘anic verses, which show that ‘human agency, ... was integral to 
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the revelation, interpretation, and practice of Islam from its beginning in the seventh 
century.’98 
At the heart of Islam An Na‘im finds the principle of reciprocity. If Muslims reflect on 
this principle, the idea that ‘one should concede to others what one claims for oneself,’99 they 
will realise that violence is ‘unproductive’ and that ‘the Golden Rule is the constant, simple, 
yet totally comprehensive standard.’100 An Na‘im has always believed that the Golden Rule 
‘is shared by all the major religious traditions of the world.’101 
9.3.2 A practical proposal  
An Na‘im’s prime proposal is for Shari‘a reform. Underlying his position is the awareness 
that Islamic law was developed in the 8th-9th centuries C.E., and the need for an adaptation to 
new contexts:  
…it is simply impossible for the same principles of Shari‘a formulated by Muslim 
jurists more than thirteen centuries ago to remain the only valid law of Islam.102 
Muslim understanding of Shari‘a could be transformed with the help of the Islamic concepts 
of shura (consultation) and mu‘wada (reciprocity).103 An Na‘im accepts that the search for 
‘credible agents of internal religious change’ is challenging.104 The emphasis is on the 
‘internal’. He emphasizes ‘the need to work from within the culture and to preserve its 
integrity.’105 In order to reform, Muslims must draw on the ‘symbols of their own culture’ and 
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history.106 Commentators like Usama Hasan agree that ‘the task of reformation is primarily 
for Muslims’ and that it has been in progress since the Ottoman reforms of the middle of the 
nineteenth century.107 
Rationality in the form of reasonable dialogue is also fundamental to An Na‘im’s 
practical vision. He is happy to endorse a quasi-Habermasian / Rawlsian procedural 
rationality, whereby Muslims may bring their religious commitments into the public sphere, 
but only by translating them into the language all can share: ‘they must provide civic reasons 
through a civic reasoning process in which all citizens can participate without reference to 
religion.’108 An Na‘im spends some time distinguishing his own ‘civic reasoning’ from 
Habermas’ communicative action and Rawls’ political liberalism, but concludes that he is 
right not to invest in too detailed a view of the subject. He defines ‘civic reason’ as  
…the requirement that the rationale and purpose of public policy or legislation be 
based on the sort of reasoning that most citizens can accept or reject and use to make 
counterproposals through public debate without reference to religious belief as such.109 
An Na‘im proposes a Ratzinger-style reconciliation with the secular, which can be summed 
up as a ‘yes’ to secularity and a ‘no’ to secularism. He accepts that the secular state ‘should 
neither favour nor disfavour one particular tradition over another,’ because its purpose is ‘to 
unite diverse communities of belief and practice into one political community precisely and 
only because the moral claims it makes are minimal.110 At the same time he supports 
Henkin’s dictum that ‘No country can develop effectively if its development excludes 
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participation on grounds of religion.’111 He rejects secularist indifference to, or rejection or 
exclusion of religion or religious considerations.112 Muslims have the right to propose public 
policy and / or legislation, provided that they can support their proposals in ways that are 
open to public debate.113  There is no reason why Shari‘a ‘should not play a role in shaping 
and developing ethical norms and values that can be reflected in general legislation and public 
policy through the democratic political process.’  
9.3.3 Conclusion 
An Na‘im represents precisely the ‘currents of thought’ sought by Ratzinger. He shares 
Ratzinger’s key propositions on the right relationship between religion, the procedural 
rationality of liberal democracy, and the legal framework of the secular state. An Na‘im offers 
an intriguing ‘dialectic of compatibility and incompatibility.’114 Identification of religion and 
state constitutes a mutual betrayal of their respective identities and purposes. But in order to 
preserve the mutual health of both, religion cannot and must not be separated from politics. 
Muslim states should concede the theoretical incoherence and practical impossibility 
of a totalizing religious Islamic law. Secularists should concede the injustice of a totalizing 
and exclusionary secularism. Muslim states should be allowed and encouraged to let Islamic 
law underpin state law. They can provide the pre-political foundations both for personal 
morality and the broader ethical orientations on which all legal systems and polities depend, 
regardless of whether they are ‘religious’ or ‘secular.’  
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We can usefully remind ourselves that as early as the 1920s Hassan al Banna, founder 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, affirmed that democracy was not incompatible with Islam.115 We 
can also cling to the conviction that Islamic approaches to society may not be inherently 
democratic, but ‘they are certainly not irreconcilable with democracy’ and ‘there is no 
theoretical obstacle to democracy in Islam, no anti-democratic theology.’116 
9.4:  ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
An Na‘im has endeavoured to open up a space in which Islam seeks reconciliation with liberal 
modernity without capitulation to secularism or materialism, and has sought an 
accommodation with the culture of human rights, without compromise to the integrity of 
Islam. This enterprise presupposes a question: the compatibility of Islam and human rights. 
This section will explore the three narratives of incompatibility, compatibility and consensus.  
9.4.1    Narratives of incompatibility 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides an important starting point for 
incompatibility narratives, since it is often claimed that Muslim voices were not heard in the 
1946-48 drafting process. This argument tends to be based on the fact that few African and 
Asian states participated, Western manners and languages predominated, ‘non-Western’ 
representatives were fully Westernized.117 This view can be expressed thus: 
These laws were not adopted by nations but by a small clique of lawyers, bureaucrats 
and intellectuals who are highly westernized and most of whom have absolutely 
nothing to do with the cultures in which most of their fellow nationals live.118 
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However, Waltz has done important work to dispel the myth of Muslim absence, non-
involvement or exclusion from the process of drafting the Universal Declaration.119 Her 
detailed research into the United Nations records enables her to establish ‘the active 
engagement’ of delegations from the Muslim world over the twenty-year period from 1946 to 
1966.120 In fact, one of the greatest Muslim achievements was the inclusion of the opening 
article of both the 1966 and 1976 covenants: ‘All peoples have the right of self-
determination.’ Morsink likewise dismisses as a myth the idea that ‘something went wrong 
way back at the beginning.’121 He explains that the religious drafters welcomed a secular 
framework because it was inclusive and because they agreed on ‘independent access to the 
basic truths of morality.’122 
Incompatibility narratives of Islam and human rights were strengthened by Asian 
delegates at the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, based on a putative dichotomy 
between Western individualism, based on rights, and Asian or ‘Eastern’ communitarian 
values, based on obligation. The success of such an analysis would have conceded to ‘Asian’ 
cultures the right to selectivity and non-implementation of certain human rights. The 
argument from ‘Asia’/’Islam’ would be that 
International human rights fall within the historical continuum of the European 
colonial project in which whites pose as the saviours of a benighted and savage non-
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European world ... Thus human rights reject the cross-fertilization of cultures and 
instead seek the transformation of non-Western cultures by Western cultures.123 
The adverse effects of colonialism and Christian mission may be the hidden motivators, 
drawing ‘Islam’ into a polarized ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative.  Mawdudi, for example, 
complains that  
The people in the West have the habit of attributing every good thing to themselves 
and try to prove that it is because of them that the world got this blessing.124 
Panikkar sees Western secular rights as only one ‘window’ through which to view problems 
of ‘a just human order.’125 Without doubting the sincerity of such interlocutors, Mayer warns 
us that some incompatibility postures may be proposed to ‘insulate the conduct of modern 
nation states from scrutiny.’126 Some Western thinkers, influenced by postcolonial guilt and 
postmodern relativism, endorse this stance with critiques of Western civilizational 
hegemony.127 Pollis and Schwab are influential Western proponents of a questioning of the 
Western human rights approach.128 A key riposte to this whole approach is to recall that, in 
the face of those ‘Asian’ voices that expounded an Asian exceptionalism, the 1993 Vienna 
Conference reaffirmed that ‘the universal nature of these rights is beyond question.’ 
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Closely related to this argument is a widespread sense of the broader incompatibility 
of secular human rights universalism and religious cultural particularity. This is a more 
serious point. It seems valid to question why centuries-old religious cultures, ‘deeply rooted 
in the lives, beliefs and values of billions of people,’ should yield to recently-minted human 
rights standards.129  Asad, for example, questions why Islam should accord to secular human 
rights the status of ‘a transcendent truth’ when in reality the secular rationality of rights is 
implicated in a panoply of political and economic presumptions and ‘heavily invested in myth 
and violence.’130 Secularists have a tendency to portray Muslims as ‘frenzied, irrational, 
thoughtless and brutal,’ forgetting that Christianity and secularism were to some extent forged 
by ‘fanatics of destruction.’131 There may be fundamental contradictions between secular 
rights and religious Islam: 
Islam does not recognise such ideology. Man for Islam does not possess inborn rights, 
rather he has a radical obligation toward God ... Islam is not going to abandon its 
worldview simply because another civilization has decided to disband religion and has 
put human rights above divine rights.132 
It would be wrong to avoid the specific incompatibilities which loom large in the Western 
imagination, especially ‘aspects of the rights of women and freedom of religion and belief.’133 
Without detailed consideration of these complex issues, it is worth noting that it cannot be 
surprising that Islamic law from the 8th – 11th centuries C.E. is incompatible in certain 
respects with human rights law developed in recent history. We can add that, as observed 
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earlier, ‘Islamic law’ is always state law, and, as such, can always be rendered compatible 
with human rights law by being reformed.134  Nevertheless, Ignatieff makes Ratzinger’s point, 
that ‘the Western separation of church and state, of secular and religious authority, is alien to 
the jurisprudence of political thought of the Islamic tradition.’135 Sachedina, meanwhile, 
candidly catalogues Islamic human rights violations as intolerance and violence against 
religious minorities, disregard for the rights of women, lack of democracy, constitutionalism 
and citizenship.136 Cerna lists countries which invoke Shari‘a law just to avoid the full 
implementation of human rights treaties.137 Whatever we say about the specifics, we must 
never lose sight of the warning given by Cerna: change in Islam can only come from within; it 
cannot be imposed from outside.138 The universalities are there in the form of ‘elementary 
values’ such as ‘an essential equality of human beings’ and this can be ‘a starting point for a 
debate.’139 But the debate must initially be internal to Islam, not imposed from without. 
To conclude by turning from the specific to the general, the issue of the compatibility 
of Islam with human rights involves a high-stakes debate between universalism, which 
demands compatibility, and relativism, which allows incompatibility. Excessive universalism 
or absolutism leads to a denial of the integrity of local cultures. Excessive relativism or 
cultural pluralism leads to an acceptance of the inhumane, and fails what I will call ‘the Nazi 
test.’140 Renteln takes the balanced view that ‘diversity be recognized’ without destroying the 
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possibility of an international moral order and calls for a Ratzingeresque broadening of human 
rights ‘which incorporates diverse concepts.’141 In order to counteract the ‘caricatured picture’ 
of relativism,142 she helpfully unpacks a variety of ‘relativisms.’143 She concludes that 
‘relativism is compatible with the existence of cross-cultural universals.’144 The implication is 
that the compatibility of rights with Islam can be found through empirical research into these 
cross-cultural universals. 
9.4.2   Narratives of compatibility 
An Na‘im insists that the idea of the incompatibility of Islam and human rights has no ‘factual 
or normative’ basis.145 Peters also warns against ‘methodological flaws’ which involve a 
failure to recognise that in comparing ‘human rights’ and ‘Islam’ we are not comparing like 
with like.146 However, some Islamic compatibility narratives may be equally lacking in any 
factual or normative basis. Certain Islamic apologists, such as Mawdudi, offer ‘strained 
readings’ of the Qur‘an in an attempt to demonstrate that the Universal Declaration was 
anticipated in 7th century Islam.147 Madjid may be guilty of this approach when he avers that 
in his farewell speech ‘the Prophet elaborated the principles which today would be called 
‘Human Rights’ and ‘the whole process of the development and the perfection of Prophet 
Muhammed’s sacred mission culminated in his declaration of the principles of human 
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rights.’148 A further example from a different source is the statement that ‘fourteen hundred 
years ago, Islam gave to humanity an ideal code of human rights.’149 Mawdudi-style 
approaches produce a faux compatibility, ‘a superficial and uncritical “Islamization” of 
human rights’ which falls into the trap of essentialism.150 The use of isolated Qur‘anic verses, 
‘quoted out of context and without reference to the classical exegetical tradition’ displays 
‘intellectual poverty,’151 or ‘lethargy.’152 Such apologetics tend to produce ‘pietistic fictions 
about the presumed perfection of Islam,’153 ignore the fact that ‘there is no unequivocal 
language of human rights per se in Islamic sources.’154 The end-result is invariably ‘a one-
sided and uncritical Islamization of human rights language at the expense of both the 
universalism and the emancipatory spirit of human rights.’155 It might be better to admit that 
while there is much in Muslim tradition that could be used to support a human rights policy, 
‘the contemporary concept of human rights does not occur.’156 
Usama Hasan finds compatibility between the Ottoman royal decree of 1839, giving 
equal citizenship rights to Jews, Christians and Muslims and the Universal Declaration of 
1948. He refers to Turkish scholar Recep Senturk, who pointed out that in 1948 the Turkish 
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scholars of Islamic law such as Kazim Kadri and Ali Fuat Basgil welcomed the Universal 
Declaration as consistent with Islamic law and declared that its ‘universal concept of the 
human’ deserves the support of Muslims.157 
Another popular shortcut to compatibility (and universality) is the restriction of human 
rights to a ‘thin’ theory of rights, free from foundational commitments or comprehensive 
doctrines. Human rights thus become a purely human political construct, centered especially 
around the ‘first generation’ civil and political rights. The point is that as human beings, set in 
political contexts, Muslims have the same rights to, and need of, the universal provisions of 
the human rights conventions as any and every citizen. Inquiry into the source and grounding 
of the agreements is irrelevant and divisive.  Thus Mayer would prefer that Muslims spend 
time considering ‘what freedoms most need protection in light of the patterns of governmental 
human rights abuses.’158 Waltz favours this ‘constructive’ approach on the grounds that 
foundational approaches ‘may needlessly polarize and alienate.’159 
Sachedina, however, is not so sure that compatibility can be derived merely from the 
pragmatic efficacy of rights in ‘protecting human agency.’160 Such a retreat from 
foundationalism opens wide the door to cultural relativism behind which Muslim political 
actors can hide ‘their lack of commitment to promoting certain freedoms for their Muslim as 
well as non-Muslim citizens.’ Absent an ‘Islamic’ foundation, human rights are vulnerable to 
rejection as a ‘secular European religion.’161 On the other hand, it is precisely to avoid rights 
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becoming a religion, or humanist idolatry, that Ignatieff expounds his theoretical 
minimalism.162 
In fact, Sachedina and Ignatieff are not far apart. Ignatieff proposes that ‘the 
grounding of human rights in a defence of human agency is widely acceptable across many 
cultures,’163 while Sachedina’s premiss is that ‘liberal views about human individuality, 
dignity and agency are compatible with Islamic revelation as developed in Muslim 
philosophical theology and juridical methodology to understand human personhood.’164 
Ratzinger would strongly endorse Sachedina’s point that Ignatieff’s denial of 
foundationalism, although proposed as inclusive, involves the imposition of an exclusive 
Western rationality and acts as ‘a conversation stopper’ in the dialogue of cultures. 
Contra Ignatieff-style rights as a theory-free zone of positive law, Sachedina uses the 
concept of natural law in the search for the compatibility of secular and Islamic human rights 
formulations. He believes that Islam is facing an epistemological crisis which has dislocated 
theology, ethics and law and paralysed reflection on human rights. Islam does have well-
developed resources, such as the common good, (al-khayrāt) (Q:5:48), moral agency (jihād), 
humankind as a universal community, (umma wāhida) (Q:2:213, 5:48, 10:19). It has a theory 
of natural law, fitra, based on belief in ‘the common, immutable, and eternal nature of human 
beings’ and ‘confidence in the substantive role of reasoning in discerning moral values.’165 
Sachedina is not an isolated voice. Madjid, for example, also speaks of ‘the immutable fitra of 
God, deep inside of the human spirit’, relating it to hanifīyah samhah, ‘the broad-minded 
                                                             
162 Ignatieff’s anti-foundationalism is expressed in this way: ‘Human rights are important instruments for 
protecting human beings against cruelty, oppression and degradation. That’s all we need to believe to defend 
human rights. Many people believe far more about human rights, for example, that there is a divine or natural 
source for human rights. The human purpose of defending human rights, however, may not differ dramatically, 
even if the imputed sources do.’ Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p.xi. 
163 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and idolatry, p.xxii. 
164 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.16. 
165 Ibid., pp.87-88. 
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natural inclination to the sacred and the true’ and nūrāniy, or conscience. Fitra is ‘that 
universal gnosis which always has existed and always will exist.’166 Sachedina sees natural 
law as ‘the most logical point of entry’ into human rights for Muslims because ‘the notion of 
a natural or innate constitution of the human being is the core doctrine of the Qur‘an.’167 He 
explains that  
…the Qur‘anic metaphor fitrat allāh, meaning God’s nature, through which God has 
created the universe, implies that the natural world is entirely divine, and reason and 
faith are not only not incompatible, they are also correlative in guiding human life to a 
meaningful existence.168 
Fitra opens the door not just to compatibility with human rights, but to universality and  
commonality with Christianity: 
The natural law idea, if proven as intrinsic to Islam as it is, for instance, to 
Catholicism, will determine the course of action to revisit and revise the traditional 
disqualifications for inclusive membership of all human beings on the basis of 
divinely endowed dignity.169 
Bin Talal would add that the concept of the logos, (Arabic kalimah, word), is common to both 
Christian and Islamic orthodoxy and that both faiths can build on their common belief in 
human access to a source of divine wisdom. 
The Catholic experience is highly relevant to the Islamic rights compatibility debate. 
In the Roman Catholic tradition, incompatibility of Catholicism and human rights (The 
Syllabus of Errors, 1864), was transformed into compatibility and enthusiastic endorsement 
(Pacem in Terris 1964). This was ‘the result of a complicated and lengthy learning process’ 
                                                             
166 Nurcholish Madjid, ‘The Roots of Civil and Political Rights in the Islamic Concept of Human Being’, in Race 
and Shafer, Religions in Dialogue, p.160. 
167 Sachedina, Islam and the Challenge of Human Rights, p.93. Sachedina (p.94) translates fitra as ‘something 
natural, native, innate, original.’ 
168 Ibid., p.100. 
169 Ibid., p.101. 
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which produced ‘a revised and modernized version of Christian tradition more appropriate for 
Christians living under the circumstances of modernity.’170 Arkoun’s recommendation is 
relevant: Muslims should strive to ‘enlarge the thinkable area.’171 
The fact that there is no agreement on the foundation of human rights may actually 
open rather than close the door to compatibility. Maritain famously made the point that the 
virtual silence of the Universal Declaration on foundations was not designed to preclude each 
religion or culture from supplying its own theoretical justification.172 Agreement had been 
reached ‘not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man, and of 
knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action.’173 
However, Maritain showed in his own work how his own tradition could supply its own 
philosophical rationale for rights.174 
Renteln’s preferred approach is a Weltethos-style empirical investigation into cross-
cultural universals, ‘those least common denominators to be extracted from the range of 
variation that all phenomena of the natural or cultural world manifest,’ some of which have 
persisted ‘through countless generations.’175 Donnelly takes a different approach. He makes a 
significant contribution to the Islam and human rights compatibility debate by walking a 
tightrope between relativity and universality: 
                                                             
170 Bielefeldt, “Western” versus “Islamic Human Rights Conceptions?, pp.98-99. 
171 Mohammed Arkoun, A Critique of Islamic Reasoning, (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1984), p.218, quoted by Nikkie 
R. Keddie, ‘The Rights of Women in Contemporary Islam’, in Rouner (ed.) Human Rights and the World’s 
Religions, pp.76-93, at p.108. 
172 ‘Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why.’ Quoted by Mary Ann Glendon in A 
World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (New York: Random 
House, 2001), p.77. 
173 Glendon, A World Made New, pp.77-78. 
174 Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1986), original French 
edition, 1942. 
175 Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, p.66 
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…universal human rights, properly understood, leave considerable space for national, 
regional, cultural particularity and other forms of diversity and relativity.176 
He rejects Renteln-style anthropological universality, on the grounds that it does not exist. 
Ratzinger would agree. He rejects foundational or ontological universality, because 
philosophically it cannot be established. Ratzinger would disagree; to give up on ontology is 
to abandon humanity. His preferred universality is ‘functional, international legal, and 
overlapping consensus universality.’177 This is similar to Waltz and Ignatieff, but more subtly 
positioned. He keeps open the door to ontology, based on ‘imperfect reflections of a deeper 
ontological universality,’ and concedes that ‘an ontologically universal comprehensive 
doctrine has recently and contingently endorsed human rights as a political conception of 
justice.’178 On the cultural relativism side of the debate, he accepts the fact of cultural 
relativity but rejects the ideology of cultural infallibility or absolutism, which, counter-
intuitively, are the corollaries of ‘substantive relativism.’ I read Donnelly as saying: rights are 
not trumps, (contra Dworkin), but nor (contra Pollis and Schwab) is culture. 
Throughout the literature on the relationship between Islam and human rights, the 
theme of dignity recurs. Of course this word is contested and can lead to diametrically 
opposed conclusions. Nevertheless, many interlocutors revert to it as an appropriate starting-
point for the dialogue of cultures, conscious of the fact that a rights discourse based on mere 
expedience is neither charismatic nor efficacious. The analysis provided by Kamali may 
illustrate how a contemporary Muslim scholar is exploring dignity as a bridge in the dialogue 
of cultures.179 
                                                             
176 Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.29, No.2, (May 
2007), pp.281-306, at p.281. 
177 Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, p.281. 
178 Ibid., p.293. 
179 Mohammed Hashim Kamali, The Dignity of Man, (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2002). 
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Kamali starts with the premise that ‘human rights are a manifestation of human 
dignity and that from the Islamic perspective, dignity is a manifestation of God’s favour on 
mankind.’180 A key Islamic concept that might serve as a correlative of dignity is expressed 
by kilafa, the vice-regency of man on earth. This means that Islam always balances rights with 
obligations, individual with collective good and freedom with virtue. God’s love is key, 
because it is ‘the cause of the creation of man and of the conferment of dignity on him.’181 
Reason or rationality is equally central: ‘God Most High has honoured mankind in endowing 
him with the faculty of reason.’182 Kamali claims that ‘the commitment of the Shari‘a to the 
dignity of man is so strong and pervasive as to warrant the identification of human dignity as 
one of the higher goals and objectives of the Shari‘a.’183 Osman agrees that Islam considers 
human dignity to be fundamental to its habits of thinking and practice, drawing inspiration 
from the Qur‘anic divine statement “We have indeed conferred dignity on the children of 
Adam...” and that this means that Islam should always ‘present itself through sound 
reasoning.’184 He concludes with a practical recommendation: 
Muslim countries should take human dignity as a postulate and framework that is then 
taken to its logical conclusion in the detailed formulations of the basic rights and 
liberties that are upheld and guaranteed therein.185 
 
 
 
                                                             
180 Kamali, The Dignity of Man, p.ix. 
181 Ibid., p.xvi. 
182 Ibid., p.xvi. Kamali is here quoting al-Alusi (d.1864). 
183 Ibid., p.102.  
184 Fathi Osman, ‘Democracy and the Concept of Shura’, in Race and Shafer, Religions in Dialogue: From 
theocracy to democracy, p.88.  
185 Ibid., p.102. 
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9.5: AN ISLAMIC LOGOS THEOLOGY AND AN INCLUSIVE CONCEPT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Ratzinger at Regensburg called for a ‘dialogue of cultures’. An-Na‘im agrees. We need ‘a 
conversation between civilizations’ on a global level, in the form of a ‘non-violent dialogue 
and negotiation between competing sources.’186 Whatever the results in terms of international 
human rights norms, ‘each participant in the process remains free to perceive as they wish the 
source of the normative force of the obligations.’187 
One of An-Na‘im’s central messages is that religions will never accept human rights 
without internalizing them for themselves. One of the strategies for building ownership of 
human rights by religions is steadfast adherence to the hard-fought 1948 achievement of 
holding together the ‘second generation’ economic, social and cultural rights, and even the 
‘third generation’ collective rights, in other words the rights most favoured by religious actors 
such as Catholics and Muslims, together with the ‘first generation’ civil and political rights 
most favoured by secularist humanists.188  
If we agree with Renteln that human rights will not be successful until there is ‘a 
global consensus’ that supports them,189 then we must also accept that to be truly inclusive, 
rights must embrace religion: ‘the more religious perspectives are excluded from the 
conversation, the less likely are religious adherents to accept the universality of human 
rights.’190 
                                                             
186 An Na‘im and Odeh, Islam and International Law, p.166. 
187 James Cockayne, ‘Islam and International Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversation Between 
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Religion however, must embrace rights. Part of this process is the mutual 
reconciliation and peace between religions. Part is a self-reflexive purification of religious 
practice. In an echo of Ratzinger’s ‘broadening of reason’, bin Talal calls for ‘an expanded 
humanism’ in both Christianity and Islam. This expanded humanism, which embraces the 
culture of human rights, must make as many demands on Christianity in general, and on 
Roman Catholicism in particular, as it does on Islam. 
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CONCLUSION ON PART THREE: 
THE LOGOS AT WORK IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES 
Chapter Eight concluded that Ratzinger has no desire to dominate the public sphere and has a 
profound respect for the culture of deliberative democracy and its underlying values of 
pluralism, tolerance, secularity, equality, non-discrimination and liberty. He rejects, however, 
the notion that the best that can be hoped for from the public sphere is the use of a procedural 
reason to arrive at a consensus and majority rule through positive law. He likewise rejects the 
notion that the voice of religion must be excluded. In Ratzinger’s logos-based political 
thought, the Church should place itself at the service of the legislative process by drawing on 
the long tradition of scriptural reasoning and natural law thinking, to put questions to the 
legislative authority about the morality of its actions and the moral principles on which it is 
founded. Ratzinger believes that reason needs to be broadened beyond the instrumental. His 
openly inclusive logos theology also places itself at the service of wider society by the way it 
fosters communities of solidarity, enhances social cohesion, works for the common good and 
develops individual conscience. We can call this a logos theology because it is based on the 
capacity of reason, the personal logos, to listen to the voice of the Logos. This voice is 
expressed through the logos spermatikos of each individual person’s practical reason or 
‘heart’, which can be enlarged through scriptural reasoning, which is a listening to Logos as 
Word of God. 
The implication of this theology for human rights is that the framework of human 
rights should sit above the public sphere, to act as judge upon its actions and a guide for its 
discourse. Ratzinger understands that the framework of human rights is still only a logos, in 
the sense of a reasoned discourse we speak to ourselves, but also sees that this logos is our 
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way of giving expression to some of the deeper values of modernity. These values can be 
expressed as liberty, equality and fraternity or solidarity, but are themselves are grounded in 
an even deeper value, the dignity of the human person, which Ratzinger insists should be at 
the heart of the democratic process. He asks for a special respect to be granted to religious 
belief and practice, because it is a capacity for transcendence which is the true essential 
dignity of the human person.  
As a logos theologian, Ratzinger invites Islam to recover its own logos tradition of 
philosophical reflection and to recover its confidence in the faculty of reason as a key 
component of the dignity of the human person. This gift of rationality can be used by Islam in 
the interpretation of scripture and the devising of new ways of living that respect the dignity 
of the human person. With its mighty tradition of belief in transcendence, Islam can form a 
natural alliance with Ratzinger’s logos theology, to remind secular modernity of what is 
missing from its rationality. Building on Ratzinger, this thesis invites Islam, not only to 
reform its law through a recovery of the concept of natural law, but to show the liberal culture 
of human rights that it can be strengthened if it rests on pre-political moral foundations 
ultimately grounded in revelation. 
Ratzinger is forced to define his position in relation to modernity. This is not easy 
because there is a profound disjunction between his logos theology and modernity. 
Ratzinger’s logos ontology is grounded in the transcendent, modernity in the material. Logos 
epistemology believes in the complementarity of faith and reason; modernity is constructed 
from reason alone. Modernity’s ethics is instrumental and utilitarian; logos ethics is grounded 
in natural law. Modernity’s politics is secular and admits of only one type of discourse, 
Ratzinger’s logos theology asks for a voice in the public square. Yet both modernity and 
Ratzinger find a place of meeting, and a common language to speak, in the framework of 
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human rights. In this dialogue of human rights, the logos tradition finds that historically it has 
been penetrated by modernity, while modernity finds that the logos tradition still flows 
through its bloodstream. 
Ratzinger feels compelled to give an account of his position in relation to Islam. He is 
conscious that the dialogue with Islam has been dominated by secular voices thoroughly 
imbued with the spirit of modernity. For these voices the key imperative has been tolerance. 
Yet Ratzinger warns that secular modernity’s approach to Islam can become intolerant, when, 
under the banner of enlightened tolerance and universalism, it disrespects the unique 
particularity and exclusivism of Islam. Ratzinger’s logos-based approach has more in 
common with Islam than it has with the materialist, instrumental culture of modernity. But all 
cultures, Christianity, secular modernity, and Islam can and must find common ground in the 
culture of human rights. This is partly possible because where doctrine and theory has a 
tendency to divide, collaborative humanitarian endeavour has the potential to unite. More 
profoundly, it is because the religious cultures of the world share a vision of the human 
capacity for transcendence which modernity has lost. Modernity can only benefit from this 
encounter, because it is dependent for its survival on a vibrant culture of respect for the 
dignity of the human person. The self-proclaimed progressivist project of Western liberal 
modernity, with its non-negotiable commitments to democracy, tolerance and human rights, 
has delivered great benefits for human dignity. Yet it is also capable of great intolerance, 
violence and injustice. It therefore requires a force which is not identical to itself, which can 
critique it from outside itself. Both Christianity and Islam are capable of fulfilling that critical 
role, but both must accept that they too are prone to intolerance, violence and injustice. 
Extreme secularism has a tendency to believe that its modern moral order will best be 
preserved if the religions are either eliminated, or at least reduced to private pastimes. A 
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healthy secularity, by contrast, recognizes the ethical depth of religious communities not as a 
threat but as a resource for democracy. 
Reason, religion and rights constitute a co-dependant triad, such that any one of them 
will lapse into pathology, if deprived of the wise restraining power of both of the other two. 
We can call them three great rationalities, which together constitute what Ratzinger at 
Regensburg called ‘the full breadth of reason.’ 
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CHAPTER TEN  
CONCLUSION   
THE LOGOS AS A WELLSPRING OF OUR HUMANITY 
‘the experience of the fact that despite our specializations, which at times made it difficult to 
communicate with each other, we made up a whole, working in everything on the basis of a 
single rationality with its various aspects and sharing responsibility for the right use of 
reason – this reality became a lived experience.’1 
 
10.1   THE CHALLENGES OF THE THEME OF DEMYTHOLOGIZATION 
10.1.1   Demythologization: how far can you go? 
Part One of the thesis explored the foundations of the logos through specific studies of 
Plato, John and Justin, thereby opening up the theme of demythologization and the contrast 
between mythos and logos. This theme has been instrumental for my championing of 
Ratzinger’s logos theology for the healing of human rights. Following Ratzinger, I have taken 
Plato, John and Justin as representing breakthroughs to ontological, epistemological and 
ethical truth. A key function of the broadened rationality espoused at Regensburg is the 
process of searching or questioning that leads to the dethronement of myth and the disclosure 
of truth. From Plato, in Chapter Three, came a belief not just in a transcendence, but in the 
human capacity for participation in this transcendence. From John, in Chapter Four, came the 
conviction that the source of all being is personal, communicative and relational, that divine 
transcendence was manifested in the startling historical immanence of the person of Jesus 
Christ, the Word made flesh. From Justin, in Chapter Five, came the realisation that both 
                                                             
1 The Regensburg Lecture, para.4. 
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philosophy and the prophets had prepared a path for Christ and that consequently faith and 
reason were ways of knowing which were intimately related. These three great truths, the 
human capacity for transcendence, the capacity for God to dwell with Man and the capacity 
for reason and faith to purify and nourish each other, these are the truths which Regensburg 
proposes, but which are forever vulnerable to being in their turn demythologized.  
Socrates, in Guardini’s view, and thence in Ratzinger’s scheme, pre-eminently led the 
charge against the gods and dared to whisper what everyone was beginning to think: that there 
was an unsustainable mismatch between belief and truth. Heidegger and Nietzsche, albeit in 
different ways, sought to demythologize Socrates, to get back to the time of the poets or the 
heroes. In Jaspers’ scheme, the move from mythos to logos started in the Axial Age, when a 
series of conceptual transformations somehow precipitated a phase transition in the religious 
consciousness of humankind. The fact that the concept of ‘the axial age’ itself can be exposed 
as a myth is a warning that the theme of demythologization presents dangers both for logos 
theology and for the philosophy of human rights.2   
Human rights are part of the story of demythologization, because they emerge from 
the process of demythologization, only to find themselves in turn rejected as myth. The 
confident demythologizers of the Enlightenment were soon busy repopulating the imagination 
with what could be regarded as new myths: the liberty, equality and fraternity of the 
encyclopaedists, Descartes’ cogito and Rousseau’s social contract, Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
Hume’s Sympathy and Kant’s Categorical Imperative in the Kingdom of Ends. Even Rawls, 
to produce a ‘theory of justice’ and a ‘law of peoples’ had to rely on the myth of an ‘original 
position’, while Habermas’ ‘communicative action’ was no less of a mythical construct. 
                                                             
2 For a thorough critique of the Jaspers thesis, see Iain Provan, Convenient Myths: The Axial Age, Dark Green 
Religion, and the World That Never Was, (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2013). 
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Human rights themselves were forged out of Locke’s demythologization of the theist God in 
favour of the deist deity, and from Grotius’ call to abandon the myth of the deity altogether, 
and reconcile ourselves to the etsi deus principle. Precisely as products of the Enlightenment, 
rights have always been ripe for further demythologization, from Bentham’s nonsense on 
stilts to MacIntyre’s witches on broomsticks. From a different perspective, but again, 
precisely because of their Enlightenment provenance, in the eyes of Hauerwas and Milbank, 
they are too toxic to be redeemed, too compromised with the Enlightenment’s substitution of 
human for divine sovereignty. 
Regensburg can be read as a demythologization of Enlightenment reason, unmasking 
it as a false god, with its materialist, instrumentalizing and atheistic rationality, a rationality 
which can never explain or justify itself and displays a totalizing and intolerant attitude to 
religious faith. But it is legitimate to question whether the Ratzingerian logos is genuinely 
demythologization-proof. It may be that Ratzinger’s warmed-up (Hegelian?) logos is just the 
latest in a long line of myths, an impressive scarecrow clad in pseudo-classical garb and 
planted in the field of post-modernity to frighten the population with the ghosts of long dead 
convictions. It is possible that it too must succumb inevitably to its own unmasking, at best a 
useful theory designed to support an enduring, inclusive and universal framework for the 
culture of human rights, or at worst, an obscurantist construction designed as a bulwark for 
the uncompromising non-negotiables of an authoritarian magisterium (Kristeva). Ratzinger’s 
big tent could be deconstructed as a patchwork of totemic, and indeed polemic, shibboleths, 
such as solidarity, concern for the other, human nature, human dignity, love, relationality, 
natural law, transcendence, truth, every one of which is potentially vulnerable to further 
demythologizations.  
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I read Ratzinger as exhibiting certain features which are common to both Hauerwas 
and Milbank. He takes his stand in the transformative power of the living historical Christian 
community (Hauerwas) and in its fidelity to an ancient tradition of wisdom and truth 
(Milbank). He also makes moves common to both Newman and Rahner. Living traditions 
must clash, coalesce, be purified, develop, as they interact with each other in history 
(Newman). But there is, after all, such a thing as a humanism, a humanum (Rahner). As 
Twomey makes clear, in Ratzingerian thought, cultures never cease to find common ground in 
the transcendent capacity of the moral conscience. They never cease to demythologize 
themselves, or be demythologized by others, for as the ‘conditions of belief’ change (Taylor), 
and language changes, so truths ossify and crumble to dust if not re-expressed or re-
developed.  
My answer to my demythologization question of ‘how far can you go’ is that, as with 
good hellenization and bad hellenization, good dehellenization and bad dehellenization, there 
is good demythologization and bad demythologization. I reject demythologization unending, 
since this can relapse into a dead end, if not of outright cynicism and nihilism (Nietzsche), 
then certainly of ironic detachment and defeatism (Rorty). This would truly be the end of 
history, not in Fukuyama’s sense of the triumph of the West, but in the final betrayal of 
Kant’s sapere aude, defeated by an agnosticism which had decided it knew nothing of faith, 
or of moral certainty, or of God. In my analysis, the Ratzinger project offers a better solution, 
by recognising that the culture of human rights, if re-grounded in the truth about the dignity of 
the human person, may be the best hope we have of negotiating the perils of a postmodern, 
post-secular, post-Westphalian, post-European world, the ‘supernova’ of Taylor’s hyper-
technologized, hyper-expressivist age. 
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10.1.2   Demythologization: a Ratzinger response 
In a speech at La Sapienza in Rome, (a university founded on the principle of 
Wisdom), Ratzinger does something similar to Regensburg, addressing the nature and 
purpose of the university, and portraying himself as ‘a voice for the ethical reasoning of 
humanity.’3 Even Rawls, notes Ratzinger, accepts that ‘humanity’s wisdom – the wisdom of 
the great religious traditions – should be valued as a heritage that cannot be cast with 
impunity into the dustbin of the history of ideas.’ The Pope speaks to the dialogue of cultures 
‘as the representative of a form of ethical reasoning.’ The university derives its rationale from 
Socratic questioning, the kind of questioning used in the famous Euthyphro debate (as at 
Regensburg) to contrast truth with myth. Socratic demythologization is not destructive or 
cynical. Its desire for truth makes way for ‘the discovery of the God who is creative Reason, 
God who is Reason – Love.’ Socrates was being truly religious and so early Christianity 
recognized and accepted in him ‘reason’s laborious search to attain knowledge of the whole 
truth.’ The truth makes us good and in Jesus Christ the Logos, creative Reason is recognized 
as goodness itself. Today the search for the good and the true takes the form of a search for ‘a 
                                                             
3 Benedict XVI, The Truth Makes Us Good and Goodness Is True: Speech at the University of Rome, La 
Sapienza, 17 January 2008. Available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2008/january/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080117_la-sapienza.html (Accessed: 18 January 
2016.) This speech was never in fact delivered, due to the threat of disruption from student protesters, who were 
still enraged by the Regensburg Lecture. Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) actually refers explicitly to the Regensburg 
Lecture within the first few sentences of the address. The unprecedented cancellation of the pope's visit was 
announced at 5 p.m. on Tuesday, January 15, in a press release from the Vatican press office. On Wednesday 
January 16, the cardinal secretary of state wrote to professor Renato Guarino, the rector of the university:  
"Since at the initiative of a decidedly minority group of professors and students, the conditions for a dignified 
and peaceful welcome were lacking, it has been judged prudent to delay the scheduled visit in order to remove 
any pretext for demonstrations that would have been unpleasant for all. But in the awareness of the sincere desire 
on the part of the great majority of the professors and students for culturally significant words from which they 
can take encouragement for their personal journey in search of the truth, the Holy Father has arranged to send 
you the text he prepared personally for the occasion [...] with the hope that all may find within it ideas for 
enriching reflections and examinations."  
On the afternoon of that same day, "L'Osservatore Romano" published the complete text of the address that the 
pope was supposed to have read the following day at the La Sapienza University. Source: 
http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/186421?eng=y&refresh_ce (Accessed 23 March 2016.) 
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juridical body of norms ... that serves an ordering of freedom, of human dignity and human 
rights.’ Ratzinger offers no pat answer to this question, which Socrates asked, and which is 
‘never asked and answered once and for all.’ He wishes only to keep company with the great 
minds throughout history ‘that have grappled and researched, engaging with their answers and 
their passion for truth.’ Habermas, adds Ratzinger, is to be admired for his insistence on 
‘sensibility to the truth’ as an essential component of political argumentation. Knowledge and 
recognition of human rights and dignity have evolved over time, ‘and for this we can only be 
grateful.’ In a subtle reference to Justin Martyr, Ratzinger reminds us that ‘the Fathers had 
presented the Christian faith as the true philosophy’ because it fulfilled the demands of reason 
in its search for truth. In an allusion to John 1:9, and, speaking in almost Hegelian mode, he 
asks people to recognize Jesus Christ ‘as the light that illumines history and helps us find the 
path towards the future.’ 
With the self-limitation of reason comes the dismissal of Plato’s transcendence, of 
John’s divine self-communication, and of Justin’s hard-won religious faith, as myth. With a 
broadened rationality, they can be embraced as the enduring wellsprings of humanity, as the 
oases where cultures can meet and find refreshment. 
To demythologize the Socratic project out of existence, would be to give up on the 
ontological, epistemological and ethical questions that have animated and illuminated the 
Christian faith. These questions are not ‘secular’ and ‘Greek’, but religious and human. When 
Christian faith meets with the secular and with other religions, it brings with it this Socratic 
imperative as something inclusive and universal. The culture of human rights becomes more 
inclusive, more universal, more sustainable, when it allows its moral insights to be purified by 
the wisdom of religious tradition, while also asking religious practice to be purified by its 
moral insights. 
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10.2   THE CHALLENGES OF THE THEME OF IDOLATRY 
10.2.1 Idolatry: can we worship the human? 
Regensburg provides a brief genealogy of rationality, in which reason undergoes a 
series of self-imposed limitations. In Part Two of this thesis, Chapter Six took up this theme, 
to see how these developments related to the genealogy of human rights. A number of 
paradoxes emerged. Divine voluntarism, originally conceived to avoid idolatry and preserve 
God’s greatness, resulted in modernity’s idolatrous human voluntarism and the primacy of the 
human will. The culture of human rights could only emerge and blossom once God had been 
set aside by Grotius. Human rights became themselves a sort of new idolatry, the worship of 
Man and the eclipse of God. In Chapter Seven, natural law was shown to have its own 
genealogy. In a world where the insights of Plato, John and Justin were still live options for 
humanity, natural law could flourish as a participation in the eternal law. Once knowledge of 
God had been declared out of bounds, and receptivity to divine self-disclosure forgotten, 
natural law morphed into modernity’s idolatrous enthronement of the autonomous human 
subject. 
Weber and Taylor taught that the idols of the old enchanted world have been deposed, 
starting with the pantheon, then the theist God, then the deist deity. Gone is the ancient 
cosmic order in which the human, divine and natural worlds were joined, in which sacralised 
time was lived out against a backdrop of eternity and the good and the true could be read in 
the book of nature. It has been replaced with the new idols of the Enlightenment and these 
include democracy, the rule of law and the culture of human rights. These idols still make 
ethical demands of their subjects, in the imperatives of freedom, equality and tolerance, 
Taylor’s modern moral order of exclusive humanism. In a Habermasian translation, Christian 
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faith, hope and charity have morphed into the supreme expression of Enlightenment belief, 
the culture of human rights. Postmodernism in turn makes the culture of human rights look 
tired, as it sets up its own new idols: Diversity, Contingency, Historicity, Liminality, Alterity, 
the Marginal, the Dissident and the Subaltern. Against this backdrop, Ignatieff fears that 
human rights may overreach themselves by being transmuted into a new mythology and 
idolatry. Lest they be deposed as false gods, he seeks to keep them limited, practical, 
earthbound. Moyn meanwhile would rather let them fly, so that they can provide true moral 
inspiration and the only utopia left to our post-postmodern world.  
Ratzinger has consistently opposed all forms of utopia. He was alerted in his early 
years to the misguided utopian thought of Joachim di Fiore.4 He went on to see the twentieth 
century brought to violence by three waves of utopian totalitarianism, Communism, Nazism, 
and the political violence of the revolution of the 1960s. In the twenty-first century he was 
witness to a further wave of utopian endeavour, the Islamist project to create a perfect State. 
This Islamist movement, often termed ‘medieval’ by the West, may actually be very modern, 
if the jihadists have bought into technologism, the perfectibility of man, the Sovereign State, 
and the absolutization of their own Will to Power. As Ratzinger has repeatedly warned, those 
who try to create heaven on earth, soon come up against the intractability, the sinfulness if 
you will, of the human person, and in order to force through their utopian project they resort 
to violence and oppression. Meanwhile in the ‘West’, the culture of human rights, Ratzinger is 
keenly aware, can all too easily lapse into a project, intolerant and hostile to true human 
freedom, a programme perfectly exemplified by the unprecedented prohibition of papal 
freedom of speech at La Sapienza. 
                                                             
4 See J. Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, (Chicago IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971 and 
1989), p.39. 
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10.2.2 Idolatry:  a Ratzinger response. 
Ratzinger’s highly sensitive awareness of the perils of utopian idolatries is well 
expressed in his funeral homily for Msgr. Luigi Guissani.5 It is right for Christians to engage 
in ‘social works and needed services, to help mankind in this difficult world where Christians 
bear an enormous and urgent responsibility for the poor.’ But when we come ‘face to face 
with extreme poverty and misery’, we are often tempted to set Christ aside, to set God aside, 
because there are more pressing needs.’ Utopian idolatry says ‘we have to change structures, 
fix the external things; first we must improve the earth, and after we will be able to find 
heaven again.’ Christianity morphs into moralism, moralism into politics, believing into 
doing. Losing sight of that which underlies human rights, the dignity of the human person, we 
lose the criteria for distinguishing between justice and injustice: 
Whoever does not give God gives too little; and whoever does not give God, whoever 
does not enable people to see God in the face of Christ, does not build anything up but 
rather, wastes human activity in false, ideological dogmatism, and so ultimately only 
destroys. 
If the culture of human rights becomes an exclusive secular idolatry, then it will never achieve 
true universality or inclusivity. On the other hand, if Christians baptize it so thoroughly and 
indiscriminately that it is fashioned into an ersatz substitute for Christian faith, then the 
Christian birth right will have been sold away for an idolatrous mess of socio-political potage. 
I propose as a remedy the application of a Ratzinger-style ‘theological seismograph’ to the 
shifting tectonic plates of the surrounding culture of human rights, in an attempt to discern 
between the new mythologies which are bubbling up to the surface and which need to be 
unmasked as delusory, and the authentic translations (Habermas) or mutations (Rowland) 
                                                             
5 J. Ratzinger, ‘Funeral Homily for Msgr. Luigi Guissani’, in Communio: International Catholic Review, Winter 
2004, 685 – 687. 
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which can breathe new life into Christian language and culture.6 The Ratzingerian 
recommendation lies in a renunciation of the programmatic, and the fostering of a process, 
namely, the bringing together of Christianity, the religions and the now secular culture of 
human rights, into a mutually enriching and purifying dialogue. Here, however, we must 
confront the whole issue of dialogue. 
10.3   THE CHALLENGES OF THE THEME OF DIALOGUE 
10.3.1 Dialogue, but with whom, about what? 
Part Three of the thesis looked at two great dialogues of today, the dialogue with the secular 
(and ‘postsecular’?) state, and the dialogue with Islam. Central to the Regensburg Lecture is 
Ratzinger’s invitation to the dialogue of cultures. Given that it is almost impossible to find a 
philosopher or theologian who does not, pace Milbank, endorse the imperative of dialogue, 
Ratzinger’s invitation may be dismissed as little more than a platitude. This thesis, however, 
has emphasised the dialogic orientation of Ratzingerian thought.7 It has drawn the conclusion 
that the Ratzinger project calls for a mutually purifying and healing engagement between the 
religious and the secular, with the culture of human rights as a sort of third party to the 
encounter. This culture of human rights both offers healing and requires to be healed, so that 
human rights can continue to fulfil their role as honest broker and as a common ‘way of 
meeting’ between the religious and the secular. 
If Regensburg envisioned a dialogue of cultures which might be based on, and 
engender, a broadening of reason, then in Part Three of this thesis, this desideratum of the 
                                                             
6 I have taken the idea of Ratzinger’s theological seismograph from D. Vincent Twomey, ‘Pope Benedict XVI: 
Joseph Ratzinger on Politics’, Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture, (Fall 2015, Volume 18:4), 
pp.82-99. 
7 The dialogic orientation of Ratzinger’s logos theology is eloquently portrayed in Christopher S. Collins, The 
Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI, (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 2013). 
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Ratzinger project was put to the test, to assess its plausibility and viability. Chapter Eight used 
Ratzinger’s dialogue with Habermas as a model of what might be possible in the dialogue 
between religious and secular cultures. The results were impressive in terms of the 
overlapping consensus achieved by the interlocutors. Yet this was but one limited dialogue 
between two ageing contemporaries. Doubts may be raised as to how realistic the prospects 
are for religious voices, making use of the discourses of natural law and human dignity, to 
make meaningful interventions in the public square. 
At Regensburg, Ratzinger expressed doubts as to the depth of the inculturation of 
Greek-style reason or rationality in Islamic thought and practice. He called into question 
especially the potentially harmful effects of an extreme voluntarism. Although designed to 
conserve God’s transcendence, voluntarism constitutes a self-limitation of reason. It serves 
paradoxically to truncate the dignity of the human person, while also substituting the human 
for the divine. Chapter Nine responded to this challenge by amplifying a number of Islamic 
voices whose vision of a productive interplay between philosophy, theology and the secular, 
at the service of democracy and human rights, shares much in common with Ratzinger.  
A healthy scepticism may raise doubts about the actual feasibility of such a dialogue 
of cultures, especially in terms of the settings or ‘ways of meeting’ available. In the light of 
the Regensburg and Sapienza lectures, the most promising setting may be the university. I 
suggest a primary engagement could take place within the ‘first order’ realms of philosophy, 
theology and religion, whether these faculties be independently constituted or conjoined, 
followed by a ‘second order’ engagement within the university, followed by wider public 
engagement.8 A further way of meeting is suggested by Ratzinger’s papal addresses to the 
                                                             
8 Ratzinger commences the Regensburg Lecture by drawing an attractive (idealized?) picture of the university as 
a locus of cross-disciplinary fertilization and ‘lively exchange’ (‘Die Kontakte ... waren sehr lebendig’). 
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United Nations, to legislatures, and to a host of professional and specialized audiences.9 The 
effectiveness of such interventions can certainly be doubted, but they do at least perform 
genuine encounters between the secular and the religious. Central to this thesis and to the 
Regensburg Lecture is a third type of encounter, the dialogue with Islam. There is no doubt 
that this takes place daily on countless levels and in many modes, although a caveat must 
always be borne in mind: there is no single ‘Islam’ with which to dialogue, any more than 
there is a single secular or Christian voice. Furthermore, prior to any dialogue between Islam 
and ‘the other’, Islam should be granted the space to find its own ways of meeting to facilitate 
its own internal dialogue about the broadening of reason. The phenomenon of scriptural 
reasoning might suggest itself here as a non-threatening, open-ended and fruitful mode of 
encounter which respects the Hauerwas / Milbank / MacIntyre imperative that we must stand 
within our own tradition and rationality and be true to that, alongside the Ratzinger theory of 
interculturality, which knows that Christianity from the logos onwards has always been 
enriched and purified by bumping up against other cultures and even recognizing itself in 
them.10 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Rowland, following Nemoianu, explains that a unique feature of German-speaking lands was the emergence and 
flourishing of circles of intellectuals, which afforded ways of meeting between theologians and others, ‘such that 
theologians were not cut off from the currents of thought in the world of arts, politics and literature.’ Tracey 
Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: T & T Clark, 2010), p.11. 
9 In the last twelve months of his pontificate Ratzinger, as Benedict XVI, reached out beyond Christian 
audiences to the Foundation for the Sahel, to the journalists of Mexico, to the dignitaries of Cuba, to the 
musicians of Leipzig, to the Jewish Congress of Latin America, to the farmers of Italy, to the World Congress of 
Sports Medicine, to the General Assembly of Interpol, to the Financial Times of London and to the president of 
the Italian Republic. Available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en.html (Accessed: 23 November 
2015). 
10 For an endorsement and explanation of the power of the scriptural reasoning model of interreligious encounter 
and dialogue, see Nicholas Adams, ‘Scriptural difference and scriptural reasoning’ in Habermas and Theology, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.234-255. 
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10.3.2   Dialogue: a Ratzinger response 
On a trip to the Lebanon in September 2012, Ratzinger, as Benedict XVI, delivered 
one of his last major public addresses before his resignation the following February.11  As at 
Westminster, the address modelled the tripartite encounter between secular power, Christian 
faith and the world’s religious cultures, triangulated by the unifying concept of human rights. 
The speech was delivered in one of the most violent and troubled settings imaginable. 
Lebanon is a land with its roots in the ancient and biblical worlds, and was once home to a 
highly successful mélange of Christian, Islamic and secular Western European culture. 
Ratzinger spoke to a country overwhelmed by the influx of refugees and migrants fleeing 
from violent conflict. Without using the word logos, he presented a vision of peace and 
reconciliation based on the dignity of the human person and rooted in natural law.12 Once 
again, the starting point was Socratic. The human spirit has an innate yearning for beauty, 
goodness and truth. This datum of human experience has an explanation; it is part of God’s 
plan and ‘he has impressed it deep within the human heart.’ We can call it a reflection of the 
divine, ‘God’s mark on each person.’ We have to listen to this voice, if we want peace. 
‘Without openness to transcendence ... men and women become incapable of acting justly and 
working for peace.’ 
                                                             
11 Ratzinger, J. as Pope Benedict XVI, Apostolic Journey to Lebanon, Meeting with Members of the Government, 
Institutions of the Republic, the Diplomatic Corps, Religious Leaders and Representatives of the World of 
Culture, May 25th Hall of the Baabda Presidential Palace, Saturday 15 September 2012. Available at: 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2012/september/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20120915_autorita.html. Marc Guerra has chosen this speech as the first of six key speeches of 
Ratzinger, all of which are based on a logos theology. Regensburg (2006), Westminster Hall (2010) and the 
Reichstag (2011) are all included in the collection. Guerra (p.xi.) comments that ‘Each speech offers an 
unwavering defence of the splendour and majesty of created reason’s ability to know – and to be liberated by – 
the uncreated Truth.’ See Marc D. Guerra, Liberating Logos: Pope Benedict XVI’s September Speeches, (South 
Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2014). 
(Accessed: 4 December 2015). 
12 With 32 references, the word ‘peace’ runs like a mantra through this address. 
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It is not true that there is no such thing as ‘the nature of the human person’ and no 
such thing as ‘shared values.’ Wherever the idea of human nature is ignored or denied, 
humanity loses sight of the ‘grammar’ which is ‘the natural law inscribed in the human heart.’ 
There truly is a ‘substratum of values’ which expresses man’s true humanity. For each 
cultural tradition, genealogical work could recover the spiritual values which give wisdom 
traditions their real meaning and power. These are ‘the wellsprings of our humanity.’ They 
are not the possession of any particular culture. Cultural, social and religious differences are 
real, but what truly unites is ‘a shared sense of the greatness of each person.’ Here is another 
Ratzinger word, die Größe, which encapsulates his vision of the dignity of the human 
person.13 
Human rights are essential, because they remind us that even before the law we must 
acknowledge the inalienable value of each person. The shared values we discover across 
cultures are human rights, ‘the rights of each and every human being.’ If cultures are to live in 
‘genuine mutual esteem’, to grow in understanding and harmony, there has to be respect for 
the human rights of all. Religiously associated violence may be a problem, but so is the 
violence that lurks in the dark underbelly of Western liberal modernity: unemployment, 
poverty, corruption, addiction, exploitation, trafficking. The only antidote is ‘solidarity’, 
based on respect for each human being, a solidarity which believes in ‘the greatness of each 
person and the gift which others are to themselves, to those around them and to all humanity.’ 
All forms of violence must be rejected because they are always an assault on human dignity.14 
The alternative for a pluralistic society is ‘continuous dialogue’: ‘It is heartening to see 
                                                             
13 Cf. ‘It is part of the inherent greatness of the Christian faith that it can lend conscience its voice’ and ‘power 
attains greatness when it allows itself to be moved by conscience.’ J. Ratzinger, trans. W.J. O’Hara, ‘Conscience 
in Time’, in David L. Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy (eds.) Joseph Ratzinger in Communio Vol 2: 
Anthropology and Culture, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), pp.17-27, at pp.25 and 27. 
14 The dignity of the human person is referred to 6 times in this address. 
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examples of cooperation and authentic dialogue bearing fruit in new forms of coexistence.’ 
This is certainly possible in Lebanon, because Christianity and Islam have lived there side by 
side for centuries. 
This, then, is my reading of the Ratzinger recommendation, my interpretation of the 
Regensburg prescription, a proposal that respects and restores human rights to their full power 
and strength. Far from being overly idealistic and unworldly, this recommendation may well 
be the most hard-headed and practical healing for the sicknesses of the twenty-first century, 
for a time ‘when things fall apart’, just as they did in the twentieth century for Habermas and 
Ratzinger. 
My logos theology of human rights is not a system. It cannot be portrayed as a 
complete, finished intellectual construction. It is a path, a hodos.15 It calls for ‘resolute critical 
discernment’.16 It requires the courage of a Socrates or a Justin, to explore truth in the face of 
secular and religious power and violence, and this includes a ‘readiness to look for the truth in 
what strikes us as strange or foreign; for the truth concerns us and can correct us and lead us 
further along the path.’17 Europe has tried living veluti si deus non daretur. Kant’s sapere 
aude has failed. Now Europe must listen once again to the wellsprings of humanity and try 
the opposite: quaerere Deum, seek the truth, ‘truth, which does not impose itself by violence, 
but rather “by the force of its own truth”: the Truth which is God.’18   
 
                                                             
15 Truth and Tolerance, p.145. ‘Christianity only opens up in the experiment of going along with others; and as a 
whole, it can only be grasped as a historical path.’ 
16 Christian Morality, p.64. 
17 Many Religions, One Covenant, p.110. 
18 Apostolic Journey to Lebanon. Ratzinger is quoting here from Dignitatis Humanae, para.1.  
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